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Political obligation is one of the “big problems” in political theory, one that 
has elicited concerns for the better part of 20 centuries.1   Though it would be a 
mistake to assert that throughout this expanse of time everyone from Plato to 
Simmons has understood it in the same way, since historical circumstances, previous 
ideological commitments, social backgrounds, current societal issues, l’esprit du 
temps all heavily influence perspectives on the requirement to obey, a common 
denominator in the many writings dealing with the relationship between citizens and 
their institutions is the preoccupation with the source of the supposed duty to comply 
with the law of one’s state. That preoccupation survives to this day, secular 
experience having proven it easier to start from an assumption of generalized 
obedience, as practice does, than to vindicate the existence of a particularized moral 
requirement to obey, as is the aim of moral philosophy.  
Much of social and political discourse is centred on this strong conviction that 
citizens have duties to their countries of birth that others, including those that reside 
within the jurisdiction but do not hold full citizen status, do not. In scholarship, many 
pages have been devoted to the meaning and content of citizenship, and to the 
functions, duties or rights associated with it. Yet its main content – that alleged moral 
requirement to abide by the state’s directives – remains conjectural. Plenty of 
compelling reasons, from considerations of utility to considerations of justness and 
morally superior outcomes, can be produced as to why obedience towards the law is, 
preferable to disobedience; and plenty of reasons why the familiar state is an 
arrangement superior to all other existing or possible sets of circumstance can be 
summoned. These abundant motives however have not amounted, either individually 
or as parts of larger constructions, to an explanation as to why a particular set of 
institutions can use the law to change the normative status of those in its jurisdiction 
by dictating, sanctioning, forbidding and controlling their behaviours. “Authorities”, 
as we know and understand them, have not therefore been shown to be in possession 
                                                        
1 The term “political obligation appears in the literature in 19th century. Thomas Hill Green was the 
first to use it in a lecture considering its sources. He defined it as including “both the obligation of the 
subject towards the sovereign, of the citizen towards the state, and the obligations of individuals to 
each other as enforced by a political superior”. His intended goal was “to discover the true ground or 
justification for obedience to law”. See T. H. Green, Lectures on the Principles of Political Obligation 
and Other Writings, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1999, p. 13, p. 14.  
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of a right to our obedience.  Paradoxically, the more political theory has sought to add 
to this pool of compelling reasons, the more apparent it has become that perhaps the 
best we can aspire to are more modest arguments for authority that settle citizens with 
duties that mimic, but do not mirror in intensity, generality, permanency, or solidity, 
the political obligations so readily ascribed to them. Thus, while we can attribute 
some authority to our states and, on some readings, even some measure of legitimacy, 
that full right to command interconnected to an obligation to obey from which there is 
no immunity and no derogation escapes us.  
Of course, political obligation is not claimed to be the exhaustive content of 
citizenship nor is it opined that the absence of a generalized moral requirement to 
obey equates to the absence of any measure of justified compliance, or to a wide-
ranging permission to disobey. There is wide acknowledgement that non-obligated 
citizens can, and will, have duties towards specific laws, specific co-members, 
specific institutions at specific times; piecemeal duties are possible and will arise. 
These lesser duties will not, however, confirm the state as a morally legitimate 
authority, or entrust it with a power-right over citizens, or show that whatever 
commands it issues in the public domain are, in and of themselves, normative 
requirements that function as sufficient reasons for action. In other words, they will 
not ascertain a special relationship between state and citizen as one between rightful 
authority and an individual bound to obedience. It is this special relationship  that is 
the “bread and butter” of theorists of political obligation, with the bulk of their efforts 
narrowing down to attempts to vindicate the idea that there is something exceptional 
enough about citizens and their actions, or states and their actions, or the way they 
interact with each other to create and sustain it. “Why them” and “why obedience” are 
thus the two main questions concerning the problem of political obligation and what 
justification- the term used to describe all efforts to vindicate the moral requirement to 
obey-seeks to resolve. 
 
In spite of the lengthy period political philosophy has dedicated to considering 
the requirement to obey, comparatively few opinions have been embraced to the point 
of becoming axiomatic beliefs about political obligation. Broad agreement has been 
reached only on a series of general assumptions about the concept itself, and a list of 
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features an appropriate account of it should theoretically meet.2 These first have come 
to be considered largely incontestable, and thus act as the building blocks upon which 
existing theories rest and of which all future theories will have to be mindful.   
To begin with, although the moral requirement to obey the law is “political 
obligation” not all justifications of it need be as straightforward political obligation; 
some are natural duties accounts. This is the result of a theoretical distinction, 
semantics and a change in the thought on political obligations occurring post Rawls. 
The theoretical distinction is the one between “obligations” and “duties”. Although 
orthodox political thought rarely engages in discussions on the two concepts – insofar 
as they are used interchangeably, both are moral requirements and not much is to be 
gained from such a discussion – there are some, important, ways in which they are not 
synonymous.3 Firstly, duties entail a connection with “motives and dispositions” that 
obligations do not have.  As Green and Brandt explain, a moral duty is a duty to act in 
a specific manner when prompted by certain “motives and dispositions”.4 In contrast, 
an obligation is simply an act an individual must either do or abstain from, this act 
being compulsory independently of the reasons he may have for or against 
discharging it. In other words, duties rely on a foundation of values, opinions, moral 
judgements and prompts, whereas obligations are prima facie categorical, ignorant of 
and immune to the above, having to be performed not because they are indicated by 
wants, moral compasses or evaluations but simply because they have been voluntarily 
assumed, or because they are the commands of bodies morally sanctioned to issue 
such commands. The inclinations and primary reasons/motives of purported agents 
are relevant for the former but not for the latter. The distinction becomes quite clear 
when considering political obligation: in its case obedience towards the law is 
mandatory regardless of any and all other reasons individuals may come up with to 
support or reject the decision to discharge it, including strong opinions that obedience 
is the right/correct/moral/useful thing to do, fear of punishments or habit. As with any 
other obligation, political obligation thus binds external acts (acts towards the state, 
towards other citizens) irrespective of any anterior or ulterior considerations. 
                                                        
2 The latter are the subject of chapter I.  
3 My view on duties vs. obligations is paradigmatic. Rawls, Hart, Green, Brandt, Simmons, Klosko, 
etc. all hold the same view, although Brandt’s  “The Concepts of Obligation and Duty” remains the 
most detailed expression of this view.  
4 T.H.Green, Lectures on the Principles of Political Obligation and Other Writings, p. 17. 
 6 
  Secondly, duties are not as conclusive a reason to action as obligations are. 
Identifying subject “X” as being obligated to Y is to say that X must Y and only Y, or 
else. Conversely, moral duties do not compel the individual to act in certain way, 
being guidelines for personal and public behaviours, not directives. No punishments 
similar to those afferent to trespasses against obligations are attached to them. 
Failures to help the poor, to tell the truth, to participate in rescue operations, etc. are 
not offences in the same sense as a failure to discharge obedience and therefore are 
not under the same regime of sanctions and reprimands. Thus, although we may have 
good and strong reasons to satisfy some particular moral duty, we are not compelled 
to do so in the same almost inescapable sense that we are obligated to obey the law: 
that something is law is reason enough to act in consequence and it is not the sort of 
reason that suffers evaluation, contestation or a choice of inaction outside of 
extraordinary circumstances. In specific jargon, while the contents of obligations are 
peremptory and authoritative, the contents of duties are merely pre-emptive. This 
holds even in the case of “heavy” duties (prohibitions on murder, rape, theft, etc.) that 
appear categorical and conclusive: it is not their heavy moral content that passes some 
imagined threshold into legal and moral obligation, it is that it so happens that 
lawmakers have deemed it necessary to positivise their content into a legal rule. 5 As 
such we must not kill not because God demands that we do not or because that 
prohibition is part of our moral code but, first and foremost, because law demands 
that we do not. Law and political obligation are thus, as known, about musts while 
moral principles and duties are about oughts.  
Finally, duties and obligations differ significantly in their scopes. Moral duties 
are duties that apply to humans qua humans independently of their age, citizenship, 
gender, religion, race, class, education, etc. In contrast, obligations, particularly 
political obligations, have a special nature: they belong to certain classes of 
individuals, in certain places, at certain times and have clear starting points that 
separate the life of an individual into “before” and “after”. Ensuing to this diversity, 
to their being ulterior to actual birth, and to their special nature, obligations are not 
seen as having a moral charge equal to that attendant on moral duties. 6  In 
                                                        
5 “Positivisation” is the term I use to describe law-making on the basis of moral principles, i.e. law 
making that translates moral norms into legal rules. 
6 Some discover a category of “special duties” halfway between typical natural duties described above 
and obligations. These duties are special insofar as they are non-voluntarily assumed, like classic 
duties, but hold only between special classes/groups of individuals, identically to obligations. They are 
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consequence, moral and political theories afford the latter regulatory capacity: 
whatever the obligations individuals assume or are charged with, they must not 
confront moral duties. Otherwise the possibility of being overridden arises and the 
individual may be freed of the imperative to perform them.7  
This is the short and uncomplicated story of duties versus obligations. Practice 
however looks somewhat different, both because of a semantic issue and because of 
the Rawls-provoked change in the thought on political obligations mentioned before. 
The lexical exhaustion brought about by the overuse of the word “obligations” in texts 
on obedience, and the fact that the dictionary allows the terms to be used 
interchangeably encouraged the usage of both to describe the requirement to obey, 
even if conceptual differentiations technically did not allow for it. In the earlier days 
of voluntary explanations of obedience this was entirely unproblematic, as all 
understood that whenever the term “duty” was used, it was a consequence of paucity 
in jargon, not a re-evaluation of the prerequisite of obedience. Once Rawls elaborated 
on his natural duty of justice as something requiring compliance with the just 
applicable institutions however – thus effectively making the moral requirement to 
obey the one way to discharge a duty people have [supposedly] qua humans –  
confusion, or at least the possibility of it appeared. Rawls was very judicious in his 
handling of terms: he differentiated between the moral requirement to obey upon 
which the satisfaction of the natural duty of justice is predicated, and the political 
obligations some individuals have voluntarily acquired; they were identical, but they 
had different sources. His followers, however, did not embrace this dichotomy. Still, 
they cannot be said to have abandoned the theoretical distinction. For them, duty vs. 
obligation was not a question of differences in perspectives about concepts but one of 
justificatory strategy, asymptomatic as far as actual understandings were concerned. 
What sets natural duty accounts apart, therefore, is not some alternative opinion on 
meaning, but a practice of considering obedience to be the particularized conduit to 
the satisfaction of a superior duty, which departs from the standard view of political 
obligation as an end in itself. As such, both political obligation and natural duty 
justifications settle citizens with the requirement to obey, the only difference being 
                                                                                                                                                              
the finds of associativists and communitarians (partially) preoccupied with making morally justifiable 
claims about what citizens owe each other in the political-legal sense. 
7 For differences between duties and obligations also see R.B. Brandt, “The Concepts of Obligation and 
Duty”, Mind, Vol. 73, No. 291, 1964, pp. 374-393 and H. Beran, “Ought, Obligation and Duty”, 
Australasian Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 50, No.3, 1972, pp. 207-221.   
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that the latter presupposes a degree of separation that is not discoverable in earlier 
strategies. Neither this gap nor any other of the dissimilarities mentioned above are in 
and of themselves, however, an advantage or an obstacle to these justifications; their 
success or failure is not in any way contingent on conceptualizations, but on their 
ability to meet the standards and requirements to be listed in chapter I. What is most 
pertinent in this discussion then is that obligations – including the one that specifically 
concerns us – are conceptually predicated on the satisfaction of four conditions: a) 
political obligation needs be brought about by something, it cannot be considered a 
“natural state”, b) political obligations need to be owed by specific people to specific 
people, c) a right has to be generated against the obligees and d) the root of obligation 
needs to be the act/event/transaction/ “x” itself, not its nature or effects, meaning that 
an act’s being morally permissible or morally unobjectionable or a source of morally 
superior consequences cannot and should not be considered the ground.8 Outside of 
these political obligation is fool’s gold. 
The second important postulation about political obligation is that justifying 
the moral requirement to obey means establishing authority as legitimate in the fullest 
sense. Discussions on the precise meaning of “justification” are conspicuously absent 
from the texts of those that deal with accounts of political obligation. The term is 
taken at face-value and defined in pure dictionary terms: when one justifies political 
obligations, one accounts/ validates why citizens must obey the rules of their states. In 
“Justification and Legitimacy” however Simmons explains what justification must 
mean.9 He argues that accounting for authority correlated to an obligation to obey 
amounts to more than showing the state to be morally acceptable, necessary and 
preferable to all other socio-political arrangements that stop short of requiring 
obedience from members. Justifying political obligation therefore imposes a 
demonstration that there is a special moral relationship between the state and its 
citizens, one in which the former has the right to the uniform compliance of the latter. 
Simmons contrasts this Lockean interpretation of the demands of justification 
with the incorrect Weberian strategy that approaches legitimacy as something 
predicated upon popular attitudes towards governments, and the Kantian one that 
                                                        
8  Also see A.J. Simmons, Moral Principles and Political Obligation, Princeton University Press, 
Princeton, 1979, pp. 11-12. The first condition, which for him necessarily grounded obligation in the 
performance or “omission” of an act has been adapted to reflect the now more common belief that 
political obligation can have non-voluntary sources.  
9 A.J. Simmons, “Justification and Legitimacy”, A.J. Simmons, Justification and Legitimacy: Essays 
on Rights and Obligations, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2001, pp. 122-158.  
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aims to demonstrate that an already present and inescapable state is something 
reasonable people trapped under its authority would obey. Scholars of political 
obligation have almost uniformly adopted the first, as made evident by their efforts to 
argue for political obligation as a morally correct connection between the inhabitants 
of a jurisdiction and the particular institutions that are held to apply to them that is 
unique in the sense that no other set of citizens or set of authorities have a hold on that 
specific group that is identical or comparable. This is not necessarily evidence of 
some underlying adherence to Lockean thought but of awareness of the justificatory 
mark for political obligation and what can constitute sufficient evidence for it. While 
common sense discourages the Weberian one (no one examined here aims to make 
legitimate authority and political obligation contingent on popular opinions), the 
Kantian interpretation has, however, in some instances, caused issues, insofar as it has 
facilitated confusions between the threshold for justifications of political authority, 
and the threshold for political obligation, which is higher. Kantian views on 
justification – which are married with equally Kantian opinions that states play a 
determinant role to our elementary rights and duties, that there is a duty of state entry, 
and that justice is the exclusive ability of the state – are, as we shall see, perhaps 
sufficient when the goal is to show that well-performing states are entitled to 
piecemeal compliance, but not when the target is the vindication of a moral 
requirement. So for the purposes here, including future ones and ours, justification is 
at all times to be taken to presuppose what Simmons describes, i.e. a demonstration 
that political obligation is a morally correct special relationship between a group of 
citizens and their authorities.   
The third important opinion on political obligation is that it necessarily implies 
authority and legitimacy, but neither authority nor legitimacy necessarily bring it 
about or entail it. In modern political thought on obedience, the moral requirement to 
obey has been predominantly thought to be correlative to legitimate political 
authority, meaning that any state in possession of a right to obedience settles its 
citizens with an obligation to obey, and all citizens such burdened with obedience 
necessarily live under the thumb of a legitimate authority in possession of a morally 
justified right against them (henceforth the correlativity thesis). Although this is the 
most orthodox opinion on the perfect relationship between legitimacy, authority and 
political obligation, the chronic inability to vindicate the existence of a generalized 
duty of obedience has led to a shift in perspectives on the relationship between 
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political obligation-political authority-legitimacy and to the opinion that the three are 
divorceable, in the sense that the former’s absence would not inevitably mean the 
disappearance of authority and, rarely, of legitimacy.  
Political authority, that species of authority describing the relationship 
between states and citizens (or citizens and citizens, on a horizontal view), splits into 
categories according to nature, claims and justifications. Separation is most often 
rooted in whether or not said relationship is normative or descriptive. Along this line, 
practical authority is subsequently to be contrasted with theoretical authority, de facto 
authority with de jure authority, authority that claims with authority that is and so on. 
In this taxonomy, political authority of the kind we actually experience is deemed to 
be an instantiation of the former, de facto, practical authority, that claims and behaves 
rather than authentically is; and this could come to correlate with an obligation to 
obey on the side of citizens if properly legitimized (by which I mean shown to be in 
possession of a right, justified in the Lockean sense) but, as of now, it correlates with 
piecemeal acts of obedience or even with a weak duty of non-interference.10 Political 
authority as an ability to impose political obligation, and political authority as an 
ability to issue authoritative commands, are therefore different, with authorities who 
can only do the latter subsequently not being denied some entitlement to compliance, 
but under the caveat that their citizens are obviously not bearers of an obligation to 
obey but mere subjects of reasonable, intelligible imposition that cannot be upgraded 
to political obligation on merit, justice, fairness, democratic practice based 
considerations or other findings of “worthiness”. As for legitimacy, it remains truly, 
first and foremost a property of “true”, de jure authorities in possession of rights 
against their citizens, although some scholars are ready not to exclude lesser, de facto 
authorities, from the category.11  
In more concrete terms, obedience became a discussion on two levels. On the 
one hand there were the classical scholars of political obligation – Simmons, Klosko, 
Horton, Green, Smith, etc. – who continued to embrace the correlativity thesis and 
                                                        
10 C. Morris, An Essay on the Modern State, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1998. 
11 William Edmondson holds political legitimacy to be a property of any state that sincerely claims it 
even if then manages only to impose a duty to abide by its directives when it applies laws in particular 
cases (Three Anarchical Fallacies, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1998, p. 39); his 
legitimacy does not presuppose political obligation but a weaker duty to cooperate in a state’s efforts to 
resolve disputes. Lefkowitz, on the other hand, views legitimacy as the property of a state that can 
impose something as weak as a duty of non-interference. Finally Estlund (2007) believes democratic 
decision-making procedures are sufficient for legitimacy.  
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held genuinely legitimate authorities to be only those capable and allowed to impose 
an obligation to obey. 12  When unable to discover a proper justification for that 
requirement to obey, they advocated philosophical anarchism, a position that deemed 
states to be illegitimate but held people to owe obedience as the content of other sets 
of obligations and duties. Others, however – such as Raz, Estlund, Kantian 
functionalists such as Stilz or Waldron, and defenders of democratic regimes – were 
inclined to distinguish between fully legitimate authorities and authorities not 
correlating with a generalized duty to obey but still capable of imposing obedience in 
a fashion that could mimic the permanency and coherence of the moral requirement.13 
These are scholars who discovered real states to make understandable, correct claims 
to authority, who deserve obedience and who, when disobeyed, are unjustifiably 
wounded in a claim they have against citizens. These states are political formations 
who have earned submission, by exhibiting some redeeming ability or quality, either 
by performing their political exercises in a fair, inclusive, democratic fashion, or by 
ensuring better compliance with applicable reasons when people obey because of the 
secondary, content-independent reasons they provide; they may not be in possession 
of a right to obedience, but their commands can and do make piecemeal acts of 
compliance morally required. Thus, they have political authority, just not political 
authority corresponding to obligation, that perfect species of de jure authority. 
The accounts these scholars construct reflect these perspectives. While 
scholars of political obligation treat justification as the answer to a metaphysical 
question about the circumscription of natural autonomies, accounts of political 
authority are much more defensive constructions, insofar as their efforts do not 
explain how people have found themselves in a situation in which they are settled 
with a duty to obey, but rather observe that they obey and are expected to do so and 
seek to show that the states on the receiving end of this obedience are entitled to it in 
a way that approximates to the ideal of authority and legitimacy. Of course, in 
practice, this differentiation between scholars of political obligation and theorists of 
political authority is not as clear-cut, with many straddling the line. Raz, for example, 
thinks political obligation to be realizable only in a voluntarist universe, and thus 
                                                        
12  Leslie Green explains the correlativity thesis to be a normative statement that one is either a 
normative condition or the normative consequence of the other and therefore full of justificatory force.  
See L. Green, The Authority of Law, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1988, p. 236.  
13 “Kantian functionalists” is a terminology I borrow from Simmons (Boundaries of Authority) who, in 
his turn, borrows it from Stilz; it is a general term designating those who tie authority to the well-
functioning of the state and who generally have clear Kantian allegiances.  
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embraces philosophical anarchism, but at the same time marshals his normal 
justification thesis as a thesis of authority.14  In his work the absence of political 
obligations entails the absence neither of authority (effective authority) nor of 
obedience; the same could not be said about Simmons or Green, however, even 
though they start from some of the assumptions. Others, “dip their toes” into both 
aspects: Christiano writes about a natural duty for respect as a vindication of political 
obligation and about the majoritarian, inclusive principles of democratic assemblies as 
a justification for political authority; otherwise, Estlund elaborates on normative 
consent as an argument for the moral requirement to obey and about democratic 
practices as a source of legitimacy; Stilz aims for political obligation but arguably 
moves no further than authority; and Wellman considers legitimacy to be the feature 
of an inferior state with a liberty-right to enforce and a claim-right to non-interference 
but not a power-right to create reasons.15 Variations are therefore abundant.  
I do not embrace the correlativity thesis (as a statement about the impossibility 
of political authority without political obligation), not because there is something 
inherently objectionable about it but because it is an exaggerated opinion as far as the 
relationship between political obligation- legitimacy/authority/legitimate authority is 
concerned. The case has been convincingly made that the inability to account for 
political obligation does not exclude the possibility of justifiable authority (or, at the 
very least, of authority justified in its demands). In these conditions, while my 
account of political obligation brings about de jure authority that is legitimate in the 
fullest sense, I do not deny that morally correct arguments can be made in favour of 
obedience towards lesser, de facto authority. Then, by “de jure, legitimate authority” I 
mean authority morally justified in issuing commands to citizens politically obligated 
to comply with those commands simply because they are its commands. Conversely, 
de facto authority is authority not corresponding to political obligation and blanket 
compliance, but authority rendered with an entitlement to piecemeal acts of obedience 
                                                        
14“….the normal way to establish that a person has authority over another person involves showing that 
the alleged subject is likely better to comply with reasons which apply to him (other than the alleged 
authoritative directives) if he accepts the directives of the alleged authority as authoritatively binding 
and tries to follow them, rather than by trying to follow the reasons which apply to him directly.” See J. 
Raz, The Morality of Freedom, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1986, p. 53., pp.54-56.  
15 This view is discoverable in: C. Wellman, “Liberalism, Samaritanism, and Political Legitimacy,” 
Philosophy and Public Affairs, Vol.25, No.3, 1996, pp.211–237; W. Edmundson, Three Anarchical 
Fallacies, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1998; A. Buchanan, “Legitimacy and Democracy,” 




by one of its features, functions or structure. The first, as Rawls explained, can change 
the normative situation of individuals; the second orbits around sums of justifiable 
demands. Finally, as far as legitimacy is concerned, I consider it a true property only 
of authority corresponding to political obligation (legitimacy in the full sense), but I 
do not reject describing de facto authorities’ claims as legitimizable in Simmons’ 
Kantian sense (limited legitimacy). Legitimacy without either authority or political 
obligation seems to me however both useless and unintelligible.  
What is most important, however, when admitting that political obligation 
implies legitimate authority, but that authority does not necessarily imply it, is 
keeping in mind the threshold for proper justification. Political obligation is justified 
only when it is shown to be the content of a right that a state - that is legitimate in the 
full sense- holds against the citizens of its jurisdiction, who then have to surrender all 
judgment for the only and sufficient reason that the state is the source of commands. 
For those that do not endorse the correlativity thesis it is important to remember that 
the good, correct reasons they may invoke in defence of authority do not in 
themselves make for adequate sources of a moral requirement to obey.  
 
Types of Justifications of the Moral Requirement to Obey 
the Law 
 
Scholars navigate the perimeter delineated by purpose and commonalities in 
opinions about political obligation in ways that allow for the discovery of trends. 
Based on the relationship they choose to entertain with voluntarism, and on the 
element of the explanations they elect to emphasize, the theories proposed so far 
organize into distinctive schools. According to how they position themselves vis-à-vis 
voluntarism, three kinds of accounts can be identified: voluntary accounts, non-
voluntary accounts, and minimally voluntary ones – whose commitment to 
voluntarism is more verbal than actual. 
Of the three, voluntary justifications are by far the most significant, both in 
historical and theoretical terms. These types of justifications of political obligation 
hold, as the name suggests, that the obligation to obey can be traced back to a single 
intentional act through which the individual has knowingly and deliberately expressed 
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his desire to be bound. In this category fall the social contract and consent theories of 
political obligation, and the principle of fairness account in its Rawlsian formulation. 
Theoreticians of political obligation consider voluntary accounts of obligation to be 
most appealing, as they are in tune with the orthodox opinion that dictates that 
obligations, of whichever kind, should be the direct consequences of intentional acts 
performed by cognizant, rational, intelligent adults. Unfortunately however, they also 
believe these accounts to have failed to meet their justificatory ends, the type of 
deliberate actions they endorse as sources of obligations being impossible to discover 
in real life. For some, the failure of voluntarism coincided with the end of political 
obligation tout court, insofar as they considered will to be the only authentic source of 
moral duties; these are the scholars that more often than not embraced philosophical 
anarchism, an opinion on obedience to which the entire architecture of modern 
thought on obligation can be considered as representing a response.  
Minimally-voluntary justifications are typically subsumed within the first, 
although they clearly exhibit less practical commitment to voluntarism than their 
predecessors. I suggest a separation because, in spite of the expressed adhesion, the 
ground of political obligation is of dubitable voluntary nature. There is a systemic 
fault in these accounts – their consent does not exhibit sufficient intentionality 
genuinely to act as the authentic source of political obligation. This fault results from 
decision to alter the concept of consent in hope that would dismiss previous issues 
arising from inconsistency with reality, on the idea that whatever consent loses in the 
process can be made up for with a supplementary argument from something else. 
What they fail to realize is that when consent loses its ability to carry the normative 
burden on its own, the account degenerates, usually into whatever the supporting 
contention dictates. Novel forms of tacit consent (residence, voting) belong here. 
Finally, non-voluntary justifications are more modern answers to the failure of 
the first to be reconciled with reality. In contrast to voluntary and minimally voluntary 
justifications, these explanations of political obligation do not seek to identify any 
premeditated acts leading to it. Instead, they focus on a special feature of the state or 
citizens, or on an actual relationship between the two that they consider to hold 
special status. Associative theories, which derive justification from the attachments 
citizens have towards their communities and the allegedly powerful meanings and 
consequences of membership, belong to this group. In this category I also include 
Klosko’s principle of fairness. Although his account is transactional, usually held to 
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be synonymous with voluntarism, to his mind the allegedly indispensable nature of 
the benefits provided by the state are enough to generate an obligation to obey, even if 
the recipients of the goods are unaware that those benefits are the result of 
cooperation, or that taking these goods will result in them becoming bound to their 
distributor. The most significant theories in this section are nevertheless natural duty 
accounts, which use arguments from the just character of institutions, from the 
equitable provision of freedom, from respect, from procedures, etc. to meet their goal.   
As mentioned previously, in and of itself the choice between voluntarism and 
non-voluntarism is not a predictor or indicator of success; at most, it is a marker of the 
theoretical and methodological challenges proponents will face. What is more 
important than the rapport entertained with will is the element justification elects to 
emphasize as the actual source of the duty to obey, element that needs to be shown to 
be sufficiently normatively charged to sustain political obligation. Based on this 
second differentiation accounts fall along the following lines: 
 
• Action-centred accounts: these emphasize supposedly performed acts. In 
classic consent theory that act is the deliberate express or tacit consent through 
which one conveys one’s desire to become a part of the community. In 
reformist consent theory the act can be a decision to continue to reside in the 
country of one’s birth or a decision to vote. Hypothetical consent accounts 
distance themselves from claims of actuality, instead marshalling contentions 
that the acts can be assumed to have been performed or would be performed, 
in certain conditions. Finally, in the Rawlsian principle of fairness account, 
such act is a voluntary acceptance of cooperative benefits.  
• Status-centred accounts: these are accounts that stress the important status of 
citizens, and the rights and duties that flow from this privileged position. 
Associative justifications derive political obligation from this sort of 
argument.  
• Benefit-centred accounts: they concentrate on the many goods states provide 
us with or on the indispensability of state-delivered goods to living an 
“acceptable life”. Political obligation is consequently seen as either a debt of 
gratitude (gratitude theories) or as the fair cooperative repayment for 
benefaction (Klosko’s principle of fairness).  
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• Duty-centred accounts: Accounts that hold obedience to be the way to fulfil 
the requirements of a duty (justice, samaritanism, etc.), or consider it to be 
proper reciprocation for some well-performed function or an instantiation of 
respect for the interests and opinions of others fall here.  
• Multiple grounds accounts: these are the least popular accounts of political 
obligation. They are a product of the past few years, having appeared as a 
response to the inability of scholarship to defend single-ground explanations 
of the types described above. Some have responded to this inability by 
delivering hybrid theories that blend two or more explanations (arguably 
Gilbert, though she insists on her associativist credentials). Others observe 
both this failure and the fact that citizens interact, position and respond 
differently to law and consequently maintain that, given these, a pluralistic 
approach makes sense (Klosko 2005, Knowles 2010). These latter 
justifications build on the idea that there is nothing inherently objectionable 
about believing that, within the same state, political obligation can have 
different sources. Accordingly, their proponents contend that in state X some 
citizens will be bound because they have consented while others will be so 
because they have accepted benefits or because they have genuine affections 
towards their co-citizens and state, and so on. Multiple grounds theories have 
not gathered any momentum or supporters. Although political theory reminds 
scholars of political obligation not to assume that a single ground will be able 
to explain the bound of each and every citizen, the underlying intuition about 
multiple principle accounts is that they are a de facto recognition of defeat in 
the quest to solve the problem of political obligation. The opposition to them 
is therefore largely one “on principle”, although these patch-on arguments are 
not only susceptible to criticisms addressed to composing parts but also to 
aggregate ones as well.16 Thus, as far as the future is concerned, the “big 
problem” is not whether or not argument can be combined into a coherent 
explanation that can navigate misgivings but whether, given the general-case 
nature of political obligation, and the standard opinion that law demands the 
                                                        
16 So, for example, multiple principle accounts that combine elements of principle of fairness with 
natural duties and/or consent will not only fall prey, separately, to all the typical criticisms addressed to 
fairness, natural duties and consent paradigms, but also expose themselves to crippling questions about 
the coherence of arising duties, about their distribution among the citizen body and so on.  
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same of all and all have to respond to it in identical fashion, it makes 
theoretical sense to aim for plurality.   
 
              Given that all these kinds of justifications are held to have failed their 
attempts to achieve justification, it could seem unfair to categorize some as being 
weaker than others. Still, insofar as we can distinguish between theoretical failures 
and failures in practical execution, a hierarchy of sources of normativity is possible. 
In this pyramid, arguments from will obviously occupy the top spot: moral 
philosophy’s opinion of individuals as free agents dictates that their obligations 
should be, optimally, the result of their deliberately performed acts. All others 
compete for a distant second place, with some narrowly rescuing defeat from the jaws 
of victory (Klosko’s principle of fairness) while others can be deconstructed claim by 
claim or are superlatively far-fetched. 
 Their uniform failure is something established here definitively. I hold my 
original contribution to political theory to be two-fold. First, I definitively 
demonstrate that we are at the end of justification of political obligation as we know 
it, insofar as the familiar paradigms purporting to account for the moral requirement 
to obey are precluded from achieving that goal not only by whichever errors and 
inconsistencies are discoverable in each specific instantiation, but also by structural 
flaws that pervade and poison the justificatory strategies themselves; I show that 
extant approaches not only fail but will always necessarily fail, because there is 
something wrong with the underlying logics that guide them.  Secondly, in response 
to these observed failures, I propose an entirely novel justification I hold able to 
survive the charges that have crippled preceding arguments. This ability derives from 
the fact that, instead of focusing on extracting evidences of or from will, transactions, 
horizontal attachments or duties whose content is allegedly obedience, it draws on the 
nature of the so far ignored third element of the special relationship of obedience – the 
law.  
 
Intent and Structure 
 
My argument is directed not only at those that have attempted to vindicate 
political obligation with accounts along the familiar lines, but also at those who 
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propose lower level accounts of political authority without a correlative obligation to 
obey, or who abandon political obligations in favour of philosophical anarchism. The 
first are meant to understand that their strategies are faulty ab initio, in as much as the 
chosen source of normativity is either insufficient, or theoretically sound but 
inconsistent with some aspect of reality or of the mandatory criteria, or a combination 
thereof; they should become aware that not only have they missed the justificatory 
mark, but their persistence in attempting justification through the familiar patterns 
will necessarily continue to yield negative results because of the weakness of the 
chosen ground itself. The second interest me more narrowly as a third option lodged 
between the ideal vindication of the moral requirement to obey bringing about 
legitimate authority, and the capitulation that is philosophical anarchism. They and 
their opinions are of relevance to political obligation mostly as cautionary tales about 
the dangers of (a) misjudging a chosen ground as a sufficiently strong source of 
political obligation when it is only adequate for the lower goalpost of de facto 
political authority, and (b) confusing the requirements of a Lockean justification for a 
Kantian one. Finally, philosophical anarchism is a school of thought we are implicitly 
addressing whenever discussing obligation. As a general opinion on obedience, 
philosophical anarchism is theoretically uninteresting, insofar as its rejection of a 
generalized obligation to obey does not imply a permission to disobey or a denial that 
obedience may routinely be brought about by other factors, ranging from 
considerations of utility to superior moral consequences to applicable duties. I do not 
find philosophical anarchism of the kind most modern political theorists marshal to be 
problematic: it is a tenable conclusion – or at least a posteriori philosophical 
anarchism open to the possibility that obligation may be explained by paradigms other 
than voluntarism is – reached after years of evaluations that have revealed that the 
requirement to obey remains unjustified; rushed perhaps but certainly endorsed by 
evidence. Consequently, I do not stop to isolate its faults, as William Edmundson 
endeavours (Three Anarchical Fallacies) or identify any great merits and lessons, as 
Magda Egoumenides (Philosophical Anarchism) does: a successful defence of 
political obligation automatically entails a rejection of philosophical anarchism, while 
the lessons purportedly provided by it amount to recommendations for thresholds for 
authority, obligation and legitimacy that only express consent could potentially pass 
and that impose adherence to the correlativity thesis; the first is thus unnecessary, the 
second an instance of theoretical purism of the kind that is out of place in this context. 
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Philosophical anarchism therefore makes for a target, but a particularly meek monster 
at the edge of the map.  
The structure of this thesis reflects my intentions. In chapter I I explain what 
kind of right is the one the state is in possession of against its citizens by appealing to 
the classic Hohfeldian typology and to some of Applebaum’s comments. I reject, 
however, the discussion on whether some rights correlate to liabilities rather than 
obligations as an uninteresting and unhelpful instance of splitting hairs: in typical 
moral theory discourse the object of a right against is in a position of duty vis-à-vis 
the right holder, and I adhere to this practice. In the same chapter I I also set the 
criteria justifications must meet, as well as a list of precepts, warnings, standard 
objections and opinions political theorists have to observe when performing this kind 
of effort. Here I borrow significantly from A.J. Simmons, the foremost scholar of 
political obligation, who not only helped shape our common understanding of the 
concept of political obligation but was also instrumental in establishing stepping 
stones and red flags in justification. Others contribute as well, points of theory from 
Klosko, Horton, Knowles and Egoumenides that I have found to hold universally 
being included in the package of prerequisites/observations alongside my own. 
Together they provide methodology in construction and evaluation, and ensure that 
justifications are uniformly held to, and assessed according to, the same set of 
standards. Importantly, they also provide a guideline for future attempts, with new 
proposals having to navigate the perimeter they set up. In simpler terms, in the first 
chapter I set out the rules by which the justification game has to be played, i.e. 
unaffected by dispositions, theoretical inclinations or moods.  
In chapter II, I begin my examination of existing theories with voluntary 
accounts of political obligation.  After opening remarks on Lockean express and tacit 
consent as instantiations of the paradigm that are [by and large] theoretically 
impeccable but undiscoverable as recurring in political life, I focus on modern 
interpretations of the latter. I first show Beran’s tacit consent as residence to not be an 
authentic option in a morally permissible choice situation. Then I examine 
Plamenatz’s tacit consent as voting and find it to be a failed account that confuses the 
giving of consent with the practice of selecting occupants of unjustified authoritative 
positions through ballots, and that is guilty of a faulty logic that considers voting to be 
a creator of obligated citizens rather than part of the collection of rights and duties 
people held to be citizen-role occupants are settled with. Finally, in the closing pages 
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I analyse three versions of hypothetical consent, as provided by Pitkin, Murphy and 
Estlund. I reject the first as an incomplete Kantian thesis of authority that misses the 
justificatory mark for political obligation, the second as a faux argument from consent 
that mixes elements of Rawlsian natural duty with rudiments of Raz’s normal 
justification thesis that genuinely makes no further progress towards political 
obligation than the first, and the third as an exemplary case of what happens when 
intentionality and knowledge are removed from consent – damage that renders the 
concept barely recognizable, let alone capable of sustaining duties of the magnitude of 
political obligation. In the second section of chapter II, I perform the same analysis in 
respect to principle of fairness theories. Hart’s principle is first rejected as an 
incomplete account that settles neither what counts as a cooperative venture nor, most 
importantly, how membership and corresponding obligation are acquired. Rawls’ 
principle is then found to correct some of the original faults – in ways that are 
evocative of his preoccupation with justice – but his argument from acceptance as a 
source of membership, benefaction and obligation, though theoretically sound, is 
shown to be as inconsistent with reality as express consent. The issues with Klosko’s 
principle, however, are not as clear-cut, since this is the best expression of a fairness 
account and most likely the best account tout court. I conclude my analysis of the 
principle of fairness with an assessment of this incarnation. The principle entertains 
no connection with will but that is unproblematic insofar as Klosko explains 
convincingly that his principle falls outside of the voluntary-non-voluntary 
dichotomy. This renunciation of any distinguishable connections with deliberateness 
will nevertheless prove costly even though it solves issues related to membership and 
consistency with reality, since Klosko has to show (and fails to do so) that obedience 
is the only morally unobjectionable form of fair reciprocation. That, accompanied by 
a host of other more (alternative supply) or less significant issues eventually proves to 
be crippling. At the end, I draw the conclusion that no intent-based account will 
provide an appropriate justification: consent that does not verify in reality, or meet its 
elementary features, does not have the normative force to sustain political obligation, 
while principle of fairness reasonings removed from intent are highly unlikely to 
exclude, definitively, forms of reciprocation other than obedience as unfair in a 
morally impermissible sense. These, I conclude, are transactionalism’s systemic 
faults.  
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In chapter III I deal with non-voluntary justifications. Arguably the weaker 
theories, associative accounts of political obligation can be faulted along identical 
lines: a practice of comparing the relationship between citizens with familiar or 
friendship relationships and attempting to extract duty from that, a refusal to consider 
the probability that role obligations are not rooted in the relationship/association as 
such but in the moral principles and corresponding natural duties governing them, a 
practice of awarding attachments normative powers, and a generalized inability to 
construct arguments obviously distinguishable from natural duty accounts. I show all 
these to be problematic by examining the criticism to which they expose their 
proponents. I first assess the conceptual argument, a proto version of the associative 
account that rejected interrogations about political obligation as a failure to 
understand the meaning of citizenship, and hold it to be un-academic and wilfully 
blind to the logical gap between questioning supposed role obligation and questioning 
the role itself. Then I consider Dworkin’s associative account, an argument that, 
amongst other errors, exemplifies associativism’s failure to hold associations to be 
genuinely the root of obligation and not degenerate into alternative accounts. 
Margaret Gilbert’s joint commitment justification and communitarian opinions on 
associativism, obligation, identity formation and normativity are subsequently 
explored: Gilbert is found to commit a series of errors resulting (generally speaking) 
from a proclivity towards confusion, whereas communitarians’ error lies in their 
decision to endorse two theses that contradict our common-sense observations about 
the human psyche and standard moral theory opinions about higher order moral 
principles and their powers. Finally, I argue that John Horton’s account exhibits all 
the defects of the others, apart perhaps from a less manifest tendency towards 
degeneration. I conclude that associativism cannot cope with or free itself from 
accusations of parasitism, confusion or unchecked proclivity towards arguing from 
unsubstantiated assumptions, and that ultimately it cannot thrive as a justification of 
political obligation because a) normativity cannot be extracted from something as 
conjectural, confused, fickle and diluted as attachments for fellow citizens and b) 
because obligations, especially of the strength of political obligation, are not 
justifiable on some Wittgenstein-like argument from the meaning of supposedly 
emotionally charged roles. These beliefs and practices are associativism’s systemic 
faults.  
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The bulk of chapter IV is dedicated to natural duty accounts. Part of the earlier 
wave of responses to the miscarriages of voluntary and non-voluntary accounts of 
political obligation, they follow similar lines, which allows for blanket criticisms. I 
open my counter-argument with an examination of Rawls’s natural duty of justice and 
then follow with an appraisal of Stilz’s natural duty of justice as equal freedom, 
Christiano’s duty of respect and Wellman’s duty of samaritanism (most significant 
justifications in their respective categories) before finding them to be unsound in two 
crippling ways; their inability to show obedience to be the exclusive content of the 
duty, and their inability to secure particularity and, as such, morally sanitize 
restrictions in applications. In this chapter I also briefly engage with Kantian 
functionalists’ accounts of de facto authority, as they often mimic, accompany or 
degenerate from natural duty constructions. Insofar as they are not accounts of 
obligation but specifically of authority without it [political obligation], they are 
uninteresting, but they do serve in showing that arguments from well-performed state 
functions can only take one as far as vindicating piecemeal acts of obedience and thus 
underline the need to properly consider the strength of arguments. I end the chapter by 
holding natural duty accounts to exhibit systemic faults that are unlikely to be 
resolved in a manner that does not morally offend, and suggest that a justification of 
the moral requirement to obey that draws on the moral nature of law may be able to 
eschew the issues discovered previously.  
In the final chapter V I propose a new account of political obligation derived 
from the fact that law provides and regulates moral entitlements and responsibilities 
to citizens it traps into new moral relationships, with itself and each other. I first 
announce that I hold the law to be moral and explain what I mean (and do not mean) 
by this, the core contentions being that, much like us, the law is a moral entity and 
agent, and that its moral status is not conditional on law’s effects and content. Then I 
address the fact that “the law is moral” is a sentence with different meanings in legal 
theory, and defend it against legal theorists that would regard it as a rejection of the 
dominant perspective on law, positivism.17 I follow by defending my claim about the 
                                                        
17 Positivism (legal positivism) is a theory of law that holds all law to be source-based. According to 
them law’s existence and content is determinately entirely by social facts, and not by moral merit. 
H.L.A. Hart, Jules Coleman and J.Raz are among its foremost proponents. In chapter V I explain why 
my statement on the nature of law is not as incompatible with positivism as it would seem to hard-line 
positivists, such as Raz. I find that my view is, in fact, compatible with more moderate positivism but 
acceptance is not something I seek. The political theory of political obligation is not interested in what 
the law is beyond mandatory.   
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nature of law from hard-line positivist opinions that hold it toxic to their credo that all 
law is sourced based, and legality is not conditioned on morality.  I do so by showing 
a) their separability thesis- that holds there are no necessary connections between 
normative system law and normative system morality- is flawed, insofar there are, in 
fact, necessary connections between the two, and b) that holding the law to be moral 
is consistent with imperfect, immoral or amoral laws, and with the opinion that 
legality can be discovered even when the connection to morality is hard to spot. I 
conclude on the statement as being correct, even reconcilable with a less orthodox 
version of positivism, and not committing us to any school of thought on law that may 
fail to pass the test of modernity.  Once done, I argue the law, vindicated as a moral 
agent, is the sort of thing that can be owed moral requirements, and construct a case in 
favour of the idea that law is owed obedience, first in a limited sense as a fellow 
moral agent, and then in the sense of political obligation. I then show that my account 
meets all the conditions set in chapter I, including the authoritativeness condition 
orthodox positivist thought jeopardized by claims that the law is moral. In this 
direction, in the final pages, I insert myself in the debate between exclusive legal 
positivism and the inclusive branch, in order to show that my claims about the moral 
nature of law do not prevent the account from allowing law to retain this feature, and 
perform whatever epistemic functions law may hold. I conclude by recommending the 
study of the law itself as a potential avenue to justified political obligation. 
Some final practical considerations are in order. I use the phrases “political 
obligation”, “moral requirement to obey”, “duty”, “obedience as a right against”, 
“right against”, “compliance in my sense”, “compliance corresponding to a right 
against” to refer to the moral requirement to obey and to the content of the 
moral/political-institutional obligation people have towards their states (sometimes in 
the plural form of political obligations); in chapter IV, where I discuss the difference 
between accounts of the requirement as political obligation and accounts of it as 
natural duty, “political obligation” is in italics. Similarly, I use the term “obedience” 
(or “compliance” or “submission”, here treated as perfectly synonymous) to refer to 
both the content of political obligation and to the consequence of political authority 
without political obligation; context will reveal what I mean, and when discussing 
obedience brought about by lower, de facto, political authority, I will qualify it as 
“piecemeal”, or refer to it as “compliance simple”. I have already explained my views 
on different species of authority and what appear to be degrees of legitimacy, and the 
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relationship between the two concepts and political obligation. Suffice it to add the 
term “authority” simply refers to authority over subjects of political obligation in all 
contexts but those where the topic at hand is the de facto political authority of states 
not in possession of a right against their citizens (context makes it clear). 
Connectedly, as mentioned, I distinguish between “fully legitimate”, “legitimate in 
the fullest sense” or “legitimate in my sense”, by which I mean de jure, legitimate 
political authority corresponding to political obligation, and “legitimizable”,  
“legitimate in the lesser sense” and “legitimate not in my sense” to describe de facto 
authority. Vocabulary wise, I often use “moral wounding/wounds” or “morally 
harmed/harmed” to refer to the fact that a made argument or contention harms a right, 
entitlement or claim an individual or group of individuals has or may have qua 
human(s); “mutilating” is the term I employ to refer to the practice of altering (in 
fashion that chips away at normative strength) concepts. 
Finally, I exclude from analysis gratitude theories, which misjudge the 
relationship between law and citizenry, utilitarian claims, since they run against the 
axiomatic opinion “that which is useful does not create obligations”,18 and multiple 









                                                        
18 Gratitude theories (A.D.M Walker, W.D.Ross) argue as if state-delivered benefits were favours for 
citizens. This is an inaccurate portrayal of benefaction as well as an argument that ignores that favours 
are a two-party affair; states, however, do not single out individuals for favouritism but conduct 
identical relationships with all, as demanded by law that imposes equality and equal treatment. This 
aside, all criticisms made against benefaction accounts count against them as well.  
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Chapter I: Methodological Considerations 
 
 Political Obligation: A Power Right  
  
 In the introduction political obligation was defined simply as a moral 
requirement to obey the law of the states with which citizens are burdened in 
particularized fashion; these citizens are held to be under an institutional duty to 
comply with whatever legal pronunciations their governing institutions issue. This 
brings about interconnected questions about the object of obligation, how it can be 
described and what it can be said to be in possession of. The first is easily resolvable: 
the constrainer is a legitimate authority, defined in the context of politics as a morally 
justified source of authoritative commands receivers have to perform for no other 
reason than their being issued by the applicable authority.19 This hold the authority 
has over the obligated is generally considered to be a Hohfeldian right, a morally 
justified entitlement a party has of another. That said, exactly what kind of Hohfeldian 
right is it?20  
 Undoubtedly it is not a liberty-right. A liberty-right would allow a state no 
more than an ability to enforce law and would create on the side of citizens no more 
than a weak duty of non-interference in the former’s affairs – in other terms, S would 
be at liberty to X and C would be at liberty to do anything except bar, preclude, or 
interfere with S’s X-ing. This contradicts our ordinary way of understanding and 
discussing authorities and their relationship with those they purport to command, as 
well as the way authorities describe themselves. A state in possession of a liberty-
right would be a state whose pronunciations are, by and large, warnings aimed at 
citizens to not get in its way; they would not create reasons for actions, impose any 
duties or bring about any measure of legitimized compliance. On the most charitable 
interpretation, this state would be a glorified administrator.  
                                                        
19 L. Green, The Authority of State, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1988, pp. 41-42.  
20 In Hart’s logic this right is a “moral right” of the kind that exists only in contexts were restraints are 
to be imposed on one’s individual freedom and autonomy, a restriction that requires moral justification. 
Hart explains that whenever a moral right is established an obligation is necessarily established as well, 
and vice versa. See H.L.A. Hart, “Are there any Natural Rights?” in The Philosophical Review, Vol. 
64, No. 2, 1955, pp. 175-191.  
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  The second interpretation of the state’s hold against its citizens is as a 
claim-right. This has been the predominant interpretation of political authority in 
Hohfeldian terms. On this reading S has a claim to C’s X and C has a duty to S to X 
with C therefore being under an obligation that, if not discharged, would bring about a 
breach of duty and thus cause harm to S. This equation appears to be a proper 
translation of the relationship of political obligation as we understand it. It is, 
however, problematic in two ways. First, on accounts in which obedience is the way 
to bring about the satisfaction of some moral principle (fairness) or natural duty it 
would not be obvious that what S has a claim over is unequivocally compliance; 
given that fair, just, respectful, rescuing, etc. behaviours could materialize in forms 
other than obedience, it is not at all clear that S’s claim is to submission specifically. 
Citizens may owe duties of justice or respect or samaritanism and S may have a 
rightful claim to acts that are conducive to their realization, but, insofar as acts other 
than obedience can bring them about, S’s claim could not be to law abidance or to law 
abidance exclusively.  
 Secondly, this interpretation does not fully account for the state’s moral 
pretences. In this category of “moral pretences” are included states’ desires to inflict 
their moral judgments, to regulate citizen behaviours beyond what is stricto senso 
necessary for order and other state delivered services, or to create new, content-
independent reasons for action with an actual moral charge. Political authority as a 
claim-right does not put the “moral” in “moral requirement”, in “moral obligation” 
and, in the case of non-compliance, in “moral wound”; in other words it is not 
obvious that the duty citizens are under, or the reasons they have been provided with, 
have actual moral charge beyond what authorities typically claim about themselves, 
pace Raz. In these conditions, this reading arguably explains legal obligation, but not 
the kind of moral obligation that political obligation is.21 Consequently, authority as a 
claim right is better suited to describe real world contexts devoid of actual 
justifications for the moral requirement to obey, in which states enjoy some imperfect 
measure of legitimacy and can create piecemeal duties but not impose obligations. 
Authority as this type of right is therefore de facto authority with believable, 
                                                        
21 M. Kramer, “Raz, Reasons and Requirements”, Ethics, Vol. 109, No. 2, 1999, pp. 375-407; H.L.A. 
Hart, Essays on Bentham: Jurisprudence and Political Philosophy, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 
1982, chapter 6.  
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intelligible and, in some measure, justifiable claims to citizen obedience but not 
more.22  
 The final interpretation of the right to rule is as a power-right. This is the 
strongest perspective, the holder of a power-right being an entity that can change the 
normative status of an individual by saddling him with moral rights and duties at will, 
an entity that can create conclusive, content-independent reasons for action that apply 
regardless of the balance of reasons, the subjects’ opinions and desires and (to some 
extent) even ulterior moral considerations; correspondingly, a violation of the power-
right is an act of moral aggression that is wrong in the legal sense, immoral in the 
moral sense and, outside of extraordinary circumstances, unjustified.23 The state S 
that has a power right against C is a state that also has immunity from other states S1, 
S2, S3, etc., third parties that cannot intrude in the relationship between it and the 
subjects of its power to alter or obstruct its impositions and claims. A body politic in 
which institutions are in possession of this power-right and immunity is therefore the 
felicitous political community in which genuine political obligation exists and people 
have an incontestable moral obligation to comply. This power-right is then the goal of 
justifications of the kind we are evaluating, with the first two [types of rights] being 
the bar for lesser authority without generalized political obligation arguments.   
In practical terms this attempt to inscribe authority in one of Hohfeld’s boxes 
is neither of great help nor of great hindrance, given that what genuinely matters is 
that, at the end of justification, there are no doubts about particularized law’s 
fulfilment of the authoritativeness condition (people having to do what the law 
demands because it is law that demands it), it is ascertained that the content of 
obligation is surrender, and derogation from compliance is permissible only in rare 
instances when superior moral reasons interfere and annul pro tanto ones. The final 
thing to be mentioned here is that, lately, Applebaum and Perry have opined that, if 
                                                        
22 Raz explained de facto authorities in The Morality of Freedom as authorities that only make claims 
to this status and to legitimacy. J. Raz, The Morality of Freedom, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 
1988, pp. 27-28. William Edmundson thinks legitimate political authorities would fall here but, given 
our inability to vindicate political obligation, actual authorities are in possession of a protected liberty 
right. W. Edmundson, "Legitimate Authority Without Political Obligation", Law and Philosophy, 
Vol.17, No.1, 1998, pp. 43-60. That law makes claim to authority and that these claims are moral in 
nature are, of course, opinions pervasive to legal and political theory. Raz is best known for his ideas 
on law and its claims. See Raz, The Authority of Law, pp. 153-157; Raz, “Hart on Moral Rights and 
Legal Duties”, p. 131; Raz, Practical Reason and Norms, pp. 123-129, pp. 162-177; Raz, Ethics in the 
Public Domain, pp. 317-318. 
23 Raz also describes legitimate authority as a power right in The Authority of Law, Clarendon Press, 
Oxford, pp. 3-33. Authority as a power to “change the normative situation” of the individual is the way 
Raz influentially defined the concept in The Morality of Freedom. 
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the ability to settle citizens with a burden of obedience is best understood as a power 
in Hohfeld’s logic, then this power correlates to a liability, rather than a duty. 
Furthermore, to be liable to be placed under an obligation is not the same as actually 
being under an obligation. 24  While this may be stricto senso true about the 
correspondences imagined by Hohfeld in his typology, it is not a line of argument 
conducive to any solution. As a point of theory, liabilities are not really the objects of 
moral discourse. In this type of discourse bearers of moral requirements are moral 
entities burdened with obligations and duties, according on the manner of 
acquirement. Conversely, it is in legal discourse that the legally obligated are under 
liabilities under which they might –or might not- be put. There is an inescapable 
dimension to obligations that liabilities do not presuppose, or to which, in better 
terms, they do not rise. The failure to discharge the requirements of an obligation in a 
way permitted by the criteria of justified disobedience is undeniably immoral (even if 
only because a right holder was wounded in his claim), whereas the non-performance 
of a responsibility set by a liability is a civil or criminal infraction, but not necessarily 
wrong or immoral.  In other words, breaches of liability are harms under common law 
whereas disobedience is first an immoral, unjustified trespass, and only then an action 
that may presuppose legal sanctions. There is also the added factor of unmet liabilities 
triggering both sanction and remedies whereas disobedience can presuppose sanctions 
but not reparations, immoral actions being the sort of wounds that, once caused, are 
there permanently. Moreover, the requirement to obey the law as a liability robs it of 
some of its assigned moral character, possibly up to a point when legal obligations 
and moral obligations become indistinguishable, not in terms of content but as 
categories of duties. Liabilities, therefore, pertain to more mundane laws of contracts, 
torts, civil wrongs, etc., whereas obligations and duties of the kind with which we are 
concerned belong to the moral domain in which we operate. And, as a final 
consideration, if it were true that power rights trigger liabilities, not duties, and being 
under a liability is not the same as being the bearer of a duty, then what would that 
entail about the problem of the moral requirement to obey the law? Assume here the 
ideal situation of political obligations brought about by express consent. If the power-
right against these consenters does not presuppose a full-on, clearly voluntarily 
                                                        
24 A. I. Applebaum, “Legitimacy without the Duty to Obey,” Philosophy and Public Affairs, Vol. 38, 
2010, pp. 215–239; S. Perry, “Political Authority and Political Obligation”, Faculty Scholarship Paper 
417, available online at http://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/faculty_scholarship/417 
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acquired obligation on the former’s side, then what could settle them with an actual 
requirement to obey? If expressed will can, in the best-case scenario, only produce 
liability, then obligations become fantastic.  
To conclude on this issue, political obligation corresponds to the legitimately 
authoritative state in possession of a power-right against its citizens. Conversely, de 
facto political authority is authority in possession of a claim-right to acts of piecemeal 
obedience. Differentiations in terms of behaviours may be minimal, but moral ones are 
not.  
In the Introduction I stated that there are general features that attempted 
explanations of political obligation must meet. In the following section I list the 
criteria for a proper justification (by which henceforth I mean a justification that settles 
individuals with a conclusive duty to obey and entrusts the state with the Hohfeldian 
power right described above). This list is definitive and holds regardless of 
justificatory strategy, relationship with voluntarism, chosen source of normativity, 
philosophical orientation and so on. Consequent to the [by and large] axiomatic nature 
of the criteria, all evaluations are performed on their basis, and the failure to meet one 
is generally considered to bring about failure altogether. This ensures fairness, 
uniformity and structure in a field of moral theory that stands to benefit from more 
methodological rigour. To this list of prerequisites I also join some general 
recommendations as to the practices, assumptions or ideas justifiers should avoid.  
These are the sorts of things hiding behind a veneer of acceptability or common sense 
that nevertheless reveal themselves to be problematic at best and utterly toxic to 
vindication at worst. If heeded alongside the set of indicated criteria, future efforts of 




The first and most basic feature of a proper account of political obligation is 
generality (C1).25 Generality here ought to be taken to mean near uniformity – a 
justification should ensure that the proposed source of normativity covers nearly all 
those held to have to obey the law of the state, thus vindicating the legal system’s 
                                                        
25 Political obligation is a contentious field, with little collaborative effort; the following lists comprise 
the things scholars of political obligation agree upon, and all the things they should agree upon. 
Together they are the “lessons” of past efforts in this field. 
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claim to impose itself over that specific group of people it legally recognizes as 
belonging to its jurisdiction. This criterion therefore ensures that law and obligation 
are both comprehensive in application, thus making the requirement to obey legal 
rules the “standard case” within a body politic.  Generality has proven to be not much 
of a theoretical issue, as chosen grounds typically cover all legal members of a state, 
but it has been a practical one, as is to be seen in the discussion on voluntary 
accounts.26  
The prerequisite of generality is married with the one of universality (C2). 
Universality is achieved when the chosen source of duty can be found to produce 
political obligation for, broadly speaking, any group of citizens towards all applicable 
laws.27 In practical executions of justification universality is often qualified with a 
caveat that the state must be just, reasonably just or at least reasonable in its treatment 
of citizen in ordered to be allowed to hold a right against them.28 While not erroneous, 
the ideal should continue to be to provide an explanation of political obligation that 
verifies everywhere, including places that fall outside of the perimeter of acceptability 
prescribed by liberalism, with any moral issues arising from this broader inclusion 
being made up by the caveat that citizens should be awarded reasonable access to 
disobedience (C3). This reasonable access translates into a permission to engage in 
civil disobedience and to non-comply in situations when superior moral 
considerations interfere and justify a course of action other than the one identifiable in 
law, or in situations when the state can be shown to act as an aggressor that no longer 
protects and secures lives, liberties and possessions.   
This “reasonable access to disobedience” is evocative of the fourth 
requirement of retaining political obligation’s prima facie nature (C4). Political 
obligation provides citizens with strong but not conclusive reasons for action, i.e. 
reasons to act as indicated in law, without consideration for any individual or tertiary 
reasons for or against said action agents may come up or be provided with, in all cases 
                                                        
26 Generality is a prerequisite for: A.J. Simmons, Moral Principles and Political Obligations, Princeton 
University Press Princeton, 1979, pp. 55-56; G. Klosko, Political Obligations, Oxford University 
Press, Oxford, 2005, p. 10; J. Horton, Political Obligations, Palgrave Macmillan, New York, 2010 p. 
10; D. Lefkowitz, “The Duty to Obey the Law”, Philosophy Compass, Vol. 1, No. 6, pp. 571–598, 
2006, p. 572; M. Egoumenides, Philosophical Anarchism and Political Obligation, Bloomsbury, 
London, 2014, p. 24; and others.  
27 See Lefkowitz, “The Duty to Obey the Law”, p. 572; William Edmundson, “State of the Art: The 
Duty to Obey the Law”, Legal Theory, Vol. 10 No.4, pp. 215–259, 2004, p. 216; Egoumenides, 
Philosophical Anarchism and Political Obligation, p. 24.  
28 As John Rawls famously demands in A Theory of Justice; so does George Klosko in Political 
Obligations, p. 9.  
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except those of the kind described above as allowing for non-compliance. A citizen’s 
moral requirement to obey is therefore not a perfect obligation from which there are 
no morally permissible derogations – it is not absolute, the requirements in law being 
defeated by reasons both mentioned and unmentioned in law.29 Although this may 
seem to conflict with regular views on how citizens do and should interact with the 
domain of law, this prima facie character is advantageous: advocates of political 
obligation can champion a moral requirement to obey the law that is universal and 
permanent without risking brushes with the irrational or the immoral by claiming that 
there are and can be no exceptions to the rule of obedience. Political theorists have 
almost uniformly retained this feature, the only notable departure in speech being 
Joseph Raz’s opinion that legitimate de jure authorities provide exclusionary reasons 
for action, thus exceeding our normal way of speaking and understanding the moral 
requirement as well as our normal way of perceiving the relationship between 
competing moral principles, which awards higher order ones regulative and 
overriding powers, including the one to sanction acts prohibited by law.  
Law and its reasons are the content of another important criterion, which for 
the sake of brevity I call ‘the authoritativeness of law’ (C5)30: a proper account of 
political obligation preserves the authoritative character of law by underlying 
“because the law said so” as the permanent bottom-line reason why citizens perform 
an action prescribed through it. This is achieved, simply, by allowing no gap in the 
theory that is or can be construed as making obedience contingent on a process of 
evaluation (in terms of utility, superior consequences, etc.) or of deliberation; law’s 
reasons must remain content-independent. In other words, law that is genuinely 
authoritative is law whose reasons are not only first order categorical but also second 
order pre-emptive, eliminating the permission to consider and act according to the 
results of consideration. This is not to say that law aims to remove or ban beliefs 
altogether: its authoritativeness is not affected by an agent believing that imposed 
                                                        
29 Classic political obligations scholars such as Simmons and Klosko describe law’s reasons as being 
not conclusive; Raz however uses the language of exclusionary. Assuming “exclusionary” to be the 
superlative of decisiveness I suggest the moral requirement to obey be denied this attribute, rather than 
conclusiveness. Terminology however matters less as long as it is understood that moral duties and 
obligations do not “exhaust the subject matter of morality”, as Simmons puts it (Moral Principles and 
Political Obligations, p. 25), and that political obligation is not an all-things-considered duty, there 
being situations in which it will impose compliance, and situations in which it will be annulled by 
better reasons. 
30 Lefkowitz, “The Duty to Obey the Law”, pp. 572-573; Egoumenides, Philosophical Anarchism and 
Political Obligation, p. 25; Edmundson, “State of the Art: The Duty to Obey the Law”, p. 217.  
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actions are effective, correct, superior etc., as long as the reason for acting in the 
specified way is that the law has commanded it. Law retains this feature in all 
accounts of political obligation that hold citizens must unquestionably, uncritically, 
invariably obey in all scenarios in which their behaviours intersect with the domain of 
law (apart of the exceptional circumstances); the only exception are utilitarian 
accounts, which fall altogether and immediately because of their practice of tying 
compliance to considerations of utility. 
The sixth feature of a correct justification is arguably the most important, and 
also the one must likely to cause issues in situations in which the source of obligation 
is non-voluntary and non-associative-particularity (C6). 31  This fundamental belief 
about political obligation is a common sense one that a moral requirement to obey the 
law can only be owned by specific citizen groups to specific states. This requirement 
has been consistently emphasized since the late 1970s, mostly in response to non-
voluntary accounts of political obligations, at the time principally marshalled by John 
Rawls. Restricting the discharging of political obligations according to existing 
jurisdictions had been a non-issue in clear voluntarist contexts; consent to one’s state, 
benefaction from one’s state, utility in one’s state obviated particularity. That would 
not continue to be the case with non-voluntary justifications, especially natural duty 
ones: when political obligation became the predicate of a natural duty, it 
automatically invited questions about the moral correctness of restrictions through 
borders, the possibility of wounding in exclusion, the permission to opt in or out of 
states and so on. It became clear that while political obligation need not be a special 
relationship arising from transaction, the state still had to be shown to be in a [morally 
unobjectionable] privileged position vis-à-vis the citizens it purported to command. 
Justifications of political obligation need to ensure that obedience reflects the reality 
of compartmentalized authority, particularity being not the sort of thing that can be 
assumed or regarded as a a theoretical luxury. In its absence, best-case scenario a 
successful account will bind some theoretical group of people to a theoretical state but 
every real border will be, for reasons later explained, an instance of potential moral 
aggression. Failure to demonstrate particularity is synonymous with an inability to 
show real world jurisdictions to be morally permissible and justified and thus 
consequently brings about crippling concerns regarding the possibilities of over-
                                                        
31 Uniformly required by all; Simmons, op. cit., pp. 31-35; Klosko, op. cit., p. 12, Egoumenides, op. 
cit., p. 24; Horton, op. cit., p. 10; etc.  
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inclusion/under-inclusion, and exposing every claim to obligation, or absence thereof, 
to counterarguments from moral wounds and aggressions. This must not be taken as 
far as claiming that advocates of political obligation need provide a justification of the 
territorial rights of states; but they must show that existing legal jurisdictions (i.e. 
such as they are, without the need to morally sanitize history) to be morally justified 
in the restricted enforcement they practice. “Because they’re there”, “because they 
were born there” or because “law’s efficient there” do not make for proper -in the 
moral sense-arguments. 
The final two criteria are two common sense demands designed to facilitate 
justification. The first is a Horton-introduced criterion of conformity (C7) that 
stipulates that justifications should not marshal contentions that may come to conflict 
strongly with any of the “features of ordinary thought” (strong intuitions, convictions, 
feelings, attachments, etc.).32 This can be further explained as a requirement not to 
attempt to ground obligation in claims that contradict our empirical observations of 
the real world or experiences, or in a principle that obviously does not encapsulate 
and reflect citizen-state rapports and interactions. The underlying purpose of this 
criterion is thus to keep justifications and their claims realistic, important in a field 
where disconnect from the observable political realities of the world brought about 
the failure of the theoretically perfect consent theory. Simply put, it precludes rooting 
political obligation in statements farfetched, wildly optimistic or pessimistic or 
otherwise inconsistent with practical realities. The final (C8) prerequisite is the 
criterion of non-triviality, designed to discourage punctiliousness and gratuitous 
criticisms questioning political obligation in contexts in which obedience in morally 
insignificant or in which legal considerations should rise but do not, or do and should 
not, and so on.33 This precondition is mostly a reminder that situations in which moral 
arguments for obedience will be hard to gather do not count against political 
obligation as a generally applicable concept. In other words, that moral arguments in 
favour the obligativity and enforceability of the order that bans bringing Polish 
potatoes into Britain may be hard to conjure does not undermine the claim that this 
law is obligatory or the standard case of obligation. Being trivial or insignificant, as a 
law, is not derogation from compliance; and non-enforceability does not signify 
                                                        
32 Horton, Political Obligation, p. 9.  
33 In more concrete terms, this means not drawing any conclusions about the obligativity of law from 
observations that insignificant or out-dated or bizarre laws are sometimes ignored and/or ignored but 
not sanctioned (a classic example is the traffic light in the middle of the desert).  
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derogation, permission to disobey. This being said, issues of triviality do not arise 
and, really, cannot arise, as the authoritativeness condition by and large eliminates 
them on the “because this is what law demands” argument.  
 
The picture these criteria paint of political obligation is the one of an 
institutional duty that holds exclusively but generally over all the legal subjects of a 
jurisdiction who must comply with the authoritative commands of applicable 
institutions independently of any distinguishable or indistinguishable moral merit 
discoverable in the content of law whenever superior moral demands do not sanction 
disobedience. This is not to say, however, that an account meeting all the criteria set 
above is necessarily successful: Klosko’s principle of fairness struggles with none of 
these yet is still uniformly considered to have failed. Equally important to how 
justification is performed is the content of the justificatory opinion.  
One of these pitfalls is improperly estimating the normative strength of the 
chosen ground of obligation (hereby CO1Asufficient-normative-strength). Although, 
again, there is nothing inherently objectionable about arguments from multiple 
sources, a successful account of the moral requirement to obey will marshal a ground 
that is valid for all citizens, so as not to invite any questions of gaps or inconsistency 
and the likes. In spite of justifiers invariably claiming to defend a single ground 
account, there have been occasions where supplementation was required and, equally 
invariably, this resulted in the poisoning of arguments and pretences. The 
consequences of normative additions cannot be minimized or glossed over: first and 
foremost they obviate the fact that the designated ground is incapable of sustaining 
obligation on its own; then they introduce additional [correct] misgivings about 
degeneration [into other paradigms, henceforth CO1Bnon-degeneration 34 ]; and the 
auxiliary claims introduce, in their turn, subsidiary criticisms. It is a vicious circle 
from which there is no escape because, regardless of all else, there is clear proof that 
the chosen ground is inadequate. This automatically vindicates critical arguments that 
either a) the defender is actually marshalling a multi-principle account prioritizing an 
argument that visibly cannot sustain obligation meaning, at the very least, that one 
category of citizens will be absolved from political obligation; b) the proposed 
account is simply an instantiation of another one masquerading as an alternative 
                                                        
34 The term I choose to use to describe an argument’s collapsing/deteriorating into another paradigm. 
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justification; or c) the contended for vindication is theoretically uninteresting insofar 
as other competing explanations organize some [all] of the same claims into neater, 
more direct, better performing arguments. The necessary conclusion for evaluation in 
these situations is then rejection: a proper justification of political obligation rests on a 
unique, clear, non-derivative ground that sources political obligation in a cause and 
effect logic. Further, there is the added consideration that a proper account is a 
straightforward, shortest-route affair, meaning that in situations when supportive 
elements are introduced justifiers need to ascertain that they actually collaborate with 
the designated ground. If they compete, the element that more rapidly and more 
unobjectionably invites considerations of political obligation will “win”, rendering the 
original source useless and thus condemning the account to a diagnostic of 
degeneration. To be clear, the point here is not that theoreticians of political 
obligation should steer clear of multiple principle accounts or that justification is not 
achieved unless the ground justifies the political obligation of literally every citizen, 
but rather that they must ensure the declared ground can actually sustain obligation, 
no matter if for everyone or just a subsection of citizens.   
A second pitfall is discovering sufficient force to change the normative 
situation of an individual in evaluative findings, such as “just” or “delivering of 
justice” (CO2non-foundational-justice/quality).35 The fact that something is just does not in 
and of itself create an obligation to submit. At most, it could provide individuals who 
decide to go along with a moral justification for their wilfully committed acts they can 
however stop at any time without wounding “the just” in a right it may have against 
the agents. The reasons why this is so are the moral, conceptual and logical gaps 
between “should” and “must” and our ordinary way of approaching individuals as 
agents free to occupy positions of moral neutrality and immorality. As for justice, it 
often leads to issues lethal to justificatory efforts when married with Kantian opinions 
that the state is necessary for achieving it or that states are determinant to our basic 
rights and duties. In our context, these issues will prove to be an inability to show that 
the content of a duty of justice (no matter what public conception of it operates in 
situ) is obedience towards the state, and incapacity to establish particularity. In clearer 
terms, the supposed fact that the state is just or necessary for justice does not 
obviously entail that a) people must submit to the requirement of justice, b) people 
                                                        
35 Justice in “CO2non-foundational-justice” can be replaced with any quality.  
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can only fulfil the corresponding duty by obeying the law, exclusively and c) that the 
distribution of justice and alleged corresponding duties distribute along borders in a 
morally permissible way.36 In chapter IV, it will become obvious that proponents of 
such arguments have no answer for the first and the contentions they marshal to 
resolve the second are weak and have great potential to cause moral harm. The 
warning to be heeded here is that it needs to be proven, not assumed, that the 
fulfilment of a duty – any duty – is contingent on compliance and that this duty can be 
narrowed down to match borders. Justified political obligation is incompatible with 
doubts about contents and precise inclusion (CO3precise-districting/inclusion).37  
This latter issue of correct districting is particularly salient because common 
sense so easily misleads into thinking that actual borders make for morally 
unobjectionable compartmentalization of obedience. Theory, however, demands that 
political obligation be defended as a special relationship in which the state has the 
upper hand over specific sets of individuals. This presupposes a proper argument for 
specificity. Specificity (particularity) is not only something that must not be assumed, 
but also something that requires a foundation with sufficient moral charge. Natural 
duty paradigms often believe an argument from birth or proximity to be sufficient. 
Their logic however awards random facts of life excessive moral force: though birth 
may hold some moral meaning it does not obviate the existence of a unique 
relationship with artificial political institutions as powerful, permanent and 
demanding as the moral requirement to obey; moral theory disallows accidents of fate 
having these kind of consequences. Similarly, proximity is a weak argument 
attempting to establish a moral relationship on the basis of literal geographic 
juxtaposition coupled, occasionally, with a claim from efficiency that may be of some 
help when the goal is political authority, but not when aiming for political obligation, 
distance making for an even weaker source of “specialness” than birth. Particularity 
and correct districting/inclusion therefore requires a reason that is sufficient, strong 
and unobjectionable.  
The other condition from precision concerns content, specifically the moral 
requirement to obey the law as being the precise, unique content of a duty, or its 
                                                        
36 Egoumenides captures the spirit of this when she writes that accounts of political obligation must 
show that institutions have to be obeyed “as they require to be obeyed”, Egoumenides, Philosophical 
Anarchism and Political Obligation, p. 25 
37  “Districting” is A.J.Simmons term; he uses to refer to dividing people and territories into 
jurisdictions with precise borders. A.J. Simmons, Boundaries of Authority, Oxford University Press, 
Oxford, 2016, chapter 3. 
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precise, unique predicate. Natural duty accounts- and Klosko’s principle of fairness- 
run into an unfortunate issue of managing to establish that something is owed 
(arguably) by citizens to fellow citizens or overarching institutions, but not that the 
“something” they owe necessarily is political obligation; they assume that justice, 
rescue, fairness are contingent on compliance, not show that they are. And if the space 
between “should comply” and “people owe compliance” is enormous, so is the one 
between “people owe” and “people owe compliance exclusively and specifically”. 
Call this requirement to establish political obligation as the firm content CO4precise-
content. 
Moving on, regarding this special relationship political obligation is morally 
and theoretically thought to be, a routine occurrence in the thought on political 
obligation is basing the power-right against citizens in supposed attachments 
presumed by membership roles within the larger [alleged] associative structure 
commonly referred to as the state (CO5non-generational-assumptions-from-attachments). 
This has proven to be a mistaken policy, attachments being rejected as proper sources 
of obligation on counts that they are unstable, inexistent or arguably confused and 
manipulated, while arguments from roles are rejected as Wittgensteinesque opinions 
blind to the possibility that governing moral principles may play the determinant part 
in engendering afferent duties, and to the logical gap between finding meaning and 
finding sufficient justification for presupposed actions. What this practice has made 
abundantly clear is that attempting to extract political obligations from claims of care 
and comparisons with paradigmatic affective relationships is destined to fail because, 
besides the theoretical faults that are discoverable, the claims themselves are 
unrealistic. These yet again make obvious that maintaining a discernible connection 
with the features of the real world is important in justification: broad, sweeping, 
naïve, or overly pessimistic/optimistic statements about citizens, the state, the 
relationship between them or the context in which they operate are not only not 
helpful, but can contribute decisively to rejection, especially when joined at the hip 
with obfuscating the difference between actual consent-justified entitlements and 
mere practices of going along with the demands of de facto authorities (CO6non-
confusion). Political obligation is not an issue of or resolvable by interpretation. 
Two other issues concerning this special relationship need to be paid attention 
to when attempting to justify the moral requirement to obey the law. Unlike the 
standards discussed above, these tie in the converse issue of “too much” duty. One is 
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a warning not to allow theory to bind so strongly to obedience that concrete 
opportunities for reasonably disobeying or opting out [or proving to have opted out] 
disappear (CO7not-too-much-duty). This has almost uniformly not been an issue, the 
only exception being Klosko’s principle of fairness, who outlines a burden of showing 
that one is not on the receiving end of excludable goods that is so heavy that there is 
ample space to doubt that it could ever be discharged, making his account a 
transactional construction from which one of the parties could not extricate itself 
through methods other than immigration. Klosko’s opinion, however, becomes 
genuinely problematic only when taking into account the larger context, one which 
denied alternative supply in the face of realistic, believable claims that bodies other 
than the states can and do deliver goods required by acceptable lives (CO8accounting-
alternative-supply). This second counterargument from alternative supply affects 
justifications deriving political obligation from the alleged fact of the state being the 
unique source/distributor of things inherently and instrumentally valuable, such as 
public goods and justice. It belongs in that category of problems arising from 
assumptions that are either contradicted by reality or that suffer considerable probing. 
In this latter aspect, claims about justice are particularly vulnerable, given that it is not 
at all obvious that no other arrangement, political or non-political, is or can be 
conducive to it, or that it is obligatory to receive justice from “our” state (whatever 
that may mean), as opposed to from another one, or the most just, or some other 
formation of our own creation; and, as is to be seen, arguments from the provision of 
indispensable goods perform similarly poorly in the face of this crippling charge, 
unable to demonstrate exclusivity either as a fact of life or as the only possibility, and 
therefore unable to alleviate misgivings about the possibility of morally objectionable 
coercion, of variable subjection, and so on.38  
 
 The discussion here draws on broad agreement in academia on what political 
obligation is, and what a justification of it should presuppose – a moral requirement to 
obey the law that corresponds to a state-held right which can only be explained 
through an account that meets the eight criteria set out here and, in the practical 
execution of its demonstrations, (1) avoids rooting obligation in a weak or insufficient 
                                                        
38 The only thing to add here would be not to lose track of the intention behind efforts of justification: 
the goal is to see if we must [theoretically and morally] obey, not whether- on the practical side of life- 
we should continue to comply. Concrete behaviors vis-à-vis practical authorities are not the subject 
here.  
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ground that requires strengthening with ancillary arguments, or (2) relies too heavily 
on assumptions that are unverifiable, go against standard opinions in moral theory, or 
generally contradict empiric observations about political life.  
          In the next chapter I show how transactional accounts – from Lockean tacit 
consent to Klosko’s non-voluntary principle of fairness – fall short of meeting a series 
of the requirements expressed here and consequently miss their justificatory targets.  
My main claim against consent theory is that its original fault of entertaining no 
discernible connection with mundane political realities is gradually transformed into 
issues of erosion and degeneration arising out of the modern practice of mutilating the 
concept by distancing it from its original knowledge-deliberateness-intentionality 
conditions in order to make up for earlier sins. As for the principle of fairness, I show 
that it too replaced an earlier problem of non-conformity with problems of imprecise 
content, alternative supply and arguably even of degeneration. My conclusion is that 
both exhibit structural faults that decisively preclude present and future 
manifestations from vindicating the requirement to obey. In doing this I track how the 
accounts fare in regard to the criteria and conditions mentioned above; a crossed our 






















In the Introduction and the first chapter I have elaborated on the source and 
meaning of the term “political obligation”, described what are the main points of 
agreement on the topic, established a methodology for justification and evaluation by 
setting out the precepts and criteria it ought to meet, explained that this obligation is 
most correctly seen as corresponding to a Hohfeldian power right, set my goal to 
demonstrating that available paradigms are structurally flawed and the consequent 
imperious necessity to discover new sources of normativity, and provided a chapter-
by-chapter summary of the thesis.  
In this chapter I set out to prove that transactional theories of political 
obligations – the heading under which agent-centred consent and principle of fairness 
theories are grouped – fall short of justifying the obligations to obey for a broad class 
of people. I first discuss the core tenets of these theories. Then I start to assess their 
different instantiations with a view towards establishing how they fare vis-a-vis their 
goal. To finish, I draw a general conclusion as to their success. The structure of the 
chapter reflects these intentions. In the opening section I review the consent theory of 
political obligation. After a few brief introductory comments on the fundamental 
features of the concept of consent and on the obvious failures of the express variation, 
I focus on classic Lockean tacit consent. Once I find this to miss the justificatory 
mark (for reasons very similar to those that have led to the collapse of express 
consent) I turn my attention to the two modern versions of “reformist consent”: as 
residence and as voting. My main argument against them is that, in spite of 
appearances, they do not amount to actual consent to becoming bound, as their 
proponents either discover will in contexts moral theory disallows from identifying as 
authentic choice situations, or misinterpret the subject of conveyed desire and are 
consequently incapable of generating political obligation.  Following this, I explain 
that the tools of consent are later employed by hypothetical consent defenders and 
show that they too fail to account for the moral requirement to obey, these accounts 
being sabotaged by an inability to see that consent that does not exhibit its basic 
features is not consent that can sustain political obligation. I draw the preliminary 
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conclusion that consent theory, in any of its guises, can no longer raise any claims to 
having justified the duty to obey of real people, before moving on to part II, which is 
dedicated in its entirety to the principle of fairness. The pattern I follow there is 
identical to the one employed before. I examine all three versions of the principle, 
Hart’s, Rawls and Klosko’s, and find that, though compelling in its second and 
especially third form, it still falls short of explaining political obligation in a way that 
does not conflict with our basic realities or, importantly, shows obedience under 
obligation to be the exclusive content of fair repayments. At the end of the chapter, 
based on the counterarguments formulated against these explanations, I conclude by 




When stripped of the mental experiments of the state of nature and of social 
contract, consent theory remains a model of justification that rests on four pillars. 
First, “man is naturally free”, and thus incapable of acquiring political obligation 
simply by virtue of being born. This conviction is best encapsulated in the following 
quote from Locke’s Second Discourse: 
  
“Men being, as has been said, by nature, all free, equal and independent, no 
one can put out his estate, and subjected to the political power of another, without his 
own consent. The only way whereby any one divests himself of his natural liberty, 
and puts on the bounds of civil society, is by agreeing with other men to join and 
unite into a community for their comfortable, safe and peaceable living one amongst 
another, in a secure enjoyment of their properties….”.39 
 
 Secondly, an individual can divest himself of his natural freedom by “giving a 
clear sign that he desires to do so”.40 Much like the making of a promise, obligation 
can arise out voluntary, intentionally and knowingly made acts that belong to the class 
of performances known (both by their agent and by external observers) to generate 
                                                        
39 J. Locke, Two Treatises of Government, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1988, p. 330.  
40 A.J. Simmons, Moral Principles and Political Obligations, Princeton University Press, Princeton, p. 
64.  
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duties.41 Thirdly, consent protects citizens from their governments by preventing them 
from unintentionally and unknowingly becoming bound to them (irrespective of the 
morally unobjectionable or just nature of those authorities), and by introducing the 
caveat that consent no longer applies when states begin to hurt those who have given 
it to them.42 Finally, consent theory holds that a state that has been consented to is one 
that protects the interests of its citizens, by which is meant that citizens cannot 
become or be held bound to unjust, unfair governments even if they have, past or 
presently, consented. 
  
This list of tenets shapes consent as a performative act that alters the 
normative situation of the individual by generating rights-against him and new moral 
relationships on a purely voluntary basis limited [perhaps] only by the caveat that he 
must not be allowed to will himself worse off.43 Consent theory thus immediately 
reveals itself as a justification with four clear merits: (1) being perfectly in tune with 
the idea that individuals are capable, autonomous beings that must be allowed to 
determine their lives through independent actions and decisions; (2) moulding itself 
on the heavily supported model of promises, thus guaranteeing that obligations are 
always intentionally, voluntarily and knowingly assumed; (3) preventing obligations 
from being inadvertently acquired or imposed;44 and (4) establishing a clear, simple, 
sufficient ground of obligation.45  
That express consent (EC), the open declaration of submission that makes 
“him [the individual] a perfect Member of that Society, a Subject of the Government”, 
fails to account for real political obligation is obvious:46 given that only a minority of 
                                                        
41 The connection with deliberation and intentionality is very important in classical consent theory. See 
H.M. Hurd, “The Moral Magic of Consent”, Legal Theory, Vol.2, pp. 121-146. Richard Flathman 
writes that for consent to happen the consenter must “know what he consents to, intend to consent to it, 
communicate his knowledge of what he is consenting to and his intention to consent to the person to 
whom consent is given”.  R. Flathman, Political Obligations, Atheneum, New York, 1972 p. 220.  
42 Simmons, Moral Principles and Political Obligations, p. 66.  
43 Terminology borrowed from J. Raz, “Authority and Consent”, Virginia Law Review, Vol. 67, No.1, 
1981, pp. 103-131, pp. 120. W. Edmundson also stresses this point. He believes one of the main credits 
of consent theory is its ability to give the law moral power and to close the gap between moral reasons 
and moral requirements, thus making the “consenter morally required to do what she is not 
independently morally required to do”. See W. Edmundson, “Consent and Its Cousins”, Ethics, Vol. 
121, No.2, 2011, pp. 335-353, p. 337. 
44 Carr calls this “the internal ethics of consent”. C. L. Carr, “Tacit Consent”. Public Affairs Quarterly, 
Vol. 4, No.4, 1990, pp. 335-345, p. 338.  
45  See Edmundson, “Consent and Its Cousins”, p.338; Simmons, Moral Principles and Political 
Obligations, p. 69. 
46 Locke, Two Treatises on Government, pp. 347 
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people (comprising those that have been sworn into office, new citizens, and not 
many others) have ever performed such declarations, express consent cannot source a 
duty to obey general enough to allow a discussion on a blanket bind to obedience 
within a state; it fails completely to meet C1generality. In these conditions, express 
consent had to be, and was, set aside in favour of its tacit cousin, examined in the next 
section. This examination will show that tacit consent is capable of sustaining 
political obligation in neither its more honestly Lockean form nor in any of its modern 
ones, precluded from success first by a tenuous connection with the realities of 
political life (C7conformity) and later by more theoretical faults having to do with the 
concept and its features themselves.   
 
• Lockean Tacit Consent (TC) 
 
Locke was not particularly generous in his description of tacit consent. Unlike 
the express consent that clearly removes the declaring individual from the state of 
nature, makes him a member of political society, and binds him to obedience towards 
the government of that particular society, tacit consent has a more subtle nature and, 
as we shall see, more mysterious effects. Quoting Locke: 
 
 “… the difficulty is, what ought to be look’d upon as tacit Consent... And to 
this I say, that every Man, that hath any Possession, or Enjoyment, of any part of the 
Dominions of any Government, doth thereby give his tacit Consent, and is as far forth 
obligated to Obedience to the Laws of the Government, during such Enjoyment, as 
any one under it; whether his Possession of Land...or a Lodging only for a Week; or it 
be barely travelling freely on the Highway; and in Effect, it reaches as far as the very 
being of any one within the Territories of that Government”.47 
 
The simplest reading of this first paragraph is that tacit consent, understood as 
something inhabiting the space between owning property within the confines of the 
                                                        
47 Locke, Two Treatises on Government, pp. 347-348.  
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state and simply living or travelling within its borders, makes one obligated to obey 
local laws for as long as he or she is there.48 Locke later writes, however:  
 
“But submitting to the Laws of any Country, living quietly, and enjoying 
Privileges and Protection under them, makes not a Man a Member of that Society... 
This no more makes a Man a Member of that Society, a perpetual Subject of that 
Commonwealth, than it would make a Man a Subject to another in whose Family he 
found it convenient to abide for some time...Nothing can make a man so [subject of a 
government] but his actually entering into it by positive Engagement, and express 
Promise and Compact”.49  
 
Locke appears to first claim that tacit consent, in the form of possession, 
enjoyment, living, etc., binds one to obedience, albeit temporarily, towards the laws 
of the state; then however he writes that, unlike express consent, these sorts of things 
do not actually make one a member of society. The propositions appear to be at odds. 
This contradiction nevertheless is likely to be deceptive. Perhaps it is simply the case 
that tacit consent obligates one to obedience without going further and making that 
person a “perfect” member of society as well. It may very well be that Locke 
distinguishes between having a temporary duty to obey and being a full member of 
the community that is also perpetually obligated to obey.50 In this scenario, express 
consent generates full membership and obligation whereas tacit consent merely 
produces an obligation that begins with enjoyment/possession and ends when the two 
are no longer experienced – possibly on account of departure from the lands, possibly 
on account of death. This uncertainty about how much consent makes one a full 
member of society or not is nevertheless a largely toothless issue. The main issue is 
that Locke believed traveling, residence, “enjoyment” to be capable of producing 
political obligation, a belief that not only comes into conflict with some of consent 
theory’s basic commitments (which Locke himself had set, no less) but also fails to 
verify.  
                                                        
48This latter time limit is a caveat introduced by the phrase “during such Enjoyment, as any one under 
it”. This places tacit consent in contrast to express consent, which holds forever. Locke, Two Treatises 
on Government, p. 349. 
49Ibid., p. 349. 
50 I. Hampsher-Monk agrees. Iain Hampsher-Monk, “Tacit Concept of Consent in Locke’s Two 
Treatises of Government: A Note on Citizens”, Journal of the History of Ideas, Vol. 40, No.1, 1979, 
pp. 135-139.  
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The obvious issue here is that Locke appears to forget that he originally tied 
consent to knowledge and intentionality and begins to discover it in acts devoid of 
these attributes. It would have been unproblematic if he had clarified his claims to be 
statements that certain acts – owning, enjoying, living – can constitute tacit consent in 
appropriate, known circumstances. But he did not. To restore Locke to full 
voluntarism A. J. Simmons writes convincingly that: 
 
“….. nearly any act can, given suitable background conditions including the 
right sorts of convention, be one whereby a man expresses his consent. Locke is 
saying rather that, in modern states at least, these acts necessarily constitute the giving 
of tacit consent. In other words, such acts are always signs of consent, irrespective of 
the intentions of the actor or his special circumstances”.51  
 
If this is true, then Locke’s tacit consent, as it is on first reading, “violates” the 
knowingly, willingly and deliberately conditions of obligation engendering consent: if 
a certain act X is to produce political obligation for an individual, the individual must 
be aware of the significance of the act, know that it will result in him becoming bound 
and still be willing to perform it. Passive and unthinking owning or living within a 
state do not obviously imply any of the above; they are not consensual in the sense 
Locke arguably intended. In consequence, they cannot be taken as signifying consent 
or as resulting in obligation; at most, they could perhaps be said to be indicative of a 
desire to go along with whichever political arrangements are in place. Confronted 
with this, Simmons suggested an interpretation of his writings that could potentially 
rescue them from fault by harmonizing with the features consistently ascribed to 
consent in the Second Discourse: tacit consent as a silent mode of expressing approval 
that has consequences just as binding and meaningful as any open declaration of 
agreement.  
This consent is, arguably, more Lockean that pure Locke, belonging just as 
much to Simmons as it does to the English philosopher. He builds the argument in 
favour of this reading of tacit consent on an example of board members who, when 
asked by their Chairman if they object to holding the next meeting on Tuesday at 8 
o’clock, say nothing. In this particular set-up the silence and inactivity of those asked 
                                                        
51 Simmons, Moral Principles and Political Obligations, p. 84. 
 46 
to speak up if they are opposed count, according to Simmons, as a quiet consent to the 
Chairman’s proposal. Here consent is: 
 
“… tacit not because it has a different sort of significance than express 
consent, or because it, e.g. binds less completely....  Consent is called tacit when it is 
given by remaining silent and inactive; it is not express, explicit, directly and 
distinctly by action, but rather is expressed by the failure to do certain things”.52 
 
Importantly, this example sets conditions for silence to count as consent: (1) 
potential consenters must be aware that they are in a situation in which both 
consenting/non-consenting are possible; (2) a specific period of time during which 
people can consent or dissent must be predetermined; (3) potential consenters must 
know that after the set period of time expires they will not be able to express their 
approval or objection;53 (4) potential consenters must be allowed to express their 
dissent in reasonable and easy ways; and finally (5) the costs of dissent must not be 
forbidding or harmful to the individual. These conditions collectively establish a 
clear-choice situation, they include silence in the known category of acts that in the 
appropriate circumstances will be taken as signs of consent, and they guarantee 
genuine voluntariness by preventing the choice of dissent from becoming so 
dangerous, strenuous or costly that no one would be inclined to opt for it.54 Tacit 
consent given within these parameters would then undoubtedly engender an 
obligation. This interpretation has the same fundamental flaw as express consent, 
however – it takes us no closer to justifying the political obligations of actual citizens. 
Political life never places individuals in situations that are equivalent to the board-
meeting example (C7conformity). This negates all aspirations to generality 
(C1generality) as there are bound to be no citizens whose silence or inaction, at the 
right moment, has legitimately been the kind of tacit consent that meets the four 
prerequisites. Tacit consent as meaningful silence is therefore not the kind of 
argument that can realistically sustain the genuine political obligations of citizen 
masses and consequently cannot be found to justify the political obligations of actual 
citizens because it is just as recurrent in nature as express consent.  
                                                        
52 Ibid., pp. 79-80.  
53Ibid., p. 81.  
54 Call this the sufficient freedom condition; it should be held to apply to all accounts that appeal to 
supposedly voluntarily made choices that do not involve clear expression.  
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Though many have embraced Simmons’ interpretation of tacit consent (Raz, 
Edmundson, Carr, Horton, Klosko, Knowles all think that his reading is probably very 
similar to what Locke had in mind) the view is not canonical; there are some that hold 
that the sorts of acts Locke mentions can, in fact, amount to authentic consent. These 
authors have proven to be neither as willing to insert as considerable moral baggage 
into the theory, nor as committed to voluntarism as Simmons is. Simmons set the 
standards for political obligation as being the result of a freely delivered tacit consent 
higher than anyone, including Locke; to his mind the obligation to obey [justified 
through consent] belongs only to those who have willed it under full conditions of 
knowledge in clear, non-coercive, non-damaging situations. Other voluntarists are 
nevertheless ready to lower the bar of consent. They subsequently argue that tacit 
consent can be assumed to have been given when citizens cannot appeal to excusable 
ignorance about the supposed significance of continued political membership past the 
age of legal majority, or when they perform acts associated to the role of citizen itself. 
These practices of stretching intent to fit routine features of [democratic] life will not 
prove, on further analysis, to have the expected pay offs, however.  
 
•  Tacit Consent as Residence (TCR) 
 
Joseph Tussman was among the first to defend the idea that residence is a 
form of tacitly consenting to the authority of the state.55 Against Hume’s original 
claim that “lodging” cannot be a genuine sign of consent because its alternative, 
leaving, is prohibitively costly, Tussman argues that if governments were capable of 
creating awareness that the choice to stay within the borders of one’s state of birth 
signified tacit consent then, regardless of how taxing the alternative of leaving would 
be, residence would produce a moral duty to obey the law. Tussman discounts the 
idea that the “unpleasantness” of the choice detracts from voluntarism. For him: 
 
 “…to say that consenting to the status of a member is involuntary because the 
alternative is not as pleasant or convenient [as staying] is to confuse convenience with 
                                                        
55 J. Tussman, Obligation and the Body Politic, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1960. Before him 
Plato used residence as a means to justify obligation in Crito, and so did W.D. Ross, in The Right and 
The Good, when he wrote that residence “is an implicit promise to obey”, Oxford University Press, 
Oxford, 1930, p. 27.  
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necessity... [This unpleasantness] does not rob a deliberate choice of its voluntary 
character”.56 
 
Tussman’s opinion on the effects of unpleasantness on consent has 
encountered much resistance in the literature, the standard objection being still 
profoundly Humean: tacit consent in the guise of residence violates the conditions set 
for what counts as a correct instantiation of it because citizens are unaware that 
staying in the country of birth past a point means consent, and immigration is 
obviously not in the category of reasonably easy alternatives.  
Even with distance from classic Lockean consent, or when viewing the fourth 
and fifth conditions [for tacit consent] as the excessive demands of orthodox 
voluntarists, there are still ample reasons to consider the proposition that 
“unpleasantness is inconsequential to voluntarism” unconvincing. Prima facie it can 
be agreed that impediments, no matter how extraordinary, are not always necessarily 
unsurpassable or toxic to real choice situations. In theory, the reality that emigration is 
unpleasant establishes no more and no less than that it is an uneasy, challenging and 
costly option; it excludes leaving neither from the realm of possibility nor from the 
category of genuine alternatives. Nevertheless, as human beings operate on practical 
levels, the proponents of tacit consent as residence must acknowledge that its 
exorbitant price makes it the sort of choice few individuals could bring themselves to 
will. Put simply, citizens can theoretically will to emigrate and do it. But would they 
actually ever be inclined to take into consideration and act on such a decision? 
Arguably not, or at least not but in the most exceptional of cases. Tussman ignores the 
fact that, in the real world, costliness and difficultness effectively eliminate 
emigration as an alternative to obedient residence everywhere but on paper (and thus 
falls foul of C7conformity), with citizens far more likely to opt for staying out of fears 
of exclusion, isolation, deprivation, loss or poverty, than because they experience 
some authentic desire to submit to the rules of the government. This should be taken 
as a first reason to doubt that tacit consent as residence amounts to actual consent.  
Although Tussman’s account was not successful he was not the last to employ 
tacit consent as residence as an instrument of justification. Harry Beran and Michael 
Walzer have both famously articulated this sort of theory of obligation, writing on the 
                                                        
56 Simmons, Moral Principles and Political Obligations, p. 98.  
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issue with the intention to eliminate the uncertainty that residence is a genuine, non-
extorted promise that produces obligations.57 Of the two, Beran makes the better case. 
In a series of texts he sets out to defend the hypothesis that the choice to continue 
residence past the age of majority is a form of obligation – generating tacit consent 
not affected by the probability that individuals are by and large unaware that, from 
that age onwards, their residence will constitute an agreement to be bound.  
His first contention in favour of this thesis is that, even in the absence of this 
knowledge, people still understand that remaining within the confines of their birth 
countries is the equivalent of an acceptance of “full membership” that entails, among 
others, obedience to law. 58  Beran’s logic is that if people comprehend that 
membership in a community presupposes abiding by its rules, then they are in 
practice consenting to compliance. Beran attempts to reinforce this contention by 
explaining that even if people were to fail to fathom this, they would still be obligated 
to obey because, in that case, their ignorance would be negligent, rather than 
excusable.59 Finally, to address the fears of those concerned that residence may not be 
a bona fide choice, Beran argues that moral opinion does not prevent seeing “forced 
by the circumstances” consent through residence as capable of producing an 
obligation; the hard choice – between continuing to reside and obeying the law and 
emigration – is not an unfree one and it can produce obligation even if the promisee 
would rather not make it.60 
 
There are multiple issues with this argument. To begin with, when performing 
justifications, statements that people “understand” and “accept” ought to be taken 
with a grain of salt: generally there is little substantial evidence to back them up, and 
it unwise to use uncorroborated and potentially wide-of-the-mark assumptions as 
                                                        
57 M. Walzer, Obligations: Essays on Disobedience, War and Citizenship, Oxford University Press, 
London, 1970, pp. 103-112. 
58Excusable ignorance is the sort of ignorance that results from a lack of experience, from being 
deprived of information, from youth, from alienation. It is opposed to ignorance that results from 
negligence, i.e. wilfully opting to remain unaware, not taking into account certain bits of information, 
etc. A. J. Simmons, “Consent, Free Choice and Democratic Government”, Georgia Law Review, 
No.18, 1983-1984, pp. 791-819, p. 806. Beran keeps this in mind when he writes his argument. H. 
Beran, “What is the Basis of Political Authority?”, The Monist, Vol. 66, No. 4, 1983, pp. 487-499. pp. 
494-495.  
59It is so because people “should consider what moral significance there is in their new status and their 
new rights”. H. Beran, “In Defense of the Consent Theory of Political Obligation and Authority”, 
Ethics, Vol. 87, No.3, 1977, pp. 260-271, p. 270. 
60 H. Beran, The Consent Theory of Political Obligation, Croom Helm, London, 1987, p. 105; also see 
Beran, “What is the Basis of Political Authority?”, pp. 497-498.  
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sources for normative consequences of the weight and magnitude of political 
obligation. In this case it is particularly unwise to go down this route, since whatever 
“understandings” and “acceptances” people may have vis-à-vis membership – as a 
general category of belonging – are likely to be sourced in practical experiences 
within groups that have very little in common with the state. In the real world, 
individuals belong to two types of groups, voluntary ones, in which entry is fully 
consensual and predicated on the explicit (or tacit but in a context that perfectly 
replicates Simmons’ board example) acceptance of status and rules, or non-voluntary 
ones in which entry is accidental but which are typically held together by emotional 
or biological ties and informed and permeated by attachments, convictions, moral 
duties, interpersonal connectivity and the likes. Membership in either of these is, for 
obvious reasons dissimilar to citizenship in the large, heterogeneous, impersonal, 
unfeeling body politic. As such it is unlikely that people will draw mental parallels 
between the groups they recognize and perceive themselves as belonging to, and the 
state, and arrive at similar understandings and acceptances concerning the latter.   
Another aspect to cause immediate misgivings is his claim about occurred 
understandings. Simmons thinks that if the understandings Beran has in mind actually 
happened we would see some outward sign of them.61 This is not a very strong charge 
but still stronger than a potential rebuttal. It could be argued that there are events in 
one’s political life – the issuing of ID, the legal coming of age, etc. – that do coincide 
with some change in social behaviour (at least in the latter case, as full legal 
responsibility begins), and that could hence be said to be joined at the hip with some 
novel awareness. Sociologically speaking, this is a defendable counterclaim, 
especially when considering that those occurrences separate the lives of individuals 
into “before” and “after”. It would however be difficult to incontestably demonstrate 
these understandings regard residence as a method of conveying consent to 
subjection, or immigration as the alternative to it. Merely becoming mindful of one’s 
assigned full rights and duties is much more probable. And equating potential 
realizations of acquired full citizenship to an acceptance of political obligation would 
not be that much different from equating admitting to your sickness to consent to be 
ill, or observing yourself burnt to a crisp to consent to be struck by lightning. 
Internalizations of status quos, even those accompanied by outward pronunciations of 
                                                        
61 “only the rare individual thinks that there is anything to join at his majority”. Simmons, “Consent, 
Free Choice and Democratic Government”, p. 809.  
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occurred recognitions, simply do not amount to consent. Observing yourself to be “x” 
is not consent to be “x”, nor does it obviously (a) imply an insight that you have done 
something, however passively and non-intentionally, to bring this about, (b) produce a 
duty or a belief that there is a duty to behave in a certain way, (c) coincide with 
resignation and “acceptance” of the state of things or (d) otherwise trigger other 
meaningful light-bulb moments. If there is an argument for political obligation in the 
vein of what Beran has in mind (and there is) it is not one that can genuinely claim 
itself to be consensual. The fact of the matter is that, in the picture Beran paints, both 
consent and acceptance are bastardized concepts, the latter beyond all recognition, the 
former almost. As such, although Simmons’ complaint is not in itself strong, his (and 
everyone else’s) underlying opinion verifies that there is simply no proof of 
understanding obligation to be a consequence of membership tacitly consented to by 
a failure to depart, let alone of low-key, barely mindful acceptance. Beran’s argument 
therefore entertains a dubitable connection to the mental realities of citizens, and thus 
misses the mark for C7conformity.  
A still more potent objection to Beran’s account is the one that draws on his 
peculiarly Hobbesian view on choices. Elaborating on views he first expressed when 
criticising Tussman’s account, Simmons takes issue with Beran’s readiness to 
discover authentic choice situations in scenarios arguably victimizing of individuals. 
He writes that, although not all difficult-to-make decisions are necessarily extorted, 
moral theory disallows unconscionable agreements, or agreements obtained through 
manipulation or in exchange for necessary goods, to produce a right against the 
consenter; to his mind obligation cannot flow from the exploitation of persons found 
in a position of vulnerability. 62  Simmons is not alone in this last suspicion. In 
“Reformist Consent and Political Obligation” George Klosko formulates an identical 
critique based on what he calls “the independence condition” of tacit consent as 
residence. To understand what he means we need to go back to Beran’s original 
attempt to show that taxing choices are not always coerced ones. To prove his point 
about hard choices Beran constructs the examples of “Green” who has to submit to 
hospital rules in order to receive medical treatment and of “Brown”, an innocent 
person who is accused a murder and needs to contract a lawyer. Beran’s point is that, 
even though they would much rather not conform to hospital policies or contract legal 
                                                        
62 Simmons, “Consent, Free Choice and Democratic Government”, p. 811, pp. 813-815.  
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representation, the choice to abide by hospital rules and to pay for counsel are not 
coerced: they are unpleasant, they are costly, but they are freely made (by individuals 
whose universes of choice remain wide) and thus “sufficiently voluntary”.63 Although 
Klosko does not take issue with these claims, he nevertheless denies that the choice 
faced by those forced to opt between staying (and obeying the law) and leaving is 
identical to the choices that had to be made by Green and Brown.  
The key difference between these cases is the fact that, while in the examples 
provided by Beran, the tribulations faced are in no way caused by those to whom a 
promise will be due, in the paradigm of the state the problem (having to opt between 
remaining in the country or emigrating) is actually generated by the very state to 
whom a promise to obey would be owed should the option to stay be selected. The 
state and the presented choice are therefore not independent of each other but linked 
through cause and effect.  Less confusingly, the state disrupts the lives of individuals 
by presenting them with a mandatory hard decision with the easier way to end the 
disruption being succumbing to its will and submitting to its rules. What Klosko aims 
to convey is that, within the logic of this argument, the state is both the one to 
“wound” and the one to “save”. He thinks this serves to detract from the authenticity 
of the choice: when it comes to opting between binding oneself or “something 
difficult”, the choice is a free one only if the “choicee” is not forced into making a 
decision by the person/persons to whom they will become bound if they pick one of 
the alternatives.64 
This objection is the most powerful criticism. A Hobbesian may attempt to 
take them on by counter-arguing that contract and consent were designed to be made 
in the ultimate difficult situation – the state of nature – and that, if consent was able to 
produce an obligation then, it should be able to degenerate a duty to obey in the 
scenario proposed by Beran. That however would be a straw-man argument. In that 
scenario, obedience and surrender were hard but rescuing alternatives to suffering and 
disorder; in this one they are options in a shoved-down-the-throat choice between 
them and the “evil” of emigration. The contexts are not comparable – in one 
obligation is the one condition attached to rescue, in the other it is one of two 
hardships between which an unsuspecting individual suddenly has to choose. And it 
                                                        
63 Beran, The Consent Theory of Political Obligation, p. 105.  
64G. Klosko, “Reformist Consent and Political Obligation”, Political Studies, 1991, Vol. 39, pp. 676-
690, pp. 680-681. 
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would be mistaken to believe a counterargument in this vein would fare better on a 
more positive Lockean/Rousseaun view on the state of nature: duress and hardship in 
those more positive contexts were not imposed by or created by the party to whom 
consent was to be given, pace Klosko. The consented-to remained in a default 
position of moral neutrality vis-à-vis the consenting agents.65 Conversely, Beran’s 
state forces the individual into electing between severely unbalanced options and 
stands to benefit if he or she opts to surrender and obey. Thus, while it cannot be 
denied that not all hard choices are obligatorily coerced, the consent-or-leave choice 
imposed by TCR is unconscionable and cannot create, as moral theory informs us, 
political obligations.66 In these circumstances I find with Simmons and Klosko that 
Beran’s choice situation is sufficiently un-free to negate consent.  
To these protestations, one other needs to be added concerning Beran’s claims 
from acceptance. In the language of political obligations, “acceptance” is a strong 
term that should not be used without carefully determining if the conditions for it 
verify. As will be seen when discussing the Rawlsian account on the principle of 
fairness, a person can be said to have accepted something only in the aftermath of a 
meticulous, well thought-out personal process of evaluation that has generated certain 
states of mind and a firm, fully conscious decision to do so. In the theory of 
obligation, acceptance is much more akin to actual consent than to passive 
acquiescence – the most realistic description of citizen responses to authority. 
Nothing in Beran’s argument, or reality, suggests that is what happens when people 
allegedly consent through residence. So, even if citizens had the realizations about 
membership he has in mind, there would still be as little space to spot acceptance as 
there would be to discover express consent (C1generality). The argument from 
acceptance is therefore not only probably factually inaccurate but also brings us no 
closer to justifying the requirement to obey. In the best case scenario his acceptance is 
no more than a false synonym for going along; and while going along may create 
expectations it does not, in and of itself, produce duty or otherwise render the state 
justifiably entitled to expecting compliance (CO6non-confusion). 
                                                        
65 B. Boxill, “On Some Criticisms of Consent Theory”, Journal of Social Philosophy, Vol. 24, No.1, 
1993, pp. 81-102, pp. 85-88.  
66For more on consent vs. hard choices see J. Murphy, “Consent, Coercion and Hard Choices”, 
Virginia Law Review, Vol. 67, No.1, 1981, pp. 79-95, p. 88 and R. Higgins, The Moral Limits of Law, 
Oxford University Press, Oxford, p. 107.  
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To conclude, much like Tussman’s justification, Beran’s argument allows 
knowledge, deliberation and will to play neither the meaningful part their 
predecessors awarded them, nor one substantial enough to allow the identification of 
consent. TCR hence cannot justify political obligation because of structural issues that 
are profound enough to raise serious doubts about whether the argument authentically 
belongs in the voluntary category and about the moral permissibility of the choice 
situations employed. Beran’s bottom line fault is attempting to root obligation in a 
will that is not there and which cannot be shown to have had to be there (insofar as 
Beran expects too much of citizens and inserts too much moral force into the act of 
staying). If membership is to establish a special connection then it will be on some 
associative argument, not one arising from presupposed consent. This interpretation 
of the tacit consent paradigm is therefore flawed and unsuccessful. In the next section, 
I show that the same conclusion can be reached about tacit consent as voting. 
 
• Tacit Consent as Voting 
 
The faults of the argument from residence prompted a second class of modern 
proponents of tacit consent to pursue the alternative avenue of voting. These scholars 
think that, should they manage to convince that the present equivalent of tacit consent 
is voting, they will be able to justify a duty to uphold the law without encountering 
any of the obstacles faced by previous consensual accounts. John Plamenatz, Alan 
Gewirth and Peter Steinberger have reached this sort of conclusion. 
For example Plamenatz, an important consent theory scholar, writes in the 
preface to the second edition of his classic tome:67  
 
“If Smith were in fact elected, it would be odd to say of anyone who had voted 
for him that he did not consent to his holding office .... Where there is an established 
process of election to an office, then, provided the election is free, anyone who takes 
part in the process consents to the authority of whoever is elected to the office.”68 
 
                                                        
67 This opinion is at odds with Plamenatz’s original argument in the First Edition that consent must 
always be voluntary, intentional and aware. 
68 J. Plamenatz, Consent, Freedom and Political Obligation: Second Edition, Oxford University Press, 
Oxford, 1968.p.168 and J. Plamenatz, Man and Society, Longman’s, London, 1963, pp. 239-240. 
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Three main arguments against tacit consent as voting can be put forward: 
citizens cannot vote on laws or constitutional provisions, since this is the prerogative 
only of elected majorities;69 voting is merely a way to express preference for a person 
or party from a list of given options (which is the standard indictment against this 
form of consent); officials’ portraying of voting as both a right and as a duty of 
citizenship indicates “that the status and duties of citizenship have some entirely 
different basis than the consent given in voting”.70 Of the three the second and third 
charges have most force, the first being a commonsensical observation that requires 
no further clarifications. The third contention, introduced by Simmons, is a 
fundamental question of causation: have we a) voted and therefore have conveyed our 
consent to political obligations and have thus become citizens or are we b) citizens 
and therefore settled with a privilege-duty to vote that reflects our alleged special 
status and relationship with our state? Proponents of the argument think the first, all 
others think the latter. Logic and evidence, however, suggest the consensus of 
political thought to be the one in the right here. By way of analogy, if their logic was 
fair, then the Prince of Wales is royalty because he has accepted institutional 
patronages and has so consented to royal status. Since clearly the inverse relationship 
of causation is the one that verifies, ceteris paribus, we have the prerogative to vote 
and vote because we are assumed to be citizens, as opposed to being citizens because 
we have voted. Citizenship logically and procedurally precedes voting, with voting 
being predicated on it, as do all responsibilities or perks associated to a held role. If 
the opposite were true then crippling questions about inclusions (in voting pools) and 
the moral permissibility of exclusions and districting would arise and bring about a 
host of other issues.  
There is sufficient weight in the standard indictment to make all others 
superfluous, however. In actual democratic circumstances voting is not consent to 
becoming obligated. The two are intrinsically different: consent is an agreement to X 
where X is to submit and to obey the law; voting on the other hand is a choice 
between alternatives P, Q, R and S as the agents in charge of exercising authority. 
This difference between the two is not subtle. Suppose that an individual is presented 
in elections with a choice between Labour, Conservative and Liberal Democratic 
candidates. Suppose, at first, that she goes out to vote and her preferred Labour 
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70Ibid., pp. 800-801.  
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candidate wins the constituency. Can this be said to be identical in meaning to her 
having consented to renounce as much of her natural freedom and autonomy as is 
necessary for social order, the protection of lives, liberties and possessions, etc.? Not 
at all. Her thinking that Labour policies are on balance more conducive to the 
achievement of her and her fellow citizens’ goals is not the same as a personal 
agreement to renounce her natural freedom and be ruled by a legitimate political 
authority that so happens to be divided between Parliament, the executive branch, and 
the hereditary head of state; at best, this can be interpreted as her having given 
permission to a certain candidate to exercise a political authority that is still to be 
shown to be correlative to obligation. Suppose now that the Labour candidate is 
defeated. Surely her being represented by an MP elected by a majority of which she 
was not a part does not amount to consent; quite the contrary, she herself has not 
consented to submission or authority being exercised by that person, a fact made clear 
by her desire to send someone else to the Commons. In this situation not only has she 
not been proven to have political obligations towards the state, she is also dissatisfied 
with the way political arrangements have turned out. No agreement can be discovered 
at all. In the first case she could perhaps be said to have by and large assented to some 
officials (from the provided list of options) being in government, physically, to being 
in authority on the assumption that someone has to have authority; whereas in the 
second one she can decisively be said to have consented to absolutely nothing. 
Suppose, lastly, that our young person does not dispose of her constitutional right to 
vote and stays home on election day. Defenders of tacit consent as voting could be 
tempted to claim that her political inactivity is her way of silently consenting to the 
authority of whomever the majority elects. Far from it: if “silence” is not a 
conventional response to a clear choice situation in which participants are aware that 
it constitutes agreement it cannot be counted as consent to anything. A permission to 
rule over her is yet to be granted, her inactivity only excluding her from the selection 
of the still unjustified authority positions. Because of this we can be sure that, 
whatever the results of the electoral process, her silence has no higher significance 
than perhaps acquiescence to go along with the results. Voting, therefore, does not 
create de jure authority- it just divides de facto one; CO1Asufficient-normative-strength 
therefore fails to be observed.  
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These criticisms against Plamenatz’s tacit consent as voting also stand against 
the other two relevant proponents of the theory, Alan Gewirth and Peter Steinberger. 
Their arguments can be subjected to further internal criticisms, however. Gewirth’s 
main claim is that voting is the “institutional arrangement” that lies at the foundation 
of government by consent, and that it serves as a justification for a prima facie 
obligation to obey the law because of all the benefits it confers to government.71 
Although it would be hard to dispute that democratic governments are better than the 
available, tangible rest, the fact that a government is “better than…” does not serve as 
an explanation of the bind to obedience, CO2non-foundational-justice/quality; thus his 
reasoning is incomplete, as far as the establishment of political obligation goes. 
Steinberger, on the other hand, thinks of voting as a way of participating in a fair 
democratic process that bestows certain benefits on its members.72 He likens it to 
sitting down in a poker game and playing. His logic is that, in both cases, once you’ve 
started playing nobody would think to ask you if you consent or if you have accepted 
the benefits that you drew from the game.73 The drawbacks to his argument are that: 
(1) the discussion about benefits fairly derived from participation does not belong to 
consent theory but to the principle of fairness, a fact that automatically changes the 
ground of obligation from consent to receipts of benefits, and thus renders consent 
normatively useless and grounds political obligation in an argument that, as we shall 
see, cannot be said to generate political obligations, (CO1Asufficient-normative-strength) 
and CO1Bnon-degeneration; (2) that his poker game example does not reflect the reality 
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of our political lives – which would have been better captured if he had imagined 
players in the mental experiment being born at the poker table with one leg shackled 
to it (C7conformity). Independently of these considerations however, an analysis of 
their theories brings us back to the same issue, i.e. voting not being able to account for 
the source of the authority those who are elected will come to apply.   
The proponents of TCV therefore obfuscate not only the distinction between 
consent and voting, but also the distinction between consent and acquiescence. The 
first is a clear expression of will; the second a form of expressing a preference that is 
no more than the exercise of a right to pick from a pre-determined list of available 
alternatives those agents that will come to discharge political authority, and this does 
not correlate to political obligation on the side of citizens. Connectedly, while the 
absence of consent is the absence of a duty to obey, the absence of voting, or a 
negative vote, has no effect on the duty to obey in contexts in which genuine moral 
requirements to do so exist. Furthermore, in worlds that allow political authority in 
the absence of political obligation, voting is in all aspects irrelevant, because 
whatever piecemeal obedience there is it is not contingent on expressed preferences – 
whatever justifies de facto authority is not at all affected by opinions, majoritarian or 
otherwise; that is what being authoritative means. The big problem with this 
argument, therefore, is that voting is inconsequential as far as obligation and 
obedience are concerned, even if it is the way to select authorities (and thus has 
political obligations consequent to it, pace Rawls), since going out to vote for the 
favourite candidates acts merely as a permission, a “gift” of power to a set of civil 
servants who get to oversee the execution of authority, and not as a way to end natural 
freedom and obligate ourselves to obey the authoritative commands of the 
Government independently of who is in government. Further, while voting establishes 
some degree of responsibility, as does any choice with blanket effects, it has no power 
to change the normative situation of voters; it is not a creator of moral requirements to 
obey; and it is a feature of the special relationship rather a source of it. In the wake of 
these comments, the best that can be said about voting is that it contributes to the view 
of democratic procedures as sanctioning some authority without political obligations, 
as defenders of democratic regimes better show. TCV, therefore, does not have the 
imagined normative consequences, their proponents failing to distinguish between 
sources of authority and sources of obligation, as well as failing to recognize voting 
not as creating citizens, but as part of the package of rights and duties corresponding 
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to this morally unjustified special status. Moral and theoretical reasons preclude this 
modern spin on tacit consent from achieving success in its justificatory endeavour.  
 
In the aftermath of these rejections, advocates of consent-based accounts of 
political obligation introduced a measure of separation between substantive reality 
and purported instances of consenting, rendering it conjectural. In this novel direction, 
efforts were made not to show that consent has happened, but that in appropriate 
circumstances it can be thought to have happened or be argued morally impermissible 
not to have happened, the underlying opinion being that, in this way, criticisms 
arising from both inconsistences with reality, or from the lowering of the threshold for 
consent, could be avoided. In the next section I show that these arguments fall short, 




The failures of express and tacit consent as residence and as voting to account 
for the obligation to obey forced political theorist to focus on a lesser known variation 
of the paradigm discovered by Kant. This is how hypothetical consent (HC) came to 
be revived in the 20th century. HC theorists uniformly sacrifice to an important extent 
the powerful connections that exist between the classic consent and voluntarism, 
knowledge and deliberation in an effort to reconcile consent to political realities. As I 
show, this decision has not only rendered hypothetical consent virtually 
indistinguishable as a manifestation of consent, but has also failed to yield successful 
justifications.  
The first and best-known modern advocate of HC is Hannah Pitkin who, in her 
celebrated “Obligation and Consent I” defends this position from a Lockean 
perspective.74 In this essay, Pitkin asks herself three questions: what does it mean to 
“tacitly consent”, to what does one consent to, and what are the practical implications 
of tacit consent for those that can be said to have employed it. Pitkin’s answer to these 
questions is a reinterpretation of the concept. For her, to consent tacitly means to 
“append your signature as if it were to the original document”, as a gesture of 
approval to “the terms of the original contract which the founders of the 
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commonwealth made, no more no less”.75 Because she considers this appendage of a 
signature to be virtually automatic in modern societies, however, the ground of 
obligation in her argument eventually shifts from a personal promise to obey onto a 
special characteristic of the authority/ government, namely the fact that “it acts within 
the limits of the authority rational men would, abstractly and hypothetically, have to 
give government”, that it is the kind of government that “deserves consent”.76 The 
bulk of her argument from then on becomes that, as long as governments function 
according to the “trusteeship” established by the social contract (utilizing its authority 
over people and limiting their freedoms only as far as made necessary by the 
requirements of order and security), individuals give a hypothetical consent to it that 
is just as meaningful as express consent.  
Pitkin’s description of hypothetical consent as being a type of Lockean TC has 
drawn criticisms from Simmons. He reads Pitkin’s text as a failed effort to reconcile 
(1) the fact that Locke’s words on tacit agreement create the possibility of consent to 
bad or immoral governments, (2) the fact that Locke previously tells us, numerous 
times, that we cannot obligate ourselves to tyrannous political constructions, and (3) 
consent as being the only grounds of obligation. Pitkin was noticeably concerned with 
the quality of the governments to which people could be said to have tacitly 
consented. Motivated by the desire to ensure that consent can only be given to proper 
authorities, when faced with the apparent inconsistency in Locke’s text, Pitkin chose 
to “sacrifice” condition three. Simmons thinks this to have been a major error. 
According to him, Pitkin ought to have realized that it is perfectly possible for consent 
to be “only a necessary, rather than a sufficient, condition for the generation of 
obligation”. 77  What Simmons means by this is that, in certain situations, 
considerations of morality interfere and prevent us from becoming obligated, even if 
we are inclined to give our consent. This is a standard caveat in consent theory 
derived from natural law – our consent binds us to anything we will, except those 
things that are prohibited by superior moral considerations (such as illegal acts). It is 
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because of this insufficiency of consent that Simmons does not feel there is any 
unbearable inconsistency between the three Lockean claims; people can tacitly or 
expressly consent to a bad government but that does not mean they will become 
bound to it: regardless of whether he has consented or not a “man, not having the 
power over his own life, cannot, by compact... enslave himself to any one, nor put 
himself under the absolute, arbitrary power of another...”78. Thus, the possibility that 
we may come to consent to morally objectionable governments does not compel us to 
alter the grounds of obligation, as Pitkin has done; it only forces us to remember the 
creed that individuals do not have the right to dispose of their lives in whichever way 
they see fit. Consequently, Simmons’ criticism of Pitkin’s assertions about Locke is 
correct, insofar as it confirmed by both Locke and everything natural law scholars 
have taught us.  
Of course, Pitkin’s misconstruction of Locke does not necessarily mean that 
hypothetical consent must fail as an independent theory of political obligation. Even 
when separated from Lockean thought, however, Pitkin’s hypothetical consent does 
not fare any better. To begin with, determining if authorities actually operate within 
the parameters set by the original contract, and thus deserve consent, would be an 
enormously daunting task. Since the social contract is a mental experiment, we have 
no way of knowing what its exact terms are, and therefore nothing against which we 
could genuinely verify accordance. Although we could perhaps intuit them the 
evaluative task would not be much simplified. Governmental review would still be 
conditioned, as Pitkin herself acknowledges in “Obligation and Consent II”, by the 
setting up of some procedural standards, and of a series of “substantive standards” 
designed to enable citizen bodies to discover if “good, benevolent, justifiable 
policies” are being pursued.79 Since these standards would have to cover all realistic 
political scenarios, be fixed enough to allow for uniformity of practice but 
simultaneously change in ways that mirror modifications of relevant social 
circumstances, and still be accessible enough for everyday popular use, compiling 
such a list would most likely be beyond the intellectual capabilities of any one or 
collection of individuals. Moreover, even if these standards could be put forward, we 
have little reason to believe that citizens would have the time, patience and capability 
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to review all political decisions and all available alternatives according to them. It 
would require levels of political participation and awareness superior even to those 
assumed by direct democracies (C7conformity). These two facts alone are enough to 
show that “consent worthiness” is not something that could be established, at least 
without tremendous efforts. Coupled to this, however, is another issue,; the fact that, 
independently of whether or not people would be capable of making the necessary 
appraisals of governmental quality, Pitkin should have provided an explanation as to 
why the statement that “we ought to obey a government that deserves consent” is 
synonymous with “we must obey a government that deserves consent”; an 
impossibility, considering that theoreticians of obligations have time and time again 
underlined the distinction between the language of “have to” (the language of moral 
requirements and obligations) and the language of “ought to” (which belongs to the 
realm of moral reasons and non-compulsory duties). In these conditions, there is 
space to argue that Pitkin’s argument is not that much different from a Kantian thesis 
of authority deriving piecemeal obedience as a consequence of well-performed state 
functions; but there is not enough force in her argument to close the gap between legal 
obligation and moral obligation (CO2non-foundational-justice/quality). Pitkin eventually 
sees all these herself and in her second article on obligation and consent, in which she 
acknowledges the faults of her argument, rebuffs the idea of tying obligation to an 
indeterminate “ought”, recognizes the forbidding complexity of evaluation and even 
questions the rationale behind resting political obligation on consent genetically tied 
to an artificial institution of promising.80 In these ways, she effectively disowns her 
own theory.  
 
For decades Pitkin’s hypothetical consent remained the only such theory of 
obligation. 81  Ronald Dworkin played an important part in that when he wrote 
“…hypothetical contracts do not supply an independent argument for the fairness of 
enforcing their terms. A hypothetical contract is not simply a pale form of an actual 
                                                        
80 Pitkin, “Obligation and Consent II”, pp. 45-48.  
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contract; it is no contract at all….” 82 In recent years however two attempts have been 
made to resurrect hypothetical consent as a stand-alone argument, by Mark Murphy 
and David Estlund.83 Murphy’s account of political obligation revolves around the 
idea that citizens hypothetically consent to the authority of the state by surrendering 
their rights to form judgements about the principle of justice. He employs a “notion of 
consent in which one consents to another if one accepts the other’s determinations of 
general principles as his or her own”. These determinations belong to political 
institutions that make them for “the purpose of practical reasonings”, i.e. long term 
goals that require public cooperation such as establishing the just order.84 Murphy’s 
argument from then on narrows down to the hypothesis that what people consent to is 
actually a cooperative scheme whose primary aim is discovering principles of justice 
that govern the just order that people can recognize as their own (his intuition being 
that we have to abide by principles that we perceive as applying to us).  
Murphy’s proposed justification of political obligation allows and encourages 
a two-level reading: one at face value, and one – truer in many senses – interpretative. 
At first glance, Murphy’s argument appears to attempt to reconcile statements specific 
to voluntarisms with elements of natural duty logic. First, there is a very weak (if that) 
element of consent. This consent is not “attitudinal” or “occurent” and has no role, 
normative or otherwise, other than being assumed to have been surrendered.85 It is not 
backed up by will, by intention or by deliberation, it is not an event, in any senses of 
the word, and it is not a belief or a specific behavioural pattern either. In fact, it is 
unclear what his consent amounts to; according to the criteria set by past consent 
theories, it is unrecognizable as such. Secondly, there is a “principle of fairness” 
component that never quite makes it to a fully-fledged argument from benefits in the 
vein of what fairness proponents marshal. Murphy borrows the idea of a cooperative 
scheme from fair-play accounts and marries it with his earlier straightforward appeal 
to consent; an unorthodox choice, considering that claims from fairness were 
designed as means to avoid the latter’s issues and are theoretically sufficient grounds 
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of obligation. Together, they amount to ground muddling overkill, any one of them, if 
vindicated, being able to on its own to generate perpetual political obligation. Still, 
Murphy adds. Besides elements of consent theory and of principle of fairness 
accounts, Murphy also inserts parts of Rawls’ natural duty of justice account and 
quasi-Scanlonian contractualism into his argument. In doing this he sets aside two 
known facts, (1) that Rawls was a non-voluntarist and (2) that Scanlon’s 
contractualism is quite different from Rawls’, thus reinforcing previous observations 
that he tries to reconcile statements that were not designed to go together: an 
argument cannot simultaneously be voluntary and non-voluntary, an account of 
classic political obligation and a natural duty justification, Rawlsian and Lockean, 
unless it is a multi-principle account. Murphy, however, gives no indication that that 
is what he desires, or any sense of districting citizens into groups according to their 
applicable source of political obligation; and his one ground of obedience is always 
nominally consent (although in practice it has almost no normative power). Murphy, 
therefore, falls foul of CO1Asufficient-normative-strength because of a practice of 
supplementation that obviates both the failures of enumerated grounds, their 
incompatibility and implicit degeneration (CO1Bnon-degeneration). 
Even if we overlooked all these, Murphy’s apparent decision to fuse 
arguments from justice with elements of fair-play and consent, is still puzzling. 
Murphy chooses a winding route and risks exposure by arguing from toothless, 
essentially meaningless, consent and fairness, instead of opting for the more forthright 
route of natural duty that is obviously more in tune with what he has in mind. The 
persistent question of why not argue directly from justice informs his account at all 
times. After all, stripped of hypothetical consent, Murphy’s argument boils down to a 
claim that there is a cooperative scheme – at this point a fancy phrase for a state – that 
provides us with principles of justice that we recognize as our own and under whose 
domain we are better off.  
While Murphy’s account seems Rawlsian, however, it could also be argued 
that it is actually very Razian, the idea that “something” imposes obedience on people 
because they are better off under it being at the core of the normal justification thesis. 
Then Murphy could be said to replace, behind all artifice, Razian reasons with the 
principle of justice. This still would not be progress. In fact, it is doubly problematic, 
firstly because it entrusts the production of principles of justice to run-of-the mill 
institutions and secondly because Raz’s normal justification thesis (NJT) was not a 
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defence of generalized political obligation but a defence of the right to obedience held 
by de facto authorities. As a point of theory, given that Murphy’s construction is 
devoid of a mental experiment, and those agreeing on the principles of justice are in a 
context morally and normatively inferior to those behind the veil of ignorance, there 
is room to argue that his institutions will be less successful in determination of 
principles than deciders in the original position; there is even room to accuse Murphy 
of a dubious logic in which people are just because they live according to principles 
dictated by institutions instead of institutions being just because they operate 
according to principles set by people in circumstances adequate for this sort of 
determination. Although troubling, this is not fully toxic, however: misgivings aside, 
it is possible for institutions to deliver generally acceptable principles to which all 
reasonable people could agree. What is genuinely awkward, however, is the 
aforementioned fact that Raz did not hold the NJT to be an argument for political 
obligation. Ceteris paribus, any theory that mirrors it, cannot and will not explain 
away the moral requirement to obey unless associated with something else that will 
fill the gap between piecemeal duty and generalized, homogenous, obligation. As 
such, in the absence of powerful consent or of an argument from fairness that can 
sustain the normative burden, Murphy’s account ultimately takes us no further than 
Raz’s thesis. Indeed, if there are any suspicions that the parts of the discourse on 
justice he adopts are of help they are false. The fact that the state is just does not 
create a duty to obey on the side of citizens, as CO2non-foundational-justice/quality 
instructs. And if we take Murphy to want at least part of the normative burden to be 
supported by a claim from a duty of justice, aside from the already present doubts 
about the actual ground and the implicit fears of degeneration, he still would not move 
forwards towards the vindication of political obligation because, as is typical of 
natural duty accounts, he would not be able to establish the content of that duty to be 
particularized obedience.  
To sum up on Murphy, no matter how literal or how generous we are in 
interpreting his writing, his construction is plagued by faults: his hypothetical consent 
is not consent or vaguely consensual, his claim from fairness is effectively futile, and 
his round-about appeals to justice and its principles do not have the consequence of 
obligation; he fails to negotiate the obstacle course that is proposing a ground with 
CO1Asufficient-normative-strength while not forgetting about CO2non-foundational-
justice/quality and avoiding CO1Bnon-degeneration.  And there is of course the fact that 
 66 
behind the veil of consent, behind the screen of Kantian-functionalism sits a 
restatement of Raz’s old argument that is no account of obligation at all.  
 
 
Conversely, David Estlund’s hypothetical consent theory is quite 
compelling.86 Estlund’s explanation for the obligation to obey is part of a larger effort 
to justify democracy that he has dubbed “epistemic proceduralism”.87 In Democratic 
Authority he attempts to show that democratic regimes enjoy both political legitimacy 
and political authority. Although he could produce a stand-alone account of political 
legitimacy  (which, in simple terms, boils down to the claim that democratic decisions 
are legitimate because they stem from democratic procedures that are most likely to 
produce correct, acceptable results), in order to establish political authority 
corresponding to political obligation Estlund required a justificatory theory. That is 
how he came to his normative consent account. 
His account is built around an asymmetry he notices in classic consent theory. 
Recalling that the consent paradigm holds that sometimes willingly and intentionally 
given consent can be nullified and thus fail to produce an obligation88 (when consent 
is given to something prohibited by superior moral considerations), Estlund produces 
the parallel contention that, in certain conditions, non-consent can be nullified too: 
“why not say, instead, that just as consent is sometimes null if it fails to meet certain 
standards, likewise non-consent can be defective too.”89 Based on this asymmetry he 
then argues, through examples, that in the circumstances of politics withholding 
consent is a morally wrongful and a null act that cannot keep us from having to 
discharge our political obligations. 90  For Estlund this means that consent to the 
authority of the state is normative consent (NC).  
                                                        
86 Estlund classifies his work as hypothetical consent and we will discuss it as such even though there 
are scholars who claim that Estlund is actually proposing a natural duty account. Estlund denies that, 
however, because he sees natural duty accounts as “separate authority from issues of consent 
completely”. D. Estlund, Democratic Authority, Princeton University Press, Princeton, p. 116. His 
opponents are, as we shall see, right.  
87 See D. Enoch, “On Estlund’s Democratic Authority”, The Jerusalem Philosophical Quarterly, Vol. 
58, 2009, pp. 35-48.  
88  “…without consent there is no authority (the libertarian clause), but unless there are certain 
nullifying conditions (the nullity proviso) consent to authority establishes authority (the authority 
clause)”. Estlund, Democratic Authority, p. 119.  
89 D. Estlund, “Political Authority and The Tyranny of Non-Consent”, Philosophical Issues, Vol. 15, 
Normativity, 2005, 358-367, p. 357.  
90  G. Sreenivasan, “Oh, but you should have”: Estlund on Normative Consent”, The Jerusalem 
Philosophical Quarterly, Vol. 58, 2009, pp. 62-72 has a good discussion on this.  
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That consent is normative in the senses that it has normative power is obvious: 
all proponents of this theory believe that consent changes the normative situation of 
an individual, that there is a gap between moral reasons and moral requirements that it 
can perfectly fill. 91 Because of its feeble connection to individual will and 
unprecedented and perilous reliance on moral reasons, Estlund’s consent, however, 
proves not to have the normative power of its predecessors. As I show next, very little 
is actually normative about “normative consent”.  
Estlund’s discussion on asymmetry is supposed to make the reader understand 
that on occasion moral reasons can nullify both consent and non-consent. The 
propositions he defends are that “consent produces a moral obligation in all but those 
situations in which it is nullified by superior moral considerations” whereas “non-
consent does not produce a moral obligation in all but those situations in which it is 
nullified by superior moral considerations”. There is nothing inherently objectionable 
about these statements, insofar as they are perfectly compatible with what we already 
knew from the earlier consent tradition and moral theory. Nevertheless, Estlund 
believes these statements to underline the equal and correlative normative power of 
consent and non-consent. This belief is false. On the positive side of the coin, i.e. the 
situations in which the agent’s consent produces an obligation, it is perfectly clear that 
consent carries the normative load – it is the source of the moral requirement to X. In 
cases of nullification however, the normative load lies with the moral reasons that 
generated the nullification, not with the consent or non-consent. In other words, 
independently of whether that nullification has produced an obligation or not, 
consent/non-consent have not played any “morally productive” roles:92 in each case 
the agent’s will is simply trumped by overarching moral reasons that negate it. Thus, 
when it comes to nullification, from a moral standpoint, consent has generated 
nothing; moral reasons have. This is crucial, as it has determinant negative effects on 
obligation. 
It is important to understand that the outcomes of nullification of consent vary 
in one very significant way from the outcomes of nullified non-consent. When 
consent is nullified the agent is returned to a position of moral neutrality – no moral 
                                                        
91 W. Edmundson, “Consent and Its Cousins”, Ethics, Vol. 121, No.2, 2011, pp. 335-353, p.  336.  
92 Phrase used by T. Christiano, “Authority”, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Edmundson 
expressed a similar opinion; he too doubted that in Estlund’s theory consent has any normative or 
explanatory role that is not already fulfilled by moral reasons. Edmundson, “Consent and Its Cousins”, 
p. 347.  
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obligation that was not there before is now present. In that context, the only power 
moral reasons have is to stop the appearance of a novel obligation. In contrast, when 
non-consent is nullified, according to Estlund’s writings the person is yanked out of 
neutrality and burdened with a new obligation (to obey, no less). Moral reasons – 
understood as the moral principles that apply to the situation – therefore not only have 
the power to annul the will, they also have the ability independently to produce an 
obligation. But this is not something moral or legal theory accept: moral principles 
have pre-emptive power and regulative abilities but, on their own, they cannot settle 
individuals with obligations; create natural duties they have in virtue of their own 
humanity, yes, prima facie obligations, no. If they could and did, this would actually 
pose the greatest challenge to his account. If moral reasons have this capacity to not 
only override the agent’s wishes but also independently create obligation, why appeal 
to consent in the first place?93 What gap is there still that needs consent in order to be 
filled?94 Estlund thus either denies the existence of separation between pre-emptive 
character and peremptory character or he is awkwardly restating the NJT as the ability 
of secondary reasons for nullification to annul the primary ones for non-consent. The 
consequence of this would not be authority, however, as was the case with NJT, but a 
mere return to the default position of neutrality, since, as seen, the power to prevent 
the desires of agents from materializing does not correspond to a power to settle them 
                                                        
93 Couple this with Estlund’s admission that authority can have sources other than consent (when 
consent is absent it does not necessarily mean that there is no political authority; it only means that 
there is no political authority stemming from that consent). Estlund,  “Political Authority and The 
Tyranny of Non-Consent”, p 354.  
94 Moral principles generate moral requirements but these requirements are not obligations. Remember 
the list of conditions for the latter established in the introduction. First of all, requirements imposed by 
moral principles have to do with the internal ethics of the moral agent and speak about their character. 
Obligations, on the other hand, are either voluntarily assumed or are brought about by circumstances 
that have nothing to do with, and are not impacted in any way by the moral fibre of the bearers. 
Secondly, these requirements apply at least to all those that embrace the generating moral principles. 
This goes against the condition that obligations be a special relationship and is seriously problematic 
for political obligation specifically, since particularity could never be justified in the one group of 
citizens-one set of applicable institutions sense; if moral principles imposed obligations then all would 
owe to all. Thirdly, these requirements do not impose a right. It is not implicit in the claim that one 
should perform ethical behaviour X or Y that the others have a right against them to act in that specific 
way. This is the classic differentiation between should and must: the facts that it would be better for 
myself or others for me to X, or that my Y-ing would bring about morally superior consequences do 
not entail that I must X or Y or that others are justifiably entitled to my X or Y-ing.  Finally, insofar as 
we start from the standard assumption of natural freedom (meaning that there is no natural duty of 
subjection), whatever duty moral principles would bring about its satisfaction would have to be shown 
to be exclusively predicated on districted obedience for political obligations to work. Whatever 
impositions moral principles generate then they remain squarely in the realm of ethics. Remember here 
also that when the content of moral principles and legal obligations overlap it is law that obligates, not 
the principle directly. 
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with whatever obligation is desired instead. It all comes down to a question of 
sufficient capability, and sufficiency for annulling consent is not sufficiency for the 
generation of obligation; and moral principles may be able to create duties but they do 
not have the ability to manufacture obligations from thin air.  
In these senses, his account is paradoxical: if nullified non-consent is real and 
presupposes the consequences Estlund imagines, then moral reasons are sufficient for 
obligation and appeals to consent – or any other source – are superfluous; practice and 
theory nevertheless inform that they are not. So either Estlund discovered ability 
beyond what moral theory uniformly awards or the logic in his claims is poisoned.    
 
This one criticism is enough to reject Estlund’s normative consent as a 
compelling theory of political obligation. Still, it pays to at least consider a situation 
in which non-consent is nullified, at least to see what that looks like. I contend that his 
main example of a nullified non-consent situation is neither obviously true, nor one in 
which considerations on the consent of individuals are likely to arise.   
 
“Consider a flight attendant who, in an effort to help the injured after a crash, 
says to Joe, ‘You! I need you to do as I say!” Let us not yet suppose this puts Joe 
under her authority. Even if it does not, Joe would (I hope you agree) be morally 
wrong not to agree to do as she says (at least under a significant range of 
circumstances). Once that is granted, the question remains whether by refusing, 
wrongly, to agree to do as she says, Joe has escaped the duty to do as she says. 
Consent theory, with its libertarian clause, draws a libertarian conclusion: Joe may 
have various obligations in such a terrible scenario, but the flight attendant’s 
instructions have no authority over him. Why? Because, luckily for Joe, he is 
despicable. If you find consent theory’s implication implausible here, as I do, then 
you think that Joe has not escaped the authority by refusing to consent. So he is under 
authority even without having consented. In this case, non-consent to authority is null. 
If this is granted, consent theory must be rejected.”95 
 
This example is supposed to illustrate the fact that Joe would be wrong in 
withholding consent from the flight attendant who has assumed authority and that, 
                                                        
95 Estlund, Democratic Authority, p. 124.  
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consequently, he has to do as she commands. That the flight attendant (FA) is best 
equipped to act as the authority in this scenario is one possible conclusion but it is not 
the only one and it is not obviously or necessarily correct. Although probability 
indicates it, the fact is that our knowledge of the situation and the agents involved is 
imperfect: what if Joe were some sort of survival specialist or if the FA mismanaged 
the situation by failing to prioritize properly or giving out erroneous orders? What if 
cooperative efforts in which each decided what to do individually, based on know-
how, were more productive? Would the FA still retain authority and, if so, why? 
These questions should encourage us, and Estlund, to consider the fact that in the 
absence of complete information we cannot isolate the applicable moral reason and 
discern, with any degree of certainty how they affect the individuals involved. His 
example is therefore not conclusively one of a scenario in which non-consent meets 
his criteria. This is not at all surprising given that Estlund himself was, by his own 
admission, incapable of compiling a definitive list of wrongful and null acts or of 
providing us with a method of discovering them.96  When it comes to the moral 
reasons that make non-consent wrongful and null, leaving the realm of conjecture is 
extraordinarily hard.  
The bigger problem is that this example very much reads as one underlying 
the difference between being “an authority” and [merely] being “in authority”, thus 
bringing us back once again to the issue Estlund has with the very concept, as well as 
creating broader theoretical concerns about the kind of account he is actually 
suggesting. Talisse and Harbour make the point that, even if the FA were best suited 
to assume command, Joe could be submitting to her leadership, rather than her 
authority. If this were the case, what Joe would have to do would be to follow her, 
rather than to obey her.97 Estlund denies this on the basis of a presupposition that, 
unlike leadership, the authority of the FA (and the correlative obligation to obey) 
survives the making of mistakes. This opinion is not unorthodox; true authority 
survives error resulting from excusable ignorance to negligence up to the point of 
reasonable disobedience.98 As such, Estlund is correct in claiming that authorities, as 
opposed to mere leaders, maintain control beyond their mistakes in a way that the 
latter do not. The problem, however, is that his flight attendant, knowledgeable as she 
                                                        
96 Ibid., p. 127.  
97 R. Talisse, M. Harbour, “Questions about Normative Consent”, The Good Society, Vol. 18, No.2, 
2009, pp. 48-53, p. 50.  
98 J. Raz, The Morality of Freedom, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1986, pp. 47-48. 
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may be, is no actual authority. Everything in his short example, as well as common 
knowledge about this sort of scenario, suggest that she may be in authority – the 
person rising up from the group ranks to regulate it, its members and their actions – 
and have the authority of expertise, but she is no obvious holder of a power right to do 
so. Thus, any decisions she might make, including those supported by strong moral 
reasons, are not commands in the sense of political obligation, and the fact of people 
acquiescing to her demands is not an expression of consent or an instance of 
discharging obligation but mere going along with someone recognized as a director 
(the same way children go along with the decision of the more knowledgeable coach, 
patients with the demands of their doctor, students with the requests of their teachers, 
and so on). Estlund’s flight attendant may, therefore, be the expert and some 
compliance may lend itself to the situation, but obedience (let alone any theoretically 
possible obligation) is not in any way caused or conditioned by or on her persona or 
status. Not consenting to her may be offensive, morally and otherwise, but it is in no 
way a failure to discharge obligation.  
The second issue, as mentioned before, has to do with the shape of his account 
and is a question of theoretical belonging. Aside from his declared commitment to 
refashioned consent, Estlund’s account reads very much like an orthodox natural duty 
or urgency account similar to what people like Christopher Wellman have defended.99 
These accounts attempt to derive obligation from situations of urgency, on the idea 
that in these scenarios the natural duty to rescue those in peril can only be met if the 
holders of duty obey. Estlund’s account can be placed in this category without 
difficulty, as obedience is ultimately a way to remove the others from a dramatic 
situation; the receiver of obedience being in that position specifically because 
submission to his authority is the only way to save everyone. Re-examining his 
proposed justification from this perspective could be a saving grace, up to a point. 
Removing all discussions about a problematic and inconsequential hypothetical 
consent and about the authority of expertise vs. authority in the political theory sense 
leaves us with an account of political obligations resting on a single sufficient ground. 
The problem, however, is that this sort of justification only takes us so far. As will be 
seen later, the fact that this paradigm barely resembles our mundane political realities, 
                                                        
99 Others view it as more akin to an obligation of fair-play or some plain utilitarian consideration. D. 
Lefkowitz expresses such an opinion. See https://publicreason.net/2008/02/25/estlund-reading-group-
chapter-7/. 
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coupled with a persistent inability to demonstrate the content of this duty of rescue to 
be obedience and to demonstrate particularity brings about its failure as a justification. 
To conclude on Estlund, his writings are not conducive to a finding of genuine 
political obligation. His belief that moral reasons and expertise are a source of 
political obligation is wide of the mark, and efforts to salvage it by categorizing it as a 
natural duty of rescue – from which it is virtually indistinguishable, hypothetical 
consent aside – are not conducive to success for reasons already mentioned and 
explored further in chapter IV. In the absence of the target of justification of political 
obligation, the most that can be said about Estlund’s account is that it manages to 
extract some authority from the ability of states to manage complicated situations 
better than average citizens, thus reinforcing his larger claim on authority as the 
province of democracies most adept at reaching true and correct decisions.  
 
The failures of hypothetical consent as a justification of political obligation 
had a two-pronged effect. On the one hand it forced political theory into the 
realization that that this practice of changing consent to the point of “disfigurement” 
has no pay offs, both because it has no good results as far as justification is 
concerned, and because it opens the door for degenerations into something that could 
either function as a thesis of authority or into something theoretically unremarkable 
that fails to distinguish itself, in any relevant manner, from the more straightforward 
claims of bona fide, declared natural duty efforts.100 On the other hand, consent theory 
as a whole, left without what most considered its last standing leg, was by and large 
shelved as an explanation of political obligation. The collapse of the theory brought 
about new efforts to come up with alternative justifications of political obligation that 
could make up for its faults and better capture the realities of socio-political life; this 
is how principle of fairness and associative accounts of obligation came to be. The 
principle of fairness is the topic of concern of the second part of this chapter. It is the 
last attempt at resolving the problem of political obligation on 
voluntarism/transactionalism and the idea that has dominated the thought on the 
requirement to obey for the better part of twenty-five years. Its eventual failure, at the 
                                                        
100 I say mutilation because this consent does barely mimic actual consent, embrace voluntarism or 
pays as much attention to bindingness and compliance. C. Stark, “Hypothetical Consent and 
Justification”, in The Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 97, No. 6, 2000, pp.  313-334, pp. 316-320.  
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hand of Simmons, marked the total collapse of voluntarism and its definitive 
replacement with non-voluntarism. 
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H.L.A. Hart was the one to introduce the principle of fairness as a [sketch of 
a] justification of political obligation in his now seminal article “Are There Any 
Natural Rights?”: There he held that “when a number of persons conduct any joint 
enterprise according to rules and thus restrict their liberty, those who have submitted 
to these restrictions when required have a right to a similar submission from those 
who have benefited by their submission…”.101 
His brief comments are clear insofar as the application of the principle is 
concerned, with it being conditioned on the existence of an enterprise governed by a 
firm set of rules designed strictly to regulate the behaviours of individuals who 
participate in it and who profit from it on a regular basis. Unfortunately, Hart does not 
explain further what type of “project” counts as an enterprise, why is a governing set 
of rules necessary, and whom exactly the class of beneficiaries is comprised of.   
There are two obvious issues with Hart’s bare-boned articulation of the 
principle. Firstly, how one becomes a member in an enterprise or remains an outsider 
should have been firmly determined; Hart’s failure to mention the mechanisms, 
methods or procedures for acquiring/avoiding membership is bound to become 
problematic in situations in which the high costs of membership, or suspicions of 
free-riding or of forceful “conscription” into the enterprise make necessary a precise 
identification of the principle’s subjects. Secondly, Hart’s insistence on rules could 
also cause qualms. Although efficient cooperative enterprises not governed by rules 
seem somewhat farfetched, the fact of the matter is that the cooperation they require is 
not predicated on the existence of governing rules, the principle of fairness being 
capable of triggering a duty to cooperate regardless of the existence, quality or 
specificity of regulative norms.102 His paragraph is therefore misleading in the senses 
                                                        
101H.L.A. Hart, “Are There Any Natural Rights?”, The Philosophical Review, Vol. 64, No. 2, 1955, pp. 
175-191, p. 185. 
102 Simmons agrees. His intuition is that whenever an enterprise exists and benefits are accrued from 
participation the requirements of fair play should be met regardless of the “tidiness”, neatness or 
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that it can give the impression that there is a relationship of dependence between rules 
and the cooperative requirement – there is not: a disorganized enterprise providing 
members with benefits is still one owed fair-play and its content. Since Hart writes no 
more on the principle though, the gaps in his original justification had to be filled by 




Rawls proposes the principle as a justification of the moral requirement to 
obey on a voluntarist reading in the era immediately preceding his commitment to the 
natural duty of justice. He makes a few changes to the Hartian principle. While he 
retains one of the original conditions – that the cooperative scheme should be 
governed by rules – he redefines the “enterprise” governed by the principle as a 
mutually beneficial and just “active scheme of cooperation”, adds a free-riding clause 
that links the possibility of benefaction to a generalized avoidance of unfair profiting 
and, most importantly, states that becoming bound to a scheme is not contingent on 
mere receipt of goods but on “having accepted and our intention to continue accepting 
the benefits of a just scheme of cooperation”.103 These are all evident in the following 
quote: 
 
“The principle of fair play may be defined as follows. Suppose there is a 
mutually beneficial and just scheme of social cooperation, and that the advantages it 
yields can only be obtained if everyone, or nearly everyone, cooperated. Suppose 
further that cooperation requires a certain sacrifice from each person, or at least 
involves a certain restriction of his liberty. Suppose finally that the benefits produced 
by cooperation are, up to a certain point, free: that is, the scheme of cooperation is 
unstable in the senses that if any one knows that all (or nearly all) of the others will 
continue to do their part, he will still be able to share a gain from the scheme even if 
he does not do his part. Under these conditions a person who has accepted the benefits 
                                                                                                                                                              
cohesion of the enterprise. A.J. Simmons, “The Principle of Fair Play”, A.J. Simmons, Justification 
and Legitimacy: Essays on Rights and Obligations, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2001, pp. 
1-27, p. 4. 
103 See J. Rawls, “Legal Obligation and the Duty of Fair Play” in S. Freeman (ed.), The Collected 
Works of John Rawls, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 1999, p. 122. Also, see Simmons, “The 
Principle of Fair Play”, p. 5. 
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of the scheme is bound by a duty of fair play to do his part and not to take advantage 
of the free benefits by not cooperating”.104 
 
Rawls’ additions are significant. First, there is the free-riding condition. Rawls 
is convinced that benefaction is only possible when participants in a scheme discharge 
their duties of return fairly; this in turn implies that failure to cooperate is unfair and 
morally reprehensible. That may not be true. Though free-riding is in and of itself [at 
least] objectionable, a single – or repeated – act of it is very unlikely to endanger 
benefiting, much like individual cooperative discharges are unlikely genuinely to 
affect the production and distribution of benefits. This begs the question of whether a 
diagnostic of morally reprehensibleness for free-riding is justified ab initio. And if 
this occasional or habitual free-riding does not deprive others of benefits what are the 
implications for the obligation to obey? It seems possible that inconsequential free-
riding, while unfair as a matter of principle, is not unfair vis-à-vis other participants in 
the scheme, i.e. participants who remain unaffected by individual X’s non-
performance, or by his performance. Then, if the benefiting of others and benefiting 
itself are indemonstrably influenced by X’s non-cooperation, can it really be said that 
X is under an obligation to fair-play? The point here is that common senses and moral 
intuitions encourage telling an individual “you are obligated by your own benefaction 
and under fairness in cooperation” but further probing reveals it is much harder to 
defend the claim in the face of retorts that his or hers actual or theoretical free-riding 
does not have the consequences ascribed by proponents of the principle and therefore 
may fail to impose a duty. Ultimately, the individual could answer that a point of 
general principle is used to impose heavy burdens on him without his actions having 
any concrete, real life effect on the scheme and other members. He could argue fair 
play to be a well-mannered response dictated by etiquette and social rules, but not 
authentically mandatory; he could object that “jerkiness” does not one “unjustified, 
unfair disobeyer” make. Still, it is understandable why Rawls felt compelled to 
introduce the clause. It is the sort of thing morality dictates and minimally acts as a 
safeguard of efficiency (although inefficiency automatically precludes neither the 
application of the principle nor benefaction).105   
                                                        
104Rawls, “Legal Obligation and the Duty of Fair Play”, p. 122.  
105Simmons, “The Principle of Fair Play”, p. 4.  
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Secondly, he introduces a just condition, discoverable in the phrase “suppose 
there is a mutually beneficial and just scheme”, evocative of his life-long 
preoccupation with the issue. What is more mysterious, however, is what Rawls 
means by this and how it affects cooperation, if at all. We can speculate that a scheme 
can be just in two different senses: if it pursues a non-morally objectionable goal or if 
it distributes benefits justly between members, whatever that may mean (it could 
mean proportionally to reciprocation, it could mean equally, it could entail 
proportionality with needs, etc.).106  Slim chance that Rawls meant to convey the 
former, nothing in his work suggesting that: although moral theory presupposes broad 
agreement on the idea that a nefarious goal is incompatible with obligation, this could 
not be the type of “just” Rawls had in mind: i.e. that, under the principle of fairness, 
whenever a functioning cooperative scheme governed by rules and supplying benefits 
can be discovered obligations of reciprocity exist regardless of the morality of goals: 
 
“….the intuitive force of the principle of fair play seems to be preserved even 
for criminal conspiracies, for example. The special rights and obligations that  arise 
under the principle are thought to do so because of special relationships between the 
cooperating parties.... No reference is made here to the morally acceptable status of 
the scheme”.107 
 
Although scholarship resists the idea of “immoral obligations”, Rawls gives 
no indication that he intended his principle to be restricted to those cooperative 
schemes pursuing obviously moral purposes. Such a limitation would undoubtedly 
prove to be challenging, as it would create the necessity of moral evaluation and bring 
about a whiff of paternalism. Subsequently, it seems permissible to conclude that 
“just” could not have been intended as a confirmation of the morality of the scheme. 
 The second senses appear to be more readily in tune with Rawls’s intention: a 
scheme is just insofar as participants are “allocated at least a fair share of benefits” in 
return for having borne a fair share of the burden.108 Simmons has issues with this 
meaning. While he understands that Rawls’ motivation was a desire to ensure that no 
one be required to carry the designated share of the burden of cooperation when they 
                                                        
106Simmons agrees. Simmons, “The Principle of Fair Play”, pp. 6-7.  
107Ibid., p. 7.  
108Ibid.,p.7. 
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have not been allocated a correct amount of benefits, Simmons thinks this is an 
instance of Rawls overreaching. He reads Rawls as requiring that everyone be given a 
fair share of the burden/benefit in order for any one X individual to be considered 
obligated under the principle of fair-play, an idea with which he disagrees. 109 
According to him, as long as an individual has been assigned a fair share of the 
benefits he is bound to discharge his share of the burden, regardless of how equitably 
benefits have been paid onto the others or of how distribution is done generally. 
Besides this, Rawls’ writings on the principle of fair play (or even our own 
“intuitions” about it) do not suggest that individuals who have cooperated in an unjust 
scheme, but who have still received a fair share of the benefits, are somehow exempt 
from obligation. In these conditions, Simmons concludes that the justness of the 
scheme does not actually entail anything relevant about obligation. 
Simmons makes a valid theoretical point. One could be a co-operator in the 
most disgustingly motivated, most haphazardly distributing cooperative scheme in the 
universe, yet, as long as benefits are accepted once profits are received, a requirement 
to comply ensues independently of the scheme’s moral worthiness or, more 
importantly, of the scheme’s fair or unfair behaviours towards other members. But 
again, as the principle was intended as a general ground of political obligation with 
blanket efficiency, the question becomes “how many individuals living in an unjust 
state are likely to receive a fair share of the benefits?”. Probably not very many, 
certainly not enough to be able to speak of a majority of them (in the scheme) as 
being politically obligated under the principle of fair play. Thus, while Simmons’ 
claim that some people can have obligations even towards schemes that victimize 
others is perfectly plausible, we have to allow that, as far as political obligation is 
concerned, Rawls’ justice condition acts as a guarantee for the general applicability of 
the principle. 
Simmons nonetheless does not see this. Insisting on his point, he moves on to 
explain that, even if we become tempted to alter our understanding of a “just scheme” 
from a scheme in which everyone receives a fair, equal share of the burden and of the 
benefits, to a scheme in which the benefits awarded are proportional to the burden 
carried, Rawls’ justice condition continues not to appear as absolutely mandatory. On 
this reading of the clause everyone who has received a portion of the benefits 
                                                        
109Simmons, “The Principle of Fair Play”, p. 8. 
 79 
produced by the scheme – be it large or small – has a duty to shoulder their fair share 
of the burden. The only caveat is that those who have received fewer goods from the 
scheme have a weaker duty to support it than the ones who have profited more from 
it. While he acknowledges that in cases of schemes in which burdens cannot be 
distributed unequally this sort of interpretation of the phrase “fair share” cannot apply, 
he thinks that in the cases in which it is appropriate it still does not show why the 
justice condition is necessary. Simmons believes that, on this reading, the best 
example that could be construed in favour of the justice condition would be the one of 
an unjust scheme that requires the cooperation of both those it rendered better off and 
those it mistreated by distributing inequitable shares of the benefits. This worrisome 
example might encourage thinking that it would be best to restrict the principle of 
fairness to just schemes so that, even if we draw few benefits from them, that amount 
is still fair in the sense that it is proportional to the cooperative effort we have put in. 
Simmons denies this, however. He argues that in cases such as the one above, other 
moral considerations (not specified) or non-acceptance will interfere and “may 
override the principle of fair play”.110 
This is an instance of splitting hairs. The state is not the kind of scheme that 
divides citizens into classes corresponding to distinct levels of benefaction and 
subsequent distinct levels of obligations, hence discussions about differentiations and 
proportionality in duties to obey are off-topic. What matters genuinely is if the 
justness, or unjustness, of scheme state has any actual effects on obligation and on 
individual acts of discharge. The answer, on this reading, is that it does not. Rawls’ 
principle of fairness is a voluntary account and, as such, as long as subjects willingly 
accept benefits, as he claims, they owe obedience even to unjust schemes, at least 
until benefactions cease and disobedience becomes reasonable and justifiable. Rawls’ 
just condition, though meant to act as a safeguard, has therefore no causal or deterrent 
impact on obligation: once agents become members through acceptance and benefit 
they are bound regardless of the moral nature of the scheme itself, this irrelevancy 
actually working to the advantage of the account by excusing members from 
discovering duty only when moral evaluations indicate that justness permits it. 
Acceptance alone is thus a sufficient, perfect ground of obligation because it is an 
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expression of will. The only issue with this is that, much like express consent, it is 
impossible to discover.  
 
The Issue of Acceptance 
 
The most significant contribution made by Rawls to the principle of fairness is 
making its application contingent on acceptance. Acceptance plays a powerful double 
role in his account. On the one hand, it confirms purposely, knowingly performed acts 
as bringing about both benefaction and obligation. On the other hand, it has 
transformative power, changing outsiders into full scheme members (with voluntarily 
acquired status), thus negating accusations that the principle allows for roping in and 
settling individuals with underserved duties and Nozick’s opinion that the 
membership issue cannot be resolved without appeals to acts committed prior to 
benefaction that would change the ground of obligation and force the theory to 
collapse into consent.111 Any problem acceptance may have is therefore not one of 
generational or sustaining power; it can perform the tasks with which it was settled by 
Rawls. Its only issue is that it cannot be discovered often enough in real life to justify 
a duty to obey the laws of the state. C7conformity poisons the well again. 
Acceptance’s absence can be seen as the result of one of two reasons: (1) 
either because state-provided benefits are “open benefits” available to all, undeniable 
and basically unavoidable, as Simmons suggests, or (2) because none of the state’s 
provisions trigger the mental responses associated with true, wilful, acceptance, as I 
argue.  
Simmons writes that, while it is not feasible to deny that citizens receive these 
open benefits from the state, we have little reason to conceptualize them as having 
been accepted. His view is that the only way in which acceptance can be established 
is by showing that citizens actually believe that open goods are the results of 
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cooperation and worth their costs, and that they would choose to take them even if 
they had the option to refuse. 112  He justifies these two requirements as the only 
appropriate evidence of voluntariness (the latter) and of the state as being an actual 
cooperative scheme (the former). Simmons is, however, entirely reluctant to believe 
that average modern citizens exhibit an attitude of acceptance; on the contrary, he 
suspects that they “barely notice and seem disinclined to think about” state benefits, 
that they think them to be received from the state at exorbitant rates, and that more 
often than not they “commonly regard [open benefits] as purchased (with taxes) from 
a central authority”.113 
More radical than Simmons, I doubt that citizens even think of the open goods 
he mentioned as benefits at all. I believe most individuals imagine benefits to be only 
those things to which they can ascribe a monetary value or perceive as coming from 
“the goodness of the State’s heart” (scholarships, reductions in fees, compensations, 
aid, etc.). Everything else – from infrastructure to pensions – they more likely 
perceive as entitlements derived from tax paying and general compliance. And people 
who do not think of what they receive as stricto senso benefits from a state they do 
not recognize as a cooperative scheme (more on this later) are people who cannot be 
said to have “accepted” in a sense that meets the knowledge-intentionality-
deliberation conditions attached to it as a wilful, consensual act. 
To drive this point further I suggest two alternative understandings for the 
term “acceptance” that should make its absence in real-life situations even more 
obvious: acceptance in the weak senses and acceptance in the strong senses. The first 
version presupposes the presence of a “hearty” psychological dimension – individuals 
must want the benefit offered and know (or at least intuit) that it is the result of 
cooperation – and of an emotional one composed of beliefs such as “worthiness” (of 
accepted benefits, in term of how valuable the good is for the individual) or cost 
appropriateness. Conversely, weak acceptance is much less complex. It is predicated 
only upon the individual wanting a benefit and making an effort to obtain it that could 
be as little as making sure he is in the right place at the right time. Arguably, 
important, unavoidable and omnipresent public goods can be conclusively shown to 
trigger neither the psychological and emotional components associated with strong 
acceptance nor the “wanting” and “making efforts” linked to the weak one. National 
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defence is a good example of this. First of all, it is likely that citizens typically regard 
security within the borders as an endeavour paid for through taxes and sustained by 
the concerted efforts of very specific groups of people that occupy military and 
governmental functions, rather than as ensuing from popular cooperation. Secondly, 
under conditions of peace, we have ample reasons to think that they seldom take the 
time genuinely to appreciate the positive effects it has on their life. Thirdly, if asked, 
most would probably say that the daunting, burdensome and permanent demands the 
providing state makes in exchange for it are exaggerated repayments. Moreover, 
although at a deeper level they probably desire security above all else, if, given the 
opportunity to have a direct say in how taxes are employed, it is likely they would 
either direct the funds towards more visible public projects, or choose to retain that 
money for private pursuits which. Finally, the overwhelming majority of citizens 
make no efforts to obtain it: much like the national health and educational systems or 
the political apparatus, national defence is simply “there”, not very different from a 
random fact of life – we are safe or we are not. The same sort of arguments extends to 
all other open goods. Realistic claims about the acceptance of state-delivered public 
benefits are therefore doubtful on any interpretation of “acceptance”, no matter how 
generous. As such, even if we accept (sic!) all of his previous contentions, Rawls’ 
account fails because the purported ground of obligation, though theoretically 
excellent, does not materialize in the real world, entailing, yet again C7conformity. 
 One closing charge to be made against the Rawlsian version of the principle 
is a now standard one that it marshals a conception of the state that hardly reflects life 
and interactions between states and citizens. Simmons was particularly adamant about 
this. In “The Principle of Fair Play” he wrote that he does not “think that many of us 
can honestly say that we regard our political lives as a process of working together 
and making necessary sacrifices for the purpose of improving the common lot” and 
that “where there is no consciousness of cooperation, no common plan or purpose, no 
cooperative scheme exists”.114 Twenty years later, when he assesses some of the later 
developments in the principle of fairness (particularly Klosko’s theory, which will be 
discussed next), he comes back to reinforce his point by arguing that “there is a vast 
moral difference between genuinely collaborative efforts for mutual benefit” and the 
accidental coordination that occurs when people live in the same territory and which 
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occasionally produces not only individual benefaction but also a communal one.115 
Simmons understands cooperation as being about common motivation and at least a 
minimal awareness (among participants) that they are working towards a shared goal. 
To his mind, nothing in the configuration of modern states suggests they are a scheme 
of cooperation.116 
This thrust is noticeably endorsed by reality. Most of the intuitions people 
have about fairness and cooperation come from the experience of having been a 
member in some small scheme in which people know each other and work in an 
orchestrated manner towards the fulfilment of whatever fixed ambition. Proponents of 
the principle of fairness as a ground for political obligation extrapolate from these 
little enterprises to the enormous state and imagine that nothing is lost in the process. 
This is, to an important degree, implausible. Within the enormous group that is the 
state, people by and large individualistically pursue their own interests. And while it 
would be incorrect to claim that citizens never make orchestrated efforts or genuinely 
cooperate (in the full meaning of the word) towards some commonly desired good, 
the fruits of this cooperation are much more limited in availability, scope, cost and 
inclusivity than the benefits states provide in ways that do not make them feel or think 
they have been involved with a determinant role in either production or delivery. 
Factor in the previously expressed conviction that people are more likely to think of 
state benefits as appropriate and expected repayments for taxation, and the diluted, or 
non-existent, relationships between the millions or billions of members of states, 
Rawls’ conception of the state as a cooperative scheme patterned on the same model 
as small, voluntary enterprises is evidently flawed. Still, as far as assumptions go, it is 
not one that goes against the conformity criterion established in the methodology, in 
the sense that, while closer to the outer limit of acceptability, it is not far-fetched to 
the point that it becomes toxic to the justificatory narrative, at least not on this 
account in which will is the ultimate source of political obligation. The problem with 
this assumption, therefore, is not so much that it is “unrealistic”, but that it invites 
considerations of fairness in a context in which it may not apply, or apply minimally; 
other principles more obviously governing citizen interactions than it. Since will is 
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present though, threats implied by this are kept in check, problems truly arising out of 
this inconsistency only when it is removed from the account.  
 
The idea that citizen bodies are not disjoined sums of individuals but groups 
with many and significant commonalities, including of purpose and interest, will recur 
in the history of the thought on political obligation but it will not be under the 
umbrella of voluntarism. So will the principle of fairness. While Rawls renounced it 
in favour of his non-voluntary justification from a natural duty of justice, others, most 
noticeably Klosko, picked up the baton and tried to salvage it. This would prove to be 
an arduous task because, such as it was post-Rawls, whatever new argument was 
going to be produced would need successfully to address the membership issue in a 
way that would not introduce some new, ground-changing act, that would not 
entertain a too tenuous relationship to reality or make exaggerated claims about 
people, their actions or metal states, and that would negotiate the complicated 
relationship with voluntarism. Klosko will come closest to accomplishing this task, by 




In his articulation of the principle, Klosko relies heavily on the previous work 
of Richard Arneson. He was the one to tie the application of the principle of fairness 
to the distribution of public goods, and the one to first suggest that obedience to the 
law is the fair-play repayment owed to a state that has fairly distributed non-
excludable public goods to its citizens. This idea would have tremendous influence on 
Klosko who, as we shall see in the next pages, marshalled a non-voluntary version of 
the principle that rests on it.  
Arneson came to the conclusion above about the relationship between public 
goods and fairness in “The Principle of Fairness and Free-Rider Problem”, an article 
in which his main intention was to defend the principle from Nozick’s critique.117 
Unlike Simmons, who rejected this objection by reminding us of the force of 
Rawlsian acceptance, Arneson argued that some benefits can produce obligations of 
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reciprocation, even if they have not been voluntarily accepted. These benefits are 
those public goods that exhibit three features: they are available to all citizens, insofar 
as X’s consumption of public good G leaves just as much and as good G for others; 
they are impossible to deny to particular groups of disqualified people (they are non-
excludable); and they are consumed in identical quantities by all citizens.118 In short, 
the benefits that generate duties even in the absence of wilful acceptance are non-
excludable, collective benefits that can be neither voluntarily rejected, nor voluntarily 
accepted, and that require the cooperation of all simply because all must receive.119  
Klosko was inspired by Arneson to by and large eliminate all pretences to 
knowledge, intentionality and deliberation, not by embracing non-voluntarism per se, 
but rather by placing the principle of fairness outside of the logic itself: i.e. it is not so 
much that his principle is non-voluntary, it is that it cannot be voluntary. 
 In “Presumptive Benefit, Fairness, and Political Obligation”, Klosko thus 
follows Arneson in arguing that the “limiting argument”120 – the argument that one’s 
mere receipt of benefits cannot obligate one to cooperate towards the purposes of a 
scheme – can be defused if the conditions of the principle of fairness are changed so 
as to include the requirement that the goods received “be important” and “worth the 
recipients effort in providing them and presumptively beneficial”, i.e. non-excludable 
public goods (henceforth NEPGs).121 In this perspective, his main contention is that, 
as far as that category of public benefits that are necessary for the good life are 
concerned, receipt can generate obligation even in the absence of acceptance.122 
Klosko is convinced that the indispensability of presumptively beneficial public 
goods “overrides the outsider’s [of a scheme] usual right to choose whether he wishes 
to cooperate” or not.123 Thus, for him, the magnitude/value of a cooperative public 
good is enough to generate obligation.  
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Klosko parts ways with Arneson, however, when it comes to restricting his 
theory to non-excludable goods. Realizing that such a limitation could at best justify 
obligation only towards a minimal state, in the same article he extends his line of 
thought so as to include discretionary public goods (DPGs).124 Discretionary goods 
are explained to be goods that, despite not being individually necessary for proper 
living, are required to sustain the provision of non-excludable ones. Consequently, 
Klosko claims that, while a cooperative scheme’s provision of a single discretionary 
good cannot produce obligation, when they are delivered as items supplementary to 
the packages of NEPGs already being provided by the scheme, they produce 
additional obligation for beneficiaries.125 This clarification is supposedly fundamental 
for his argument. According to Klosko, it serves to shift the burden of proof: instead 
of him having to prove that citizens have additional obligations for this secondary, 
non-important category of goods as well, it is for people that already have to 
participate in the provision of the NEPGs to show that the extra involvement 
demanded by the supplementary delivery of DPGs makes the overall costs of 
participation exceed the total worthiness of goods obtained. Thus, unless it can be 
shown that benefaction has decreased overall as an outcome of the addition of DPGs, 
or that the scheme has become unfair, people continue to remain obligated.126 
When he picks up the principle again, in his The Principle of Fairness and 
Political Obligation, Klosko keeps his argument almost identical, introducing only a 
few new relevant details about the benefits provided by the state. On the one hand, as 
far as presumptively beneficial public goods are concerned, they are now described as 
having two central features. First, as we knew from before, they are indispensable, a 
fact which continues to “override the outsider’s usual right to decide whether he 
wishes to cooperate” (with people having to input into non-excludable schemes 
whether they want to or not), and to guarantee that the costs on non-excludable goods, 
no matter how high, low or demanding, are always worth paying.127 Secondly, as a 
novelty, Klosko also explicitly underlines the absence of any link between non-
excludable goods and particular mental states. Individuals do not have to believe they 
draw benefits in order to become obligated: if the proponents of a scheme can 
                                                        
124Ibid., p. 254. 
125Ibid., pp. 254-255. 
126 Ibid., p. 256. 
127G. Klosko, The Principle of Fairness and Political Obligation, Rowman & Littlefield, Oxford, 1992, 
p. 54.  
 87 
convince that a non-cooperator displays the attributes of a beneficiary, they have a 
right to demand reciprocation regardless of the subject’s opinion (about whether or 
not they are genuinely benefiting, about the importance of the goods received, about 
the source of the goods, etc.).  Nor do the subjects of obligation have to acknowledge 
(or even realize) that non-excludable goods are products of cooperation. Klosko 
insists that requiring awareness of these factors is self-defeating because, 
independently of them, the important nature of these goods makes receipt and the 
supervening obligation to cooperate unavoidable. Similarly, regarding discretionary 
public goods, Klosko introduces two sub-clauses: an indirect one, which establishes 
that discretionary goods must (1) be added to a scheme through fair and democratic 
procedures governed by majority rule, (2) not increase the overall cost of the scheme 
to the point of outweighing benefits, and (3) be as fairly distributed as presumptive 
goods in order to produce an obligation of reciprocation;128 and an institutional one 
which aims to justify compliance with laws regulating discretionary goods by 
invoking both the superior level obligations individuals incur in return for 
presumptive goods (obligations that in his opinion cover discretionary ones as well) 
and the “corrosive effects of disobedience”.129 
Klosko’s argument is, at face value, excellent: he manages to find a way for 
benefaction to change the normative situation of the individual by settling with an 
obligation of fair-play whose content is a requirement to obey while marshalling more 
moderate claims about the state as a cooperative scheme dedicated to the provision of 
goods of such importance that receipt, almost unavoidable, is sufficient to generate 
duties. Deeper analysis reveals issues however, almost all discovered, as mentioned, 
by Simmons.130  
Simmons responds to Klosko’s version of the principle of fairness in his 1987 
“The Anarchist Position: A Reply to Klosko and Senor” and then later in his “Fair 
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Play and Political Obligations: Twenty Years Later” 131 . In his original piece, 
Simmons produces three counter-arguments to Klosko’s account. The first one (which 
appears to be Simmons’ main concern) stresses Klosko’s obscure view on the 
relationship between indispensability and fairness-generated obligation. Simmons has 
trouble grasping why Klosko feels that “indispensability is relevant to fairness”.132 
His main intuition is that the importance of a benefit is likely to bring forward moral 
principles other than fairness; the duty to help those in need and to promote happiness 
come to his mind. The following passages make this abundantly clear: 
 
“I believe the magnitude or importance of goods functions in two ways in 
Klosko's argument; but neither works to the advantage of his position. First, it seems 
clear that one reason why intuitions of obligation follow perceptions of 
indispensability is that the importance of benefits brings other moral principles 
(besides the principle of fairness) into play. Our duties to promote happiness and to 
help those in need, for instance, are actuated by occasions for providing indispensable 
goods. But these duties have nothing to do with fairness;…. But magnitude of benefit 
seems important in a second way as well. Klosko's examples are supposed to show 
that active participation (and the attitudes and beliefs I have argued best explicate 
participation in non-excludable schemes) is not necessary for one to have obligations 
to support a scheme….This suggests not that participation and attitudes are 





“Klosko repeatedly emphasizes the great importance of presumptive public 
goods in arguing for our obligations to their provision…. Klosko is not emphasizing 
what a fairness theory of political obligation should emphasize. Klosko…makes the 
easy but fatal slide from genuine concern about fair play (i.e. not taking advantage of 
co-operators) to quite distinct moral concerns about required charity of beneficence 
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(i.e. helping provide others with what they need), justifiable paternalism (i.e. 
requiring others to accept what they themselves need), and moral necessity (i.e., 
contributing to projects in ways that others have a prior right to, independent of our 
having benefitted from their sacrifices within the cooperative scheme).”134 
 
In the article Simmons also expresses misgivings about Klosko’s opinions on 
participation, specifically the way in which he understands the relationship between 
indispensability, participation and obligation. He reads Klosko as trying not to pay 
any particular attention to participation – and the accompanying beliefs and attitudes 
– because it supposedly plays no part in the genesis of obligation. Simmons thinks, 
however, that Klosko’s insistence on indispensability ends up putting participation 
under the spotlight anyway, because of the underlying intuition that the more we 
enjoy and want a good the more inclined we are going to be to participate in its 
provision. To Simmons, “this suggests not that participation and attitudes are 
unimportant but that magnitude of benefit is important only because participation 
is”.135 Based on footnote 22 in Klosko’s “Presumptive benefit…” he believes Klosko 
came close to admitting as much. Simmons therefore concludes that, all in all, 
indispensability is not so much a standard condition for the application of the 
principle of fairness as it is “an indication of when the requirement of active 
participation is most likely to be satisfied”.136  
Simmons’ counterargument so far can be summed up as this: indispensability 
is no way to get around the limiting argument because, a) it is more likely to bring 
about obligations under principles other than fairness (obligations presupposed by 
natural duties, in all probability) and, b) because indispensability is not really a 
necessary condition for the existence of an obligation of fairness but an indicator of 
the probability of participation, making it not only an improper point of emphasis for 
an argument that purports to ground obligation on fairness, but a weak ground of 
obligation tout court.  
The second objection is a too strong reading of Klosko’s claim. At no point 
does he predicate the general existence of a principle of a fairness-regulated 
relationship of reciprocation on the condition that the items supplied be non-trivial. 
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His argument from indispensability is merely supposed to show that fairness can 
dictate moral obligations in the absence of expressed will. In this sense, his claims 
from indispensability mimic hypothetical consent, insofar as they both attempt to 
convey that, if presented with actual choice, citizens would not opt-out, would want 
and value what is being offered, and would accept the costs of provision. 
Indispensability therefore is supposed to bridge a gap. As for participation, I read 
Simmons as saying that, overall, beliefs and attitudes are much more relevant to the 
application of the principle than Klosko thought or would openly acknowledge (an 
admission which Simmons seems to believe would be detrimental to Klosko’s 
efforts). If so, then Simmons’ intention is likely to argue that the assumption of 
indispensability is the kind of exaggerated claim that cannot be used to sustain 
obligation. I find, however, that we have no reason to suspect Klosko of being 
disingenuous. Klosko was very much aware that a good can be considered 
indispensable only when an overwhelming majority of people believe that it is 
required by the good life, that indispensability is the result of a uniform – or at least 
predominant – belief. Nevertheless, he is not concerned with finding solid proof of 
these sorts of opinions, at either an individual or collective level. He utilizes a “rough 
standard of reasonable beliefs” which dictates that having “strong, reasonable 
grounds” for believing that any community C will find good G to be indispensable to 
well-being is “tantamount” to community C actually regarding that good as 
indispensable.137 Klosko hence acknowledges the role of beliefs and attitudes in the 
actual process of assignation of importance [to benefits], but his initial assumption of 
homogeneity in tastes concerning open benefits simply affords him to ignore potential 
discrepancies between actual individual opinions. In other words, he concedes that 
indispensability is often an evaluative conclusion (not always though – the 
significance of some benefits is obvious) but makes no effort to discover evidence of 
it, either intellectual, in the guise of expressed opinions, beliefs, convictions, or 
actual, in the form of participation in the procurement and delivery of the good. As far 
as assumptions go, this one is largely inoffensive and very likely legitimate: as a 
matter of practice we do not expect people to voice their concern, or want for some 
things, or to be actively involved in obtaining them in order to consider them 
desirous. For example, few of us routinely lapse into spiels about the importance of 
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clean water or national defence or take part in filtering or machete sharpening 
operations but it is still perfectly reasonable to assume we want to ingest potable 
water while not being attacked by barbarian hordes. So Klosko can be forgiven for 
this since, as of yet, C7conformity is not endangered. What truly matters, however, is 
whether this assumption of indispensability can be used to sustain obligation. In this 
direction, I hold that it seems bizarre to outright deny that indispensability has any 
effect on our duties, at least in as much as the truly necessary benefaction of others is 
contingent on our actions; but the fact that indispensability could settle us with some 
duty does not mean it does settle us with political obligation. The biggest question 
about the rule of cooperation is not whether it exists, but whether its content 
necessarily takes the form to submission to law. 
This brings us to the first of Simmons’ counterarguments. This objection 
speaks of his ultimate conviction that Klosko’s version of the principle is really a 
natural duty account attempting to settle political obligation as the predicate of a duty 
that demands we participate in the provision of others with indispensable public 
goods; what matters then is not fairness, but actual possession. This is a legitimate 
interpretation, given Klosko’s underlying non-voluntarism and given the fact that 
moral discourse about things necessary for the good life, about external involvement 
in the supply of the necessary and about moral principles compelling us to 
helpful/Samaritan/charitable actions pertains to natural duties. This then begs a 
question whether or not Klosko has miscategorised his own work and whether 
obedience is the content of a natural duty regarding goods indispensable to the 
acceptable lives of others, rather than the content of a principle of fairness. In other 
words, Simmons worries that Klosko misidentified his grounds. Nonetheless, 
focusing on this, as Simmons does, is an instance of failing to see the forest for the 
trees. What is truly problematic is not whether or not Klosko’s account is more akin 
to natural duties or whether or not the argument from indispensability brings about 
considerations other than fairness, but why reciprocation, be it the substance of a duty 
or a requirement imposed by the principle of fairness, must necessarily take the form 
of obedience. The important question is not “of what is obedience a content of” but is 
obedience content at all? Klosko’s issue is not one with CO1A or CO1B strength-
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degeneration but a crippling one of jumping the gun from “benefiting imposes” to 
“benefiting imposes obedience and only obedience”, hence CO4precise-content. 138 
 Klosko equates “the rule of cooperation” – i.e. the rule that requires the 
members of a scheme to cooperate, in the manner deemed fit, as repayment for the 
benefits they have received – to be the moral requirement to obey the law. In other 
words, he assumes obedience towards the law to be the only and full content of the 
rule of cooperation as well as the “fair share” of the burden everyone is supposed to 
shoulder in return for fair benefaction.139 Obedience, however, has to be shown to be 
the exclusive content of an obligation or duty. In the absence of this demonstration, 
what the principle accomplishes in a best-case scenario is simply changing the 
normative situation of the beneficiary by settling him with a duty whose content is not 
obviously obedience and consequently open to interpretation. “How do we know that 
the only and best way to play fairly is to obey the law” is a legitimate question. In 
other words, while moral theory leaves little doubt that benefaction comes with some 
burden of reciprocity – the content of that burden need not necessarily be a moral 
requirement to obey the law. Klosko’s readiness to assume that is a fatal error for his 
account of political obligation since this cannot claim obedience to be wilfully 
contracted through transaction. For political obligation to verify he needed to 
demonstrate that the requirement to obey be the one and only way to cooperate and 
repay fairly, or exclude all other possible forms of cooperation as morally 
impermissible: there is a gap between “they have to cooperate” and “they have to 
cooperate by obeying” that nothing in his account clearly covers. Rejecting 
alternatives to obedience as proper forms of fair reciprocation is a possible and 
probable instance of moral wounding, therefore.  
Throughout his account, Klosko demonstrates a serious proclivity towards 
assuming. Besides presuming indispensability and obedience to be the only 
manifestation of a fair repayment, Klosko also adopts the basic one of cooperation. 
                                                        
138 Jiafeng Zhu also notices this gap. J. Zhu, “Fairness, Political Obligation, and the Justificatory Gap”, 
Journal of Moral Philosophy, Vol.12, 2015, pp. 290-312.  
139 Patrick Durning makes some similar claims. He believes Klosko’s statements have to be shown to 
hold by performing these demonstrations: that citizens obey the law because they know that is what the 
rule of cooperation demands of them to do; that citizens profit from other citizens obeying the law as a 
manifestation of the rule of cooperation; that the world in which people obey the law as the 
requirement of the rule of cooperation is superior to worlds in which they do not obey the law but still 
act in morally permissible manners; and finally, what I have in mind, that fairness is obedience. P. 
Durning, “Two Problems with Deriving a Duty to Obey from the Principle of Fairness”, Public Affairs 
Quarterly, Vol. 17, No. 4, 2003, pp. 253-264. 
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On this issue Simmons rearticulates his beliefs that modern political communities 
exhibit no signs of a “clear consciousness of cooperation”, and that presumptive 
goods are, as a rule, provided throughout “vertical” state structures (governmental 
agencies), not through public collaboration, 140  meaning citizens perceive these 
benefits as resulting neither from cooperating with fellow citizens nor with the 
government. 141  Although I have already expressed broad agreement with the 
significant doubts Simmons has about states being cooperative enterprises in the 
discussion on Rawls, I did not find that concern exceptionally bothersome when status 
would be the consequence of an act of acceptance. Put otherwise, I did not consider 
the assumption of cooperation nauseating in a context that allowed will to function as 
the genuine ground of obligation. The problem with Klosko’s account is that he does 
not benefit from voluntarism and this assumption of the state being a cooperative 
enterprise is juxtaposed to the one of indispensability and held to be justification 
enough for doing away with freedom of choice. This is awkward for an account that 
presupposes no fully knowingly, deliberately performed, membership-acquiring acts; 
no need to acknowledge or even recognize the state as a cooperative scheme; not 
much chance to avoid reception of goods and therefore incorporation; a reverse 
burden proof that allows little space for opting out of cooperation/ disproving receipt; 
and even permits external recognition of receipt to be confirmation of it sufficient to 
generate a requirement to obey under the rule of cooperation. Separate from one 
another the assumptions of cooperation and indispensability may not be intrinsically 
awkward. When taken together, however, and packaged into an account that already 
impermissibly assumes the content of the rule of cooperation to be obedience, and 
DPGs able to create additional duties of obedience, there are just one too many 
unsubstantiated assumptions. Klosko seems to operate on a belief that his most 
important presumption – indispensability – and his most basic one – cooperation – 
whitewash all others and each other; but one can only take an argument so far when 
they are not heuristic devices. Klosko assumes much, so much that his argument 
                                                        
140 Simmons, “The Anarchist Position: A Reply to Klosko and Senor”, p. 273. See also Simmons, “Fair 
Play and Political Obligations: Twenty Years Later”, p. 39.  
141 Gans disagrees with this objection: he argues against it by claiming that people find the state and the 
law useful. The state being useful is not, however, obviously synonymous with people perceiving 
public goods as resulting from cooperation. There is a degree of separation between the two that Gans 
does not perceive. See C. Gans, Philosophical Anarchism, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 
1992, pp. 61-62.  
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pushes on the outer limits of C7conformity. And the list of assumptions does not end 
here.  
Simmons’ last concern expressed at this stage lies with Klosko’s readiness to 
“assume the presence of an obligation, rather than the presence of a liberty” whenever 
there are no obvious signs of unfairness or cost/worth discrepancies. He think this is 
particularly visible in the case of schemes providing DPGs in addition to NEPGs, 
when Klosko equates “still [being] obligated” for the NEPGs, with “having new 
obligations” for the DPGs which have been added onto the enterprise. Simmons is of 
the opinion that, whenever the scheme decides to add DPGs, they should do so “at 
their own risk” – provide them free of charge or render them excludable – without 
imposing their costs on people who, by definition, do not regard them as 
indispensable.142 This objection covers two issues. First, the problem of DPGs: the 
way in which Klosko construes them and links them to political obligation 
undoubtedly has some dubious implications. By allowing schemes to impose 
additional obligations corresponding to the added DPGs a danger is created that 
citizens will be brought to the very limit of marginal utility; if DPGs are continuously 
added to a scheme there will come a point when some might find themselves 
crumbling under the weight of their duties.  To protect citizens from this Klosko made 
a mention that DPGs should only be added through fair and democratic methods. 
Nevertheless, these methods are not in place now and it is implausible to believe that 
they will be installed later: mechanisms allowing citizens to tell states which specific 
DPGs they want to be provided seem rather farfetched, especially when considering 
the practical and intellectual obstacles entailed. Moreover, his argument for DPGs 
creating obligations is purely indirect. When stripped to its barest form it comes down 
to us having a duty to support their provision because they are attached – through 
simple processes of addition (that are not actually in place) – to an entirely different 
category of benefits that Klosko has “good reasons” to deem important to us. There 
were already issues with this line of thinking when Klosko liberally assumed the 
indispensability of NEPGs; now he marshals obligation goods dispensable by 
definition without even having the ability to rest it on a concern with acceptable life 
standards.143 And while I, unlike Simmons, do not begrudge him his presupposition in 
                                                        
142Simmons, “The Anarchist Position: A Reply to Klosko and Senor”, p. 274. 
143 In his original article Klosko stated that discretionary public goods are not indispensable to the good 
life. In The Principle of Fairness and Political Obligation, however, he alters his position to claim that 
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the first case, extending it even further is the sort of exaggeration that reeks of 
paternalism and encourages conclusions that CO7not-too-much duty fails to meet 
because justification imposes less than the author believed it would.   
Secondly, as a general point of criticism about the practice of his account, 
Klosko is exceptionally cheap with exit and non-participation options awarded to 
citizens, his justification being one in which citizens are left with virtually only one 
option – to contribute to a scheme. Although theoretically they have a chance to 
escape obligation if they manage to prove that (a) they do not need the benefits, (b) 
profit from the scheme, or (c) that the benefits are too costly,144 throughout his work, 
Klosko identifies no methods through which an individual could actually perform 
these demonstrations (probably because there are none). In practical terms, this 
equates to people having no concrete window for reasonable disobedience. This is 
awkward: a proper account of political obligation is one that makes the moral 
requirement to obey the law hard to renounce but not inescapable. Klosko’s tying the 
justified non-performance of obligations to three nigh-on-impossible demonstrations, 
is thus worrisome – it makes the state practically Hobbesian, with reasonable 
disobedience more of a very slim theoretical possibility than something that could 
occur in the real world. An argument can be made that his justification falls foul of 
C3resonable access to disobedience because of CO7not-too-much-duty.  
 As far as objections go, however, this last opinion is correct but of limited 
significance compared to the other major issue with Klosko’s account – his failure to 
acknowledge and make provisions for alternative supply. Alternative supply is a 
counterpoint to Klosko’s claim that the delivery of indispensable goods is something 
that no construction other than the state does or could do.145 Klosko presents the state 
as the sole source of valuable and valued services and seems actively to forbid people 
                                                                                                                                                              
these goods can have a certain “practical indispensability” because they assist in the provision of 
presumptive benefits. We are thus left unsure how important – or unimportant – these goods actually 
are. See G. Klosko, The Principle of Fairness and Political Obligation, p. 87. How this cumulative 
importance relates to obligation is something of a mystery, however. In “Presumptive Benefit, Fairness 
and Political Obligation”, Klosko had told us that DPGs cannot create obligations by themselves, but 
only when added onto schemes already providing NEPGs; in his 1992 book he changes his mind and 
writes that “because discretionary public goods are of less immediate value than presumptive goods, 
the obligations they generate will be weaker”, leaving us with the impression that DPGs can actually 
produce some duties. See Klosko, The Principle of Fairness and Political Obligation, p. 99.  
144Ibid., p. 48-49.  
145  Simmons discovers this issue much later. A.J. Simmons, On the Edge of Anarchy, Princeton 
University Press, Princeton, 1993, pp. 258-259.  
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from trying to secure these things through their own devices; 146  he makes no 
allowance for those who want to avoid using public resources, for any reasons. 
Klosko’s state, therefore, discourages alternative supply and its pursuit and 
unilaterally decides on both the subjects and objects of basically non-optional 
benefaction. In On The Edge of Anarchy Simmons writes that “many public goods 
supplied by the state can be provided by alternative, private means” and that the state 
should accommodate the individual “who prefers to try to provide the good 
privately”. 147  In time, this last contention has become the main charge against 
Klosko’s principle, and in his article “The Natural Basis of Political Obligation” 
together with large portions of his 2004 book Political Obligations Klosko 
endeavours to respond.   
 
To demonstrate that alternative supply is not a real obstacle for his principle, 
in Political Obligations, Klosko marshals two sub-arguments: that the state is 
necessary (chapter 1), and that no non-state entities (NSEs) can be plausibly thought 
to be capable of assuming the state’s role in the provision of open public goods 
(chapter 2). 148  He begins his demonstration by providing a new definition of 
“acceptable life”: 
 
 “… by acceptable lives I mean lives in modern industrial societies, as we 
know them. These societies are relatively safe, have functioning economies, and 
allow travel and a wide range of occupations, activities and modes of life”.149 
 
Then, he states that “individuals could not provide [indispensable benefits] 
themselves and so must rely on the state”150 and moves on to list all the goods states 
deliver to us in an attempt to show that they will always be more successful in the 
provision than any NSEs could ever be.151 Two problems can be detected even at this 
early stage. To begin with his definition of acceptability is both Western world 
centric, therefore severely reducing the possibility that his principle of fairness may 
                                                        
146Klosko, Political Obligation and the Principle of Fairness, p. 40. 
147 Simmons, On the Edge of Anarchy, p. 258.  
148G. Klosko, Political Obligations, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2005,p. 64.  
149Klosko, Political Obligations, p. 20.  
150Ibid., p. 21. 
151Ibid., pp. 22-41. 
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be used to justify political obligation in non-Western societies,152 and yet again quite 
paternalistic, a recurrent theme throughout his work. It begs the obvious question 
whether it would not be better to assume that the standards of acceptability are not 
imposed from above (which may be an immensely heavy task, something that Klosko 
does not consider), by scholars and state agencies, but rather determined personally, 
on an individual basis. Holding acceptability to be uniform runs a heavy risk of 
offending not only personal sensibilities, but freedom of choice as well [which Klosko 
tries so hard to circumvent]. In addition, insofar as this assumption is married to one 
that people will invariably not be able to provide and obtain on their own, this issue is 
not only one of common sense but a moral one, at least insofar as they are banned on 
a simple presumption of inability from something that it is not immoral to attempt to 
do.  
Secondly, an opponent of Klosko does not automatically question, as the 
philosopher presumes, the need for the state, or the idea that it is the provider and 
facilitator of many important things including order, coordination and an environment 
in which we can exercise our rights and freedoms, practise justice, pursue happiness 
and so on. Nor does she [the critic] deny that, as far as non-excludable public goods 
are concerned, the state is typically the best provider (because of its large resources –
financial and otherwise – and its ability to regulate and coordinate). What she rejects, 
however, is this apparent state-held right of exclusivity that Klosko puts forward 
based on the idea that no non-state agent is going to deliver goods as efficiently as the 
state: the state may truly be necessary in the senses that without it life would be nasty, 
brutish and short; and the goods it provides may well be indispensable to the good 
life, but that does not necessarily mean that the state is indispensable to their 
provision. Just as it is not at all obvious that citizens can only obtain the goods they 
need from the state, it is not obvious that they are better off receiving them from it 
than from some another source. Alternative supply is not impossible and it is not 
inescapably an inferior option to state benefaction. In these conditions, instead of 
assuming, Klosko should have focused on determining whether the lack of choice is 
mandatory, not on arguing for the general usefulness of a state that none who took 
issue with his principle denied.   
                                                        
152A fact which Klosko acknowledges: “whether people in such societies have political obligations and 
what there are or would be like are questions I will not explore”. Ibid., p 37.  
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Klosko instead claims that the provision of NEPGs requires the cooperation of 
large numbers of people organized in complex ways by agencies capable of ensuring 
compliance,153and that NSEs will not be able to achieve this consequently failing to 
provide. This becomes the core of his entire argument against alternative supply. 
Thus, even though he admits that “it would seem unfair not to allow [people] a 
reasonable opportunity to set up alternative mechanisms of provision”154  and that 
“when a given alternative mechanism is able to satisfy the plausibility requirement it 
would seem unreasonable not to allow [people] to pursue some benefit through it 
rather than the state”, he remains firmly convinced that the necessary mechanisms 
will never translate into reality.155  Nevertheless, in spite of his insistence that an 
NSEs-led alternative supply is implausible, his text reveals at least a subconscious 
awareness that it may not be entirely impossible: after announcing that NSEs cannot 
organize well enough to distribute NEPGs and the afferent DPGs, he writes that, even 
if it turned out to be in fact possible for them to organize, these corporations would 
most likely become a dangerous monopoly-owning consortium, guilty of collusion 
and ultimately of exclusion, and therefore undesirable.156 
Klosko’s claims are weak. Assuming that there are no material structures 
delivering indispensable goods, Klosko should have made more of an effort to 
imagine a functioning NSE.157 Postulating a large-scale enterprise, patterned on the 
model of successful state and privately owned big businesses, with their operations 
vertically controlled in a pyramid of management, and distributing goods alongside 
the state is not difficult; the universe in which such a construction could exist is not 
necessarily not our own. But NSEs delivering indispensable goods alongside the state 
is problematic for his general claims about obligation. If such constructions existed 
and functioned then citizens would have to be allowed to choose, unless it could be 
shown that NSEs and their operations are morally objectionable in the senses that they 
are doing something impermissible. Otherwise they [the citizens] would be morally 
harmed; and so would they be if the state insisted on it remaining the sole provider.  
In such a scenario, in order to avoid becoming an aggressor, the state would have to 
allow for alternative supply. The consequences for the requirement of cooperation 
                                                        
153 Klosko, Political Obligations, p. 24. 
154Ibid., p. 63. 
155Ibid., p.65.  
156Ibid., pp. 31-32. 
157  An arguably wide-of-the-mark assumption, considering the private health, education or 
telecommunications systems, for example, which outperform state-owned ones.  
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would be negative, however; states would not be justifiably entitled to expect fair 
reciprocation – whatever that may mean – for goods citizens do not take from it, 
which would render the content of cooperation patchy at best.  
As for his certainty that the NSEs would degenerate and cause harm, this is yet 
another unfounded assumption. These NSEs would be distributing goods alongside –
as emphasized – not instead of the state; and while Klosko presumes that NSEs will 
tend towards supplanting it (either by design or accident) they could just as well 
function properly in parallel to the state, with individuals opting for the provider they 
find most efficient. Nothing in the scenario I propose prevents the state from 
maintaining regulatory power. The state is not a mere purveyor of goods – it holds the 
monopoly of violence and coercion, more or less legitimately, and has the authority to 
employ the law in a fashion that protects and bolsters citizen-interests. The 
functioning of NSEs would not entail the disappearance of the state and its agencies 
nor would it affect, in any radical way, its roles or abilities. In these circumstances, 
NSEs would have to function between the existing legal parameters and conform to 
state directives, like any other business in the market. In addition, even if this 
supposed consortium were to malfunction, citizens would always have the option to 
fall back on state-supplied goods, hence never being in danger of having to do without 
indispensable goods or being left at the “whim” of some enterprise. The only obvious 
victim in this picture is therefore the already maximally conjectural political 
obligation, for which justification weakens even further; CO8accounting-alternative-
supply is not met. 
Klosko concludes on alternative supply by writing that the final burden of 
proof lies with his anti-state opponents who have to prove either that citizens “do not 
receive public goods” or, better yet, conclusively establish that NSEs have the 
capacity to take over the delivery of NEPGs/DPGs completely. 158  Because his 
arguments against alternative supply are insufficiently convincing, the burden of 
proof is reversed, however. It is up to him to show that NSEs are truly impractical or 
that the overlapping state and private supply of indispensable goods would necessarily 
create blockages, incongruities of distribution or deprivations; or, if he accepts the 
possibility of alternative supply, account for the effects on his account, particularly on 
his claims of indispensability and cooperation and, most importantly, what this 
                                                        
158 Klosko, Political Obligations, p. 70. 
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differentiation in sourcing would have on the generality of political obligation (as 
well as its permanence and coherence).  
Klosko, however, will not. At the end of Political Obligations he embraces a 
multiple principle account that is synonymous with a theoretical capitulation. His 




Classic consent theory has revealed itself through this examination to be a 
paradigm that struggles with reality beyond what could be considered tolerable. 
Although purely theoretically there is not much on which it can be faulted – it meets 
almost all the criteria set in the methodology and allows political obligation to retain 
all features assigned to it while providing it with a normatively sufficient source – its 
inconsistency with concrete political experience bars it from generality in a definitive 
manner: the infinitesimal number of body politic members who could be said to have 
expressly or tacitly consented to obey prevents political obligation from even being a 
generic duty for actual citizens. This failure to achieve C1generality because of 
struggles with C7conformity is consent’s original structural fault. 
Modern consent theory’s structural flaws arise from its inability to compensate 
for what the concept lost during efforts of alteration and reinterpretation designed to 
make it more compatible with political realities. At its core, this flaw is an issue of 
degeneration that depletes the normative force of the chosen ground resulting in 
CO1Asufficient-normative strength being forfeited. For tacit consent as residence and 
voting it equated to losing sight of what counts as a genuine choice situation in which 
consent could work its normative magic, and that citizens can be found to have 
approved when exercising their statutory rights. In both cases, political obligation 
failed to ensue, in the first one because attempts were made to discover it in a scenario 
moral theory disallows considering sufficiently free to count as one in which agents 
are presented with genuine optionality, while in the second because of a confusion 
between selecting those in authority and consenting to be under the power of 
authority. While the second bears the mark of a logical error, the first is indicative of 
the practice to put distance between consent and the conditions of full knowledge and 
intentionality that would become the hallmark of hypothetical consent theory.  
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In its hypothetical embodiment, consent theory is at its most unsound, and 
(CO1B) degeneration at its most noticeable. Hypothetical consent paradigms fail 
across the board to distinguish themselves in any theoretically relevant manner from 
Razian or Kantian inspired theses of authority or from natural duty accounts. The 
reason for this is that, ultimately, they employ a consent that has been all but 
completely stripped of its core features and has consequently become something that 
is not only unable to sustain obligation on itself but obligation at all. Deterioration is 
so complete that, pretences aside, consent plays no genuine normative part in these 
accounts. Mutilation has proven to have no positive consequences, a theory originally 
structurally flawed only in the senses that it did not reflect reality with any measure of 
accuracy becoming a theory that cannot escape collapse into other types of accounts, 
whose designated ground is effectively useless and requiring of paradigm-altering 
supplementations and that, in its later instantiations, is consensual only in the 
grammatical mood of its proponents. Modern consent theory’s structural fault is 
therefore an erosion for which there cannot be any reparation: consent not free, 
knowledgeable and deliberate is consent that cannot sustain obligation. We are thus 
decisively not only at the end of these consent paradigms but at the end of consent 
theory altogether: consent is non-existent and cannot be reinterpreted or be “made up 
for” by alternative means. C1generality, C7conformity and CO1A and CO1B 
strength-non-degeneration cannot all be satisfied in a consent, or faux consent, logic.  
The principle of fairness is similarly a paradigm that moves from a flaw of 
inconsistency [with reality once more] to a more serious departure from the required 
criteria. Unlike consent, the principle of fairness is at its strongest in its last form, 
divested from any vestige of intentionality and will. Although a number of criticisms 
can be marshalled against Klosko’s account, only two issues seriously matter and both 
have destructive force: alternative supply (CO8accounting-alternative-supply), which is 
undeniable and which wounds his claims to C1generality and C2universality, insofar 
as it renders the alleged requirement to obey intermittent at both individual and 
collective levels, and the gap between establishing that beneficiaries have a duty of 
fair reciprocation and conclusively establishing that fair repayment necessarily takes 
the form of obedience (the issue of content of the rule of cooperation), which 
obliterates claims to having vindicated political obligation because CO4precise-content  
is not met. Klosko believes that what citizens owe horizontally to one another takes 
the form of compliance with the demands of law. This belief, however, rests on two 
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assumptions that are not vindicated. First, in order for it to be fair to reciprocate 
benefiting had to be shown to be clearly the result of cooperation, and not just any 
cooperation but cooperation in the guise of submission to law; secondly, that fair 
cooperation can only take the form of submission to the law. Moral discourse insists 
that it is unfair not to repay those whose actions have led to benefiting, but, for 
considerations of fairness to actually arise, the right holders have to have genuinely 
generated the gains. Even if Klosko conclusively demonstrated this, however, or we 
agree to assume with him that all citizens fairly owe, he has no strong argument 
against alternative manifestations of cooperation: strange as it may seem, even if he 
had demonstrated that benefiting is directly rooted in the compliance of others he 
would still need to exclude forms of repayment other than identical behaviours of 
obedience towards the law. Klosko’s rule of cooperation is therefore doubly 
problematic, less so in the sense that considerations of fairness may not necessarily be 
the appropriate one, more so because its content is imprecise.  
The structural flaw in the principle of fairness paradigm is therefore primarily 
a flaw of imprecise content, which, in the absence of contract and will, there can be 
no making up for, it being impossible to exclude literally all other forms of 
reciprocation as morally impermissible. As such, the conclusion to be reached about 
Klosko’s perfected principle of fairness is that it imposes, but not something that is 
obviously and necessarily obedience towards an authority in possession of a right 
against. Because of this, principle of fairness paradigms devoid of intent necessarily 
fail; aside of all other issues, CO4precise-content and CO8accounting-alternative-supply 
ensures it.  
Thus, transactionalism necessarily collapses. These failures of consent theory 
and principle of fairness pushed the thought on political obligation in a new direction. 
Voluntarism and transactionalism were abandoned in favour of a non-voluntarism 
that, on the side of political obligation, took the form of associative theories 
attempting to explain the duty to obey on the basis of community membership. This 
move was considered to be the next best strategy: the aim was naturally still to show 
political obligation to be a special relationship, but rather than consequential to a 
wilful act or exchange of benefits, as instead part and parcel of a type of duty group 
members – including those with non-voluntarily acquired memberships – have 
towards one another. These theories subsequently marshalled the contention (broadly 
speaking) that particularized obligation flows from birth, growth and life in one’s own 
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political group, from the role of the citizen, and from a connection with fellow 
members that is not dissimilar to the one between family members or friends. These 
are the accounts I address, and reject, in chapter III as paradigms that choose an 
inadequately solid ground for an obligation as heavy and permanent as political 
obligation, that require normative supplementation, and that ultimately make for 




















In the previous chapter I have explained why voluntarism cannot account for 
the moral requirement to obey the law. Scholarly efforts to move consent along from 
the theoretically impeccable but impractical express consent to a form more 
reconciled with day-by-day political realities implied a lowering of the bar for 
intentionality that eventually amounted to disfigurement [of the concept and its 
features] and rendered consent unable to produce or sustain any kind of duty; as it 
became further and further removed from will consent theory eroded to the point of 
complete degeneration. I have also shown that the principle of fairness had to suffer 
similar modifications in order to make up for its earlier structural fault of 
inconsistency with reality. Klosko’s effort to compensate for loss of will was 
compelling, but in the end his account collapsed under the weight of too many 
assumptions, the most offensive of which was the one negating alternative supply, as 
well as under a structural fault of imprecise content that did not establish obedience as 
the conclusive content of a duty of fair reciprocation towards fellow citizens involved 
in the production of benefits. I concluded that both failed and that both will continue 
to fail, precluded from success by issues arising out of their choice to divest from will 
for which, paradoxically, will would be the only solution.  
The foundering of these accounts of political obligation under the weight of 
criticisms entailed the end of hegemony for transactional justifications and cleared the 
way for the advent of non-voluntary ones, of which associative theories are most 
representative. Though associative narratives in the 1980’s works of communitarian 
scholars such as Alasdair MacIntyre (After Virtue) or Michael Sandel (Liberalism and 
the Limits of Justice) or of legal philosopher Dworkin attracted considerable attention, 
it was only a decade later that they became the dominant school of thought on the 
issue, once the principle of fairness account began to unravel.   
Scholars advocating associativism have had quite different purposes. 
Communitarians, for example, try to discourage the kind of blanket moral judgements 
universalism prompts and to validate communities as identify shapers and 
independent producers of rules and normativity; [some] feminists, rejecting liberalism 
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as conducive to the well-being of the most vulnerable groups in society, use 
associativism as a tool for the promotion of a more inclusive point of view on 
humanity that does not wilfully ignore history, roles, associations or contexts;159 
Dworkin tries to improve his theory of law as interpretation by completing it with a 
theory of obligation; Tamir is a scholar of nationalism who has issue with liberalism 
because of its self-imposed blindness to the necessity of cultural embeddedness; 
Gilbert starts as a sociologist concerned with the mechanics of group formation and 
the behaviours and attitudes of members within it; only Horton is a bona fide scholar 
of political obligation dealing with the narrow task of justification. Still, in spite of 
this diversity in academic purpose, all of these scholars see associativism as a 
potential solution to their problems with authority and obligation. Thus, their 
articulation of the associative theory reveals considerably more commonalities than 
discrepancies.  
Broadly speaking, the architecture of any associative account rests on four 
pillars: a belief that political obligation can and is non-voluntarily acquired; a practice 
of comparing membership in a group state to membership in families, on the idea that 
both are capable of imposing obligations on parties even if neither is voluntarily 
entered into (this idea evolved from a claim of similarity to an opinion that both non-
voluntary practices have similar normative powers); an argument for particularity that 
rests on the idea that we owe political obligation to the group we were born in 
because we were born and socialized within it;160 and a conviction that local practices 
are capable of generating moral obligations and determine their contents 
independently of higher order moral principles and their dictates.  
These tenets reveal associative obligations to be moral requirements not in any 
way linked to intentional acts but, at the same time, owed not to anyone qua human 
but rather to the specific members of the specific groups to which the bearers of 
obligation belong. Thus, they are neither voluntary nor unconditional:161 Bass van der 
Vossen argues them to be special obligations pertaining to special relationships that 
hold no value, substance or intelligible meaning in their absence. The task of 
                                                        
159 Significantly, Iris Marion Young, Susan Moller Okin and Nancy Hirschmann see some of the merits 
of communitarianism.  
160 A.J. Simmons, “Associative Political Obligations”, A.J. Simmons, Justification and Legitimacy, 
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2001, pp. 65-93, p. 70.  
161 B. van der Vossen, “Associative Political Obligations”, Philosophy Compass, 2011, pp. 477-487, 
pp. 477-478. Also see B. van der Vossen, “Associative Political Obligations: Their Potential”, 
Philosophy Compass, 2011, pp. 488-496.  
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associative theorists of political obligation is henceforth to demonstrate that the moral 
requirement to obey the law of one’s state is one of these special obligations attached 
to the special role of citizen.  
In this chapter I address and rebuff attempts to justify the moral requirement to 
obey on this associative argument.162 To begin with I reject the minor opinion that 
was the conceptual argument as unintelligible and un-academic in its refusal to allow 
interrogations of the duty to obey the law. Then, in turn, I first reject Dworkin’s 
account as paradigmatic of associativism’s readiness to ground obligation in 
precarious grounds which cannot sustain the normative burden on their own. 
Secondly, I argue that Gilbert’s complicated construction fails for reasons both typical 
(reliance on attachments, beliefs about roles and the self-justifying character of 
subsumed duties) and atypical (insistence on a process of recognition with 
consequences that are not obviously political obligation and a permanent brushing 
with transactionalism) of associative justifications. Thirdly, I engage with 
communitarian (and associativists) claims that obedience to the law is a consequence 
of the important part the role plays in identity formation, and of the ability of 
practices to create duties for locals independently of overarching moral principles; I 
argue the first to be false and the second to be an overstatement that only serves to 
vindicate criticisms that associativism struggles significantly not to degenerate into 
accounts from natural duties. Fourthly, I examine John Horton’s – associativism’s 
staunchest defendant – account and find that, even though he manages to avoid some 
of the classic trappings of the paradigm (degeneration), he ultimate miscarries, 
plagued by other habitual faults.163 I conclude that associativism is a flawed paradigm 
of political obligation that does not function as a proper explanation for the 
requirement to obey.  
 
The Conceptual Argument 
 
One of the first exercises in delivering this sort of account for the moral 
requirement to obey is “the conceptual argument”. This proto-associative paradigm 
                                                        
162  Whether there is merit to discovering associative obligations outside of our sphere of 
preoccupations does not concern me. 
163  In doing these I observe the determinant role the Simmons-Horton debate has had on the 
development of the associative justification of the moral requirement to obey and insert myself into it.  
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gained its fullest expression in the 1960’s work of Thomas McPherson, which owed 
something to Wittgenstein.164  
 
“That social man has obligations is therefore not an empirical fact (which 
might have been otherwise) that calls for an explanation or “justification”. That social 
man has obligations is an analytic, not a synthetic proposition….. “Why should I (a 
member) accept the rules of the club?” is an absurd question. Accepting the rules is 
part of what it means to be a member. Similarly, “Why should I obey the 
government?” is an absurd question. We have not understood what it means to be a 
member of a political society if we suppose that political obligation is something we 
might not have had and that therefore needs to be justified.”165 
 
 
It was immediately deemed controversial and it is not hard to see why – its 
core contention is that demands for justifications of obedience are a clear indication of 
a failure to understand what citizenship means. McPherson’s words are tantamount to 
a claim that doubts about the existence of a requirement to obey are best-case scenario 
signs of ignorance, if not downright irrationality. Theorists of political obligation, 
including most modern associativists, find the argument unsurprisingly unconvincing.  
The main charge against it is that, if the compulsory nature of obedience were the 
self-evident truth the conceptual arguments holds it to be, then questions about the 
obligativity of law abidance would be unintelligible.166 They are not. And if having 
hesitations and misgivings about the demands laws and states make of us is irrational 
then absurdity is pandemic; most citizens are, at various points in their lives, 
unconvinced about the prerequisite of obedience. And if these queries are shelved 
they are not so because of immediate recollections about what it means to be a 
member of a political community, but because of other reasons – disinterest, 
resignation, or the ever-motivating fear of coercion and repercussion. Moreover, aside 
from this, if there is one [allegedly] associative relationship whose meanings and 
attached obligations need to be spelled out, it is the political one. Given that members 
                                                        
164 Even earlier, in 1951, Margaret MacDonald was failing to see the logic, but not the potentially 
nefarious consequences of questions about the mandatory nature of obedience. See M. Macdonald, 
“The Language of Political Theory”, A.G.N. Flew (ed.) Logic and Language, Basil Blackwell, Oxford, 
1951, pp. 184-185.  
165 T. McPherson, Political Obligation, Routledge and Kegan Paul, London, 1967, pp. 64-65.  
166 Simmons, “Associative Political Obligations”, p. 73.  
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of political communities have been “dropped” into this association at birth, are 
strangers to one another, have no great, obvious communal purposes and potentially 
very little in common, people may need some theoretical guidance to supplement the 
gradually obtained practical experience of membership; they may need a little coaxing 
that membership is meaningless without obedience, that non-performance equates to 
dereliction of duty, even if the role is non-voluntarily assumed, that disobedience or 
asking for justifications is a sign of intellectual and logical (and perhaps moral, as 
well) failure.167  
Defenders of the conceptual argument could nevertheless not accept this. They 
were precluded by a readiness to contend that membership in the state is identical to 
membership in any club, and by an opinion that there is a metaphysical “meaning of 
political membership” that is accessible to citizens without illumination, or revelation 
or any kind of explanation simply in virtue of their being born not as gentle savages, 
but as legal members of a state. There is ample room to argue that this claim is 
unconvincing. Is not the more modest contention that, whatever meaning political 
membership may hold, it is personal, determined individually, through day-by-day 
practices, behaviours and attitudes, and that this unique, self-imposed meaning may 
not necessarily presuppose a firm or correct notion of political obligations? And how 
likely is it that political membership could hold the same significance for everyone 
across the socio-political-cultural spectrum? It is very hard to isolate the meaning the 
conceptual argument has in mind and to believe that there are accessible and precise 
methods to tap into it. This, therefore, can be taken to be a clear failure to achieve 
C7conformity. 
These are valid worries. The conceptual argument’s failure to acknowledge 
them is nowhere near as poisonous to the theory as the grave mistake its advocates 
make when they dismiss demands for justification as logical slip-ups, however. 
Probing the morality of the obligations supposedly attached to membership is not 
synonymous to questioning the value, significance or ethical character of the role 
itself (in any group) nor, crucially, denying that obligation is “constitutive” of 
them. 168  One can admit that certain associative relationships have massive non-
                                                        
167 Although most likely they would need to be informed that they are in an associative relationship 
with the other members of their political community. 
168 Scheffler writes: “non-reductionists are impressed by the fact that we often cite our relationships to 
people rather than particular interactions with them… as the source of our special responsibilities”. S. 
Scheffler, Boundaries and Allegiance, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2001, p. 100.  
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instrumental value and can admit that obligations are part and parcel of these roles; 
but that does not entail that bearers of obligation are always “morally justified” or 
doing “good” when discharging these duties. There are conceivable instances in 
which non-performance could be argued to be morally sound without implicitly 
shattering the relationship and the role. This is especially evident when the role in 
question is the one of citizen: one could disobey without as much as offending 
fairness, let alone committing some great trespass against morality or, ad maximum, 
dissolving membership.169 The radical claims of the conceptual argument simply do 
not hold.   
This form of primitive associativism had no lasting negative effects on the 
usage or popularly of the assumption that the roles with which we identify presuppose 
incumbent obligations. It could not have had. Hegel had given it clout more than a 
century earlier,170 and modern communitarians were just about to start embracing it 
wholeheartedly, come Rawls’ 1971 A Theory of Justice, which offended greatly with 
its individualism, its lack of interest in historical and cultural contexts when 
determining the principles of justice, and its penchant for moral appraisals. Twenty 
years after McPherson’s conceptual argument, however, it would not be 
communitarians that would write the most compelling associative justification of 
political obligation based on roles, but legal philosopher Dworkin. In the next section 
I examine his associative account and discover it to miss its justificatory goal for 
reasons that time and again will poison the well for associativists – inconsistency with 
reality and appeals to other principles that negate their claims to a single ground of 
obligation, and obviate its parasitism, alongside the fact that associativism is a 
paradigm replaceable with more direct accounts from natural duties. 
Ronald Dworkin 
 
In Law’s Empire Dworkin articulates his own associative theory of political 
obligation. This justification is part of a larger interpretative opinion on the law and 
has as its main purpose as establishing, beyond reasonable doubt, the truthfulness of 
legal propositions – in simpler terms, that we have to do what our laws require 
                                                        
169  David Lefkowitz expresses some of the same concerns in his doctoral thesis “ A Moral 
Contractualist Defense of Political Obligation”, defended in 2003 at the University of Maryland at 
College Park. See, chapter 3, p. 97.  
170 In the Preface to the Philosophy of Right.  
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because they are the laws of our state. 171  Dworkin’s account is grounded in 
observations the legal scholars makes about smaller human practices such as family 
and friendships. Without going the habitual route that equates family to political 
membership Dworkin holds that, just as these practices can impose obligations on 
members on non-voluntary grounds (no contracts have been signed, no negotiations 
have occurred, no expressions of will have been made), other forms of community – 
including the state – can burden participants with obligations. 172  The moral 
justification for these obligations can be discovered through a process of 
interpretation of the practice itself; an examination of relationships and those 
involved in them that should obviate a set of behaviours, beliefs, attitudes, governing 
principles. 
Dworkin’s argument boils down to this deceptively simple assertion: membership 
in “true communities” characterized by the value of integrity imposes the associative 
obligation of obedience. All is definitely not as uncomplicated as it seems, however. 
Even though Dworkin obviously judges social practices able to impose clear role 
obligations on members, he qualifies his position by arguing that only true 
communities yield genuine obligations.173 These communities cannot be suspected of 
having defined and assigned obligations through manipulation or indoctrination 
(“rituals” or “conventions”) because interpretation reveals them to exhibit four 
distinctive, fundamental characteristics:174  
1. The obligations they assign are “special, holding distinctly within the group, 
rather than as general duties its members owe equally to persons outside it”.175 
2. The obligations they assign are personal in the sense that they are owed by 
each community member to each community member and not to the group as 
a whole.176 
3. The obligations they assign must be seen as “flowing from a more general 
responsibility each has of concern for the well-being of others in the group” to 
the point “that discrete obligations that arise only under special circumstances 
                                                        
171 S. Perry, “ Associative Obligations and the Obligation to Obey the Law”, S. Hershovitz, Exploring 
Law’s Empire: The Jurisprudence of Ronald Dworkin, Oxford University Press, Oxford, pp. 2-3 
(printed).  
172 R. Dworkin, Law’s Empire, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 1986, p. 197. 
173  Dworkin, Law’s Empire, pp. 195-196.  
174 Ibid., p. 199.  
175 Ibid.,, p. 199. 
176 Ibid., p. 199.  
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[must be treated] ….as derivative from and expressing a more general 
responsibility active throughout the association in different ways”.177  
4. Members are aware that the groups to which they belong show equal concern 
for them in the sense that “roles and rules are equally in the interest of all, that 
no one’s life is more important than anyone else’s”.178  
 
The third and, especially, the fourth governing conditions obviate, to Dworkin’s 
mind, that the only communities that could be considered true in his desired sense are 
those that are “models of principles”.179 These communities are societies in which a 
collective desire to be ruled by principles of justice, fairness, the rule of law, due 
process, etc., can be shown to exist, in which members accept that they have both 
rights and obligations, in which the spelling out of neither rights/obligations nor 
justifications is necessary. In simplest terms, true communities are communities that 
uphold the supreme political ideal of integrity. Importantly, in a way that departs from 
the usual associativist position that membership/roles themselves generate obligations 
independently of the practices’ goals, Dworkin restricts associative obligations to 
participants in communities that do not behave in ways or have aims that conflict with 
the goals of justice.180 Hence, the action and principles of a community must not run 
against the general demands of justice. 
The immediately evident issue with Dworkin’s account is that not even the most 
paradigmatic examples of associative relationships we can think of meet the 
prerequisites he sets, most clearly conditions (3) and (4);181 there is always some 
degree of partiality towards certain fellow members (even parents have favourite 
children) and/or some measure of disconnectedness from them to negate them; and 
the larger the group studied the clearer this issue becomes, probably to the point that 
straight-faced claims that political communities meet the latter conditions would 
cause great disbelief even amongst the less cynical; this clearly strains C7conformity.  
Independently of this, however, we cannot be sure that the conditions Dworkin 
established above are genuinely more than beliefs. The declared, self-imposed goal of 
Dworkin’s work was to discredit the positivist rule-of-recognition as a proper 
                                                        
177 Ibid.,, p. 200.  
178 Ibid., p. 201.  
179 Ibid., p. 211. 
180 Ibid., p. 204.  
181 Perry, “Associative Obligations and the Obligation to Obey the Law”, p. 18.  
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foundation for a legal system (on the basis that practices, traditions, conventions, 
beliefs are insufficient).182 Yet his account rests on what looks very much like a 
contention that there are true communities believed by their members to be models of 
principles based on equal concern and integrity, believed to meet the four conditions. 
Consequently, Denise Reaume makes a fine argument in favour of Dworkin falling 
into the same trap as positivists. Perry, Knowles and others attempt to rescue him by 
reminding that he thought the four conditions to be the routine interpretations of a 
group, not “psychological properties of some fixed number of actual members”.183 
This position seems as farfetched as his claims above about the features of true 
associative communities: can interpretation be practised without it being in any way 
affected by the interpreter’s belief systems, by precedent, by tradition, and the likes? 
It strains belief, especially when taking into consideration the fact that, in spite of his 
vehement denial of the psychological characteristic of interpretations, Dworkin is 
ready to discuss the state as capable of equal concern, of a genuine desire to advance 
and protect every member’s wellbeing. Dworkin thus proves himself less generous in 
his opinions on human psychology than with claims that largely personify the state. 
As such, regardless of whether or not Dworkin attempts to ground political obligation 
in potentially confused, mistaken, mutable beliefs or in a process of interpretation that 
in no way can escape being determinately influenced by them, his selected sources of 
duty make for very unstable ground. Missed C7conformity therefore leads to 
CO1Asufficient-normative-strength.  
This rooting has other negative implications for his account. Firstly, if equal 
concern is a matter of interpretation not psychology then the possibility of instability 
increases exponentially, in proportion with escalations in inauthenticity of concern or 
variability in expression. This can lead to localized variability and unpredictability, if 
members do not show the correct amounts of the right type of concerns at the proper 
times, a fact that Dworkin himself admits. Consequently, this threatens conditions (3) 
and (4) and therefore the very existence of a true community.184 Secondly, if concern 
is purely a matter of interpretation, the door is opened to a host of morally 
objectionable results; neither North Korea nor the dictatorships of the Middle East are 
                                                        
182 The rule of recognition is the secondary rule of a legal system that set the criteria of legal validity 
(what counts as a law) and for making and applying legal rules.  
183 Dworkin, Law’s Empire, p. 201. Also see D. Knowles, Political Obligation, Routledge, 2009, p. 
177 and Perry, “Associative Obligations and the Obligation to Obey the Law”, p. 20.  
184 At best this would entail oscillating duty. 
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likely to have any reservations about interpreting themselves as exhibiting equal 
concern and the value of integrity. It looks as though Dworkin might be ready to 
accept that abusive regimes could impose associative obligations on their members as 
long as those that perform interpretation find the four conditions to have been 
satisfied. But it is only an impression. Dworkin does not believe communities that 
practise routine violations of rights to be capable of imposing on their members a 
threshold level of justice that has to be met at all times. Without it, even if localized 
interpretations assert equal concern, no associative duties exist. The principle of 
justice has its superior, overriding moral status recognized.  
There is a serious downside to this, however. Dworkin finds himself in a position 
in which he is forced to supplement his account with an appeal to justice that is not 
without effect on the ground of duty in as much as it prompts doubts about the 
authenticity of his associativist credentials and invites questions about the precise 
carrier of the normative load.185  Dworkin insists that the ground of obligation is 
“membership in the true community” but the issues of equal concern and justice have 
all too regularly taken centre-stage. I would argue that, in Dworkin’s case, 
membership is not only not the ground of obligation, but not a ground at all.186 His 
effort begins with a claim of obligation being sourced in membership yet the bulk of 
the argument focuses on “equal concern” and justice (which comprises integrity), 
group belonging and citizenship effectively mattering much less towards obedience 
than the communities’ exhibiting of these features. Dworkin’s account consequently 
reads more like a natural duty of justice – or a natural duty of justice as equal concern 
(something Stilz later defends in convincing fashion) – than a clear associative 
account. The purported ground for the moral requirement to obey – membership – is 
parasitic on concern and justice, both of which have more moral charge and more 
normative strength, including imposing duties. Furthermore, it is not that the 
argument from membership in true communities justifies the obligations of only a 
minority of people, with justice and equal concern explaining and shouldering the 
                                                        
185 This is an insurmountable obstacle for all associative theories. Richard Dagger’s explained it best  
“…membership is not itself sufficient to generate an obligation: something extra must be added- an 
appeal to justice or to the nature of a true community- to supply what a straightforward appeal to 
membership lacks”.185 R. Dagger, “Membership, Fair-Play and Political Obligation”, Political Studies, 
Vol. 48, 2000, pp. 104-117, p. 110. The appeals to justice associative accounts are forced to make to 
avoid the conclusion that people have obligations towards immoral communities render their 
justifications parasitic on the principle of justice. In other words, they become hard to distinguish from 
natural duty of justice accounts.  
186 Or its normative burden is minuscule.  
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rest; it is that it justifies the requirement of no one, the later claim from justice, 
manifesting as equal concern, potentially creating duties before any fact of 
membership ever could. The toothless argument from belonging is therefore “beaten 
to the punch”, obviating the account’s parasitism and degeneration before we could 
even mouth objections that being an action presupposed by a role is not sufficient 
moral justification for performance. Hence, CO1Bnon-degeneration is obviously missed. 
After having encountered significant resistance to his original account of political 
obligation, Dworkin revisits the topic in Justice for Hedgehogs. Here, Dworkin argues 
that a particularized duty to obey exists because political communities wound the 
dignity of their members through coercive practices. What he means by this is that, 
just by going along and submitting to the coercive demands of authorities, each and 
every one of us negatively affecting the dignity of fellow citizens. While such 
coercion may seem wrong or morally objectionable, it is not; coercion is necessary for 
regulating social interactions between members of the political community; without it, 
the state would be morally defective.187 In these conditions obeying the law presents 
itself as the solution to the problem of preserving the dignity of others: if coercion is 
offensive yet necessary and morally permissible then the only way to protect others is 
by submitting to the same set of rules they do:  
 
“We find ourselves in associations we need and cannot avoid but whose 
vulnerabilities are consistent with our self-respect only if they are reciprocal-only if 
they include the responsibility of each, at least in principle, to accept collective 
decisions as obligations.”188 
 
 
This line of argument, though ingenious, does not help Dworkin much. There are 
multiple issues with it. First, there is the attempt to circumvent whatever objections 
there may be that particularity is not met. For typical associativist accounts 
particularity is not a problem: we owe what we owe to the political community in 
which we associate and which has contributed significantly and determinately to who 
we are, how we behave, etc. In one sense, Dworkin does not depart from ordinary 
associativism enough to assume this defence does not work for him as well. That said, 
                                                        
187 R. Dworkin, Justice for Hedgehogs, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 2011, p. 320. 
188 Dworkin, Justice for Hedgehogs, p. 321. 
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insofar as he increases the number of appeals he makes to moral principles and justice 
and dignity, he invites questions about the moral permissibility of borders, of 
exclusions and of restricted applicability. A first question in this direction is why the 
dignity of those that fall the right side of the border matters more than those outside of 
it; on what morally correct grounds was it decided to perform exclusions is another 
one; and there are other questions concerning the possibilities that communities that 
exhibit similar legal cultures and principles may also have some claims to our 
submissions, that “juster” ones may be justifiably entitled to it [obedience] as well, 
and that general justice and dignity may be better served and achieved through non-
submission or non-exclusive submission. Dworkin backs himself into the same corner 
as natural duty advocates who cannot produce a vindication of borders that saves the 
process of districting from making victims. His own perspective is at fault in this 
because he regards borders as an acceptable product of history, an opinion classically 
married to assumptions that being born within a jurisdiction is justification enough for 
restricted law abidance. C6particularity becomes an issue and so does CO3precise-
districting/inclusion. 
Secondly, there is the issue that his purported associative theory reads less and 
less like one. His claim that by submitting to law we preserve the dignity of others 
reads very much like Wellman’s claim that by submitting to law we preserve the 
safety of others. The idea of rescue however belongs to natural duty logics, not 
associativist ones. Protecting people’s dignity, whatever this may mean, from 
negative forces, including coercion, whatever that may mean, reads more like a 
natural duty we have in virtue of dignified humanity than an obligation we have as 
citizens towards co-members inhabiting the same particular space (CO1Bnon-
degeneration). Or, alternatively, it reads like a virtue one should exhibit, turning 
Dworkin’s account into something more akin to Edmundson’s virtue-ethics effort of 
describing law-abidance. Also, while C7conformity is satisfied in as much as states 
undoubtedly coerce, the fact that this imposition occurs vertically does challenge 
conformity: in real life, coercion flows down from institutions to citizens; so if it is 
not something we actually do to each other why does Dworkin think it brings about 
something we owe to each other? His portrayal of citizens as accessories to the 
wounding of [each other’s] dignities is unrealistic, because in actual political 
scenarios we are all victims of institutions. Finally, his account invites an interesting 
philosophical question about dignity itself. Throughout his justification Dworkin 
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assumes dignity to be damaged by coercion. The corollary of this is that we were 
more dignified as natural savages than we are as subjected citizens. But why? Insofar 
as dignity is, at least partially, a social virtue to be exhibited when trapped within 
adversarial relationships, why assume there would be less of it in the universe where 
there are regulated political communities? By Dworkin’s own admission, life 
presupposes inescapable social interactions and connections that the state polices with 
a view towards maintaining social order and protecting the views and well-being of 
all involved. In these conditions, an argument could be made that states use their main 
tool, coercion, to ensure that in whatever ways we interact with each other our 
dignities are preserved.  
Lastly but identical in vein to the previous objection, Dworkin’s claims from 
reciprocity automatically remind us of arguments from fairness: if for Klosko 
obedience was fair repayment for the cooperation that led to benefiting, for Dworkin 
it is fair repayment for having facilitated the coercion of others (and bringing about 
the ensuing lack of dignity). Overlap is practically perfect and we are once again left 
wondering what kind of argument the legal scholar actually meant to advance, and 
what is the authentic ground of presupposed political obligations (meaning CO1Bnon-
degeneration).    
To sum up, Dworkin’s final thoughts on political obligation do not amount to 
proper justification either. His account presents with an unavoidable issue of 
unsatisfied particularity joined at the hip with a less damaging but still existing 
concern about conformity, and, more worryingly, solid evidence of degeneration. In 
its final form, whatever Dworkin’s explanation imposes – in fashion certainly not 
restricted according to borders – does so not on an associative argument but on one 
from rescue or fairness. That imposition, however, is not political obligation because, 
as we have seen, fairness claims are cripplingly flawed and, as we shall see in chapter 
IV, rescue ones fail too. Dworkin’s justification therefore fails C6particularity and 
CO1A and CO1Bnormative strength/degeneration, CO3precise-districting/inclusion, and 
C6particularity. 
The faults in Dworkin’s account will come back to haunt associativism. That is 
not to say this school of thought on the moral requirement to obey was discouraged by 
his inability to convince. Later proponents retained much of his associativist 
argumentative structure and, post-1990’s, they argued much in the same way 
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(although without appeals to the true nature of communities) and consequently 
exposed themselves to similar objections. 
 In the interlude separating Dworkin’s argument from the revival of associative 
theories of political obligations that would come following the confirmed failure of 
transactionalism, however, another category of thinkers used associativism to resolve 
questions on authority and obligations, namely communitarians. In as much as they 
were interested in these issues, communitarians argued the moral obligations of 
citizens – including obedience – to be derivative from the identity-shaping power of 
practices and of their power to generate obligations independently of superior moral 
principles. These two ideas would later significantly inform associativists, however, 
and count equally significantly towards their eventual dismissal. In the next section, I 
explore the identity and normative independence thesis in order to expose their 




Communitarians seldom regard political obligation as the battle. They are 
generally more preoccupied with deconstructing practices of blanket moral 
evaluations based in universalism, defending group and minority rights, with 
multiculturalism, and with criticizing liberalism and its individualist “proclivities” far 
more than they are with justifications for the requirement to obey. Because they 
perceive the relationship between citizens and states as like any other associative 
relationship that imposes obligations upon its members simply because they are 
members [in the relationship] they do not stop to spell out the content of these 
obligations, answer typical criticisms of associativism or, crucially, explain why 
performing these role-attached duties is always justified. Communitarians often have 
some of the same attitudes as defenders of the conceptual argument: if we pose too 
many questions about the obligations allegedly ascribed to roles then we do not 
understand what those roles are, what they entail; we are failing to experience them 
properly or even to make sense when naming them. A less charitable suspicion is that, 
had they observed the issue more closely, they would have eventually come to realise 
that the duties associated with these valuable relationships are grounded not in the 
relationship itself but in the moral principles that govern these interactions, which 
 118 
would negate their claims that the normative burden is carried by membership/role-
holding alone, and turn their non-voluntary associative account of obligation into a 
non-voluntary account of a natural duty. Still, communitarians do make two 
contributions that will prove to be fundamental to this particular school of thinking 
about obligations: the identity thesis (IT), which ties identity formation to social roles 
and the obligations attached to them (a thesis to which everyone from Alasdair 
MacIntyre, to Sandel, to Taylor, to Tamir, to Horton appeals) and the normative 
independence thesis (NIT) (discoverable in Dworkin- with the caveat from justice-, 
Gilbert and Horton) that awards local institutions and practices the power to create 
obligations independently for those circumscribed within them.189 Simmons’ makes 
both his targets “Associative Political Obligations”. 
Simmons’ main objection to the identity thesis is that it automatically assumes 
that the “personal unintelligibility” that would allegedly follow the rejection of a 
moral obligation flowing from an identity generating role is justification enough for 
that obligation. Simmons denounces the idea that identifying with a role creates an 
authentic obligation to perform any and all duties that are part and parcel of it. To 
illustrate this point he provides the example of a Gestapo agent for whom the identity 
thesis is enough justification to perform the repulsive acts associated with his 
position: being a Gestapo agent means doing things that we now recognize as acts 
against humanity yet the identity thesis tells us that if said individual failed to behave 
in ways that constitute the very meaning of “Gestapo agent” he would suffer an 
identity crisis. To Simmons’ mind this is clearly an undesirable conclusion to reach 
about the thesis. He also thinks this conclusion to be the reason why advocates of the 
IT decided to protect it by introducing the caveat that only morally sound practices 
and roles can be seen as instrumental in identity formation. This condition is self-
                                                        
189 For example MacIntyre writes that “ …the rational justification of my political duties, obligations 
and loyalties is that, were I to divest myself of them by ignoring or flouting them, I should be divesting 
myself of a part of myself, I should be losing a crucial part of my identity”. See A. MacIntyre, in 
“Philosophy and Politics”, J.L. Capps (ed.), Philosophy and Human Enterprise, Lecture series, 1982-
1983, p. 158 (apud. Simmons, “Associative Political Obligations”, p. 80, note 37). Also, Sandel writes 
“those loyalties and convictions whose moral force consists partly in the fact that living by them is 
inseparable from understanding ourselves as the particular persons we are – as members of this family 
or community or nation or people, as bearers of this history, as sons and daughter of that revolution, 
[and/or] as citizens of this republic”. See M. Sandel, Liberalism and the Limits of Justice, Cambridge 
University Press, Cambridge, p. 179. Tamir writes: “Deep and important obligations flow from identity 
and relatedness”; “These obligations are generated by social associations that induce among their 
members feelings of membership and belonging, as well as the belief that the preservation of their 
society is a worthy endeavour”; Liberal Nationalism, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1993, p.99 
; p. 130.  
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sabotaging, however. Simmons thinks its introduction returns advocates to square 
one: if the morality of a social practice is made relevant, it is the morally sound nature 
of the practice that could justify obligation, rather than the alleged personal 
unintelligibility associated with the denial of obligations.  
The glaring first issue here is that claiming that members of morally dubious 
practices, or even of largely neutral ones that sometimes deviate, do not have their 
identities shaped in any way by their belonging to these groups, and would not suffer 
any “personal unintelligibility” if removed from them just because their practice is not 
morally unobjectionable, is actually more offensive to reality than the original 
statement [that obligations attached to identity shaping roles are always justified]; if 
identity is influenced by group-membership then it is influenced regardless of the 
moral quality of the group. This is not a moral issue and not a discussion in terms of 
“should”; if the power to shape identities exists, its existing is not predicated on 
“niceness”.  
Simmons also opines that the marriage with the normative independence does 
not provide the identity thesis with independent weight. When faced with the 
proposition that “we have moral obligations because our identities are constituted by 
social practices that also have the power to independently generate obligations” he 
thinks that appeals to the identity thesis are bound to seem “superfluous and 
misleading”.190 Marshalling his point further, Simmons states that, even if we were to 
change the identity thesis to be more about identification (with a country, 
government, people) than about identity formation, no real progress would be made: 
questions about the morality of the practices with which people identity (as the 
identity thesis could be used to justify the obligations of oppressed people who have 
come to identify with their tyrannous government) and about the “correctness” of 
identification would still arise. In the wake of this analysis Simmons concludes that 
the “feelings of obligations toward our countries of birth or residence” could just be a 
form of false consciousness that communitarian theorists have not yet managed to 
disprove.191  
John Horton defends communitarian theorists and their identity thesis in his 
Political Obligation. Horton starts by pointing out that Simmons dismissing the 
identity thesis as a form of false consciousness is no different from his later claim that 
                                                        
190 Simmons, “Associative Political Obligations”, p. 82.  
191 Ibid., p. 83.  
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associativism (specifically Gilbert, as will be seen later) confuses felt obligations with 
real obligations.192  Possibly very true. That, however, is not in and of itself a proper 
argument against Simmons, because his quarrel with communitarians is not over 
whether or not attachments, real or assumed, play a significant part in identity 
formation but with the specific proposition that obedience to the law is part and parcel 
of who we are to a point that disobedience would lead to an identity crisis. That is the 
crux of the issue. In this direction, if we have little tangible proof that emotional 
attachments justify political obligations, we have even less to assume that ceasing to 
perform our political obligations would lead to a deconstruction of our identities. The 
implication that disobedience is in important ways a mean to the preservation of 
sanity, is a far-fetched proposition, if ever, C7conformity straining like at no point 
before. Life-experience (and arguably logic) indicates that identities are formed long 
before we reach adulthood and we “identify” with a political community towards 
which we become burdened with political obligation: our socio-economic and family 
backgrounds, our religion, education and sexual orientations, etc. are the sort of things 
that make us who we are before we become adult citizens with full rights and duties. 
Chronological precedence alone is enough to ensure that those play a much bigger 
part in identity formation than our role as citizen of a particular community burdened 
with a special obligation of compliance. Thus, it is hard to understand why 
communitarian theorists assume that failing to discharge our obligations towards the 
state – mundane, thoughtless, things such as paying taxes or obeying traffic laws – 
play such a crucial part in our personhood that failing to observe them will jeopardize 
our identity and sense of identification. In comparison to the factors mentioned above, 
the fact that, as legal adults, we come to have our freedom coerced by a set of rules 
and institutions, X, seems to have very little impact; state membership and duty-
holding citizenship are more bureaucratic facts than anything else. In these conditions 
it is not at all obvious that we should agree with communitarians that renouncing 
these obligations would lead to personal unintelligibility and that they are therefore 
justified. The hypothesis does not appear endorsed by reality.  
Horton goes on to make a second interconnected claim (built on Simmons’ 
alleged inability to demonstrate false consciousness) that it is Simmons who has to 
prove that the beliefs we hold as social individuals have no validity. This is yet again 
                                                        
192 J. Horton, Political Obligation, (2nd edition), Palgrave, London, 2010, p. 157.   
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an instance of failing to see the forest for the trees. Simmons’ issue is not with the fact 
of socialization, or the idea that where we are contributes seriously to who we are, or 
even with the claim that some of our beliefs may be correct: it is with the proposition 
that political obligations are justified by the supposed determinant effect they have on 
identity formation and the implicit conclusion that a failure to discharge them leads to 
deconstruction. In clearer terms, he does not dispute that we identify as British, 
Italian, Spanish, etc. in meaningful ways, or that we have feelings towards these states 
or that being born and raised in their jurisdictions reflects in our personalities; he 
disputes. However, that paying taxes towards the local British, Italian or Spanish 
governments, or obeying their corresponding sets of laws, matter to such an extent in 
the process of identity formation that neglecting or denying these obligations would 
obliterate interior cohesion, and that this therefore renders them justified. Still, even if 
Simmons were wrong and our being socially embeddedness counted towards identity 
to the degree held by communitarians, that still would not show political obligation to 
be justified; firmly held beliefs, including about oneself and one’s roles, and including 
those correct, are not in and of themselves justificatory of real or imagined attached 
duties. There is a gap between “I am/ I believe [correctly]” and “I must”. These 
attachments (broadly speaking) have no generational power, as the ignored CO5non-
generational-assumptions-from-attachment states. 
The normative independence thesis was arguably introduced as a way to pre-
empt criticisms of the kind delivered above, on the idea that doubts about the role of 
obligations in identity construction and the above-mentioned gap could be solved by 
an argument that is tantamount to “if political obligation is not justified by their 
feelings and self-beliefs then it is something with which the practice itself can settle 
them independently of other factors”. Simmons’ article reveals that he finds the 
normative independence thesis quite exciting even if ultimately flawed.193  
Simmons’ first argument in favour of rejection builds on the potentially vile or 
defective nature of the obligation-generating practice. In his opinion, the number of 
“unjust, oppressive, pointless, woefully inefficient, and in other ways normatively 
defective [local practices]” operating in the real world should be enough to make 
“either the certification of a practice by some independently justifying moral principle 
                                                        
193 Interest is the result of the thesis’s attempt to shift the production of normativity onto the practice 
itself . Simmons, “Associative Political Obligations”, p. 85.  
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or the acceptance of the practice by those subject to it” a prerequisite for any polity 
assuming the ability to produce duties for its members.  
His second argument rests on the analogy with the family proponents of the 
theses like to employ in order to draw conclusions about other non-voluntary groups. 
Horton explains that, much like within a family unit within which no moral 
justification is required for filial and paternal obligations,194 there is no call for moral 
justification of the obligations we have towards each other as members of the 
community: both practices assign obligation automatically, without making appeals to 
higher order moral principles. The underlying intuition is that, in both cases, the 
obligations are obvious part and parcel of what the role is (to such an extent that a 
presumed X-role occupant asking for justification of actions Z and Y is someone who 
does not understand what X means and what Xing requires). Simmons nevertheless 
denies this obviousness. The core of this second counterargument is that we do not 
actually accept any supposed obligation attached to parenthood without scrutiny.195 
Simmons thinks that while it would be hard to deny that there are some statements 
about parenthood that are “self-evidently true”, this is not the same as saying that the 
practice of “family” ascribes obligations without any involvement from external and 
superior moral principles. Ceteris paribus, though there are bound to be some 
evidently correct statements about the community, this is not obligatorily synonymous 
with normative independence.  
 Simmons’ third and final misgiving about the normative independence thesis 
is that, in this battle between those who feel there are certain obligations that do not 
require justification and those who think that there are not, the only way to verify the 
thesis is by imagining a completely neutral practice and see if it is able to assign 
obligations. Simmons thinks that the existence and functioning of such a practice is 
highly doubtful because (1) all the practices that have survived history have had a 
clear moral or immoral purpose, thus making utter neutrality utopia and (2) the day-
by-day functioning of such a neutral practice would be bound to create expectations 
that, when they were not met, would create frustrations inducing of discourses on 
moral principles such as fairness, utility, etc., thus effectively ending the moral 
                                                        
194 Horton, Political Obligation, pp. 148-149. 
195 The very fact that some of us resist “paternal priority, abandonment or sale of children, genital 
mutilation, arranged marriages, and so on” is evidence enough that we do asses the demands of 
parenthood according to higher moral principles. Simmons, “Associative Political Obligations”, p. 86.  
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neutrality of the scheme.196 Consequently, Simmons feels justified in concluding that 
we have “good reasons to be sceptical about the normative independence thesis”.197  
Simmons’ entire critique bears weight. To begin with a general observation, 
the normative independence thesis renders the identity thesis effectively useless. If 
local social practices have the power to generate obligations for those trapped inside 
them then the fact that they [could] also assist in identity formation is irrelevant; even 
if they did not, or if they stopped, those subjected to them would still have 
obligations. Ceteris paribus, the identity thesis stops being a reason why people have 
obligations and becomes only collateral to the obligation-generating power of local 
practices. 
Secondly, that normative independence is the property of morally 
unobjectionable practices is not something that is necessarily true but something that 
is held to be true, in as much as political theory is averse, as a matter of principle, to 
awarding vile practices the power to create moral obligations. If normative 
independence can be something only [quality] just or reasonably just practices will 
exhibit, however, it begs the questions “how do we get to this conclusion about them” 
and “based on what”? The answers are arrived at through moral evaluations on the 
basis of the only moral standards we broadly hold to be generally acceptable – higher 
order moral principles. This translates the opinion into “normative independence 
could be a property only of practices that have been certified according to moral 
principles that have not been generated by the practice but which govern it 
nonetheless”. There is a high degree of logical inconsistency in this, insofar as 
“independence” is taken to be compatible with higher order principles retaining 
regulative power. And, if certification is required, we are returned to Dagger’s claim 
about the permanent necessity of “extras” in associative thought and to questioning 
whether it would not be sufficient – and more direct – to justify political obligation by 
directly invoking these superior moral principles.198 A proponent of the thesis could 
try to soften the blow by claiming that the complete separation between the thesis and 
higher moral principles people interpreted communitarians as advocating is 
                                                        
196 Ibid., p. 89.  
197 Ibid., p. 90.  
198  Horton does acknowledge this when he admits that higher order principles act as “general 
constraints”. But he believes them to be not “so extensive as to restrict severely the scope of local 
practices to generate political obligations” J. Horton, “In Defence of Associative Political Obligations: 
Part one”, Political Studies, Vol. 54, pp. 427-443, p. 436 and J. Horton, Political Obligation, Palgrave, 
(1st edition) London, 1992, 156-157. 
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exaggerated. Horton holds such a position: he reads it as saying not that local 
practices “are entirely independent of all broader moral considerations” but as 
allowing for some constraint by “general moral values”, in the sense that “local 
practices give these values [the higher moral principles] a particular shape, ordering 
and meaning within a specific social or institutional setting or way of life”.199 It is not 
obvious why this argument is held to be conducive to success. The purpose of the 
normative independence thesis is to explain that a particular group of people has 
obligations (including political obligation) because the practice in which they conduct 
their lives as members has the power to generate duties for them without having to 
make any appeal to overarching moral principles. Reintroducing these principles into 
the argument, however minimally, does not further the thesis’s case. It only muddies 
the ground of obligation, since it leaves us wondering whether it springs from 
membership itself, from the normative power of practices or from the higher moral 
values that the practice exercises in a fashion adapted to local institutions (CO1A and 
CO1B normative strength-degeneration fail to be met again)- and therefore makes the 
discussion on the obligation-generating power of practices effectively useless, and 
eventually ruins the inner logic of the thesis by making principles that were supposed 
to be ignored bear on the practice once more; “independent” is, after all, in the same 
category of attributes as “pregnant” or “dead”- you either are or you are not. Also, as 
always, if obligations can be justified on the basis of moral principles it makes more 
sense to directly invoke the highest order principles, without deviating into a 
discussion on practices and their normative abilities; the particularity requirement can 
be met later, by simply explaining that local practices oversee the observance of these 
moral principles or on some argument from moral particularism. 
Thirdly, serious concerns are raised by the strong conviction that questioning 
the duties attached to a role equates to a de facto failure to grasp what it means to be 
in that role. Simmons’ critique focuses on the factuality of assessment and on the idea 
that, while a role might have some self-evident propositions attached to it, that does 
not mean that all propositions will be so; a window of interrogation always exists. 
This is a good argument that needs perhaps tighter expression. The point to get across 
is that one can agree that a set of duties is constitutive of a role without going as far as 
claiming that there is no need or logic to ever question them in a justificatory sense. 
                                                        
199 Horton, Political Obligation, p.162.  
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The question here is not one about the value or merit of the role itself but of the 
morality or necessity of performing those duties believed to be attached to it. The fact 
that being a parent presupposes caring for children does not necessarily mean that 
every act of care is necessary, required or even permissible. Advocates of the NIT, 
however, argue that when explanations are required it is sufficient to spell out the 
content of those obligations in order to render it obvious that being in a role is 
justification enough. But there is a real chance, contrary to Horton’s opinion, that this 
spelling out might require the invocation of moral principles, discrediting their claim 
that obligation is rooted in the relationship alone.200  It is very likely that people 
behave the way that they do when they are in relationships, not because of some 
strong sense of identification or possession over that role but because they are 
prompted by internalized moral principles, and the corresponding duties of care, 
charity, rescue, fairness, etc. attached to them; and when the relationship is one with 
the state, towards which care and concern are harder to exhibit and which is arguably 
more diluted than traditional ones, behaviours – specifically the discharging of 
political obligation – are much easier to conceptualize as the contents of those duties 
than instincts triggered by the role itself. So even if communitarian contentions could 
make sense in the larger context of general relationships, they are not convincing 
when it comes to the obedience paradigm.  
Finally, the defender of the normative independence thesis could argue that it 
is paradoxical to ask for an explanation for how the morally neutral practice Simmons 
imagined as a test for the thesis is capable of generating moral obligation. Simmons 
himself recognizes this in his article.201 On some level this is true. There is nothing 
that indelibly commits us to assuming that requirements must obligatorily have a 
moral source, or even that political obligation is necessarily a moral duty. In this 
situation, the normative independence thesis could be rewritten as a statement that 
local practices are capable of generating obligations, moral and non-moral, 
independently of higher moral values. Nevertheless, even if the thesis is rewritten in 
this form and we change our historical perspective on political obligation as a moral 
duty, with the probable exception of those who think that calling for justifications for 
                                                        
200 Horton writes about justifying not going to a party in favour of attending one parents’ wedding 
anniversary: “… would most likely involve spelling out what is involved in familial relations, at least 
as understood within a particular conception of family life, rather than referring to any general moral 
principle. Such obligations “derive” from membership of a family….”. Horton, Political Obligation (1st 
edition), p.148.   
201 Simmons, “Associative Political Obligations”, p. 90. 
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political obligation is testament to a failure to understand what it means to be a 
member of a community, people are likely to continue to demand an explanation for 
this power in spite of the potential paradox. The claim that “we have non-moral 
obligations because the practice that we are involved in has the power to create them 
and cast them upon us” is equally nowhere near self-evidently true. 
What communitarians propose, therefore, are two theses weakly endorsed by 
common sense observations about selves, even embedded ones, and moral theory. 
They choose to ignore the facts, (1) that personhood survives an ill-performed role, 
(2) that while explanations of the role itself may be unnecessary, explanations of acts 
committed or committable on the basis of it are perfectly intelligible, and (3) that calls 
for external justification amount to neither a rejection of the role’s presumed value 
nor to an intellectual failure to understand it. More importantly, they hold obligations 
attached to roles as internally self-justifying without considering the very real 
possibility that those considered obligations may actually be duties tied to applicable 
higher order moral principles – the same ones which retained regulatory power and 
subsequently rendered the normative independence thesis fictitious. C7conformity 
issues arise again and CO1Asufficient-normative-strength is entirely missed. 
Later associativists nonetheless saw great merit in these theses so they recur, 
especially in the work of John Horton. Before this final articulation of the associative 
paradigm, however, Margaret Gilbert delivered a slightly different version of 
associativism that will drew both Horton’s and Simmons’ attention. In the next 
section I show that Simmons’ critique of Gilbert’s account succeeds in face of 




Gilbert is a scholar of social agency who ties political obligation to something 
she dubs “joint commitments” performed by “plural subjects”, two concepts she 
develops throughout a series of articles and in her 2006 book A Theory of Political 
Obligation. To illustrate them she produces the example of two people who, 
“knowingly and intentionally” start walking together: 
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“I shall consider a small group comprising two people who are going for a 
walk together. I assume that their going for a walk together makes them a social 
group, albeit a small and transitory one. .. [Their] walking together demands a certain 
physical proximity. Such proximity is a necessary but not a sufficient condition for 
walking together, as the following example shows. Suppose that you and I are out on 
a walk. We are heading in the direction of Central Park. Now imagine that without 
warning you suddenly turn away from me, without a word, and cross to the other side, 
disappearing down East 49th Street. Perhaps I will not be disappointed. But I will 
surely be surprised, and I will, more strongly, feel that you have done something 
"quite untoward." You have in some way made a mistake. We were out on a walk, 
and you suddenly disappeared without any "by your leave....” 
 
In Gilbert’s opinion these people have formed a “joint commitment” that 
bestows obligations onto both: 
  
“Without attempting a precise definition of 'obligation', it is surely plausible to 
suggest that the concept of obligation applies here. If I am out on a walk with you, I 
have certain obligations. I shall now turn to the question of the ground of these 
obligations. How do people ever end up going for a walk together? This can happen 
in various ways. Usually there will be some kind of dialogue.. Or.. Case II: I am 
already out on a walk. You see me and enquire as to my planned route. "I'll come with 
you!" you say….I don't demur. We set off. The first case involves an informal 
agreement between the parties. What happens in the second case may not amount to 
an agreement exactly. Nonetheless the relevant understanding can be thus 
established…: each has expressed to the other his or her willingness to be parties to a 
joint commitment with a certain content..... As I understand it, all that is necessary to 
establish what I call a "joint commitment" is that the relevant parties mutually express 
their readiness to be so committed, in conditions of common knowledge. The 
common knowledge condition means that the existence of these expressions must be 
"out in the open" between the parties.”202 
 
                                                        
202 M. Gilbert, “Group Membership and Political Obligation”, The Monist, Vol.76, No.1, 1993, pp. 
119-131, pp. 122-123.   
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These lengthy quotations serve to show that, as far as Gilbert is concerned, 
whenever two people willingly and expressly start doing something (a shared goal 
both have and towards which both endeavour) together and recognize each other as 
participants in an enterprise they gain mutual obligations as members of plural subject 
formed through “joint commitment”. She explains that this joint commitment need 
not always be a “datable” process, one with a clear, easily identifiable point of origin: 
occasionally plural subjects “grow up somehow” or “just happen”.203 Once they begin 
“walking”, however, participants have an obligation to continue together in their 
pursuit and to behave in a way appropriate to their activity for an unspecified – but 
seemingly permanent – period of time. 204  This rule applies to all plural subjects 
formed through joint commitments, be them tiny ones or very large ones such as the 
state. To Gilbert’s mind, the polity is an entity created, through a joint commitment 
governed by rules engendering of institutions, and sustained by citizens with an “us” 
mentality, “our” vocabulary and powerful feelings of attachments towards their 
communities.205 About the precise manner in which an individual can commit to one 
of these already created statal plural subjects Gilbert writes that belonging is 
contingent on (1) the individual routinely behaving like a member of society and (2) 
being recognized as such by those that already are full members.206 In the aftermath of 
this social process of recognition (which Horton dubs “the social convention”) that 
person becomes duty bound to that community irrespective of its moral character; 207 
together with the other members he will then be: 
 
                                                        
203 Gilbert, “Group Membership and Political Obligation”, p. 125.  
204 M. Gilbert, A Theory of Political Obligation, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2006p. 214.  
205 These rules and institutions are what citizens are supposedly jointly committed to. 
206 This idea of recognition is important in Gilbert’s thought but somewhat hard to trace. See M. 
Gilbert, On Social Facts, Princeton University Press, Princeton, pp. 217-219; Gilbert, A Theory of 
Political Obligation, chapter 7; or M.t Gilbert, “Mutual Recognition, Common Knowledge and Joint 
Commitment”, pp.10-11, available online at 
http://www.fil.lu.se/hommageawlodek/site/papper/GilbertMargaret.pdf: “In further explanation of my 
proposal, something must be said, briefly, about joint commitment. One who invokes joint 
commitment in the sense I have in mind allows that, just as an individual can commit himself, by 
forming a decision, for instance, so two or more individual can commit themselves as one. In order that 
this come about, something must be expressed by each of the would-be parties, and that is precisely his 
personal readiness to be jointly committed with the other in the relevant way”.  
207See Horton, Political Obligation, p. 153. A controversial qualification for most but not for Gilbert, 
who does not believe political obligations are moral obligations; Gilbert, A Theory of Political 
Obligation, pp. 285-286. 
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 “obligated to uphold its political institutions by virtue of [his] membership in 
that society, and membership is a matter of participation in a joint commitment to 
accept together with the other members the political institutions in question”.208  
 
As mentioned, Gilbert’s work would be a cause of a great debate between 
Simmons and Horton, with the latter endeavouring to defend it from Simmons’ 
repeated charge from confusion. Simmons’s first complaint is that Gilbert obfuscates 
“felt obligations with genuine obligations”. In his opinion, the fact that citizens use 
the vocabulary of “our” – our government, our country, our state – does not amount to 
them having real obligations but is, at most, indicative of a “vague feeling of 
indebtedness” that is not synonymous with having a concrete duty. Simmons’ 
conviction is that “confused, oppressed or unthinking feelings of obligations are too 
common a feature of our moral lives to make reasonable such leaps of faith”, i.e. 
permit us to use them as the foundations for the very real and very heavy duties 
citizens are burdened with. 209  John Horton disputes this criticism in Political 
Obligation.210 He rephrases Simmons as saying that people live under “some kind of 
mass delusion” and rejects his outlook as having no force. He writes that associative 
theorists do not deny “the bare possibility of error [in the feelings of indebtedness 
people experience towards their community]” but rather sees this possibility as having 
“no independent weight”, as not managing to establish anything definitive about 
people and their obligations.211 
There is merit to both claims: while probability suggests that at least part of 
our feelings and attachments may be the results of manipulation, indoctrination, 
confusion, or mere socialization [within a particular group] this does not necessarily 
entail, as Simmons appears to believe, that they are insignificant, as moral charges go, 
and lacking in ability to settle us with some duty. 212  The truth most likely lies 
somewhere in the middle. But as a general point of theory alleged feelings do not 
constitute an appropriate foundation for an actual obligation of the magnitude and 
                                                        
208 Gilbert, A Theory of Political Obligation, p. 289.  
209 Simmons, “Associative Political Obligations”, p. 75.  
210 John Horton’s reasons for defending Gilbert may not be entirely altruistic, as criticisms of Gilbert 
stand against him and other associativists as well.  
211 Horton, Political Obligation, pp. 153-154.  
212 Although, as always, it is plausible that these duties may be back-traceable to superior moral 
principles, making these obligations not consequences of attachments but whatever natural duties are 
applicable to the relationship in question.  
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weight of political obligation. If their existence is disproven then Gilbert and Horton 
would have, in a best-case scenario, burdened free people with demanding obligations 
on a singularly weak basis of supposed attachments; whereas in a worst-case one they 
would have bound manipulated or terrorized people to obedience towards tyrannical 
regimes.213 Suppose however, for the sake of argument, that feelings could function as 
solid grounds for obligations. The consequence for us would still not be resolution to 
the problem of political obligation. Linking it to feelings (understood broadly) is 
bound to generate very random, very unstable results because emotions are mutable, 
changing and ultimately unknown to anyone other than the agent; and it seems 
counterintuitive to assume that throughout their lives people, individually and 
collectively, will experience sentiments of affection towards their country and fellow 
citizens firm and coherent enough to support permanent obligation. Given this 
volatility, if Gilbert wants to marshal attachments as sources of obligations she’d do 
well to discover a baseline of emotion after which all citizens can be said to have a 
quantity of quality affection sufficient to generate duties. As such, while a blanket ban 
on feelings as grounds for duty may be an unwarranted, as a foundation for political 
obligation they function exceptionally poorly. Gilbert may not yet fall afoul of 
CO6non-confusion but insofar as she does tie political obligation to attachments she 
does fail CO5non-generational-assumptions-from-attachments. 
Gilbert’s second error according to Simmons is her muddling of the distinction 
between passive acquiescence and “positive obligation-generating acts or 
relationships”. Simmons thinks that going along with one political arrangement or 
another does not constitute commitment, even if that acquiescence has happened in 
“full conditions of knowledge” or for a significant portion of time: just like playing a 
game by the rules set by a “pushy participant” does not “commit us to accepting his 
further plans or pronouncements about the game or about anything else”, the 
“preparedness to continue as a participant in the political game [does not] entail any 
commitment or obligation to future obedience to and support of the political 
community’s government].214  Simmons’ insight is that, in the absence of a clear 
commitment, no behaviour, regardless of how routinely performed, will lead to 
obligation. In reply, Horton questions Simmons’ judgment not to provide a list of 
                                                        
213 Unless she wants to qualify her theory by claiming that attachments produce obligations only for 
plural subjects in just societies, in which case she finds herself faced with the old charge that 
associative theories cannot ground political obligation on their own. 
214 Simmons, “Associative Political Obligations”, pp. 75-76.  
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positive obligation-generating acts or relationships or to explain why Gilbert’s joint 
commitment is not a part of them, under any circumstances.  
Horton’s objection is not without reason. Simmons’ underlying voluntarist 
convictions make him uncomfortable with the associativists’ lack of intention to trace 
back political obligation to a single, clear, voluntary act. Although Simmons may not 
be as ready as he should be to embrace their point of view, however, two things do 
justify his counterargument. One is a theoretical necessity to distinguish between 
correct sources of obligation and routine behaviours, including ones of obedience: 
that I comply all the time does not confirm that I am obligated. The difference is the 
one between “I do” and “I have to do”. The other is Gilbert’s misleading vocabulary, 
which often belongs to the voluntarist tribe with which she entertains a mysterious 
relationship. Associative theories of obligation are by definition non-voluntary. 
Although Gilbert circumscribes herself within this tradition, in the article to which 
Simmons replies, she does not shy away from repeatedly using the jargon of 
voluntarism: she writes about the “willingness” or “readiness” of people to become 
parties to the joint commitments; she claims that, in order for a joint commitment to 
exists, people must express their desire to be involved “out in the open”;215 and the 
alternative replies available to the people in the walking together example she 
constructs could just as easily be used to exemplify the two classic forms of 
consent.216 All of these could be interpreted as the countenance of commitment to 
voluntarism. Many of Gilbert’s readers were thrown off by her writings, so many that 
in her book she had to explicitly deny her adhesion to contract theory, in a statement 
that arguably does very little to resolve the issue.217 Voluntarism was, and is, a dark 
shadow perpetually looming over her account.  
Gilbert’s account reading somewhat like a transactional account is not the only 
departure from more traditional associative theories. Unlike other associativists (and 
communitarians) she does not focus as much on the meanings of membership and 
                                                        
215 “…each [participant] has expressed to the other his or her willingness to be parties”. Gilbert, 
“Group Membership and Political Obligation”, p. 122. 
216 Ibid., p. 123.  
217 Gilbert writes that even though her work “has been cited as a form of ‘nonvoluntarist contract 
theory’... it does not in fact appeal to contracts or agreements, but it is in an important sense 
‘non‐voluntarist’. According to the theory, an understanding of joint commitment and a readiness to be 
jointly committed are necessary if one is to accrue political obligations, as is common knowledge of 
these in the population in question. One can, however, fulfil these conditions without prior deliberation 
or decision, and if one has deliberated, one may have had little choice but to incur them”. Gilbert, A 
Theory of Political Obligation, p. 289.   
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communities or on the process of identity formation; and, in spite of her initial 
insistence that attachments produce obligations, Gilbert eventually shifts focus onto 
one’s acting like a member of the community and being recognized as such by others 
as the sources of obligation. The important observation to be made here is that, while 
most associative theories of political obligation are internal-focused, hers is 
predominantly externally oriented towards responses triggered in others: Gilbert’s 
account rests primarily on outward behaviours, rather than on internal emotions or 
convictions. In these conditions we can see that Simmons, in spite of his plausible 
wariness that Gilbert is a closeted voluntarist, was still mistaken in reading Gilbert as 
saying that one’s behaviour alone is able to generate duties. He omitted Gilbert’s 
caveat that individual attitudes/behaviours produce obligation only when in concert 
with the social convention: it is not enough for one to act like a member; he must be 
recognized as one as well. Gilbert’s theory is thus not about individual behaviours 
tout court but about imitating behaviours that elicit a very particular response in other 
people. In the end, it [seems that] the social convention carries the brunt of the weight 
of obligation, not the activities of the individual.218 
If this is correct, then Gilbert, while not as prone to confusion as Simmons 
holds her, has still departed from the original associativist trail considerably 
(sufficiently for CO1A, CO1B normative strength-degeneration to fail to meet) with 
very slim pay-offs at best. The problem with making political obligation contingent 
on recognition is that it can fail to happen, happen for the wrong reasons, or not be 
uniform. Additionally, there is a logical gap between being recognized as something 
and actually being something. The proposition “I am recognized as something ergo, 
on this basis alone, I am something” is not obviously true. There is a space between 
the two that is not filled by someone’s behaviour, as Gilbert intended. Aside from the 
fact that the argument from behaviours has that whiff of voluntarism that is hard to 
shake off, and is deeply problematic for an author facing accusations of being 
improperly committed to non-voluntarism, the opinion that such behaviour can be a 
source of obligation will face the same difficulties as tacit consent. Recall that in the 
latter’s case the problem was identifying the kind of “meaningful silences” in clear 
choice situations that could be taken as consent. In this scenario, the hardship lies in 
pinpointing (1) the cases in which individuals who have been recognized as members 
                                                        
218 This becomes particularly clear in Gilbert’s “Mutual Recognition, Common Knowledge and Joint 
Attention”. 
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have behaved impeccably as such and vice-versa, and (2) the types of behaviours that 
have been acknowledged as capable of turning outsiders into members. 219  These 
difficulties bring about a multitude of associated questions, each hard to answer: (in 
no particular order) “how does one come to know that there is a difference – in terms 
of community belonging – between him and some other individuals”, “when does this 
awareness begin”, “what sort of acts of proper members should be imitated for the 
agent to be seen by others as acting as a member”, “how do we differentiate between 
those who always act as members and those who just happen to occasionally mimic 
some of the behaviours of proper members”, “ how can we be sure we have not 
recognized as a member someone who just happened to act like one at the precise 
moment of observation”, “how long must one behave like a member in order to be 
confirmed as one”, “does ceasing to act like a member lead to interruption of political 
obligation”, “how do we know for sure that the social convention has taken place”, 
etc.  Arguably, few of these worries can be alleviated, and thus proper situations in 
which adequate behaviours have been exhibited and recognized as indicative of a 
desire to become a member are bound to be as few as the situations in which genuine 
tacit consent could take place. Gilbert says little to convince us otherwise. 
Simmons’ third and final counterargument to Gilbert is that she mistakes 
“reasonable expectations” with “justified entitlements”, that she fails to realize that 
we are not automatically authorised to make demands on people who are simply 
going-along with an arrangement, no matter for how long. In Gilbert’s defence, 
Horton responds that “while mere regularity is not sufficient to generate an obligation 
... it seems hard to imagine how social life could proceed in complex societies like our 
own unless there were some obligations explicable in terms of reasonable 
expectations arising from broad and impersonal patterns of behaviour, rather than just 
close interpersonal relationships”.220  
Again, truth is probably halfway between the two positions. At some point, a 
detected action routinely performed becomes a habit for observers as well. And while 
it would be awkward to claim that the housewives of Konigsberg were “justifiably 
entitled” to Kant’s precisely timed promenade, they were justified in their 
expectations to see him (minimally in the sense that they were rational in their 
expectation) and, if somehow dependent in their clock setting on him, even entitled, 
                                                        
219 What are they, how do we know these are them, how do people learn about them.  
220Horton, Political Obligation, pp. 154-155. 
 134 
albeit in a constrained fashion. Horton can be right, therefore, but only in the same 
restricted way. Insofar as there is a gap between bona fide “justifiably entitled” and 
“justified / justified and partially entitled”, Simmons’ objection is fair, however, 
Gilbert’s account is finally guilty of CO6non-confusion.221 That patterns create genuine 
obligations is a far-fetched claim. Against this one might invoke the UK’s “right to 
roam” legislation. That, however, is not paradigmatic of what Horton and Gilbert are 
claiming. A better example would be that of an adult son who is still being financially 
supported by his parents: though we cannot deny that months or years of this does 
generate “reasonable expectations” we also cannot assert that the parents are morally, 
much less legally, obligated to continue financing their son past the age the law deems 
him to be a fully mature, responsible human agent. An entitled offspring, even one 
justified in his belief and with an intelligible claim to it, does not make one an 
obligated parent. Of course, the duties of charity, aid, samaritanism, as well as some 
measure of parental responsibility still exist and inform the relationship, but they are 
the kind of natural, moral duties that one has qua human, not obligations. We can 
extrapolate from this to draw some conclusions about Gilbert’s account; while she can 
intelligibly state that members of a community can expect of each other member-like 
behaviours if they have performed them for a considerable amount of time, we ought 
to be wary of maintaining that there is a blanket obligation to continue; people may 
just be play-acting, that mysterious process of recognition might not have taken place 
yet or have been the result of error, the person might have changed their mind, or 
simply made a mistake. And in the absence of the possibility of perfect knowledge 
about the kind of behaviours that trigger the recognition in question, of the context in 
which they should happen, of the lengths of time they should happen for, etc., people 
may stop performance on a simple claim of excusable ignorance.  
Gilbert’s underlying thought is transparent: sometimes people act in ways that 
elicit responses and reactions in others that may be important or on which they may 
come to rely, thus making consistency a fair response, or at least inconsistency 
somewhat unfair. But the opinion that behaviours, unaware ones in contexts not 
evidently known to or publicly/ explicitly recognized as fertile grounds for becoming 
                                                        
221 Or perhaps “justified” and intelligibly claiming entitlement; although the claim itself is not true it 
can be believed, and it can be understood why the speaker thought himself justified in raising it. In this 
scenario, however, while the agent would not be committing a morally objectionable act in claiming, 
and his statement would not be unintelligible, both his claim and the convictions behind it would still 
be false. 
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bound, can, on their own, incontestably and non-problematically generate rights 
against is a hard pill to swallow, even on a background of non-voluntarism. This is 
most probably the reason why she felt compelled to couch her argument with that 
sliver of voluntarism that Simmons found puzzling. Thus when she recanted in order 
to avoid muddying the grounds of obligation and philosophical orientation, she was 
left with an account of political obligation that relied authentically only on 
recognition. Interpretation though is not a proper source, for the reasons mentioned 
above: it can be mistaken, it may be precipitated, it may draw definitive conclusions 
on the basis of one-time experiments, accidents, interruptable performances and so 
on.  And it is a slippery slope that could end up in serious deviations.222 This is a step 
up from conceptualizing people as socially embedded to conceptualizing them as 
social puppets. To an important degree, her account is morally objectionable, insofar 
as political obligation is not the consequence of an act, or an imposition of a higher 
order moral principle, or a way to properly engage with our fellow citizens, but the 
result of a random conclusion reached by others. 
Aside from this, a proper account of political obligation should offer 
certainties as to when obligation begins and how it can end, especially if it advocates 
such an intimate connection to “entitlements”. Gilbert’s justificatory narrative ought 
to have made it clear at what point reasonable expectations transition into 
entitlements. Her account opens up at least three possibilities: 1) we initially expect 
one to start behaving like a member and obey and then, once one begins acting in 
such fashion, we immediately become entitled to obedience; 2) we expect one to 
continue to act like a member once one starts but we become entitled to obedience 
only after the social convention takes place; or 3) we expect one to continue behaving 
like a member once one starts, after a while we become entitled (when exactly?) to 
this behaviour and obedience, and only then does the social convention take place.  
Each of these options creates snags: in the first case Gilbert would have to produce 
some arguments as to why something that has no precise point of commencement, 
that could be a mistake, and could be easily intended as an experiment or test, 
produces instantaneous obligation; in the second and third she would have to provide 
more information about the exact moment when the social convention takes place and 
                                                        
222 According to Gilbert once you are recognized as a member you have to obey tout court. Her 
political obligation has very little prima facie character.  
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entitlement begins, about the form the social convention assumes, about whether or 
not the new full members are informed of their recently acquired status, and so on.223  
Three final theoretical counterpoints to Gilbert’s construction should be 
mentioned. One is that her concept of “joint commitment” – which ultimately plays a 
limited role in her theory of obligation – has no distinguishable connection to the 
reality of politics. What are the people of a political community supposed to be jointly 
committed to, specifically? In her book, Gilbert claims that they are jointly committed 
to rules “that count intuitively as institutions”.224 Since in a political setting, however, 
rules are specifically spelled out and imposed from above, there is nothing intuitive 
about our institutions, and citizens are determinant to neither (these sort of 
constitutional and legislative constructions being outside the scope of their political 
influence), meaning that the question about purpose remains pertinent.225 As Gilbert 
leaves it, people obey the rules for either a mysterious purpose or for the sake of 
obedience itself. If Gilbert’s subjects are “walking” they are therefore doing it for 
nothing specific, for something they are unaware of, for something they have no 
control over, or for the sake of walking that is good/moral/valuable in itself, which 
could bring about obligation arising from transactions or from a natural duty, but that 
does not obviously produce obligation arising from an associative claim. The second 
counterargument is that her joint commitment, independently of all other objections, 
is not even a relationship, let alone a special one. Drawing on Seglow’s observation 
that relationships presuppose performances designed to meet the normative 
expectations participants in the relationship have of each other, I hold that what 
citizens do for one another, if anything, individually or collectively, is not indicative 
of the existence of a relationship. 226  That they legally belong to the same state 
formation is a connection resulting from happenstance, not evidence of a relationship 
that members endeavour to maintain in an intentional way. Apart from the claims 
from vocabulary and mentality that Simmons dismissed, Gilbert offers no argument to 
dissuade that what citizens have are not relationships but impromptu interactions 
happening when their individual universes of goals and preoccupations happen to 
brush against each other.  As for the final criticism, Gilbert offers her citizens no 
                                                        
223  In addition, there is the issue of reasonable disobedience for which she makes no obvious 
accommodations. 
224 Gilbert, Political Obligation, pp. 238-239.  
225 Also see Knowles, Political Obligation, p. 188. He too fails to see the exact purpose of the joint 
commitments, of the rules/institution, of the walking.  
226 J. Seglow, Defending Associative Duties, Routledge, London, 2013, p. 29.  
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opportunity to disobey, which is particularly problematic for her because her political 
obligation is not a moral one, meaning that the usual regulative power of moral 
principles may not apply as usual. C3reasonable access to disobedience is therefore 
yet another stone in Gilbert’s shoe. 
Based on all the reasons above I find that Gilbert’s theory is an unconvincing 
mixture of claims that ignore C7conformity, CO5non-generational-assumptions-from-
attachments and CO6non-confusion and that alternate between being dangerously 
transactional in spirit and plain insufficient.227 Unfortunately, apart from the former, 
there are all accusations that could be levied against Horton’s associative account, the 
last enunciation of the paradigm. 
John Horton 
 
                    Horton’s argument builds on many of the issue discussed before. He 
begins his theory with a declaration that he does not intend to “say very much about 
the specific content of political obligation... because... to some extent, at least, such 
obligations will vary between polities”.228 This is an odd declaration, considering that 
political theorists seldom spell out the content of political obligation on the idea that 
the core is obedience towards the law. Horton may have felt compelled to be explicit, 
however, in order to protect himself from Simmons’ charge that, unlike political 
obligations, associative obligations have unclear, “indeterminate” contents.229 To his 
mind, however, this “broadness” does not amount to indeterminacy in content (Horton 
agrees this would be problematic) but is an expression of a perspective on contents as 
being more locally determined: “it is the character of the particular polity to which 
one belongs that precisely determines what one’s obligations will be”.230  This begs 
the questions “what exactly constitutes the character of a polity” and “how does it 
reflect in the contents of political obligations”. One option is that this character 
consists of, and is predicated on, the things that the members commonly like or 
                                                        
227 A.J. Simmons, C. Wellman, Is There A Duty to Obey the Law?, Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge, p. 112. Maybe even principle of fairness ones; as a point of language “joint commitment” 
seems a perfectly appropriate renaming of “joint, cooperative enterprise”.  
228 Horton, Political Obligation, p. 167. 
229 A.J. Simmons, “Philosophical Anarchism”, A.J. Simmons, Justification and Legitimacy: Essays on 
Rights and Obligations, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2001, pp. 102-122; M. Egoumenides, 
Philosophical Anarchism and Political Obligation, Bloomsbury, London, 2014, p. 165. 
230 Horton, “In Defence of Associative Political Obligation: Part two”, Political Studies, Vol. 55, No.1, 
2007, pp. 1-19; Horton, Political Obligation, p. 167.  
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dislike, the way they behave themselves, the routines in which they have, en masse, 
fallen, the cultural and other elements that are specific to them. How do these impact 
on political obligation in a determinant fashion, however? Furthermore, if the political 
obligation of an Italian will differ from the political obligation of a Rwandan, what 
are the implications for our attempts to deliver an account of the moral requirement to 
obey with blanket efficiency? The other option is that this is a restatement of the 
normative independence thesis whose problems have been already examined. Either 
way, this is both theoretically uninteresting and irrelevant, since Horton obviously has 
in mind obedience as the singular route to the satisfaction of the associative duty 
towards the state.   
                Following these initial declarations about his goals, Horton makes a series 
of more or less acceptable statements that he nevertheless regards as self-evidently 
true. He starts by saying that “we recognize that our government is entitled to make 
claims on us and we may have legitimate expectation of it, which cannot be explained 
without reference to the thought that it is our government”. 231  One could easily 
counter-argue that this recognition, if it exists, (1) is the product of the false 
consciousness to which we become subjected after living for a prolonged period of 
time within the borders of a certain territory, pace Simmons, (2) that this is the sort of 
statement intuition and dialectic suggest but for which there is little evidence, pace 
Green,232 and (3) that the expectations that citizens have of their states are most likely 
to be rationalized in terms of “we pay taxes so you [government] owe us X.Y, Z, etc.” 
than to flow from our thinking of the state as belonging to us in an important sense (so 
C7conformity)233   Horton continues by writing “we acknowledge that over many 
areas of our life our government has authority... [meaning that it can] make decisions 
that we are under an obligation to accept just because it is our government. It elicits a 
great many feelings from us, some of which imply an emotional bond.... pride and 
shame.... ”.234  A sense of attachment – arguably not towards the government but 
towards the others – does not mean we have recognized a particular set of institutions 
as having authority over us or as being in control over aspects of our lives; and if we 
did that would not necessarily mean that they have or are (CO5non-generational-
                                                        
231 Ibid., p.169. 
232 L. Green, “Who Believes in Political Obligation?,”  J. T. Sanders, J. Narveson (eds.), For and 
Against the State, Rowman & Littlefield, Lanham, 1996. 
233 This is essentially a second take on Simmons versus Horton. The counterarguments to Horton made 
there still stand. 
234 Horton, Political Obligation, p. 170. 
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assumptions-from-attachments). The fact that we hold a set of claims to be intelligible, 
believable, even acceptable is not testament to their validity. And if such recognition 
exists it may say something Razian about authority, but nothing about political 
obligations; self-regarding beliefs do not create content-independent moral 
requirements that put us into a relationship with parties that gain power-rights against 
us. Additionally, we have no confirmation of Horton’s statements and no 
overwhelming reasons to suspect them to be true. It may very well be the case that 
people simply, uncritically and unemotionally regard their government as an accident 
of birth whose consequences – policies – they will have to suffer for the remainder of 
their natural lives. Furthermore, if any feelings towards government are experienced, 
they are apt to sprout only in special circumstances – wars, disasters, national feasts, 
popular upheavals, sporting events or major socio-political-economic breakthroughs. 
Life in modern communities informs us that no one is subjected to strong positive 
emotions towards their state on a regular basis. Governmental decisions and the 
ensuing political obligations those supposed feelings are presumed to sustain are, 
however, an enduring feature of day-by-day life, and logic informs that it is 
counterintuitive to use something intermittent as grounds for something permanent. 
Unencumbered by this however, the philosopher adds “we cannot think of the state 
without thinking of individual citizens or vice-versa”.235 There is logical truth to this. 
Citizenship without a state is a clear logical impossibility. Nevertheless, an individual 
without citizenship is still an individual and she need not necessarily be confused 
about any aspect of her identity, as this restated identity thesis probably means to 
convey; people can exist outside of the boundaries of a state, as personhood is not 
contingent on state identification.  Finally, Horton asserts that “being a member of a 
polity is a fact that already has an ethical colouring and significance”. 236  It is a 
proposition with vague meanings, Horton’s lines being open to interpretation: is he 
suggesting that holding a/any citizenship is morally correct, is he saying that our 
being recognized as members confers an additional moral layer onto us that we 
previously lacked, or is this some Kantian opinion that people’s basic rights and 
duties are partly determined by the state in whose legal jurisdiction they were born? 
The latter is the sort of position natural duties proponents typical adhere to (sic) 
whereas the first two bring about separate misgivings: legal membership into a polity 
                                                        
235 Horton, Political Obligation, p. 170. 
236 Ibid., p. 171. 
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ought to be considered a morally neutral fact and holding the moral charge and moral 
significance of individuals to be affected by whether or not they are recognized by 
others as body politic members signifies discovering categories of moral worth in 
humans that apply independently of their actions-which is awkward at best. Horton’s 
further elaboration on this supposed ethical significance sheds no additional light, as 
he links it to meaningfulness- “being members of a polity [is] something meaningful”. 
This is an intuitively appealing proposition but it is also problematic as it returns us to 
the confusing issue of meaning, a meaning that this time does not exclude the 
requirement justification but that still has the power to generate normative 
consequences. No explanation as to why this is necessarily so is forthcoming: 
membership could say something about us and yet not have a moral charge. It is not 
obvious why having our birth certificates issued by institution X in country Y is 
normative and not just descriptive. Horton never considers this possibility; he 
abruptly affirms “our membership of groups such as family or polity are not just 
morally neutral facts about us” which in turn begs the question why Horton is so 
ready to rank people morally on the basis of what are simple, random facts of their 
existence.237 
                Once these clarifications are established Horton finally erects the three 
pillars of this theory: an associative component patterned on the established model, a 
principle of value-utility and an identity thesis. Following Andrew Mason’s typology, 
he first describes the community as a group (to be “distinguished from a mere 
category”) of people “who act together, or who cooperate with one another in pursuit 
of their own goals, or who at least possess common interests”; this group has 
“structure”, “persistence” and “routinely figures in practical reason and deliberation, 
including moral reasoning and deliberation”.238 Then, he argues that these groups 
(communities, states) have value based on considerations of utility. Horton believes 
that, even though these groups are non-voluntary, they still make society 
“worthwhile” because of their indispensability to secure and ordered life. 
Subsequently, in Hobbesian fashion, he explains that any form of association will 
need: “…effective coercive authority to provide order, security and some measure of 
social stability”, that “... if human beings are to live together for any length of time 
and have any prospect of worthwhile lives, at least in groups that extend beyond those 
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that could be held together entirely by bonds of affection, there needs to be some 
reasonably effective regulatory body” and that  “the basis of the need for order and 
security, backed by coercion, is to be found in the many differences between 
people....”.239  
 This argument from value is problematic in three ways. First of all, as 
stated and restated, that a role has value and that a role presupposes duties does not 
entail that the role justifies any instance of performing the duties it is held to 
presuppose. Although nobody would deny that filial roles have value and meaning, or 
that a set of obligations is subsumed within them, these requirements are potentially 
and plausibly justified as the contents of the duties of care, rescue, charity, fairness, 
etc. inherent to the position, rather than by the position itself. The claim “I have to do 
what my mother asks because it is my mother who asks” suffers further probing than 
associativists think, and it could [would] reveal that, in instances, applicable moral 
principles might disallow certain actions as objectionable and therefore unjustified. 
As long as we accept this latter possibility – for which we have many confirmations, 
particularly in courts – we have to accept that “because she is my mother”, while a 
sufficient answer in certain instances, is neither a complete one nor a necessarily 
correct one. Secondly, there is an issue arising from the fact that this argument reads 
as very utilitarian. Value aside, Horton gives the impression that at least part of the 
reason why we have political obligation has to do with the fact that states are efficient 
and indispensable (allegedly) in the provision of order, security and regulations. True 
or not, the effect of this is a muddling of the grounds of obligation that leaves us to 
wonder whether obligation flows from us being members of the community 
exclusively or if, perhaps, the state’s being useful plays some part in the generation of 
obligations as well;240 thus it makes him look suspiciously close to marshalling a 
multiple principle theory of political obligation that prioritizes an associative 
argument (which we already have strong reasons to suspect as a front for an account 
from natural duties). CO1A leading to CO1B normative strength-degeneration rear 
their ugly heads again. Thirdly, there is the fact that this argument, such as it is, has 
no force. Aside from the fact that something being valuable is no argument for 
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submission, there are the added considerations that (1) in a best case scenario it could 
only account for a minimal state, (2) the possibility of alternative supply exists and (3) 
pace Green, people will not value uniformly, meaning that generalizations will be 
difficult.241 C1generality and even CO8accounting-alternative-supply come intro play. In 
addition, while some argument from enough blanket appreciation could be 
constructed and alternative supply lessened as a threat by explaining it is a possibility 
rather than a reality, the first and last objections stand.242   
                The third and final element of his theory is a brief narrative on the 
relationship between identity and community. Taking the baton from communitarian 
theorists, Horton maintains that our identities are shaped by our living in a polity. 
According to him, “as members of that polity we assume an identity and acknowledge 
a relationship to its institutions, practices and members”, an identity which will not 
remain the same “if the connections that constitute membership of a polity are severed 
[because] my self-understanding of my relations to other people and institutions, and 
how they regard and relate to me, are in various respects transformed”.243 He is also 
certain that “through our political identity we acknowledge or recognize our 
corresponding political obligations”.244 Because Horton’s identity thesis differs in no 
significant way from the communitarians’, and his argument from recognition mostly 
mirrors Gilbert’s, the criticisms that were made to them earlier on apply to Horton’s 
discourse on identity as well. The only thing to be added here is that Horton’s choice 
to link identity to political obligation should have been accompanied by resolutions to 
problematic situations, such as when individuals fail to identify with the groups in 
which they were born, when they identify wrongly, when they assume conflicting 
identities (between groups and sub-groups), or when they identify with a group that 
rejects them. The statement that our political identities help us distinguish our 
political obligations however raises some separate misgivings. It appears to be in the 
vein of the conceptual argument. Recall that the conceptual argument held that only 
those who do not understand what it means to be a member of a community would 
demand a justification for political obligations. Horton seems to be saying much the 
same thing: if we understand the true significance of membership, i.e. if we identity 
                                                        
241 L. Green, The Authority of State, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1988, p. 233.  
242 Here, alternative supply is not used to indicate only the possibility that groups other than the state 
may provide social order. It is also a euphemism for other relationships – similar to the one between 
citizens and state – that could be assigned value.  
243Horton, Political Obligation, p. 182;p. 184. 
244 Ibid., p. 186.  
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with a certain group, then we will acknowledge our now obvious political obligations. 
In the conceptual argument’s case this sort of thinking was somewhat dangerous 
because it rejected the need for justification. In Horton’s case this opinion about the 
connection between identity and political obligation is not dangerous but, at the same 
time, does nothing to help his argument. Those who are convinced by his earlier 
statements about the individual-community relationship, his argument from value/ 
utility, his claims about duties pertaining to roles, etc., will not need this further 
reassurance; it amounts to overkill. Conversely, those who have not been persuaded 
by Horton’s efforts will regard this as yet another exaggerated claim about the powers 
of legal belonging and identification. This opinion on the instrumental value of 
identity is therefore neither necessary nor helpful.  
 
As such, Horton’s associativism did not fare better that previous efforts: it 
retained all earlier problematic issues while what was new by way of addition or 
clarification was unable to alleviate concerns. In his latest work, Horton takes issue 
with some of these criticisms, specifically the charge from voluntarism and the 
accusation that associative accounts, including his, do not distinguish themselves in 
any significant way from natural duties. To counter the first claim that associativism 
has something of consent theory and is thus in danger of falling into its traps, Horton 
writes that the process of recognition occurring, a process not completely separated 
from voluntarism, is just a mechanism through which one is identified as a member of 
a community and in no way a generator of obligation. The exclusive ground of 
obligation remains at all times the relationship itself, one devoid of any will and 
intentionality and therefore in no danger of exhibiting transactional features. We can 
admit this much to be true about his account. Horton’s justification never seemed 
ready to slip into consent theory, certainly not to a degree comparable to Gilbert’s, for 
which this issue was, and remains, a problem. Horton’s commitment and reliance on 
non-voluntarism are unquestionable. 245  He then tries to alleviate concerns that 
associativism cannot survive without making appeals to higher order moral principles 
that act as caveats. Although he acknowledges that some degree of reliance on these 
principles is necessary, he nevertheless thinks this to be “trivial and theoretically 
                                                        
245 But not for all of her followers. Massimo Renzo, for example, writes his own associative account 
that he has no issue as recognizing as quasi-transactional. It is really a multiple-principle account.  See 
M. Renzo, “Associative Responsibilities and Political Obligation”, Philosophical Quarterly, Vol. 62, 
No. 246, pp. 106-127.  
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uninteresting”.246 Horton consequently contends that there is such a thing as a “natural 
duty to perform ones associative obligation”, which to his mind confirms membership 
in the political community as the unique source of an associative political obligation, 
even when a principle of justice with clear restrictive powers is invoked. Both of these 
claims are profoundly bizarre. Aside from the fact that this “natural duty to perform 
associative obligation” is theoretically and methodologically confusing, there is 
nothing trivial about the necessity of appeals to justice: insofar as they are necessary 
they obviate parasitism, at best; at worst they illustrate the redundancy of 
associativism and the theoretical superiority of a straightforward natural duty of 
justice account. 247  The failure of CO1Asufficient-normative-strength and CO1Bnon-





In the wake of this analysis it should be obvious that associative theories are 
plagued by systemic faults that prevent them from achieving normative justification. 
Their most basic assumption – that all presumed duties held pertinent to the role of 
citizen are justified by the position itself – discourages the sort of enquiry that could 
reveal not only that behaviours within these relationship can, and do, require 
explanation, but that actions or inactions can be, and most likely are, the prompts of 
higher order moral principles corresponding to natural duties. Associativism ignores 
the possibility that role obligations do not flow (always) from the role itself but are 
derivative of the higher order moral standards that apply and regulate the practice. 
This error is congenital and pervasive, and in these conditions it will never not be an 
issue for associativism. The normative strength condition (CO1Asufficient-normative-
                                                        
246 J. Horton, R. Gabriel Windeknecht, “Is There a Distinctively Associative Account of Political 
Obligation”, Political Studies, Vol. 63, 2015, pp. 903-918, p. 913.  
247 Horton’s last paper deals with Scheffler’s distribution objection that questions if our relationships 
“should give rise to a distribution of responsibility that is favorable to us and unfavorable to other 
people … After all it may be said the effect of such a distribution is to reward the very people who 
have already achieved a rewarding personal relationship, while penalizing those who have not?”. See 
S. Scheffler, “Relationships and Responsibilities”, Philosophy and Public Affairs, Vol. 26, No.3, 1997, 
pp. 189-209 and Scheffler’s Relationship and Responsibilities. Horton’s strategy is to argue that when 
associativists cannot avoid the claims of the distributive objection, they will have to accept that they 
are right, but to an extent that is not very damaging. See J. Horton, R. Windeknecht ,“Associative 
Political Obligations and the Distributive Objection”, 
http://www.fupress.net/index.php/pam/article/view/18161/16879.  
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strength) is not met, therefore, because the force and even existence of the ground are, 
at least, overestimated.  
The other most problematic element of associativism is its practice of 
invoking other principles – typically justice – in order to sanitize or reinforce its 
argument without then considering the normative consequences of such inclusions. 
More often than not, this practice has justified opinions that their claims could be 
better arranged in an account of the moral requirement to obey as conducive to the 
satisfaction of a natural duty, the more straightforward route with a clear, single 
ground of obligation capable of sustaining the normative load; at other ones, identical 
questions are brought about by their argument being reinforced with contentions that 
bear a strong scent of transactionalism. Horton dismissed this as theoretically 
uninteresting. When the issue is justification, however, what could be more 
interesting than your chosen ground’s inability to sustain? Associativism is guilty of 
parasitism that signals a structural issue of degeneration discoverable at every step 
(CO1Bnon-degeneration).  
These are the two main complaints. There are of course more specific 
misgivings, such as those triggered by Gilbert’s mysterious view on the joint 
commitment in walking as paradigmatic of the citizen-citizen relationship, Horton’s 
brush with utilitarianism, the opinion that attachments are determinant to political 
obligation, the maximally overstated claims on the effects of citizenship on identity 
formation, and so on. To these faults in practical execution can be added theoretical 
ones, such as the arguably uninteresting (sic!) discovery of this category of political 
duties that straddles the gap between bona fide duties and orthodox obligations, and 
Wellman’s point that associativism is more akin to virtue ethics than to a justificatory 
narrative on moral duties.248 This is not to say that associativism, as an opinion about 
integrated selves or about group formation and persistence, or even about the duties 
and responsibilities we have in virtue of being role-occupants in meaningful 
relationships, is of no value. As a paradigm of political obligation specifically, 
however, because of the litany of issues described in this chapter, of which the 
structural issues mentioned are crucial, associativism does not and cannot account for 
the moral requirement to obey the law; what ties compatriots together in compliance 
is obviously not the citizen role that birth assigned them. Its structural faults of 
                                                        
248C. H. Wellman, “Associative Allegiances and Political Obligation”, Social Theory and Practice, 
Vol. 23, No. 2, 1997, pp. 181-204, pp. 187-188. 
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confusion (CO6), parasitism (CO1A) and degeneration (CO1B) condemn 
associativism, which therefore necessarily fails.  
In the next chapter I deal with the response to associativism’s failure, namely 
the renewed interest in natural duty justifications that aim to explain obligation as the 
predicate of qua human bonds, a departure from the classical way of conceptualizing 
the moral requirement. I show that this other-side-of-the-coin effort to extract a 
political duty from a broader one whose satisfaction is supposedly contingent on the 
performance of acts of submission is similarly pervaded by structural faults, of 



















In the third chapter I have shown how attempts to justify the moral 
requirement to obey on a non-voluntary principle as political obligation- 
associativism miss the justificatory goal due to structural faults of confusion and 
degeneration brought about by a systemic inability to ground duty clearly in roles and 
membership, a practice of normative supplementation whose effects are consistently 
improperly measured, a proclivity towards considering attachments to be generators 
of obligations of the magnitude of the moral requirement to obey, and a general 
reluctance to consider the part played by higher order moral principles in their 
narrative.  
The failure of associative accounts of the moral requirement to obey to excite 
and garner much support in the field marked the decline of political obligation as the 
way to approach the moral requirement to obey the law, and led to its eventual 
replacement as the ordinary non-voluntary way to approach justification with natural 
duties accounts ready to argue for political obligations as the predicates of duties. Of 
course, it was much earlier, with Rawls, that political theory was first introduced to 
the idea of conceptualizing the requirement to obey as a way to satisfy a natural duty 
one has qua human, rather than as an obligation one has qua agent or member. At that 
time, however, scholarship had still been heavily invested in finding an answer that, if 
not fully voluntarist, was at least somewhat inclusive of choice. When neither those 
efforts nor associativism yielded the desired results, a re-examination of Rawls’ 
suggestions was thought to be in order, especially in the new context where previous 
misgivings about non-voluntarism were set aside. This orientation came to represent 
the new majority opinion, surpassing the number of scholars who opted for one of the 
other alternatives, by embracing a multi-principle account of the requirement, 
adopting the political authority without political obligation middle ground or joining 
in the defence of philosophical anarchism.  
In this chapter, I examine natural duty and authority without political 
obligation accounts – the two theoretically interesting and significant responses to the 
perceived disappointments of classical political obligation justifications – in order to 
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deliver blanket criticisms (allowed by a possibility to fault these arguments along 
identical lines) and to show that the requirement to obey is not something that they 
can vindicate either. In the first part, I explain the main differences between duties 
and obligations and the justifications they inspire before examining a cross-section of 
natural duty vindications and isolating their main errors. These are discovered to be 
an across-the-board inability to defend obedience as the unique content of the duty 
and to morally vindicate particularity, coupled with more individual errors such as 
mistaking the justificatory threshold for political obligation for the one of authority, 
(Stilz), an excessive normative reliance on a weak argument from democratic 
practices (Christiano), or a practice of sourcing obligation in a duty that arises from 
situations of urgency that is incomparable to average political life (Estlund, 
Wellman). Then, in the second part, I perform an analysis of Kantian/functionalist 
accounts of authority without political obligation explanations as part of the responses 
to the observed incapacity of political obligation and natural duty accounts to achieve 
their intended goal; I find them interesting – as far as accounts of de facto authority 
go – but seriously flawed, insofar as they exhibit a similar powerlessness in 
accounting for the supposedly special and unique relationship between a state and its 
citizens. Finally, I conclude that it is time to move on from all the lines of argument 
explored, something that now can be done from a position of superior knowledge 
about the problems a novel account should navigate or resolve.  
 
 
In spite of their shared goal of justifying the moral requirement to obey the 
law, natural duty accounts are not identical to political obligation explanations. They 
are rendered so by the fact that they are genetically different from the latter, even 
though the level of differentiation has somewhat diminished from the time of their 
first introduction. In the late 1970’s and 1980’s political theorists made a firm 
distinction between the two and used the concepts with rigour. With the advent of 
non-voluntarist theories of political obligation, however, and the general ensuing 
laxity in the usage of the vocabulary of duty/obligation (recall here R.B. Brandt in 
“The Concepts of Obligation and Duty” and H.L.A. Hart in “Legal and Moral 
Obligation” explaining to us that the two are not identical) the two began to share 
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some of their life blood, or at least appear to do so.249 Aside from perceived overlaps 
and communal purposes, however, natural duty accounts and political obligation 
justifications differ significantly. A primary distinction is that while political 
obligation accounts treat obedience as an end in itself, natural duty ones seek to 
discover some duty (one has qua human) to whose satisfaction the requirement to 
obey is conducive. The latter are models that make an appeal to the just nature of the 
state, to moral agency, to “original positions” from which principles could be 
extracted, to urgency or to some superior normative consequences flowing directly 
from respect in order to explain obedience, something that settles them with the task 
of showing the fulfilment of that duties to be genuinely and exclusively contingent on 
compliance. Both have problems in demonstrating factuality, but natural duties 
struggle with particularity whereas political obligation struggles with generality; the 
first has issues narrowing its field from the whole of humanity to a specific citizen 
body, whereas the second has problems expanding obligation so as to include more 
than isolated cases. Natural duties accounts are also typically concerned with making 
some big statement about the agent or about the state. Political obligation 
justifications seldom do this, focusing instead on the connections or interactions 
between parts as opposed to on the parts themselves. In these conditions scholars 
should – and almost always do – make a firm commitment to defending the moral 
requirement to obey as one or the other (only Rawls was able to detect both 
simultaneously, insofar as he held people to have a natural duty to obey and some to 
have political obligations springing from a voluntary act).250  
Many theories are grouped under the heading “natural duty accounts”, with 
Rawls ubiquitous natural duty of justice justification being by far the most famous. 
Wellman’s Samaritan account, Stilz’ explanation based on the state’s provision of 
equal freedom, or duty of respect paradigms, all fall under it; even some who do not 
claim to lie within this category – such as Estlund’s normative consent – arguably do. 
They achieve various levels of success but it is undeniable that they come at least as 
close to justifying the moral requirement to obey as their more successful counterparts 
seeking to validate it on political obligation interpretations; cogency is most definitely 
not something they struggle to attain.  
                                                        
249 R.B. Brandt in “The Concepts of Obligation and Duty”, Mind, New Series, Vol. 73, No. 291,1964, 
pp. 374-393; H.L.A. Hart, “Legal and Moral Obligation”, Michigan Law Review, Vol. 73, No. 2, 1974, 
pp. 443-458. 
250 See J. Rawls, A Theory of Justice, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 1971, pp. 114-115.  
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In the next pages I examine the three main types of natural duty accounts that 
are discoverable in the literature: justice, respect and samaritanism/urgency. Analysis 
will reveal the great merit (and advantage) of natural duty accounts to be their doing 
away with all vestiges of voluntarism without provoking much metaphysical nausea. 
Even devout voluntarists such as Simmons seem to be infinitely less aggravated by 
their rejection of will and its consequences than by the one performed by 
associativists, for example. Natural duty accounts manage to achieve this by making 
the prerequisite of obedience something owed by all humans in virtue of their own 
humanity to states that are just, justice delivering in an inclusive manner or, at the 
very least, providing some indispensable good or service. When starting from these 
assumptions the task then becomes tapering this duty from all moral agents to any 
just/good/useful state to some moral agents to their specific state, a task easier than 
demonstrating the consent of all, the benefaction of all or the community attachments 
of all. Easier however has not so far meant achievable. From as early as Rawls’ own 
enunciation of the natural duty paradigm it became obvious that issues of content and 
particularity will unavoidably arise.  
 
Duties of Justice 
 
In the class of natural duties whose existence and content are not contingent 
on deliberate acts performed by their agent, and that are not owed to specific groups 
but to individuals generally (which includes aid, respect, non-injury 251 ) Rawls 
discovered a natural duty of justice. He describes it as a two-part duty: 
 
“From the standpoint of the theory of justice, the most important duty is that to 
support and to further just institutions. This duty has two parts: first, we are to comply 
with and do our share in just institutions when they exist and apply to us; and second, 
we are to assist in the establishment of just arrangement when they do not exist, at 
least when this can be done with little cost to ourselves”.252 
 
                                                        
251 Rawls, A Theory of Justice, p. 114; p. 137.  
252 Ibid., p. 337.  
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The first part of this duty is the political one whose content is held to be 
political obligations. This is problematic in two important senses that, on their own, 
preclude a conclusion that Rawls’ account justifies obedience.253 Firstly, there is the 
readiness to assume that the content of a supposed natural duty of justice need 
necessarily be obedience towards the law, i.e. that justice is inevitably contingent on 
the performance of the instructions in law and cannot be achieved through means 
other than it. Rawls believes that the realization of justice imposes compliance with 
the states’ legal rules. When the issue in question, however, is the justification of 
obedience, rather than justice simply, this needs to be shown to be true by excluding 
all other behaviours – ranging from piecemeal acts of obedience to acts of 
disobedience to alternating performances and, more importantly, behaviours and acts 
that do not belong to this category of submissive performances – as potentially or 
substantially conducive to the realization of justice. The problem here is not whether 
or not justice is, on average, likelier to be achieved through practices of obedience 
than through disobedience, but that the argument from achieving it may allow for 
more disobedience than it intended to permit or for “other” responses; in other words 
the account may settle us with a duty to behave justly, but it is not obvious that 
behaving justly necessarily and unequivocally means complying with the rules set by 
institutions that are held to apply to us. For this to be true, disobedience, and anything 
that could fall under the “other” heading of possible or suggested just behaviours, 
would need to be demonstrated to be morally impermissible. To be clear, the issue is 
not with the proposition “compliance leads to justice” or the correlative that justice 
required a measure of compliance but with the implied statement that justice can only 
be achieved through particularized compliance. Rawls does not prove permanent, 
uniform, exclusive compliance [with the laws of applicable institutions] to be the 
unique, morally correct way to achieve the justice with which the state is preoccupied, 
meaning that anyone that could defend disobedience or behaviours other than 
particularised compliance as conducive to justice would be excused from political 
obligation. So Rawls’s account fails to observe CO4precise-content. 
                                                        
253 Other criticisms are possible, including questioning why Rawls kept the first part unqualified but 
presented the second as a qualified duty of charity (A. J. Simmons, “The Duty to Obey and our Natural 
Moral Duties”, C. H. Wellman, A. J. Simmons, A Duty to Obey the Law: For or Against?, Cambridge 
University Press, Cambridge, 2005, p. 157) or citizens’ general ability to engage in the evaluative 
performances that would indicate to them a requirement to comply or the necessity of an effort to 
produce foreign change. 
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Secondly, Rawls’ account establishes no particularity for his duty of imprecise 
content. Not backed by a proper explanation, the phrase “apply to us” is, at best, 
empty and at worst morally nauseating. Rawls himself offered no moral reasons for 
this restriction in application and corresponding submission. This leaves open two 
options: a) Rawls sees geographical proximity as reason sufficient and permissible for 
districting, as Waldron later suggested when he attempted to limit compliance to a 
single set of institutions by restricting the range of the principle on the basis of 
proximity to groups of insiders “to whose conduct, claims, and/or interests the 
requirements of [the principle] are supposed to apply”,254  or b) Rawls sees birth 
within a jurisdiction as determinant to people’s basic set of moral rights and 
obligation, which is more likely given Kant’s influence on him. Both are strongly 
problematic, insofar as they are equally inconsistent with our common moral opinions 
and understandings and allow for great potential to morally wound. As far as birth is 
concerned, it is very tempting to ascribe superior moral consequences to it because of 
the moral and religious significances we generally attach to the event itself. By doing 
this, however, we are actively impeding realizations that there are no obvious and 
compelling reasons why we should consider it capable of independently settling us 
with duties of this kind; associative duties (not of the magnitude of obligations 
though) and duties held in virtue of humanity, yes; but not political submission to 
non-natural institutions with claims to authority that are intelligible but not obvious. 
The same can be said about geographical juxtaposition. Replacing birth with 
“dropped by the stork” or proximity with “1000 km in any direction as the crow flies” 
allows us to better understand the failings of these contentions. “If you have been 
dropped by the stork within the jurisdiction of Albania therefore you are morally 
required to obey its laws” or “if you’ve been dropped by the stork within 1000 km 
NSEW of the Duma” do not seem particularly compelling statements in favour of 
particularized obedience, either as the content of political obligation or as something 
which de facto authorities may justifiably claim. This is not trivializing; this is using 
                                                        
254 J. Waldron, “Special Ties and Natural Duties”, Philosophy and Public Affairs, Vol. 1, No. 22, pp. 3-
30, 1993, p. 13. Waldron ran into a very Nozikian problem when he states that what distinguishes 
insiders from outsiders is their “acceptance” of an institutions’ [alleged] right to “administer” the 
principles of justice and of their duty to refrain from sabotaging the activities of institutions.254 In doing 
so Waldron introduced a strong element of consent into his argument, effectively making his supposed 
natural duty of justice theory into a multi principle theory that not only still disappoints in explaining 
why we are required to go along with something that it is just, why there can be no alternative supply 
and why claims over the right to administer the principles within a certain territory are legitimate, but 
also introduces the added issue of absence of evidences of consent. 
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semantics to show that words to which we instinctively assign special substance do 
not imply a necessarily correct and persuasive argument for restricted obedience. As 
such, C6particularity fails and so does CO3precise-districting/inclusion. 
Demonstrating what makes the relationship between a state and those held 
(internally and externally) to be its citizens is something that Rawls is not able to 
perform successfully, therefore making any and all limitations placed on the scope 
and application of the rules of a legal system – and of justice, implicitly – not morally 
special or correct in any obvious fashion. Later Rawlsians faced the same challenge 
and failed identically, similarly precluded by a set of beliefs that include a conviction 
that there is a moral duty of state entry brought about by its being the supposed sole 
avenue towards the generalized realization of justice affecting all, and a belief that our 
moral rights and duties, including those that are most elementary, are determinately 
influenced by the legal jurisdictions into which we are born. Particularity, which, in 
the context in which natural duty accounts operate, is a big question of privilege 
awarded to the state to impose on some and exclude others, will be their undoing, 
alongside the recurrent structural issue of imprecise content.  
 
Decades after Rawls’ original defence of a natural duty of justice, Anna Stilz 
delivered a very similar construction explaining political obligation as predicated on a 
duty of justice understood in a more specific sense. In her 2009 Liberal Loyalties, she 
makes the argument that the democratic states’ political authority correlative to 
political obligation springs from its singular ability to provide its citizens with the 
good of justice understood as equal freedom.255 To her mind, the non-instrumental 
value of the cooperative efforts of citizens working with one another to secure justice 
[as equal freedom] is enough to justify their particularized allegiance towards their 
institutions. Her theory owes much to Kant and Rousseau. In Kantian fashion she first 
contends that the state is required if justice is to be attained; this requirement is a 
direct consequence of the supposed facts that states 1) determine the nature, scope and 
content of rights, 2) are solely tasked with their imposition (freedom as independence 
is maintained because our having rights is in no way dependent, predicated upon or 
“up to” the will of others), and 3) have a correct claim to the use of coercion to award 
rights and impose obligations for all and on all. In doing these, states remain at all 
                                                        
255 A. Stilz, Liberal Loyalty: Freedom, Obligation & the State, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 
2009, pp. 27-57.  
 154 
times, to her mind, aware of the general will. They demonstrate this by ensuring that 
everyone has a say in the procedural generation of the rights that will apply to 
them. 256  The states’ ability to deliver justice in the form of equal freedom and 
universally applicable rights, however, is only enough to establish the authority of a 
state. Political obligation is a more complicated affair in Stilz’s account, considered to 
be something all citizens owe insofar as they are personally responsible for the right 
and ability of other citizens to enjoy their political entitlements, of which the one to 
equal freedom is the most important. In these conditions, political obligation appears 
to be both the content of a duty of respect (or of a duty of justice mimicking a duty of 
respect) and of a duty to be actively involved in the democratic procedures of the 
state. Stilz, therefore, sets for herself the task of validating “democratic solidarity and 
civic allegiance”. She thinks citizenship to be in itself proof enough of these two, 
without needing to appeal to “background commonalities of language, ethics or 
culture”.257  She bases her reasoning on a conviction that citizen solidarity is created 
and sustained within every state by two models of political education, the freedom 
model and the cultural model, which inform rational citizens that their enjoyment of 
rights and freedoms is contingent on the existence of the state and the conducive 
actions of their compatriots, and which guide them towards a sense of solidarity and 
identification with one another and the state.258 Then, in the final pages of her book, 
Stilz shapes this sentiment of identification as a commonality in purpose, in this case 
the achievement of justice in a democratic state in whose procedures they are all 
involved, whose offered packages of rights they all respect, whose laws they all obey 
in order to support it.  
Stilz’s argument is compelling. In theory, it shows obedience to be the 
necessary means of nourishing a special relationship between state-individual citizen-
citizen group tethered together by a just provision of rights and freedom as 
independence. The problem with her account, as with most arguments owing to 
Rousseau and Kant, is that its claims are far broader that what the argument can 
actually defend. Stilz gets further than most, in the sense that her contentions about 
the state offering equal freedom and rights arguably could justify the existence of 
some (quantity wise) state. This state would, however, be a minimal one – or at least 
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257Ibid.,  p. 25.  
258Ibid.,, chapter V.  
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smaller than concrete ones – by which I meant that whatever it would do or offer 
beyond what is stricto senso necessary for equal freedom would not be covered by her 
argument, and all corresponding additional claims on individual freedom would be 
unjustified. In other words, she does not show that we need as much state as we 
presently have to endure in order for justice and equal freedom to exist;259 it is very 
possible that there is demand for a state (although alternative supply remains a valid 
objection), but there is ample room to argue that people are being supplied with more 
than they need. But this is only a first objection. The main misgiving her account 
triggers is that it reads like a vindication of obedience as the appropriate response to 
the many benefits and services the state bestows on us citizens without questioning 
why or how “we”, and only “we”, are the ones that ended up on the receiving end of 
this equation (C6particularity and CO3precise-districting/inclusion), or if these “gifts” 
have consequences equal to the magnitude of political obligation (and they are, in 
some sense, gifts, given that (a) no one asked for them and (b) even if they had asked, 
after some meaningful and morally correct process of consideration, that does not 
serve as proof that only their state could provide, that they should continue to ask only 
their state, and that alternative supply to their state provision is forbidden). As far as 
political authority is concerned, she defends the merits of the state while omitting to 
provide an explanation that would legitimize these non-natural roles [states and 
citizens] parties in this relationship appear to have assumed. Stilz, therefore, provides 
an account of authority with obedience as something owed to a well-functioning state 
equally concerned with the interests and well-being of its citizens. While her narrative 
may justify some claims to obedience it does not, however, manage to say something 
concrete about a duty to obey arising from belonging to a particular group: to 
establish authority it is arguably sufficient to show that the claim that the state 
provides something valuable in an unobjectionable fashion is believable or correct; to 
establish political obligation, however, a group of people has to be revealed to owe 
obedience, exclusively, to a specific state whose claims are not affected by its 
performances or the results of interpretation or evaluation. A state in possession of a 
power right against its citizens is not a state that earns their compliance. Nothing in 
her account bridges this gap. Her discussion on citizenship and the two educational 
models might explain why people may feel/think they have to obey, but it does not 
                                                        
259 Or even the state at all, if inclined to agree with Simmons’ suggestions that other arrangements 
could secure the advantages of political living, including equal freedom.  
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demonstrate that their intuitions are real and correct, nor adds to the cumulative case 
for justification, since thoughts and convictions cannot be said to trigger obligations 
of the kind we are interested in (also CO5non-generational-assumptions-from-attachments). 
This is a consequence partly of her Kantian convictions, partly of a conviction that 
solidarity will carry at least some of the normative load and partly of an obfuscation 
between questions about the origins and sources of political obligations and questions 
about the defensibility of authority: justifications of the moral requirement to obey are 
not about the good reasons, including moral, we may have to obey the state, or even 
about the justifiable claims the latter might make of citizens in light of its provision, 
they are about showing that when moral entities have their initial normative status 
changed so as to be put in a relationship of subordination to a state, they and only they 
owe obedience and only obedience. The questions “why are people bound to obey” 
and “do state actions, functions, structures and performances justify claims to issue 
allegedly authoritative commands” are not identical; the first imposes a requirement 
to vindicate that a transfer of rights has occurred; the latter presupposes the inferior 
task of defending a pretence. 
As such, Stilz does not manage to make that difficult leap from showing that 
something is good/valuable/just/useful/etc. to showing that the good, valuable, just, 
useful thing actually produces a factual duty. Hence her account arguably gets stuck 
somewhere halfway between an unobjectionable defence of a thesis of authority and a 
natural duty of justice paradigm more qualified than Rawls’ original formulation. In 
this latter direction however no real progress is made either. The solidary, civic-
minded behaviour expected of burdened citizens is yet again not obviously obedience 
(so CO4precise-content), as other performances may bring about rights and equal 
freedom for all. Nor does she make any progress towards confirming particularity as 
overlapping with jurisdiction. She assumes obligation to follow border lines without 
considering the possibility that her account might render them morally impermissible, 
that in the absence of demonstrated restrictions, borders excluding outsiders from 
better functioning democratic states with superior deliveries of rights and freedoms – 
or democratic states altogether – are morally wounding, begging a question why our 
fortunate co-citizens in receipt of equal consideration are more entitled to our 
submission than B, the unfortunate outsider who lives in a less just state. Moral 
discourse typically holds victims to be more entitled to whatever action of ours could 
render them better off than those who may be entitled to it on considerations of 
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proximity, association, etc. In these circumstances, in the absence of a proper 
justification for particularity, it could be argued to be more morally appropriate to 
consider obligation and obedience on a case-by-case basis, with those living in a 
context of superior justice having a weaker claim to it. It could be retorted that 
particularity is a question of ability and reach – there is only so much one instantiation 
of compliance can achieve and only so many it can genuinely affect – making it such 
that those likelier to have their justice and freedom determinately influenced by one’s 
actions, supposedly our compatriots, are those most entitled to it. This is a weak 
charge not dissimilar to Waldron’s argument from proximity. The fact that I have to 
do X but I can only do X towards A but not towards B does not mean I have to do X 
towards A exclusively – as particularity is supposed to ensure for political obligations 
– but that poor, unfortunate soul B is being short-changed. Ability and proximity do 
not have morally permissible restrictive effects on moral requirements; just practical 
ones on discharging. Thus, while they may render instances of non-performance 
excusable, they do not actually narrow down the moral requirement, and there is 
always the possibility that the ability to discharge X may not necessarily coincide 
with borders – it could be less inclusive or more inclusive. This is, therefore, an 
improper argument, as are those from the educational model and the alleged 
commonality of purpose Stilz introduces: the first could be rejected as a claim from 
brainwashing, pace Simmons, whereas the commonality of purpose assertion is at 
least as fictitious as cooperation. Stilz’s undemonstrated obligation is not 
particularized.260 
 This failure to account for particularity (C6), coupled with the fault of 
imprecise content (CO4) and the underlying issue of having missed the justificatory 
mark for political obligation for the lower one for political authority obviate Stilz’ 
inability to explain the moral requirement to obey. Thus, Stilz’s citizens have duties 
that range between a weak duty not to interfere to piecemeal ones whose content may 
mimic the one of full-on political obligation but are not the sweeping obligation of 
citizens whose normative situations have been changed to such a degree that absolute 
submission is unchallengeable. They may need, and have reasons, to comply, and 
they may do so consistently, but their submission is a fragmented, specific time-to-
                                                        
260 In fact, while her two educational models would likely please Rousseau greatly, they (mostly the 
second one) would vindicate Simmons’ telling associativists and earlier natural duty of justice theorists 
that they are using manipulation and indoctrination to place limits on people’s freedom. Stilz walks 
right into that trap of predicating obedience on beliefs. 
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specific-rule affair corresponding to a cumulatively vindicated but improperly 
restricted claim-right pertaining to a political authority that is not fully legitimate. 
 
Duties of Respect 
 
 The idea that political obligation is the content of a duty of respect resurfaces 
at various time in the history of the thought on authority and obligation and is 
generally accompanied by a conviction that this duty can only be fulfilled within the 
logic of democratic states which presuppose collective decision-making processes that 
award equal concern to the interests of citizens and equal respect to their various 
opinions before reaching a decision on the basis of a majoritarian principle. 261  In this 
context, acts of disobedience are morally wrong insofar as they constitute a clear 
refusal to give the opinions of others similar consideration to one’s own, thus robbing 
them of respect. Christiano and his work stand out in this category. 262 According to 
him, justice – understood as the nonbiased respect for and advancement of every 
citizen’s interest as the highest common good – can only be achieved by a democratic 
state that negotiates conflicts arising from cultural disparities, cognitive dissonances, 
moral arguments and general differences in interpretation in order to produce, through 
democratic procedures, a functional understanding of the concept that is acceptable to 
all and that, as mentioned, awards the interests of all equal consideration.  
Stricto senso this account of political obligation as the content of a duty of 
respect obligation (Christiano also has an account of de facto political authority and 
one for the moral requirement to obey), is not suitable. To begin with, it runs into the 
two already familiar problems of content and application. Firstly, in spite of operating 
assumptions, it is not at all certain that the content and predicate of this duty of 
                                                        
261 The idea of a duty of respect recurs often in the thought on authority and obligation. J. Waldron, 
talks about a duty of respect for the opinion of others which is satisfied in democracies because their 
procedures are most inclusive; see Law and Disagreement, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1999. Stilz also 
writes about respect – for others’ rights and general well-being – in Liberal Loyalties, a duty that 
imposes going along with the demands of the state; Raz, at various times, writes about respect for law 
as something that provides some reason for action, including obedience, but that does not create an 
obligation tout court (The Authority of Law, pp. 258-260); and Philip Soper’s duty of deference to law 
could also be inserted in this category, P. Soper, The Ethics of Deference: Learning from Law's Morals, 
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2002.  
262 His argument is developed throughout a number of works. Most significant are T. Christiano, The 
Constitution of Equality: Democratic Authority and Its Limits, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2008 
and T. Christiano, “The Authority of Democracy,” Journal of Political Philosophy, Vol. 12, No.3, 
2004 pp.266–200,. Also see T. Christiano, The Rule of the Many, Westview Press, Boulder, 1996.  
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respect [cum justice] is obedience, permanent obedience, only obedience and only 
towards states that meet the formal features of a democracy. He offers no reason as to 
why respect could not be manifested through other means, including by disobeying; it 
is simply assumed that compliance is the only avenue to fulfilment.263 He runs then 
into the same issue of CO4precise-content as Rawls did, as we have no evidence that 
respect, as justice, is contingent on compliance with applicable law, exclusively. 
Secondly, in what proves to be a recurrent theme, the particularity requirement is not 
properly met, insofar as a general duty to exhibit equal concern/respect needs to be 
shown, and not presumed to follow state borders. As such, the considerable possibility 
of restriction being performed in a morally wounding fashion lingers, and this natural 
duty of respect justification encounters the same problem of application as Rawls’ 
duty of justice, begging the question of why the interests and opinions of those placed 
on the same side of the border matter and compel more, morally speaking, than the 
opinions of those opposite; C6particularity fails then. 
Besides these two, there are other issues as well, mostly having to do with the 
underlying propensity towards reductionism discoverable in the arguments that 
respect can only be exercised in democracies. Accounts like his invoke democratic 
assemblies and their just policy of pooling opinions and deciding according to 
majority intentions. But the fact remains that the democratic state presupposes no 
assembly of the kind that would allow these claims to be accurately made and a 
multitude of its institutions do not function on a majoritarian principle and thus cannot 
be said to take into consideration the preponderant opinion of the citizen body.  So the 
argument, though not toothless, is blunt. Similarly, they elect to prioritize this 
majoritarian principle (or a principle of fairness instantiated in this majoritarian guise) 
without accounting for the fact that other principles could make competing and/or 
superior claims; this is a particularly salient issue for those that appeal to justice as 
well – there is a possibility, a strong one in fact, that respect would be better served by 
some other [than the majoritarian principle] higher-ranking, moral standard. In 
                                                        
263 The idea of a duty of respect recurs often in the thought on authority and obligation. J. Waldron, 
talks about a duty of respect for the opinion of others which is satisfied in democracies because their 
procedures are most inclusive; see Law and Disagreement, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1999. Stilz also 
writes about respect- for other’s rights and general well-being- in Liberal Loyalties, a duty that imposes 
going along with the demands of the state; Raz, at various times, writes about respect for law as 
something that provides some reason for action, including obedience, but that does not create an 
obligation tout court (The Authority of Law, pp. 258-260); and Philip Soper’s duty of deference to law 
could be inserted in this category, P.Soper, The Ethics of Deference: Learning from Law's Morals, 
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2002.  
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addition, if we wished to test this hypothesis further by comparing and contrasting the 
efficiency of principles as conduits to respect (or justice) we could not, as no tools or 
guidelines for evaluations are offered. Nor is it clear if they are operating on a 
conviction that democratic excellence and the consequent ability to achieve justice are 
measured in terms of the consequences they produce or in terms of how perfected is 
their practice of awarding all opinions equal concern. The bottom-line remains, 
however, that it is not at all clear that the fulfilment of a duty of respect is contingent 
on democratic rules or on compliance, assuming here that considerations of respect 
are among the first that come to mind when the relationship in question is the one 
between citizens and institutions.  
Moreover, while suggestions that democratic principles and procedures will 
help negotiate conflicts in a manner that will minimize, as much as possible, the 
proportion of those of dissatisfied ring true, they do not support his assumption that 
the good – understood as either the correct or the moral – will necessarily be achieved 
by these bodies more often than by other arrangements, political or non-political. 
Their accounts only inform that democratic assemblies will award equal respect in 
decision-making. There is no caveat that refers to some subjective or objective 
standards that could regulate or provide moral direction in decision-making: a 
monstrous decision achieved following a process of consultation with Hitler-like 
individuals is “just” and acceptable by their logic.  
There are a number of issues with this claim about political obligations as 
being rooted in respect, then. As a purported natural duty account it exhibits the same 
two structural faults of imprecise content and unproven particularity as all others; the 
issues here being exacerbated by the inexact meaning of “respect” and by reservations 
triggered by implied claims that the obligation ends at the border. Restricting duties of 
justice or samaritanism or urgency on arguments from ability and proximity may be 
incorrect but the contentions themselves do enjoy a degree of commonsensical appeal, 
insofar as it is true that individual capabilities to perform acts conducive to their 
satisfaction are limited. The same cannot be said of respect, however, which – being a 
state of mind – is harder to restrict to a true and morally inoffensive statement that 
“respect for other’s opinions and interests is first and foremost a duty owed to 
compatriots whose satisfaction is predicated on uniform compliance”. Furthermore, 
the claims of democracy are of no help, their only effect being to strengthen 
suspicions of not moving beyond an account of authority without a correlative duty to 
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obey, the kind proponents of respect most often openly marshal in tandem with their 
argument for obligation.  
 
Duties of Rescue 
 
Among those that have defended a clear-cut account of obedience as the 
content of a duty pertaining to a situation of urgency, Wellman most stands out 
through his defence of a natural duty of samaritanism. Wellman shares Christiano’s 
Hobbesian view on the world in the absence of a state as capable of imposing order 
and using coercion to bring about justice – the war of all against all – and 
consequently similarly finds the state to be a justifiably expensive necessity (Wellman 
is adamant that a coercive state is the only solution to the many violent problems of 
the state of nature); its costs may be heavy and burdensome, there is no denying that, 
but very much worth paying considering the alternative. This is the descriptive part of 
his account. Wellman was aware, however, that in order to justify obedience it is not 
enough to show that life within an order generating, just, political construction is 
superior to a life within the state of nature; Wellman does not make the mistake of 
earlier natural duty theorists who believed justice on the state’s side automatically 
entailed obligation on the side of recipients. Instead, in order to manufacture a duty to 
obey, he introduces a duty of samaritanism, understood as a duty “…to help a stranger 
when the latter is sufficiently imperilled and one can rescue her at no unreasonable 
cost to oneself”.264 This other-regarding duty justifies the use of coercion and the 
corresponding bind of obedience by invoking, not the well-being of the 
coerced/forced to conform with the law, but the well-being of those that may be 
harmed by another agent’s refusal to submit or who would risk the state of nature if 
they were to disobey. The normativity of obedience therefore arises from this duty of 
care that permanently compels us to rescue one another from the state of nature by 
complying with the law, any refusal to submit equating to a refusal to perform our 
“fair share of the Samaritan task”.265 
                                                        
264 C, Wellman, “Towards a Liberal Theory of Political Obligation”, Vol. 111, No.4, 2001,pp. 735-759, 
, p. 744. Also see C. Wellman, “ Samaritanism and the Duty to Obey the Law,” C. H. Wellman, A. J. 
Simmons, A Duty to Obey the Law?:For and Against,  Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2005.  
265 C. Wellman, “Towards a Liberal Theory of Political Obligation”, Vol. 111, No.4, pp. 735-759, 
2001, p. 749. 
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While Wellman’s argument is thought-provoking, it also raises immediate red 
flags. Simmons, who co-authors a book with Wellman, identifies two important ones. 
First, he argues that Wellman miscalculates the costs of obedience. Although 
Wellman accepts that obedience towards the law is burdensome, he argues that the 
aggregate costs of collective obedience are significantly lower than the aggregate 
costs of collective disobedience – the state of nature. When comparing the two, he 
comes to what seems a reasonable conclusion that obedience, though taxing, is not 
overly expensive. Simmons believes this argument to be specious, in as much as it is 
not the collective costs of obedience/disobedience that interest us but individual ones, 
since the requirement to obey is always studied individually. His view is that 
disobedience is not at all expensive at a cellular level: the risk is never truly the state 
of nature – we cannot bring that about on our own – but, at most, some sort of legal 
sanction. His conclusion is that Wellman ought to have come up with a better way to 
calculate the costs of the Samaritan task, which may be infinitely heavier than he 
assumed. 266  Secondly, Simmons also takes issue with the way Wellman 
conceptualizes this supposed duty of samaritanism. At first, this duty appears to be 
very similar to a clear-cut duty of rescue. When Wellman introduces an argument 
from fairness, however, this duty morphs into something more akin to a duty of 
charity. The problem with this is that duties of rescue and those of charity are quite 
dissimilar: duties of rescue are owed by all to all qua human and have a very 
occasional nature; duties of charity, on the other hand, are localized, owed to specific 
people (the ones that “deserve” to be treated “fairly”) and are more of a permanent 
fixture. Simmons believes that this indeterminate nature of the duty of samaritanism 
means that it does not have a proper, stable, answer to the question of particularity.  
The first objection is indicative of Simmons’ conviction that a good account of 
political obligation will show not only why people have to obey but will also illustrate 
disobedience to be morally impermissible even when not unfair or otherwise 
wounding. There are sufficient reasons to believe that, outside of an account of 
explicit consent or on the principle of fairness resulting from acceptance, none will 
manage this; this is simply asking too much. As for the second complaint, although a 
valid concern in the theoretical sense, it is not particularly poisonous. No matter what 
kind of duty samaritanism is, we know it to presuppose some sort of “salvation”, 
                                                        
266  A. J. Simmons, “The Duty to Obey and our Natural Moral Duties”, C. H. Wellman, A. J. 
Simmons, Is There a Duty to Obey the Law?  Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2005. 
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which Wellman explains as being achieved through obedience towards the law. As 
such, if there are any issues with particularity they will not arise out of Wellman’s 
failure properly to position his duty within the existing taxonomy.  
More serious concerns here are that Wellman has not shown 1) ordinary 
politics to equate to a situation of crisis from which we have to rescue our compatriots 
(C7conformity) and 2) that obedience towards the law is the only way to do so 
(CO4precise-content).267  We have no reasons to believe that bearers of duty might 
recognize day-by-day socio-political realities as occasions on the cusp of the disaster 
that is the state of nature, or have any instinct or intuition that obedience to the law is 
the way to alleviate the potential distress. Even if we assume with Wellman that these 
political realities are situations that suffer – or are in permanent danger of bringing 
about – duties of samaritanism [although there must be a degree of logical 
inconsistency in equating routine to occasions signalling the need for rescue], 
Wellman does not explain why obedience to the requirements in law is the exclusive 
method of “saving” everyone. The content of this duty of samaritanism is not obvious, 
and need not be submission to the law, and, if it were, it need not be either permanent 
or continuous. So, even on two generous assumptions not backed up by reality or 
evidence, Wellman’s samaritanism seriously struggles to show that the moral 
requirement to obey is the heavy, uniform, generalized, duty we observe obedience to 
be (CO4precise-content). To resolve this issue of coherence, Wellman appeals to 
fairness. But fairness is a dangerous path, as it gives his account too strong a whiff of 
transactionalism comfortably to claim a clear, single ground for the obligation to obey 
and membership in the natural duty accounts category (CO1Bnon-degeneration if not 
failed, threatened), and commits him to the morally dubious claim that it is fairer to 
rescue those that live within the same jurisdictional perimeter as ourselves. Both are 
very problematic. The first invites observations that fairness may be a more 
straightforward route to political obligation and questions about the possibility that, in 
this universe where arguments from fairness have been shown to be unable to sustain 
political obligation, Samaritan claims may be used as reinforcement; these bode well 
for Klosko and principle proponents, but are fatal to Wellman’s contentions that 
                                                        
267 The first point brings about additional concerns. If we lived in actual situations of urgency would a 
state providing more than relief be justified, and would its claims to legitimate obedience extend farther 
than non-interference and what would be required for rescue? The obvious concern here is that 
Wellman’s account could best case scenario only legitimize a minimal state’s claim to authority 
without an actual obligation to obey.  
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samaritanism functions as a single ground of political obligation.268 As for the second 
assumption, it encourages doubts about the moral permissibility of excluding 
someone from something as important as salvation based purely on a simple argument 
from legal and geographical borders that are no more than historical accidents. 
Furthermore, while salvation is naturally restricted – I may owe rescue to all the 
drowning children in the world but only some are actually in my physical reach and 
therefore this duty is at its strongest towards them – this restriction need not 
necessarily reflect real life political districting: demanding obedience for those not 
genuinely affected (rescued) by my submission is a moral wound; not demanding it 
for those that could be affected (rescued) but are not taken into consideration because 
they are placed outside of the perimeter determined by borders is a moral wound. To 
conclude on this, besides a perspective on political life that does not mirror realities, 
and an undemonstrated conviction that samaritanism has as its unique content 
compliance, Wellman’s account also invariably creates the impression that no matter 
what criteria or arguments are used to restrict the duty to one state and its group of 
legal subjects, someone, somewhere, invariably ends up morally short-changed on an 
appeal to a weak – but not weakest – argument from physical ability and proximity 
(CO3precise-districting/inclusion and ceteris paribus C6particularity). Wellman thus 
delivers a justificatory narrative that runs into the typical faults of natural duty 
explanations, as well as into issues of non-conformity and degeneration.269  
 
 
In conclusion, natural duty accounts thus reveal themselves to be plagued by a 
host of issues, two of which are structural faults poisoning their whole logic. Their 
proponents’ Kantian inclinations play a significant part in their readiness to assume 
the content of duties to be necessarily political obligation, and in their willingness to 
gloss over issues of particularity they think resolved or resolvable by ascribing moral 
                                                        
268  See G. Klosko, “Samaritanism and Political Obligation: A Response to Cristopher Wellman’s 
‘Liberal Theory of Political Obligation’”, Ethics, Vol. 113, No.4, 2003, pp. 835-840 for his opinion on 
how samaritanism can help the principle of fairness. 
269  Renzo also notices this and argues that Wellman’s inability to justify the special relationship 
between X state and X citizen group is bound to create some moral wounds, particularly beyond 
borders. Interestingly, Renzo also makes a compelling claim that, by failing properly and 
unobjectionably to restrict this duty, Wellman opens himself up to charges that, at least hypothetically, 
disobedience towards a state law’s can have morally superior consequences, not only within borders 
but outside as well, thus negating his claims that disobedience always yields negative results and is 
morally impermissible. See M. Renzo, “Duties of Samaritanism and Political Obligation”, Legal 
Theory, Vol. 14, No. 3, 2008, pp. 193-217. 
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significance and consequences to birth or facts of life beyond what moral philosophy, 
especially the philosophy of political obligation, tolerates. The end results are what 
we have seen here: a blanket inability to show that presumed duties of justice, respect 
or rescue can only be satisfied by complying with legal requirements, and that 
instances of submission must necessarily break along state lines. Content (CO4) and 
application (CO3, C6), therefore, prove to be the two main liabilities for natural duty 
accounts, with rescue ones additionally struggling with a propensity to portray 
political life in a way not reflected in reality and with a choice to include an argument 
from fairness that ultimately sabotages them. Natural duty accounts, then, do not fare 
better than their political obligation counterparts because, in spite of their 
demonstrated ability to do away with voluntarism in a way not morally nauseating or 
triggering of opinions that limitations on freedom are routed in insufficient grounds, 
they are structurally flawed in ways for which there is, and cannot be, any 
rectification. In addition, even if a morally acceptable reason for restrictions in 
application were delivered, the issue of content would endure, it being impossible to 
exclude all behaviours but compliance under obligation as conducive to satisfaction. 
Natural duty paradigms are, to sum up, as permeated by structural faults as the 
previously assessed theories. Because of them, they will necessarily fail. 
 
These authors’ Kantian inclinations can be altogether blamed for their 
mistaking what constitutes a sufficient account of political authority with what 
functions as a valid account of political obligation. This mistake, however, also 
signals a recognized potential of separation between the two concepts that, for those 
who do not endorse the correlativity thesis, equates to a permission to defend 
justifications of political authority that do not correspond to a comprehensive 
obligation to obey. In the next section I address these median justifications, not for 
their potential to establish something correct about political obligation, but as 
derivative constructions still attempting to vindicate claims to obedience.  
 
Authority Without Political Obligation 
 
Authority without political obligation theses are products of political theorists 
that no longer endorse the orthodox view of political authority as tied to the existence 
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of a moral requirement to obey. They are some of the same scholars who, either 
separately, or in the same breath, also defended justifications of full-on political 
obligation: if for the latter they argued from a natural duty to participate in the 
provision of justice as equal freedom (Stilz), from normative consent (Estlund), from 
moral contractualism (Lefkowitz) or from a natural duty of respect (Christiano), in the 
direction of political authority they generally argue from the structures, functions and 
performances of democratic states.270 Consequently, these scholars adopt positions 
that invoke the good moral standing of our political systems, their deliveries of 
justice, or their fair and considerate decisions-making practices as arguments for 
obedience that mimics political obligation but is not actually it. 
  This practice of constructing separate narratives for obligation and authority is 
implicitly indicative of a belief that authority – correct authority with entitlements and 
claims to obedience that are, in important senses and to an important degree accurate 
– is something that can pertain even to universes to which political obligation does 
not. These scholars therefore operate on a belief that the inability to account for the 
moral requirement to obey does not deny the possibility of political authority or of 
obedience, obedience however that is not the content of a moral right against citizens, 
but the legitimizable (or legitimate in a reduced sense) claim of a certain type of 
political regime – a democracy.271 Unlike classic accounts of political obligation that 
                                                        
270 See Stilz, Liberal Loyalties, chapter 2, where she argues about the democratic state as uniquely 
equipped to provide equal freedom. D. Lefkowitz (2005) resonated with Christiano’s argument and 
claimed that democratic decision-making bodies have authority stemming from their knowledge and 
ability to settle disagreements as to what actions are morally necessary to be performed by collectives.  
See D. Lefkowitz, “A Contractualist Defense of Democratic Authority”, Ratio Juris, Vol. 18, No.3, pp. 
346-364, 2005. Similarly, in Democratic Authority, Estlund defends the opinion that democratic 
decisions are legitimate commands because they have “epistemic value” insofar as they are made 
collectively (pp.231-232) following an airing of reasons [for opinions on specific issues] and it is 
generally accepted that they lean towards being “good” decisions. Estlund insists on democracies’ 
“modest” tendency towards just decisions (pp. 106-107; 160-163; 168) that reflect the local conception 
of justice (p. 169).  Also see D. Estlund, Democratic Authority: A Philosophical Framework, Princeton 
University Press, Princeton, 2007, pp. 98-116; 159-183. Finally, Jeremy Waldron defended political 
authority as springing from democracy’s ability to deal with disagreement (pp. 27; 41; 86). See J. 
Waldron, Law and Disagreement, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1999.   
271 Christiano writes in “The Authority of Democracy”, p. 275: “Democratic decision-making on the 
issues in contention is the uniquely public way of realizing equality among citizens. First, democracy is 
a publicly clear way of realizing a kind of equality. It involves equality in voting power, equality of 
opportunities to run for office, and ideally equality of opportunities to participate in the processes of 
negotiation and discussion that lead up to voting…. interests in being able to correct for others’ 
cognitive biases, being at home in society, and in having one’s equal moral standing publicly 
recognized and affirmed ground the principle of respect for the judgment of everyone in society.….”. 
Christiano has been defending this position from as early as The Rule of the Many, p. 35. Stilz writes in 
Liberal Loyalties, that the authority of the democratic state is a consequence of its functions: “First, it 
defines rights (protected interests) that apply equally to all; second, it defines these rights via a 
procedure that considers everyone’s interests equally; and third, everyone who is coerced to obey the 
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presupposed no separate explanations of authority on the correct idea that a 
justification of obedience legitimizes institutional pretences of authority, these 
accounts view obedience as a statement to be reinforced, rather than verified, and 
present authority as the property of a well-functioning state – it is not that people owe 
obedience, it is that states are justifiably entitled to and deserve it. These accounts, 
consequently, do not ask why do people have to obey, but merely observe that they 
do, and seek to show that they should continue to do so. In concrete terms, this means 
that advocates of this position aim not to justify the transition from a free status to one 
in which we are bound, but to justify the political state as a given with legitimizable 
claims to our authority. This is no subtle difference: classic theories of political 
obligation sought to explain the circumscription of our pre-political autonomies. This 
group, however, aims to show that we have to go along with whatever [supposedly] 
authoritative decisions autonomy-limiting regimes impose on us without wondering 
what permitted them to bracket our autonomy in the first place. They are not 
explaining why Caesar is Caesar; they are merely telling us why it is right to give 
unto him, on the aforementioned argument from properly-performed services. 
Legitimate political authority corresponding to a moral requirement to obey is 
therefore the province of theorists of political obligation; de facto political authority 
corresponding to piecemeal obedience of these theses of political authority. 
Insofar as obedience per se is concerned, this was a lateral move that exhibited 
neither the courage of those choosing to move forward with explanations of political 
obligations, nor the radicalism of those who turned to philosophical anarchism. But it 
was also a prudential move that endeavoured to show that the smouldering ashes of 
accounts of political obligation and the many doubts expressed about natural duty 
justification do not necessarily bury all acceptable and intelligible claims to authority.  
Uniformly, these thinkers owe something to Raz.  In “The Obligation to Obey 
the Law” he writes that while there may not be a general obligation to obey the law, 
                                                                                                                                                              
laws has a voice in the procedure”, p.78. Estlund defends epistemic proceduralism as a source of 
authority: “the bindingness and legitimacy of the decisions arc not owed to the correctness of the 
decisions, but to the kind of procedure that produced them... Democratically produced laws are 
legitimate and authoritative because they are produced by a procedure with a tendency to make correct 
decisions…”, D. Estlund, “Epistemic Proceduralism and Democratic Authority”,R. Geenens, R. 
Tinnevelt (eds.), Does Truth Matter? Democracy and Public Space, Springer, Dordrecht, 2008, pp. 15-
28, p. 20. Waldron thins (Law and Disagreement, p. 117) that the authority of democracy springs from 
its refusal to allow procedures designed to deal with disagreements to award more weight to some sets 
of interests than others.  
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obedience can be seen as being occasionally made mandatory by alternative factors 
having to do with the abilities and functions of law and institutions, including 
replacing dependent, primary reasons with secondary ones on a [believed] claim that 
this will render citizens better off. Inspired by him, scholars in this new category have 
argued that certain aspects of states will award them authority.  
As mentioned before, the idea that states may have the power to control even 
citizens not obligated to obey is no way an incoherent position, but a mere denial of 
the correlativity thesis with which we have grown accustomed. We should also, 
however, never lose sight of the fact that authority on account of political authority is 
not authority to the same power or degree of intensity as authority on a justification of 
political obligation. At most, a successful account of the former could be said to show 
obedience and claim to it to be intelligible, and somewhat legitimate and justifiable in 
a weaker sense. Connectedly, the obligation to obey of a person burdened with 
political obligation is much stronger than the duty of a subject of mere political 
authority: the former is under perfect bound, the latter has to obey in a real but 
sporadic, localized and piecemeal fashion; the former is a continuum, genuinely 
permanent and uniform, the latter a sum of instantiations of obedience. Much of the 
same is true of the other side of the coin. Authorities correlative to an obligation to 
obey are bearers of a power right. The others orbit around a claim-right (which may 
still be a too strong description) and any attempts to designate their impositions as 
moral could, and should, be met with strong objections.272 This differentiation is not a 
practical one, however: whether we obey because the state is in possession of a power 
right or we because of the balance of reasons, moral principles or practical 
considerations, compliance “happens”. The distinction is instead moral and 
theoretical, with the accounts discussed so far coming up on the losing side that is the 
one devoid of political obligation.  
Having said this, even with this lowered goal, these accounts generally fare 
dubitably. They consistently struggle with the inability to show a particular set of 
institutions to have authority over one specific portion of land between international 
borders (referred to as the districting problem; it mirrors the old application problem 
with Rawls) and to explain why only a specific group of people owe obedience to a 
particular state for reasons that have sufficient moral charge (referred to as the precise 
                                                        
272 See M. Kramer, “Requirements, Reasons and Raz”, Ethics, Vol. 109, No. 2, 1999, pp. 375-407. 
 169 
inclusion problem). 273  These accounts obviously do not have to meet all the 
requirements set for a justification of political obligation; but insofar as authority and 
obedience continues to materialize as a one-on-one relationship between a citizen and 
its state, it still needs to be shown to be correct in a minimal morally unobjectionable 
sense.  
These inabilities derive from the manner in which these scholars interrogate 
authority, and from that same set of Kantian assumptions we have seen sabotage 
natural duty of justice explanations. As Simmons points out, 274  [some of] these 
authors consider state entry to be a moral duty people owe to others insofar as states 
are believed to be indispensable to social order and the provision of justice. 275  
Assuming here that these are true, the practical experience of citizenship looks rather 
different, however – it is not entered, it is a consequence of birth. “Entry” presupposes 
some measure of intentionality and deliberateness and is an act in the proper sense, 
whereas the acquirement of citizenship does not and is not, for the overwhelming 
majority of people, something over which they have any control. State entry, in the 
sense these scholars intended, thus seems a reality only for immigrants, who arguably 
hold full political obligation on consent. Nevertheless, even if entry were a reality for 
all adult citizens, nothing imposes a duty to enter the same state as the one around us 
– a duty to enter a state is not one that has to be discharged on considerations of 
proximity. Nor does it mean, alternatively, that we have to enter one of the other 
existing states; we could opt to form our own somewhere in an unclaimed wilderness 
(a new issue of alternative supply) or even cobble up one with pieces from existing 
ones. Farfetched as these opinions may sound, Simmons is correct in pointing that 
“nothing at all follows about the rights of existing states to use coercion to limit the 
ways in which we may discharge this obligation…”.276 An alleged moral duty to enter 
a state on my part does not entail a duty to enter the one in which birth occurred. A 
proponent might counter-argue that, even though states do now allow the redrawing 
of borders, they allow movement across them and so anyone that stays has submitted. 
This is an argument made before by tacit consent as residence advocates and runs into 
identical difficulties: too hard a choice to be real, too little awareness of its existence. 
                                                        
273  Terminology shared by Simmons, who discusses over and under-inclusiveness in “Democratic 
Authority and the Boundary Problem”, Ratio Juris, Vol. 26, No.3, 2013, pp. 326-357. This article is 
reprised as chapter 2 of Boundaries of Authority, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2016.  
274 Simmons, “Democratic Authority and the Boundary Problem”, pp. 332-334.  
275 Stilz, Liberal Loyalties, pp. 37-53; Christiano, “The Authority of Democracy”, pp. 237-238.  
276 Simmons, “Democratic Authority and the Boundary Problem”, p. 337.  
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This duty, if existing, therefore establishes nothing obviously correct about the 
territorial rights of states or about political authority as something that we have to 
accept and comply with.  
The other problematic assumption repeatedly employed throughout these 
accounts is that government is a datum that has to be taken as such. To Simmons’ 
mind there is an important element of jumping the gun. Kantian/functionalists attempt 
to vindicate the rights of properly functioning, justice delivering, majoritarian states 
without pausing to explain the formation of government and to question what 
authorized them to restrict autonomies along the lines we see on maps. This amounts 
to a districting problem, which invites interrogations about the moral claims to 
existing jurisdictions and a concern that the problems of over- or under-inclusion 
could be thought resolvable by an argument from superior competence. In this second 
direction, Simmons blames these accounts for their self-serving, wilful historical 
ignorance that allows them to argue for territorialized control without accounting for 
the fact that borders and districting are the results of centuries of injustice. This is 
more than an ethical misgiving about efforts to paper over historical aggressions with 
arguments from impartial efficiency; 277  it is a practical preoccupation with their 
failure to install any safety measures that would preclude reoccurrence (see Simmons’ 
Mexican example).278  
These are valid concerns. While expectations of explanations for the formation 
of first governments or sanitizations of history are farfetched (especially considering 
the underlying intention here is not to justify political obligation but to rescue 
authority), particularity obviously remains an issue even in this new obedience-
within-the-well-functioning state logic. Contrary to any expectations that a lowering 
of the normative bar for obedience may facilitate meeting this requirement, these 
accounts bring about renewed doubts about restrictions in applications being made in 
a morally allowable manner on solid grounds. Simmons is entitled to his objection 
insofar as this claim from efficiency, understood broadly as just administration on a 
                                                        
277 Simmons, “Democratic Authority and the Boundary Problem”, pp. 339-341.  
278 Simmons explained why justness/justice are insufficient for particularity by arguing that, if the US 
were to invade Mexico, extending obedience to include them could not be justified by claiming that US 
institutions are just, and therefore worthy of and therefore entitled to obedience. The underlying point 
is that you can’t justify subjection on an argument from the quality of institutions in alleged authority; 
Mexicans would not have to obey just because the invading government is just; ceteris paribus no one 
has to obey because an encroaching government- including the one we normally refer to us “ours”- 
exhibits some redeeming quality. Ibid., p. 341.  
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majoritarian formula, is a double-edged sword: it could help legitimize actions over 
those considered to be under a state’s authority, but it could do the same for actions 
directed at outsiders. In the Kantian-functionalist universe nothing prohibits a more 
capable, more just state from invading a lesser one on a contention that the newly 
invaded will be better off under the authority of these better functioning institutions; 
these accounts presuppose no safety valves designed to preclude such actions and 
they do not expressly disallow claims to authority made in these sort of 
circumstances. Their arguments could, therefore, serve as justification for actions 
previously held to be nauseating.  
This issue, however, is more of a concern about a theoretical possibility. The 
main mistake is the failure to establish appropriate exclusivity in subjection. Although 
these accounts are not expected to source the obligation to obey, they do need to show 
that/why/how a certain group G is the subject of state S’s authority. In other words, 
while defenders of political authority are excused from demonstrating that members 
of group G are, individually and collectively bearers of a duty that binds them to 
perpetual surrender and compliance, they do need to make it clear that state S has 
authority over group G, exclusively (as opposed to three members of state S, 75000 
members of state Y and half of the members of state X, or any variation thereof). By 
insisting on the qualities of these states, and the effective, democratic way in which 
they perform their tasks of statehood, they do not show the considered subjects to be 
rightfully subjected, they just show a general, unspecific, perhaps purely theoretical 
democratic state to be worthy of the piecemeal obedience of an unspecified group of 
people that may or may not comprise all those – or only those – within an area 
designated by borders. All in all, they do not show obedience to be a special 
relationship between concrete states and the moral beings that inhabit their legally 
claimed jurisdictions. 
Why these accounts do not spell out their reasons for believing justifiable 
authority matches borders is a consequence of a continued conviction that birth (pace 
Kant) and proximity (pace Waldron) are sufficient. Given that the burden settled on 
here is not a moral requirement, these arguments are not as unpalatable as they once 
were. Nonetheless, inasmuch as heavy demands are still being made and still held to 
be the contents of claims states are justified and entitled to make, they do need to be 
shown to be correctly attributed, in a moral sense. The consequences of failure are 
thus still unacceptable. By not providing proper arguments that definitively establish 
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the presumed subjects of an authority to be the actual and all subjects of that 
authority, these accounts remain in permanent danger of over/under inclusivity and all 
the negative consequences attached to it, most importantly the risk of moral injuring. 
Such as they are, they do not preclude the drawing of comparisons between their 
alleged subjects and Simmons’ victims in the Mexican example; nor do they, 
conversely, disallow considering those excluded from life under an efficient-just state 
on consideration of birth-assigned citizenship morally as having been victimised on 
improper considerations. Ultimately, improperly defended exclusivity is an invitation 
to arguments about aggressions, be they classical or soft (denials of choice, secession, 
alternative supply or exclusion).  
On a more positive note, these “it is as it is” type justifications can be 
defended as able to say something about de facto authority – legitimizing it in a 
weaker but sufficient sense – even if not in a way that vindicates the territorial rights 
of states and borders, or one that perfectly aligns authorities with political 
memberships. On this type of reading, claims to authority are intelligible, believable 
and, to an important degree, justifiable, meaning that we will have significant 
amounts of obedience; not as much as an account of political obligations would 
provide, but much more than utilitarianism or philosophical anarchism can explain. 
This is not to say, however, that a harsher conclusion could not be argued for. Their 
inability to meet the particularity requirement (both as restriction and inclusion) is 
glaring, an uncharitable critic potentially going as far as dismissing them as 
arguments that do not make much progress past the largely uncontested claim that 
states are useful and people should not interfere with or preclude their actions.  
To conclude on this, whether or not they vindicate de facto authority as the 
province of legitimizable, but not fully legitimate, states with intelligible, arguably 
correct, claims to the obedience of groups that should comply (albeit not as an 
obligation) is a matter of interpretation; the main obstacle in favour of more positive 
final findings remaining the unsatisfied criterion of particularity, which will persist in 
being an issue for as long as real-world compliance remains districted. As far as our 
problem of political obligation is concerned, however, they categorically only serve as 
reminders that arguments from properly performed services do not cover the breadth 
of space between it and simple political authority, and as tools in the proper 
identification of the hurdle that has to be cleared by an account of obedience as the 
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content of a moral requirement to obey if it is to count as sufficient justification of 
political obligation. 
Importantly, they also serve as a moderate alternative to philosophical 
anarchism, specifically modern, a posteriori that does not view personal autonomy as 
fully irreconcilable with any measure of submission nor refuses to allow that, in 
certain conditions- contract and consent- genuine legitimacy could be achieved.279 In 
this sense, this version of philosophical anarchism is, more than anything, an 
inescapable realization to be had at the end of a process of evaluation revealing 
political obligation to be unjustified and thus all existing states to be illegitimate in the 
full, true sense. This is not to say however that proponents believe citizens do not 
have to obey: Simmons, perhaps the best know modern philosophical anarchist, 
explains that, while states are illegitimate, made so by “their contingent characters” 
citizens will be “of course, still bound by their non-political moral obligations and 
duties, and these non-political duties will sometimes have the same substance as the 
subjects’ legal requirements.” 280 In these conditions a posteriori philosophical 
anarchism’s implications are rather unobjectionable. While there may be no general 
moral requirement to obey, submission towards the state’s law will often be justified 
by anterior non-political moral requirements and by more mundane considerations of 
practicality and common good. In other words, while there are no stricto senso 
political obligations, there will be other duties with approximate content, the freedom 
to regard the state and its laws as non-authoritative and non-mandatory therefore 
neither necessarily meaning that citizens are free to disobey at all times nor justifying 
resistance. Philosophical anarchism consequently has all the hallmarks of a tenable 
position: it provides some reasons to comply, it is not drastic or revisionist and, from 
a theoretical and methodological standpoint, it is an acceptable conclusion reached at 
the appropriate time.281 For these very reasons it is also uninteresting, being moderate 
                                                        
279 Raz (“The Obligation to Obey the Law”), M.B.E. Smith (“Is There a Prima Facie Obligation to 
Obey the Law?”), Green (The Authority of State), Lyons (“Need, Necessity and Political Obligation”) 
and of course A.J. Simmons (all) are all philosophical anarchists.  
280 Simmons, “Philosophical Anarchism”, 107.  
281 Which prompted Gans to describe it as toothless. C. Gans, Philosophical Anarchism and Political 
Disobedience, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1992, p. 90. Others however strongly 
disagreed and held philosophical anarchism to be quite radical: T. Senor,  “What if there are no 
political obligations?”, Philosophy and Public Affairs, Vol. 16, No.3, 1987, pp. 260-268. T. Honore, 
“Must we Obey? Necessity as a Ground of Obligation”, Virginia Law Review, Vol. 67, No.1, 1981, pp. 
39-61, pp. 42-44). 
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as threats go and inconsequential to practices of compliance even on paper.282 The 
only issue with it is that, as a finding reached presently, it is arguably rushed (though 
for good reasons), insofar as not all avenues towards the vindication of political 
obligation have been explored. Which brings us to the question “where are we now”.  
Conclusion 
 
The end of analysis of existing accounts of political obligation coincides, I 
think, with a vindication of what I stated to be the first of my two original 
contributions to the thought on obligation- a demonstration that paradigms of political 
obligation produced so far fail and will necessarily continue to fail because of 
structural flaws.  I believe I have shown each type of justification to present with 
fundamental issues – recurrent throughout existing accounts and unavoidable in any 
new possible iteration – that definitively preclude achieving the justificatory goal. I 
have shown transactionalism, for example, to be incapable of accounting for the lack 
of evidence of will, or make up for giving up on it altogether in a way that does not 
cause alternative issues; we know now not only that Beran misidentified an incorrect 
choice situation as morally permissible, and that Estlund’s normative consent is 
useless, but, most importantly, that the inevitable mutilation of the concept of consent 
(brought about by the realization that it is irreconcilable with C7conformity and thus 
C1generality) leads to unresolvable problems with CO1Asufficient-normative-strength, 
CO1Bnon-degeneration, and CO4precise-content, or produces constructions that are no 
better than the lower specie of thesis of authority. At the end of the second chapter it 
was obvious that one cannot imagine or remove will from transactions and still 
discover political obligation, at all or specifically; and there can be no compensating 
for this practice [of distancing consent from intent] that does not necessarily equate to 
degeneration, or necessarily bring about questions of content. Transactionalism failed 
not because its proponents were incapable of organizing their claims in morally and 
theoretically correct packages but because there are no transactions, or they don’t 
                                                        
282 Lately, Martha Egoumenides stands out through her 2014 Philosophical Anarchism and Political 
Obligation. Egoumenides argues for a position she dubs “critical philosophical anarchism” (Gans’ 
original terminology, Philosophical Anarchism. 2), a form of anarchism that accepts the libertarian 
propositions that people are self-ruling autonomous individuals and that the state has no higher  
“ethical value” than it being a means to our ends but at the same time calls for the existence of a “full 
welfare state” serving us to the best of its abilities (p. 41). In these conditions, she holds the absence of 
demonstrable, justifiable political obligations to be testament to the fact that there is something 
intrinsically wrong with the state.  
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happen in the appropriate conditions and thus do not have the desired effects, or they 
can be presumed to have happen and have effects but we cannot confirm them as 
being political obligation. There can be no account in this logic that won’t run into 
these crippling challenges.   
The same holds true for the other observed theories. Associativism, no matter 
how desirous not to fall afoul of CO5non-generational-assumptions-from-attachments or 
CO6non-confusion will never not be faced with retorts that it’s the moral principles 
governing relationships- and not relationship themselves- that generate obligations, or 
that a purported obligation’s being part and parcel of a role does not actually count as 
a correct, permanent justification for its performance. That permanent, underlying 
doubt about what actually carries the normative load, and that practice of normative 
supplementation (again unavoidable, at least insofar as there is as need to 
circumscribe the paradigm to just societies), destroy associativism’s claims to satisfy 
CO1A and CO1B normative strength/non-degeneration. And again, there is no 
navigating these obstacles, because associativism is fundamentally a claim that 
obligation is imposed by the role itself, in and of its own; every incarnation of this 
paradigm will thus necessarily run into these issue [at least].  Finally, the same holds 
for natural duty accounts. Content (CO4precise-content) and application (C6, CO3) are 
the permanent challenges facing justifications seeking to narrow down particularized 
political obligation as the conduit to the satisfaction of a qua human duty, and neither 
can be resolved.  Regardless of the species of duty, the moral requirement to obey the 
law of one’s state cannot be shown to be the specific, unique, permanent imposition 
on citizens, and it cannot be demonstrated that supposedly applicable institutions 
apply in a morally correct sense. It strains belief that disobedience or alternative 
actions can be completely dismissed as potentially conducive to satisfaction, given 
that we acknowledge reasonable disobedience and alternative supply specifically 
because we recognize them as occasionally correct counterparts to particularized 
compliance, and C6particularity and CO3precide-districting/inclusion will not, on this 
logic, ever be solved; there are only so many arguments one can make for restriction 
and all have been dismissed.  As such, no natural duty account, whatever the duty, 
will manage to limit content and application in a morally unobjectionable fashion.  
I find therefore that I was right in declaring these justifications structurally 
flawed, and therefore forever precluded from achieving their goal to explain the moral 
requirement to obey. There is something corrupt at the very core of their logic, and 
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because of that sooner or later they run into an issue they cannot move past. This 
brings about an obvious question of “where are we now”. Insofar one does not ascribe 
to philosophical anarchism, or to authority without political obligation, all 
observations made so far indicate the answer is “past the point where a genuinely new 
way of approaching the moral requirement to obey became a necessity”. Analytical 
political philosophy has devoted considerable attention to the topic, and many efforts 
have been made to improve, defend or disprove proposed paradigms. The list of 
criteria and conditions, our axiomatic assumptions about political obligation, our 
shifting, more inclusive, perspectives on the concepts of authority and legitimacy, are 
the positive legacies of these exertions. The lesson however, is that we have to move 
on; this is the answer to our question. 
 In the aftermath of the findings here however, those that insist on continuing 
to defend political obligation do find themselves in an advantageous theoretical 
position, one brought about by more awareness of the pitfalls associated with this 
kind of justificatory effort, and the consequences of ignoring them. Progress in the 
field is now obviously conditional on observing all the criteria and conditions I’ve set 
in the methodological chapter and on the now obvious, common-sense need not to 
persist in the established directions.   
The step in the right direction is then a new, necessarily non-voluntary account 
that meets all the set requirements, and shows obedience to be a power-right states 
hold against citizens that have to obey their law for the categorical reason that it is the 
law of their state. In terms of going about this task, historically speaking, efforts to 
derive obligation have focused on detecting something special about states or citizens 
from which it could be sourced; experience has now instructed there is nothing 
sufficiently exceptional about either, a fact that forces us to re-examine political 
obligation as an equation. The only element not to have been investigated as a 
conceivable font of duty is the law itself.  
Arguably two moments in the modern thought on political obligation were 
conducive to making the mental jump to recognizing the law as a potential ground: 
Simmons’ 1979 discussion on obedience without political obligation, when he argued 
that the moral requirement will often have to be satisfied because of the overlap 
between law and the commands of higher order moral duties, and that small gap 
separating Dworkin’s opinions on the morality of law from his argument from 
associativism. Of the two Dworkin is most surprising, as Simmons was still waiting to 
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be convinced otherwise by something similar to what was already available. Dworkin 
on the other hand had spent the better part of the first 200 pages of Law’s Empire 
arguing that norms are sometimes laws because of their moral merit, that they play an 
important part in the determination of the legal and obligatory, etc., before finding 
obedience to be morally required on the basis of a convoluted argument from 
associativism in “true communities” that ignored the possibility that law’s being 
obligatory may have to do with the very moral nature  he had so vigorously defended 
previously. In the next, final chapter I explore law and its nature as a potential source 
of duty.  
The challenge I set for myself then is to prove there is merit to the hypothesis 
“the moral requirement to obey the law is justified by law’s providing citizens- 
trapped in new moral relationships- with rights and responsibilities law also sustains 
and regulates”. I do so starting from a claim that the law is moral. The first obstacle in 
this direction is establishing the proposition itself to be an intelligible opinion that is 
not only beneficial to a positive conclusion about law being morally obligatory, but 
also a statement about law’s nature that is acceptable to both moral and legal theory. 
In this latter direction, this is no easy feat. Although no one expresses any doubts 
about humans or states being moral, we are still, at least formally, in the throes of a 
fifty year-long debate between positivists and anti-positivists about whether or not 
law shares in this moral nature. As we generally move towards accepting this 
proposition, it bears to question whether or not law being moral has any consequences 
on the moral requirement to obey, if perhaps the reason- or part of the reason- why we 
have to acquiesce to its commands has something to do to with this very nature. I 
believe law’s moral nature to be determinant. Consequently, I attempt to vindicate 
this moral nature, and subsequently find it to be a moral entity and agent that can 
impose and be owed moral requirements.  
Once done, I map out the road from the possibility of compliance to the reality 
of political obligation. To do so I begin by arguing that we owe law a small measure 
of compliance as a manifestation of consideration for a fellow moral agent whose 
singular demand is obedience. Then, I argue positivisation-law making on the basis of 
moral norms- to generate piecemeal compliance not unalike the kind thesis of 
authority impose. Finally, I argue that compliance in my sense (political obligation 
corresponding to a right against) derives from law’s provision and regulating of 
entitlements. Having done these, I show the account meets the two conditions –
 178 
particularity and reasonable disobedience- that may appear to be jeopardized by my 
claims. Fourth and finally, I insert myself in the legal theory debate, to address the 
orthodox side’s concerns that an account that holds the law to be moral fails the 
authoritative condition, and brings about epistemological problems that impede 
recognizing and applying law; without constructing a full theory of law, I show that 
none of my contentions threaten these two features, or positivisim in itself. I conclude 


























Chapter V: Towards a Moral Account of Political 
Obligation 
  
 My argument for political obligation relies on the idea that “the law is 
moral” in order to establish authoritative facts about legal rules. The law here is 
postulated to be- and understood as- a moral agent with moral fibre, wants, 
entitlements and duties of its own. This postulation is not a heuristic device held to be 
sufficient for the present goal of justification, but a metaphysical choice to 
conceptualize the law in the same manner states and institutions have often been - i.e. 
as moral agents with rights and responsibilities. When I describe the law as a moral 
agent then what I mean is that the “the law” has will, and the abilities to have moral 
expectations and make moral demands of other, ordinary human moral agents.283 
Ceteris paribus, whenever moral agent “person” intersects with moral agent “the law” 
some of what the former owe to other humans qua humans will be owed to the law 
qua the law too, because in both scenarios that person brushes against the universe of 
wants/demands/needs/requirements of another moral entity. The only, obvious caveat 
to this is that the law will be excluded from any entitlements derived from 
corporeality.  
  When claiming the law to be moral what I also aim to convey- besides the fact 
that it too counts as a moral entity with duties, rights and agency- is that it is 
additionally in possession of a moral code it shares with those under its supposed 
authority. This latter feature is a consequence of a) law-makers inserting their own 
moral precepts and beliefs into law in the process of legislating, b) law being 
determinately influenced by the moral opinions of the citizen body it regulates and c) 
vice-versa determinately shaping the moral behaviours and opinions of the same 
group. What I am not saying however is that laws cannot be immoral or morally 
neutral or that law is incapable of such behaviours: much like us, the law is capable of 
                                                        
283 I hold that three conditions have to be satisfied in order to be able to ascribe moral agency: the 
purported moral agent has to have the ability to distinguish between right and wrong, its actions have to 
be subjectable to moral scrutiny and it has to be in a position to make decisions that impact others. The 
law meets all three: it not only clearly distinguishes between designated rights and wrongs but it is also 
actively involved in determining them, and routinely translates them into the legal and illegal, in 
appropriate circumstances283; law’s demands and actions are permanently interpreted and judged on the 
basis of the set standards283; and clearly law’s actions and resolutions have effects on other agents’ 
lives that register on the moral scale. Law clears the bar for agency.  
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all sorts of actions without losing or jeopardizing its status as a moral entity or agent. 
“The law is moral” is not a statement about its moral excellence or moral superiority.  
  It is similarly important to establish here that the claim “the law is moral” is not 
one about content [of the laws] and certainly not about consequences. The law’s 
moral status is not held to be contingent on, or predicated upon, its real-life 
implications. Often, this sort of affirmation about law being moral is taken to mean 
that law aims or manages to produce positive results, be it in a strict moral sense or in 
a utilitarian one. This is not the case here; law being moral is a claim about law’s 
nature and status, not a statement designed to underline its unobjectionable effects, 
the positive consequence of law-abidance, the instructions offered by the balance of 
reasons, etc.   
 The syntagm “the law” raises additional questions about my understanding of 
law as one body vs. a sum of legal rules. To clarify I hold the law to be both distinct 
and indistinct from laws. It is indistinct in the sense that in its most concrete form – 
on paper– it presents as a sum of laws raging in scope and importance. This is no 
different from us being, in our most concrete physical shape, a sum of limbs and 
parts.  The law is distinct from laws however that it has more moral charge, value, 
essence than a mere totality of legal rules. Again, the same can be said about persons; 
just as we are more, in moral terms, than a joined collection of body parts, the law is 
more, in moral terms, than a sum of legal parts. And just as our moral essence has 
implications for our physical body, the law’s moral essence has implications for its 
legal body. More importantly, the law’s moral essence has implications for the way its 
moral-legal body interacts with our moral-physical body in the political realm.  
 Concerning the claim that “the law is moral” understood in an indistinguishable 
perspective, something more needs be said concerning its potential effects on 
compliance. Firstly, as we shall see better later, this claim about the nature of law is 
held to be reconciled with the concrete existence of immoral or neutral individual 
pieces of legislation. Secondly, as we move forward towards an account of political 
obligation built on this statement, it should be made clear that the argument will cover 
all law, including neutral or immoral ones (these latter as far as possible). What I 
mean by this is that properly justified political obligation is synonymous with a duty 
to obey the law, all law, as far as prima facie character, reasonable disobedience and 
non-triviality allow. So, assuming here that I explain the existence of a moral 
requirement to obey, that explanation will make acts of obedience mandatory towards 
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all the demands of law, including those that fail to count, when taken individually, as 
moral. They will be made mandatory by their being the requirements of law in 
possession of a power right against citizens, independently of whether or not they can 
or do count as moral, except of course at the exceptional intersection with laws so bad 
that superior moral considerations become involved, annul duty, and permit 
reasonable disobedience; connectedly, instances of nit-picking arising from empirical 
observations that there are inefficient, obsolete or plainly stupid legal rules in any 
legal system are equally not toxic, because they do not detract from the moral status 
of law in the distinguishable sense, nor jeopardize political obligation, as the 
authoritativeness condition is met. And last, what matters here is the moral status of 
the law as a whole, not the ability to locate each and every law in the moral 
reservation, something that is anyway the rule, rather than the exception.   
 The reason why I think inability would be the exception is my own perspective 
on law. I hold law, in the indistinguishable-structural sense, to be a pyramidal 
construction that sees a moral trickle-down effect that ensures most laws register on 
the moral scale. At the apex of this pyramid is organic law, straightforwardly derived 
through positivisation from moral norms, and therefore in possession of the most 
obvious moral character. It is followed closely by the important prohibitions that 
guarantee and safeguard the above. These prohibitions have moral worth not only of 
their own however, but also additional one sourced in the fact that they support and 
facilitate the more important part of legislation placed directly above. The same can 
be said about each “level” of law – it supports what is on top and is supported by what 
is below. Even the most mundane legal norms thus gain a measure of moral merit 
derived, at the very least, from their serving the superior purposes of higher-ranking 
law: for eg., directives governing trash disposal may not be the most clearly moral, 
but insofar as they are conduits to public health and environmental safety, they 
support the pursuit of happiness. So political obligation relying on the statement we 
make is not jeopardized by the existence of immoral or amoral laws.284  
 
                                                        
284 In the indistinguishable sense positivisation and the trickling down effect add to the balance of 
evidences that the law is moral. To be clear, even in this perspective, the law is still primarily moral 
because it counts as a moral agent (the law’s status as moral agent assigns moral charge to its parts the 
same way our status as moral agent assigns moral charge to our limbs, and The Queen’s royal status 
assigns royal charge to every aspect of her body); but the facts that laws are sometimes derived directly 
from moral norms and the pyramidal construction that is a legal system sees moral charge flowing 
downwards count as well.  
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 “The law is moral” however is not a statement that has the same meaning and 
implications for both moral philosophers and legal philosophers. If for the former this 
statement is a more or less acceptable claim that law too is a moral entity, for legal 
philosophers it is a claim that legal rules are necessarily moral in content, 
consequence and source. Legal philosophers -at least of the kind discoverable today -
do not recognize “the law” as, in some dimension, distinguishable from its parts; to 
their minds the contention that “the law is moral” thus translates as one that all 
legislation has moral charge and moral worth, and legality is contingent on it 
exhibiting these features. As such, if for moral philosophy of the kind we are 
performing the statement is both a descriptive and normative one about the nature of 
law, for legal philosophy it counts as a rejection of positivism (of the strong version 
of it as least), the dominant school of thought on law of the age, that automatically 
signals at least a rapprochement to Dworkinian interpretivists or natural law 
theorists.285 
  Expressing an opinion on theories of law, or formulating something that 
resembles one, is not one of my intentions. Justifying political obligation is not 
conditional on the formulation of a theory of law or on reconciliation with dominant 
positivism; for my argument to work what the law is, beyond being moral, is 
uninteresting. That said, insofar as “the law is moral” is a considered contention that 
runs against a distinguished thesis in legal theory that denies the existence of indelible 
                                                        
285 Given positivism’s triumph as a theory of law against natural law theory one would think this to be 
an unorthodox position. Critics of positivism, however, the overwhelming majority of who are not 
natural lawyers, agree with the contention expressed above. David Lyons, for example, denied the 
separability thesis after examining it in each of its potential meanings from minimal to maximal (Moral 
Aspects of Legal Theory, The Rule of Law, “Moral Judgment and Legal Theory”). Tony Honore 
believed that the two normative systems are connected to such an extent that not only morality 
determines the content of law, but law determined the contents of morality as well; he also insisted on 
the parasitism of moral language on legal language, on the appeals to critical morality in law-making, 
on the contingency of legal interpretation on morality and so forth. See Honore, “The Necessary 
Connection Between Law and Morality”. Daniel Brudney (“Two Links of Law and Morality”) 
emphasized the connection between law and morality by reminding us of the law’s treatment of legal 
subjects as sources of moral claims and that the effectiveness of legal systems is partially (at least) 
predicated on moral norms. Similarly, Philip Soper discovered necessary links between the two in the 
language and claims of legal officials (“Legal Theory and the Obligation of a Judge: The Hart/Dworkin 
Dispute”), Michael Moore in the vocabulary employed in law and adjudication and in the practice of 
allowing morality to overturn the letter of law (“Four Reflections on Law and Morality”,) Roger 
Cotterell in the practice of common law to devise legal principles from moral principles (“Common 
Law Approaches to the Relationship between Law and Morality”), Emile Durkheim, in legal systems’ 
“reflecting and expressing” of local moral norms (Determination of a Moral Fact, Moral Education) 
and even Raz expressed an opinion, in Ethics in the Public Domain (p. 211) on the separability thesis 
as “implausible” (“The separability thesis is . . . implausible . . . . [I]t is very likely that there is some 
necessary connection between law and morality, that every legal system in force has some moral merit 
or does some moral good even if it is also the cause of a great deal of moral evil”).  
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connections between normative system law and normative system morality, I must 
address their concerns, of which at least one could potentially jeopardize political 
obligation. In this direction, in the immediately following sections I first explain 
positivist attitudes on the relationship between law and morality; then, I argue Leslie 
Green to be convincing and correct in his criticisms of their separability thesis and his 
argument that there are at least seven connections between the two that are neither 
unnecessary not unimportant, the two thresholds they established for connections 
seeking to invalidate separability; and finally, I clarify that the statement itself forces 
no affirmations of the kind natural law marshalled and should be taken neither as a 
pretence that every law is moral, nor as a desire to hold moral merit to be a condition 
of legality. I do this not to vindicate opinions contrary to orthodox positivism but to 
show that, from whichever point of view, the proposition “the law is moral” should 
not be an unacceptable one. 
 
By and large legal positivism is an opinion that law is a social fact and a 
matter of artifice, practice and custom that heavily endorses a separation thesis 
between law and morals. This “ separation thesis” suggests that positivists view the 
two normative systems, law and morality, as detached. That is not so; H.L.A. Hart’s- 
positivism’s foremost proponent- argument was not that laws and morality are 
separate, or that they should be kept separate, but rather that there is “no necessary 
connection between law and morals or law as it is and ought to be”, meaning that a 
norm’s status as law is not predicated on its exhibiting some measure of moral merit 
during a process of inspection. 286  That is why Leslie Green proposed the more 
helpful- and now orthodox- name “separability thesis”. 287 
In the first years after the original articulation of the thesis positivists were in a 
peculiar position: though they “won” the debate with competing views on the nature 
of law completely, so much so that second half of the twentieth century legal 
philosophy became synonymous with legal positivism, in the face of what little 
criticism they encountered- most vigorously from Dworkin and his interpretivism- 
they were drawn into a conflict of perspectives with each other as to how deep 
                                                        
286 H.L.A. Hart, “Positivism and the Separation of Laws and Morals”, Harvard Law Review, Vol. 71, 
No. 4, 1958, pp. 593-629, p. 601. Hart develops his theory fully in The Concept of Law, Oxford 
University Press, Oxford, 1961. Joseph Raz provides a good summary of the tenets of legal positivism 
in The Authority of Law, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1979, especially pages 36-39.  
287 L. Green, “Positivism and the Inseparability of Law and Morals”, NYU Law Review, Vol. 83, No.4, 
2008, pp. 1035-1058.  
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“separability” truly runs. What was clear from the very beginning in this fraternal 
debate was that there was no denying that morality provided law with goals and 
aspirations, or that there were “a thousand points of intersection” between the two (to 
use Hart’s phrase). The true issue was determining how much intersection and how 
much incorporation the separability thesis allowed for within the logic of positivism, 
i.e. to what extent could law be tied to morality when holding law-making, law-
abidance and law-recognizing to be fully independent of its norms. In the language of 
legal theory, this took shape as a discussion on the possibility of including morality’s 
principles in the criteria of legal validity set by the rule of recognition. This is how the 
two schools operating in this framework – exclusive legal positivism (ELP) and 
inclusive legal positivism (ILP) – first appeared.  
Exclusive positivism took no prisoners. Raz and his followers declared all law 
to be source-based and rooted in social facts, and denied any suggestions that appeals 
to extra-legal moral standards in legal adjudications equated to incorporation.288 They 
also denied that moral principles (standards) can act as criteria of legal validity and 
argued that, if they were to somehow make it into the law, their legal hold would be 
owed exclusively to their being positivised according to the rule of recognition, not to 
their intrinsic moral worth. Most importantly however, Raz and fellow exclusivists 
defended ELP as a position perfectly reconciled with the normal justification thesis of 
authority. In other words, in their view, whatever law is – and whatever relationship it 
entertains with morality – should necessarily not come into a conflict with the central 
tenet of the thesis, the proposition that authorities act as go-betweens between reasons 
for action and people who are better off acting not on whatever prudential, primary 
reasons they can identify, but on the basis of the secondary reasons offered by those 
in authority. Exclusive positivists believed that the acceptance of moral standards as 
criteria of legal validity that Dworkin289  defended and ILP accepted, negates the 
authoritativeness criterion, as it gives leeway to moral appraisals that nullify claims to 
                                                        
288 The primary and secondary literature on positivism and its branches is too vast to cite. Most 
important on ELP are J. Raz: The Authority of Law; “Authority and Justification”, Philosophy and 
Public Affairs, Vol. 14, No.3, 1985, pp. 3-29; “Authority, Law and Morality”, The Monist, Vol. 65, No. 
295, 1985, pp.295-324; The Concept of a Legal System, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1980, the 
appendix. Also see S. Shapiro, “The Difference that Rules Make”, B. Bix (ed.), Analyzing Law, Oxford 
University Press, Oxford, 1998; Shapiro, “On Hart’s Way Out”, Legal Theory, Vol. 4, No.4, 1998, pp. 
469-507; A. Marmor, Interpretation and Legal Theory, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1992. 
289 Dworkin battled positivism in Law’s Empire, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 1986.  
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authority; this is the concern that will have to be addressed as a potential threat to 
obligation. 
Exclusive legal positivism was opposed by inclusive positivism (ILP), the side 
of the school that remained truer to Hart [who, in the Postface to the Second Edition 
expressed his adherence to this view]. ILP was less radical in its opinions about 
incorporation and generally more open to the possibility of the rule of recognition 
incorporating moral principles on the basis of merit alone; in simpler terms, ILP’s 
endorsement of the separability thesis remained moderate.290  It’s proponents argued 
against ELP’s opinions on the effects of inclusion on authority and identification by 
reminding Raz that it does not follow from authorities’ claims to legitimate authority 
that they – and law – are the sort of things that genuinely allow for these sorts of 
contentions to be made; that the moral standards that make it into law need not 
necessarily coincide with the moral reasons that would vitiate the NJT; and that moral 
standards can act as criteria of legal validity without it being the case that citizens 
need to consider them in order to discover the legal or to motivate their own 
obedience. 291  Jules Coleman, Hart’s torch-bearer and ILP’s foremost exponent, 
became increasingly open to this position. Initially, he agreed to this inclusion only as 
long as it was done according to the precepts of the rule of recognition, thus ensuring 
that it was warranted by pedigree, rather than by moral merit alone and directly.292 
Later on, however, he conceded that, sometimes, moral standards make it into law 
because of moral value alone,293 an opinion he defended strongly in The Practice of 
Principle as something that neither robs law of its authoritative nature, on any 
reading, including Raz’s, nor the rule of recognition of its alleged epistemic power. 294  
Finally, in “Beyond Inclusive Legal Positivism”, Coleman bit the bullet like no 
positivist had done before and stated his belief that the separability thesis is most 
                                                        
290 Other inclusive legal theorists are J. Coleman, The Practice of Principle, Oxford University Press, 
Oxford, 2001; Coleman “Authority and Reason”, R. George (ed.), The Autonomy of Law, Oxford 
University Press, Oxford, 1996; W. Waluchow, “Herculean Positivism”, Oxford Journal of Legal 
Studies, Vol. 5, No. 2, 1985, pp. 187-210; Waluchow, “The Weak Social Thesis”, Oxford Journal of 
Legal Studies, Vol. 9, No. 1, 1989, pp. 23-55; Waluchow, Inclusive Legal Positivism, Oxford 
University Press, Oxford, 1994; M. Kramer, In Defense of Legal Positivism: Law without Trimmings, 
Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1999.  
291 J. Coleman “Authority and Reason”, The Practice of Principle, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 
2001.  
292 J. Coleman, “Incorporationism, Conventionality and the Practical Difference Thesis”, J. Coleman 
(ed.), Hart’s Postscript: Essays on The Postscript to The Concept of Law, Oxford University Press, 
Oxford, 2001.  
293 J. Coleman, B. Leiter, “Legal Positivism”, D. Patterson (ed.), A Companion to Philosophy of Law 
and Legal Theory, Blackwell, Oxford, 1996, pp. 228- 249.  
294 Coleman, Leiter, “Legal Positivism”.  
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likely “false”.295 Not all supporters of ILP are as permissive as Coleman, however; the 
majority just orbit around the moderate position that moral standards can be part of 
law on the unique basis of moral worth, with the accept of a permissive rule of 
recognition.  
Our intention to derive political obligation from the statement “the law is 
moral” draws us into the debate between positivism and anti-positivism on what 
appears to be the side of the latter. That is not true. A rejection of the separability 
thesis does not bring about or imply a rejection of the other tenants of positivism, and 
does not constitute sufficient evidence of belonging in the natural law category or of 
allegiance to Dworkinian interpretivism – it just bars us from agreement with 
exclusive legal positivists. The arguments ELP formulates against ILP, and against all 
those who more or less explicitly discover some truth in the idea that the law is moral, 
will need to be addressed, not because there is any genuine interest here in the nature 
of law, i.e. of what the law is beyond it being moral, but because they equate to 
doubts about the law’s ability to remain authoritative on such a view. In the next 
sections I will defend inclusivism’s rejection of Razian criticisms as persuasive, and 
reject exclusivism as a self-serving position that is counterintuitive, methodologically 
objectionable and dubious in its attempt to extract a theory of law with the a priori 
caveat that, whatever is obtained, must not contradict a previously elaborated theory 
of authority which is in no way axiomatic or even widely accepted, and whose best 
case scenario makes obligatory institutional decisions in a world devoid of 
generalized political obligation. It is a peculiar practice, to prioritize a justification 
thesis over the production of a theory of law that most accurately reflects, 
encapsulates, and explains the realities of everyday legal subjects, courts and 
legislators. In these conditions, our view on ELP’s protests is that they are not only 
tout court wrong  (and conducive to an improper understanding of law) but also, to 
some degree, disingenuous. As explained above, however, what matters here is not 
that ILP “win” against ELP, or be shown to be the superior branch of positivism and a 
better theory of law, but that ELP’s opinion that all arguments open to suggestions 
that the law is moral are poisonous to authoritativeness and identification is shown to 
be wrong.  
                                                        
295 J. Coleman, “Beyond Inclusive Legal Positivism”, Ratio Juris, Vol. 22, No.3, pp. 359-394, 2009, p. 
383.  
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“The law is moral”, in the indistinguishable legal theory sense, is then a 
proposition that implies an outright rejection of the thesis that holds morality and law 
to be two normative systems perfectly separable. Demonstrating law to be moral to 
legal theorists requires identifying connections of the kind positivism could not, or 
would not imagine to be present, thus challenging it on one of its main tenets. In 
doing this, three things should be kept in mind: (1) positivism’s tenet is that there are 
no necessary connections between laws and morality, not that there are no 
connections between the two; (2) in Hart’s work “necessary” changes meaning to 
“important”; 296  and (3) there is an important distinction between the denial of 
necessary connections between laws and morals, and the statement that law can be 
identified without recourse to morality, only the first being rejected here. All three are 
determinant. 
In “Positivism and the Inseparability of Laws and Morals” Leslie Green 
argues convincingly that the separability thesis is false by indicating a number of 
indelible derivative and non-derivative connections between the two having to do 
with the scope, purposes and objects of law. In that article he discovers seven bridges 
between the two spheres than cannot be torn down, anchoring the two systems to each 
other in such a way that the prospect of separation becomes illusory; these 
connections are neither non-necessary nor “unimportant”. Green’s list is exhaustive of 
the issue and, as I show, at least medially authoritative. 
Green’s list of connections consists of the following: 
 
 
                                                        
296  When he retreated a bit by saying that there are “no important connections between law and 
morality”. Hart, The Concept of Law, 2nd ed., p. 259.  
 
Na: necessarily, law and morality both contain norms. 
Nb: necessarily, the content of every moral norm could be the content of a legal       
norm. 
Nc: necessarily, no legal system has any of the personal vices. 
N1: necessarily, law regulates objects of morality 
N2: necessarily, law makes moral claims of its subjects. 
N3: necessarily, law is justice apt. 
N4: necessarily, law is morally risky. 
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Of the seven, the first three are weaker but still hard to imagine as absent or 
trivial. Morality is, after all, a system of supposedly persuasive and pre-emptive 
norms that the law routinely selects for incorporation, thus transforming their original 
pre-emptive character into peremptory one. Legality imbibes moral norms with 
efficiency, providing that additional strength required for them to regulate individual 
and collective human behaviours effectively.297 It may seem trivial – in the sense of 
obvious – but there is no moral system without norms and no legal system whose 
important parts do not consist of positivised norms. The only possible objection could 
be an accusation that Green takes positivism to reject the idea that many of law’s and 
morality’s prescriptions and instructions coincide, when all positivism denies is the 
suggestion that this is a blanket statement valid for all law, i.e. that it is necessary for 
a law to incorporate some element of morality/something morally valuable in order 
for it to be considered as such. So, while this holds as a general statement about the 
entire body of law, in particular instances it may not be true. The second of Green’s 
contentions is very clearly true, however. Although results may be morally risky or 
may wound in our more-or-less justified moral judgments, the fact remains that there 
is no legal system on Earth disallowing the practice of incorporation. The upshot is 
that legal systems that have done this  (all of them) are necessarily and blatantly 
systems in which the law is sometimes law because of considerations of morality: a 
moral norm that has made it into law has done so because of its moral worth, even if 
the translating act itself was governed by other, “drier” criteria of the rule of 
recognition; and thus whatever legal norm is born, its worth is still essentially moral, 
even if its effectiveness or coercive power or peremptory ability is owed to the law-
making act.298 The third, on the other hand, can be said, at best, to point out that legal 
systems are not prone to exhibiting the few moral failings it is possible for human 
beings and artificial systems of rules to share and, at worst, is theoretically 
uninteresting.  
                                                        
297 Green, “Positivism and the Inseparability of Law and Morals”, p. 1044.  
298 This is perhaps better captured by a sports metaphor. The reason why a newly recruited football 
player is now part of Team Great is his great skill at playing football. The signing of a contract and 
registering with the club and whatnot are just formalities that change his status from non-member to 
member. If you were to ask him, his coach or a fan why he is a member they would not invoke his 
contract but his skill at “….”. The same goes for moral norms that are positivised into law. 
Undoubtedly the process itself is important and undoubtedly criteria of legality matter; but the 
background reason, the answer to the question “why”, remains the moral worth.   
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With the fourth point Green’s list becomes much more compelling. It is 
undeniable that laws and morals both regulate the public. They do so not in parallel 
but in concert, with laws often compelling when moral norms only instructed and 
morality sometimes justifying when laws prima facie prohibited. Humans, therefore, 
as individuals, as members of groups and institutions, operate under two masters who 
do not compete against each other, but work in tandem.299 Necessity, in this case, is 
hard to deny. It is hard to imagine a place where the subjects of morality do not 
perfectly overlap with the objects of law. Within any randomly chosen jurisdiction, 
for Green’s claim not to be necessarily true it would need to be shown that a segment 
of a population, no matter how big or small, is a priori excluded from either respect 
for law or respect for morality. Given that law claims to be universal in its application 
over the members of a jurisdiction (it cannot say otherwise because then it would 
subvert its own claims to authority) necessity could be avoided only if some members 
were excused from morality – a logical and theoretical impossibility, as subjection to 
morality is a consequence of humanity itself. Thus, laws and morality necessarily 
govern over the same groups of people; and it is not at all unimportant that the bearers 
of legal duty and the bearers of moral duty coincide.  
Moving onwards, Green clarifies N2 as law instructing us what to do and how 
to act beyond telling us “merely what it would be advantageous to do”.300 In other 
words, laws and morals both prescribe and prohibit behaviours, not just to maximize 
utility and guarantee order, but to produce and advance the common good, in moral 
terms. In doing this, law claims to have legitimate authority. Both propositions ring 
true. One need not share in the opinion that the law is an expression of the general 
will to see that, at least declaratively, all legal systems aim beyond utility and order to 
public well-being. Laws strive to achieve more than the good (as in useful, efficient, 
ordered, peaceful, just). The law is also concerned with the good in the more profound 
moral sense: it does not only seek to organize and coordinate us but also to better us, 
as moral beings living with and amongst other moral beings. The law, therefore, not 
only actively seeks to keep us from being immoral, it also limits the scope of 
possibility we have to be amoral; law makes moral claims of its subjects and expects 
moral responses from them beyond what is necessary for the satisfaction of its more 
                                                        
299 Green, “Positivism and the Inseparability of Law and Morals”, p. 1048.  
300 Ibid., p. 1048. 
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obvious purposes. Furthermore, it does not have only legal pretentions, it has moral 
ones as well and needs morality in order to produce moral obligations. 
As for law’s pretentions to legitimacy, Green explains them as claims similar 
to those of Pope’s to apostolic succession from Saint Paul: it is not about veracity or 
about evidence but about the self-image they project.301 This is also very much true (a 
point of theory with which Raz would agree, as he held law’s authority – without 
political obligation – to consist of intelligible and believable but not necessarily true 
claims to it). No legal system thinks or presents itself as a codex of more or less 
important rules barked at citizens. Authorities pretend to have authority stemming 
from more than convention, the power of the stick, or complicated but ultimately 
prosaic rules of recognition; and those tasked with making and applying law and 
sanctioning trespasses against it engage in the pretence that law is obligatory in a 
justified sense, and that they are in possession of legitimate power corresponding to a 
right against the subjects of law.  
Green’s penultimate point illustrates an interesting connection between law 
and morality, although the relationship with necessity is more complicated. Laws are 
typically just in themselves and undeniably seek to produce justice. Green is 
concerned with the first, i.e. laws being “apt for inspection and appraisal in light of 
justice”. 302 He thinks this “necessary” connection to be significant because 
comparatively few human practices can be judged and deemed just, not because they 
fail at being so, but because they suffer no such appraisals. Green finds it significant 
that laws are – in themselves – the sort of things about which it can be said “they are 
just/they are unjust”.303 
Undoubtedly, the law is just beyond respecting Fuller’s criteria for the internal 
morality of law: more can be said about law following a moral appraisal than the fact 
that it excels in legality.304 Undoubtedly, parts of the law – the important parts, having 
to do with rights, liberties, freedoms, duties and burdens, etc. – are observably just; a 
                                                        
301 Ibid., p. 1049. 
302 Green, “Positivism and the Inseparability of Law and Morals”, p. 1050.  
303 Green agrees with my earlier observation that an unjust law that is still nevertheless issued in the 
proper manner and meets Fuller’s criteria is still very much a law: “It is therefore incorrect to say that it 
is law’s moral claims that open the door to morality in adjudication. It is not the claim to justice that 
makes some legal norms (and all judicial decisions) answerable to justice—it is the fact that they are, 
of their nature, justice-apt.” Ibid., p. 1052.  
304 Fuller’s criteria: general, publicly promulgated, prospective, clear and understandable, devoid of 
contradictions, constant, possible to abide by, administered in a way consistent with their meaning. See 
list in Raz, The Authority of Law, pp. 214-218.  
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special quality comparatively few human creations can exhibit that the law retains, 
even when its subjects are unjust, when it is used unjustly or even when it lies unused 
and forgotten. And, undoubtedly, just law has transcendental and transformative 
powers that go beyond ensuring effectiveness, fairness and order; law has the capacity 
to make its subjects righteous. An objector might counter-argue that this is but a half 
mouthed restatement of the natural law creed that only norms that pass a subjectively 
determined threshold of morality are law. This would not be correct, however. Green 
is not maintaining every law to be just; he is only asserting that all law is evaluable on 
this parameter and consequently discoverable on a scale that goes from just to unjust. 
He is, therefore, not excluding the possibility of a neutral or unjust norm.  
This is then a good point that actually serves to confirm law’s status of moral 
agent. An even better point to emphasize, however, would have been that all laws and 
legal systems claim to produce overall justice. No legal system holds or acts as if its 
norms were without moral consequences exceeding even-handedness, equality, 
stability, etc., or as if their only result were a basic maintaining of order; the purpose 
of courts is not limited to ensuring that all citizens follow the rules but extends further 
into moral rectification, vindication and advancement; the fairness with which 
legislators and adjudicators are preoccupied is not only about mathematically equal 
distributions of rights and burdens, but also about guaranteeing that the morally right 
is achieved; and so on. Not even the most atrocious regimes with the most warped 
conceptions of the just fail to claim justice in this sense. A legal system not declaring 
its role, purpose and function to be justice would not be a normative system – it would 
be a guidebook.305 The true significance of recognizing law’s ability to be just, neutral 
or immoral then is the realization that, in whichever context it is introduced, law does 
not sit like a lawn ornament: it morally charges it and changes it in a moral sense. A 
context into which law has been inserted occupies a discoverable place on the moral 
scale, one different from the one it occupied previously. Law, therefore, at least 
necessarily alter contexts in the direction of justice and justness.  
This brings us to Green’s last point, which contests the presumption that law 
will fix all defects and will bring about the “good” and efficiency. Green points out 
that, at the same time as the link between law and morality guarantees that legal 
systems will have “virtues, it also brings about the possibility of “vices” to which 
                                                        
305 Ibid., pp. 1053-1054.  
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subjects will inevitably be exposed.306  This is a fair point. Law’s effects are not 
discussed only in terms of efficient versus inefficient but also in terms of “goodness”.  
Those who deny the necessary connection between law and morals do the latter 
without considering the logical implication that what is capable of the good, or of 
bringing about the good, is also capable of bringing about the bad, understood as 
more than “inefficient”. This vindicates Green’s claim, even if only because it is 
inconsistent to award such credit to law and consider it a source of “goodness” but 
deny the possibility of it exhibiting shortcomings of a moral nature.    
At least five of Green’s identified connections pass the threshold from 
significant but unnecessary into necessary and important territory. Even if it were 
possible to imagine a legal system in which none of these connections are 
discoverable, they would still be true for our concrete legal universes, meaning that 
our real-world concept of law could not be fully formed or grasped without 
acknowledging them. The reverse would still work in Green’s and my favour, 
however: regardless of whether or not it could conclusively be shown that the 
connections he identifies do not actually apply to our legal systems, it would remain 
possible to imagine an efficient legal system in which they exist and law can still be 
identified without appeal to moral principles. This retains the theoretical possibility of 
moral law, of inseparability, of authoritativeness and well-performed epistemic 
functions while avoiding the more unpalatable aspects of natural law.  
Green’s list of significant connections may be conclusive but that is not to say 
that others cannot be added. I, however, believe only one other important connection 
escaped Green’s attention, namely the observable fact that law attempts to regulate 
human behaviours past the threshold of enforceability and prosecution. Law’s 
prescriptions concerning “acceptable” behaviours stretch further than what the law 
genuinely deems indispensable and is ready to actually implement or punish for 
transgressing. This could only be testament to an ethical preoccupation with our 
interactions, interactions that law wants conducted in morally appropriate ways. In 
this domain, law is not so much regulating as it is seeking to impose standards, 
morally charged ones, from which if we depart we commit a stricto senso infraction 
and a wrong, but not the kind of infraction/wrong law is bent on prohibiting and 
punishing, but rather the kind it wishes to avoid. These wrongs are legal wrongs only 
                                                        
306 Green, “Inseparability of Law and Morals”, p. 1054.  
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because of law’s ambitions and its Midas effect; at their core they are moral standards 
the law would have wished us to comply with because of its moral inclinations. A law 
that is not imbibed with morality beyond what rigid positivists deem true would not 
extend its letter and gaze to areas in which it neither wants nor expects full 
compliance and prosecution. Thus, necessarily, some legal wrongs are actual moral 
wrongs that exceed law’s area of enforceable, criminal interest but lie squarely in its 
perimeter of moral interests. 307 
 
Green’s article defends connections between law and morality in a way that 
both dismisses reductionist [radical] positivist claims and says something meaningful 
about the nature of law in the spirit of moral philosophy. To anyone who sees merit in 
any one or combination of his points (especially the last four), continuing to endorse 
the separability between laws and morality appears not only entirely non-conducive to 
an accurate understanding of what and how law is and is made and used, and of 
legality as a whole, but an instance of concept misformation. This has serious 
implications for the separability thesis. When taken maximally as a contention that the 
law has little to no moral content beyond what it is explicitly stated in its letter the 
thesis is likely false, as Coleman intuited. When taken minimally as a belief that it is 
theoretically possible to imagine a legal system with no recourse to morality, it 
remains true, but not descriptive of our concrete legal systems. 308  Even if the 
separability thesis were true about legal systems understood as systematized sums of 
legal rules, however, it need not, and would not, be true of the law itself. Green’s 
connections should at least illustrate that, even if codes of rules could consist of 
norms without important or necessary connections to morality, the law itself is in its 
spirit moral, in the same way that our atoms may be of dubitable moral charge but we 
are not, or institutions may just be bureaucratic constructions but states are regarded 
as moral personas. As such, in face of such evidence and intuitions, it should be hard 
to deny that the law is moral even in a legal perspective; law deprived of moral 
dimensions seems improperly or inefficiently understood. Most importantly, however, 
                                                        
307 Kent Greenwalt stresses a similar point that there are areas of droit in which law is satisfied only 
with “remedial satisfaction” because, while it theoretically imposes compliance, it is not interested in 
enforcing it or punishing those that do not comply. See K. Greenwalt, Conflicts of Law and Morality, 
Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1989, pp. 13-15.  
308 David Lyons provides an excellent analysis of the many ways in which the separability thesis can be 
interpreted in D. Lyons, Moral Aspects of Legal Theory, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 
1993, pp. 64-102.  
 194 
“the law is moral” proves not be a sentence that jeopardizes the concept of law, the 
ability to make it or the ability to apply it. In this legal philosophy perspective, it is a 
mere acknowledgement of the fact, on occasion, moral norms do, in fact, on their own 
and because of their moral merit, act as sources of law. 
The Road to Political Obligation 
 
 This discussion on moral philosophical vs. legal philosophical opinions vis-à-vis 
the relationship between normative system law and normative system morality allows 
for the drawing of some further conclusions about the law as a moral agent and laws 
as the pieces of its most concrete body. The correctly identified above-mentioned 
connections should underline the law as being moral as additionally due to its being 
imbued with morality from the moment of articulation, its important content 
consisting of positivised moral norms, its profound moral aims that go beyond mere 
utility, its making moral claims of its subject and its ability to charge/change any 
context in which it is introduced, its “justice-aptness” and its being subjectable to 
moral evaluations independently of its effects. As already emphasized, law’s status as 
a moral entity is not dependent or sourced in its consequences or behaviours; but the 
above-mentioned should reinforce convictions that it is appropriate to discuss the law 
in the terms that I do here. The law’s status as a moral entity is, I think, properly 
defended. 
  The law’s counting as a moral entity is, as already mentioned in the beginning, 
compatible with the observation that not all laws will derive from moral norms: 
obviously, sometimes a rule will be law because it satisfies criteria of legal validity 
other than the moral one; obviously, sometimes law will be law because it excels in 
legality without producing morally good effects; and, finally, sometimes it will be law 
for the same reasons even if its moral consequences are dubious. The corollary of “the 
law is moral” is not that the law is the positive sum of morally positive rules; the law 
can meet that description even if individual elements will not. Marshalled contentions 
about indelible connections between law and morality and about the morality of law 
are consistent with the view that rules that meet the criteria of validity and pedigree in 
the rule of recognition and Fuller’s morality in law standards, are laws, even if they 
are not positivised norms or even if they do not add morally to – or even harm – the 
space in which they are introduced. That the law is moral does not exclude the 
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possibility that one or more laws may be morally objectionable or inconsequential, the 
same way our own condition as moral agents is not belittled or jeopardized by the 
observation that our feet are morally irrelevant and our hands sometimes commit the 
immoral. In short, while our opinions definitively bar us from ELP, they do not 
commit us to natural law. And while our views are incompatible with the separability 
thesis, they are consistent with the idea that laws can be discovered without appeal to 
moral merit. 
   
  So far, we have explained what “the law is moral” means in a moral 
philosophy perspective that holds the law to be both distinguishable and 
indistinguishable from its parts, as well as in a legal philosophy one that does not. In 
this latter direction we have seen the opinion on separability between the two 
normative systems to be at least dubitable, while admitting that legal rules can count 
as law even if they are morally objectionable or irrelevant and made without reference 
to morality. Having done these, it is time to see how this helps in justifying the moral 
obligation to obey it. The first question to be asked is “can the law be owed moral 
requirements?”. The answer is obviously “yes”. Anything that demonstrates a moral 
nature is a moral agent, regardless of corporeality or the naturalness of its birth, with 
all the afferent rights, responsibilities and duties.309 Law, in spite of the artificiality of 
its history, is a moral entity and agent in the same sense and to the same degree as 
those designated by biology (humans) and traditions in dialectics (states). Ceteris 
paribus, what follows is an inescapable recognition of the law as a member of that 
group of agents that can theoretically, practically and conceptually impose and be 
subjected to moral requirements, up to and including the very heavy one of obedience, 
potentially. Denying this possibility would not only be incoherent but also morally 
wounding: it would exclude a moral entity from the possibility of a right on a weak 
basis most likely having to do with physicality. Law, in spite of the artificiality of its 
history, demonstrates sufficient moral essence, competence and ability to permit 
thinking of it as able to generate and be subjected to moral requirements.  
  The law can thus be owed moral requirements on the basis that it counts as a 
moral agent. Establishing the law as a moral agent, however, only takes us over that 
first hurdle of showing it to be the kind of thing to which obedience could 
                                                        
309 It is unintelligible to hold the law to have a moral nature and to accept the connections previously 
enumerated but to deny law’s status as a moral entity, 
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conceivably ever be owed. There is a huge gap between establishing this ability to 
impose, and establishing the content of the imposition to be obedience, exclusively. It 
is perfectly conceivable for law and citizens to entertain a relationship with one 
another in which the former imposes on the latter something other than obedience or 
something similar to obedience, but not of the same magnitude, such as a weaker duty 
of non-interference. Content has to be narrowed down, therefore. 
  A first step in this direction is discovering what law can be owed. Certainly, 
empirical observations of real-life and logic discount the law, as a moral entity, from 
being the object of certain types of duties. The absence of a physical body means that 
it cannot trigger any duty in us that would require action to preserve its somatic 
integrity (rescue, samaritanism, and the likes); and it means that while it can be 
harmed, it cannot be wounded or deprived in ways that threaten its survival, its 
mental, emotional or substantial health, thereby barring it from being on the receiving 
end of a duty of charity. Law is then an improper object of these duties. Logic, in its 
turn, makes law an awkward subject for others, such as gratitude, which may seem 
available but is not, as gratitude is owed by one specific individual to another specific 
individual/group for a favour, and law is not specific or partial in its function or 
effect. Finally, since law cannot be party to familiar relationships, collegial 
relationships, professional relationships, friendships or genuinely entertain the type of 
communal ties associativists had in mind, which require physicality, attachment, 
personhood and personality, law is excluded from being on the receiving end of 
corresponding applicable duties as well. These narrow the scope of possibility 
considerably. 
 Nevertheless, law could the object of a duty of respect or a duty of fidelity or of 
a duty of inexact (and irrelevant) designation that imposes taking into account its 
opinions, interests and, to the extent possible, well-being.310 What this duty is matters 
little; it’s content – and whether we can narrow it down to obedience, precisely – is 
what is key. The content of these types of duty we have already witnessed, in Chapter 
IV, not to be compliance uniquely or necessarily. As such, we appear to run into that 
crippling issue of imprecise content that ruined natural-duty accounts, who could not 
                                                        
310 This duty’s designation and source are irrelevant, not least because there is nothing to be gained by 
arguing obedience to be the predicate of a higher order duty. The duty could be from God Himself and 
content and particularity would still be a problem,  and therefore negate obligation. 
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isolate compliance as the exclusive content of the duty. Here, however, we could zero 
in on content, to the point that it becomes clear that it is, in fact, compliance.  
 If we stipulate legal propositions to be law’s opinions and its aims – from social 
order to overall justice and the common good – to be its interests, then respect, or 
good faith, or “X” takes the form of at least non-interference and sometimes going 
along with its demands (to an extent determined mostly at will according to the type 
and logic and interactions): in simpler terms, respect imposes that we do not interfere 
with law’s activities and, occasionally, even help them. This is not an unorthodox 
opinion to have about the way two moral entities should behave when their universes 
of preoccupations and behaviours collide – not getting in each other’s way and 
sometimes acquiescing to demands for the sake of one another’s well-being 
(understood broadly) are part of the common package of social responsibilities and 
considerations. So, minimally, this unspecified duty owed to law qua moral entity 
imposes not getting in its way and at times assisting it in pursuing its goals. To be 
perfectly clear, no political obligation flows or derives from this; it just serves to show 
that non-interference and acquiescence are contents of a duty we owe the law qua 
moral agent.  
 Another factor however intervenes as well and it is determinant in establishing 
content. Law is a single-track mind – it wants, demands and expects only compliance 
and, unlike other moral entities, it is not open to alternatives or variations and 
exchanges, and does not change opinions. An obvious question here is “why does this 
matter?”; after all, in regular scenarios, a pushy asker being pushy does not count as a 
source of entitlement. Yet here it does matter somewhat because, unlike this pushy 
counterpart, law is incapable of demanding something other or less than compliance – 
it is not that it is not amenable to displaying flexibility, it is that it cannot. Part of the 
reason why content is generally so difficult to narrow down is tied to the inability to 
exclude manifestations of respect/fair-play/rescue/good-faith/etc. other than 
compliance. But if you conceptualize law as a moral agent and observe the fact that it 
only wants one thing then you cannot non-interfere, acquiesce, or display the 
prerequisite amounts of concern for its opinions, interests and well-being by ignoring 
its unique requirement.  As such, if one accepts that (1) law, like all moral entities, is 
owed, that (2) law is owed non-interference with its opinions, interests and activities, 
and that (3) law is constitutionally and genetically intransigent and wants only 
compliance, then one has to accept that this duty does indeed foist some compliance. 
 198 
This line of argument does not establish any obligation and therefore would not have 
rescued earlier duties of respect/justice/fairness/etc. paradigms. There is an important 
difference between claiming that a duty of “X” owed to fellow citizens can only be 
satisfied if one complies with local law, and, observing law’s only demand to be 
compliance, and ceteris paribus concluding that, insofar as law is owed something 
(that is no obligation) that something is compliance, exclusively: one is a claim of 
dependence, the other a statement about a theoretical and practical requirement 
derived from the observation that this moral entity can ask and asks for one thing. 
Compliance for natural duty proponents was a questionable predicate, for us the only 
possible content of manifestations of consideration, non-interference and going along.  
Other avenues towards the satisfaction of those duties can be imagined; but one 
cannot be considerate of law or go along with its interests or demands when 
compliance is its singular demand and preoccupation. Compliance is therefore first 
something we very limitedly owe to law as a fellow moral agent. Call this step 1.  
 
 To sum up the statements made so far:  
 
1. Law is a moral entity and agent. 
2. Individuals owe law a moral requirement, moral agent to moral agent. 
3. This moral requirement cannot take some forms but it can present as a duty of 
respect or fidelity or “X”.  
4. No matter what we call this duty, it presupposes consideration for law’s 
opinions, interests, well-being and aims. 
5. Consideration takes the classic form of non-interference and some going 
along. 
6. But law can only want and demand compliance; it cannot want anything else. 
7. Hence we at least owe it the non-interference we owe all and some very 
limited compliance as one manifestation of consideration.  
 
 To be clear, this only underlines that the content of a duty we owe law qua 
moral agent is compliance. 311  No obligation whatsoever has been established 
however, and thus non-compliance would not be the wounding of a justifiable 
                                                        
311 Because of this I hold “positivisation” to also count as a statement about the nature of law, i.e. law- 
in the indistinguishable sense- consists most significantly of moral norms positivised into legal rules.  
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entitlement; as such, while a behaviour that registers on a scale that goes from 
compliance to non-compliance might be the only available response to law in all 
scenarios in which we intersect as moral entities, compliance itself is decisively not 
mandatory. To move forward from this we have to focus on the issue of the content of 
law established through the process of positivisation.  
 I have claimed earlier that the most significant content of law consists of 
positivised moral norms. Moral norms, as we know, are strictly oughts and not musts, 
demands rather than commands, directives for behaviours, not conclusive reasons for 
action. Still, in spite of their genetic inferiority to legal rules and obligation, they do 
have regulative functions and the power and leeway to make requirements of us. I 
hold these abilities not to be lost post-positivisation, since positivisation cannot be 
toxic to them.312 As such, if there were no interrogations as to whether or not we had 
to observe the moral prohibitions of murder, rape, stealing, profiting from the harm of 
others, etc. prior to positivisation, then doubts about some duty to comply with these 
norms once they translated into the rules of organic and regular law are not founded, 
with the obvious caveat that the qualitative step into peremptory nature has not been 
shown to have been made. The moral norms in law therefore retain their pre-emptive 
character, meaning that norm-sourced legal rules have at least as much power and 
claim over us as the moral norms they positivised. Of course, the legal prohibition on 
murder is truly obligatory only if law-abidance is shown to be a power-right against 
citizens. But even in the absence of political obligation people have to comply with it; 
part of the reason why is its direct flowing from a moral norm. In other words, though 
law’s command “you must not murder” has not yet been shown to be a prima facie 
obligation, insofar as it derives from a moral prescription, the legal proposition does 
have a claim – it is not a “must”, but it is as much as a “should” as the moral 
proposition; and, if you take into account my previous argument, it is a somewhat 
stronger “should”.   
 Some other things also need to be said, about the process of positivisation itself. 
Firstly, individuals that have the same moral code as law and citizens perform it, 
meaning that whatever results from it applies to the three parties involved in the 
relationship of political obligation (one law-one set of institutions- one set of citizens) 
specifically; this will later be relevant for C6particularity.  Secondly, its performers 
                                                        
312 The process is law-making as we know it.  
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have the authority of expertise, being in possession of perfect or near-to-perfect 
knowledge about the mechanisms of the process of positivisation and the criteria of 
legal validity, of the conditions of legal excellence, of the means to resolve problems 
of identification or adjudication, and so on. Thirdly, this process has higher 
metaphysical purposes than the plain issuing of legislation; all law making, always – 
at least declaratively – aims at the highest common good and the advancement of 
citizen interests. Finally, positivisation is a process characterized by integrity, 
manifesting as equal concern for all, impartiality, care and so on. These are all 
evidence that it adds to the moral context in which the law and citizens operate, with 
the law having the upper hand.  And notwithstanding the continued absence of 
obligation, they help see that positivisation is significant for obedience, even if it does 
not establish it. I hold positivisation to matter [towards obedience] not because of how 
it is performed or because of who performs it, but because of its significance for the 
relationship between the law and citizens. Aside of it allowing for pre-existing 
regulative power to be preserved in the process of transition from moral norm to legal 
rule, positivisation further adds to reasons for compliance without invoking balance of 
reasons type arguments. What I mean by this is that, beside being an implicit 
statement about the nature and content of law, positivisation should also count 
towards authority without political obligation (de facto, practical authority) at least as 
much as the normal justification thesis or any of the Kantian functionalist/structuralist 
arguments. Recall that the former held de facto authority to be justified (not in our 
political obligation sense) by citizens being better off if they acted according to the 
reasons in law rather than their own, while the others invoked good, democratic 
practices or preoccupations with justice to draw identical conclusions. In this 
direction, I hold that law and citizens share into the same moral code due to a process 
of positivisation that exhibits the above detailed features ought to be held to sustain de 
facto authority as well.  
 Law, in both senses, and its purported subjects are not only both moral but they 
are moral in the same way, a fact ensured by the “virtuous circle” resulting from 
citizen virtue having as one of its main sources institutional and legal design 
performed by institutions and law that, in their turn, were instilled with the same 
moral code as the one imbued in the society they regulate. This important 
commonality should count as an argument for obedience at least as much as “my 
institutions are majoritarian and justice producing” or “it’s better to comply than to 
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non-comply”: if de facto authority can be thought justifiable by arguments from 
inclusivity, justice, fairness then it should be held justifiable by arguments from a 
symbiotic moral relationship as well. Compliance –the kind supported by a thesis of 
authority- results from positivisation then; call this step 2.  
 The step forward to [compliance as the content of a right against] political 
obligation rests on the change that happened to the moral paysage once natural 
freedom was replaced with political subjection. Undoubtedly, in the absence of 
evidence of a permission to positivise granted at the original moment of subjection, 
the first occurrence of the process itself was illegitimate, its performers were 
illegitimate and thus unable to confer any supplementary layer of authority that would 
close the gap between what we have shown to be and genuine political obligation. 
When performing the typical mental regression associated with this sort of endeavour 
-to the moment that ended natural freedom and introduced the duty to obey- it 
becomes obvious that it does not coincide with the issuing of an express authorization 
from the future subjects of law to present and future positivisers to do so. It would be 
ahistorical to claim otherwise. This may seem like a punctus terminus for this 
account. It is not. It is just an awkward acknowledgement of an inability to account 
for the moment of legal inception. What is proposed instead is an argument about a 
gap between that moment T0 of unrestrained autonomy and freedom and moment T2, 
the moment moral agents became citizens and law came into play. During the interval 
of time T1, undoubtedly citizens were victims of unjustified oppression, akin to the 
recently subjugated Mexicans in Simmons’ Boundaries of Authority example. But 
when citizenry and law emerged (at T2) and become involved in new (as in both 
distinctive and novel) moral relationships (NMRs) political obligation followed.313  
 A first question is what moral and theoretical changes did subjection bring 
about. Firstly, moral agents were no longer just randomly brushing against each other 
but became linked - as citizens- in relationships [with each other and the law] that law 
organized in such ways that they all gained a set of rights and responsibilities 
(henceforth, in short, entitlements). Secondly, those new relationships added morally 
both to the wider moral context and to the moral dimension of participants, who 
become morally “more” than they were previous to subjection; individuals turned into 
                                                        
313 To be clear, I hold these NMRs to be law’s creations but I do not “blame” the law for them, in the 
sense that they weren’t law’s willfully and intentionally committed acts. These NMR’s were a 
consequence of imposition at T1.  
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citizens. Thirdly, law assumed a regulative role, acting as arbitrator in the NMRs, 
with a view towards ensuring that all could enjoy and exercise theirs. I hold the first 
and third points to be the reasons behind the moral requirement to obey the law. 
Simply put, I believe political obligation to be the consequence of law bestowing and 
regulating our new packages of duties and entitlements. Obedience is then both a 
horizontal and vertical requirement: we owe it to each other so that we may all enjoy 
our new entitlements and be protected against trespasses, and we owe it to law 
because the law is what confers and secures them. Political obligation is not, to be 
clear, a direct consequence of the NMRs established following subjection; and it is 
not a by-product - that we became trapped into them does not count as a font of 
obligation, and obedience can’t be argued to be the content of a duty to preserve these 
relationships, because there is no such qua human responsibility. The moral 
requirement to obey is sourced then exclusively in law’s intervention in the NMRs, to 
entrust with bundles of entitlements (to match the novel status of citizen), and protect 
them. These sets of entitlements are, in an important dimension, gifts from the law – 
after all, political rights and responsibilities are not natural, they exist only within the 
scope of state and legal codes- but in an even more important one they can and do 
exist only because of law’s effort of systematization, the term I use to describe its 
arranging of moral agents (individually and within institutions) so that all may enjoy 
their entitlements and be prevent from interfering with the entitlements of others. 
Entrusting and systematization are why we owe law political obligation. 
 This paragraph could raise misgivings that I tie obligation to implicit claims 
from something’s being good (in a moral sense) or profitable, in a construction that 
ignores CO2non-foundation-justice/quality and the observed fact that usefulness and 
balance of reasons arguments do not source a requirement to obey. I do not.  There is 
a distinction to be made here between what we owe those that foist things- good, 
profitable or otherwise- on us and what is owed to law as the moral agent that bestows 
and oversees entitlements in the NMRs.  We do not owe law obedience for creating 
those relationships, morally valuable and useful as they may be. I recognize the 
second point above as irrelevant to the existence of political obligation; that we are 
more morally as citizen members is just an empirical observation, not a purported 
source of duty.  My account exclusively ties obligation to the way law systematizes 
everything so that a) all will be awarded a set of rights and responsibilities, b) all will 
be allowed and able to maintain and exercise their entitlements and c) all will be 
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prevented from wounding others in their entitlements314. In other words, no one is 
owed political obligation because they transformed a group of random individuals 
into a citizen body, or because individuals gained an additional moral dimension in 
consequence to their having created NMRs. Political obligation is a right-against law 
has entirely because of its actions within the citizen group. Moreover, my claims 
should not be interpreted as an open or implicit contention that we are better off as 
members of those new moral relationships, that subjection is preferable to natural 
freedom or that obedience is profitable and utility enhancing. Obedience here is not 
thought to derive from the fact that we stand to benefit if we comply with law’s 
demands. It is just what is morally required so that all may preserve their entitlements 
and be protected, and what is owed to law as conferrer and regulator. No duty of state 
entry is covertly marshalled and it is not denied that life outside the state may be 
superior- in every aspect- to life as citizens, or that disobedience may at times be 
more conducive to profit. Benefiting is not held to be determinant to obedience.315  
 Insofar as I admit that T1 was an act of aggression and do not deny the 
possibility and existence of political obligation in spite of the objectionable birth of 
those NMRs, one may counterargue that my argument is an overly ambitious thesis of 
authority. It’s not. My argument does not miss the mark for justified political 
obligation because [piecemeal] obedience is not something law/authority is held to 
“earn” or “deserve” because of its inclusive, democratic practices on an “it is as it is 
logic”. And, in spite of inability to morally cleanse that moment of transition from T0 
to T2, obedience is not owed to law as a tolerated and tolerable Caesar that means 
well.  Submission, corresponding to political obligation, is what is owed to law 
because it acts as arbiter and because it bestows entitlements, entitlements that do not 
matter for political obligation, even if they arguably are determinant to our lives, how 
we interact, what expectations, aims, opinions we can have and hold.316 The law is 
then in possession of an authentic power-right, not of a weaker claim right resulting 
                                                        
314 I hold all our political entitlements to flow from the law inasmuch as they could not exist outside of 
law’s effort of systematization.    
315 This account is not akin to the principle of fairness justification because political entitlements are 
neither stricto senso goods nor obviously good in the sense of beneficial. And they are not the results 
of cooperation between individuals who neither make them possible nor can eliminate them (at most 
they can prevent others from exercising them but never from holding them).   
316 Though, to be clear, the fact that those entitlements matter is not directly or indirectly determinant to 
political obligation. They may be necessary for “acceptable social and political lives, pace Klosko, but 
their being potentially important and necessary is irrelevant to duty: we owe because law gave and 
regulated, not because law gave us meaningful things.  
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from its “worthy” structure or functions. We do not owe law not because it properly 
manages (supposedly) good things imposed on us from above. 
 I say “imposed from above” because a third worry one may have is that I allow 
law to foist and then legitimize its demands on the basis that it performs its 
coordinating functions proficiently. Again, I do not. To begin with, imposing 
(authority, subjection, new moral relationships) is not really an act of the law. A better 
view on political history would be one that acknowledges law-makers as those 
imposing citizenship and law on us, without permission, at T1. That forced the law to 
draw us into two separate layers of relationships, the first layer, one-on-one, moral 
agent to moral agent, the second layer, as regulator and conferrer of new entitlements 
pertaining to the separate connections it established between citizens. Less 
convolutely, a consequence of imposition was that moral relationships doubled: if 
prior there were only qua human interactions and owing, afterwards people 
interacted/owed both qua moral agents and qua citizens, and not just with/to each 
other, but with/to the new moral agent “the law” as well, consequently owed both in 
its capacity of fellow moral agent, and as a holder of a right-against. All of this 
however is what law had to do following an original act of aggression that is not its 
fault.  
 Secondly, as mentioned, we do not owe law because it created NMRs between 
individuals; we owe it for the way it created and awarded entitlements, and then used 
its tool to safeguard them within those new moral relationship. When I reference 
law’s regulatory role then I am not concerned with the mundane, practical aspects of 
order keeping, but with the way law organizes everyone- and its individual parts, 
laws- so that it be possible for rights and responsibilities to exist and be protected. I 
reject then counterclaims that obligation is mistakenly identified as flowing from 
efficient management because management- no matter how competent or 
incompetent- is not what is determinant to obligation. Political obligation is not held 
to be a privilege earned in the wake of well performed coordinating functions, but a 
consequence of law’s conscious systematizing of participants [in moral-political 
relationships], itself, and legal rules in a way that allows and facilitates the oft-
invoked entitlements to exist, be put in practice, be kept safe. The difference between 
what I hold the law to do here and law’s orthodox coordinating role is then the 
difference between sweeping a marbled floor and playing chess.  Individual laws may 
be tools of day-by-day management; but the law itself is not a mere administrator. It 
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is the visible hand that arranges the pieces in a logic of rights and obligations it 
establishes and regulates. 
 A penultimate issue one may have is a possible question of content [of purported 
obligation]. It would be thought a charge both unwarranted and weak. On this account 
what we owe law is definitely obedience because owing here is not a question of 
appropriate repayments, and what they may be, or a question of content of duty, and 
what it may be, but what is morally and practically required so that law may keep 
everyone in place and therefore able to have, enjoy and exercise their entitlements. 
Within the perimeter designated by the newly established moral relationships law 
creates a structure of roles, rights and responsibilities that rests on a foundation of 
compliance. Obedience is then what makes entitlements possible, what gives them 
concrete meaning and significance and what maintains the status quo. Without 
compliance the structure would be levelled, as every aspect of it is contingent on 
compliance; and I am not referring to a practical contingency (we don’t obey the law, 
our entitlements are jeopardized until the finally become purely theoretical) but to a 
congenital one: these entitlements were designed around the idea that citizens would 
and must obey, and therefore they cannot exist if they do not obey. Thus, compliance 
is not at the core, it is the core, in its absence political rights and responsibilities being 
unintelligible at best, and non-existent, at worst.   
 Finally, concerns that my distinction between the law/laws may have negative 
implications for my finding of legitimate political authority (in the sense that a duty to 
obey the law may not translate as a moral requirement to abide by laws) ought to be 
addressed too. These misgivings are equally unwarranted. Firstly, legitimate political 
authority is understood as [de jure] political authority correlative to political 
obligation defined as a moral requirement to obey the law. Having argued throughout 
for submission to the law linguistic standards alone deny hesitations. Secondly, 
differentiating between the law as a moral entity and agent, and the law as a sum of 
legal rules was my way of underlying that more can be said about law, in a moral 
sense, than what we normally do when claiming it to be moral. That discrimination 
however is neither absolute nor necessary. I recognized the law as, in one perspective, 
indistinguishable from laws- therefore all conclusions about the law apply to laws as 
well. But something else intervenes here as well- our ordinary way of 
thinking/speaking about moral entities.  We do not reach conclusions about them and 
then deny they apply to their individual parts as well: we do not award people moral 
 206 
charge but deny it to their limbs (medical ethics best defends this); we do not deem 
The Queen legitimate sovereign but deny this has consequences for her physical body 
or awards it special abilities; and we do not hold Hobbes’ contract to justify 
subjection to the Sovereign but not submission to laws. Thirdly, if somehow the 
legitimacy of laws were distinguishable from the legitimacy of the law, the 
authoritativeness condition of political obligation would come into play and resolve 
all issues: political obligations entails having to do what the law demands because the 
law demands it, meaning that the law could be argued to request compliance with 
each of its individual directives; then political obligation would be a property of the 
law while obedience towards particular laws would be justified on the condition 
invoked.  These three counterclaims are however rendered useless by the theoretical 
fact that the thought on political obligation does not allow distinguishing between the 
moral obligativity of law, and the obligativity of laws taken individually, or between 
legitimate political authority and the obligativity of law/laws. De jure, fully legitimate 
political authority is authority in possession of political obligation and political 
obligation means that all the commands of the corresponding authority must be 
obeyed. Thus, a vindicated moral requirement to obey sanctions submission towards 
all law, be it taken together or as a sum of legal rules.  
 
  
We have seen thus that we owe law compliance on three separate levels: fist, 
very limitedly, as a manifestation of consideration for a fellow moral agent; secondly, 
piecemeal, as the attitude towards an authority with a claim to submission backed by 
positivisation functioning as a thesis of authority; and thirdly, as the content of 
political obligation. Now it is time to see if this account of the moral requirement to 
obey meets the standards set in the methodology.  
 
Political Obligation or Natural Duty? 
 
The repeated usage of moral terms, the initial discussion on the types of duty 
the law can be owed as a moral entity, the general moral framework within which this 
account is developed, the apparent “big statement” about the nature of law, and 
instinctive concerns that an account that rests on an argument from bestowed political 
 207 
rights and entitlements we recognize as belonging to everyone will struggle earnestly 
with meeting the particularity requirement might encourage assumptions that this is a 
typical natural duty construction. On the contrary, I hold this justification to be a plain 
non-voluntary account of political obligation.  
That this account is non-voluntary and why it is so is manifest – no claims to 
anything resembling a willingly, deliberately performed action have been made 
whatsoever. It should also be clear that this account makes no reference to any natural 
duty whose satisfaction requires obedience: in this account, compliance with the 
demands of law is not held to be the exclusive avenue towards the fulfilment of a duty 
towards those institutions held to apply. We do not obey because we seek to fulfil 
some qua human duty, or because the law delivers something valuable in 
commendable fashion and therefore triggers a specific response in us.317 Finally, as 
far as “big statements” go, the claim that law is moral in nature is neither bold nor 
objectionable, counterintuitive, or unendorsed by evidence and, most importantly, is 
not held to be the direct source of political obligation. So our opinion in the nature of 
law does not include us in the natural duty category any more than our non-
voluntarism does.  
What this account of account of political obligation may however appear to 
share with natural duties is a struggle with the particularity requirement that is 
uncharacteristic of political obligation justifications. Why particularity was never a 
problem for classic justifications of political obligation is no mystery: consent was 
supposedly given to the set of institutions X in clear, intentional and deliberate form, 
benefits were derived from cooperation with citizen group X, thus ensuring that both 
rights and burdens were owed to/owned by very specific groups of people: 
membership from birth could only be in one particular group X, gratitude was owed 
to state X, and so on. The ability rapidly and easily to show particularity, however, is 
not symptomatic of natural duty justifications, but the unfortunate consequence of 
inching further and further away from either clear voluntarism, or from more 
straightforward claims about special group relationships. It may seem that efforts to 
prove some generality automatically commit us to sacrificing a lot of particularity. 
Our recent experiences with modern, more fluid, accounts of obedience have 
nevertheless shown that particularity is not something that can be forfeited. As we 
                                                        
317 The possibility of supra-determination has to be taken into account, in the sense that we must 
acknowledge that an action may have more than one set of moral reasons endorsing it.  
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understood from the case of natural duty accounts, the consequences of sacrifice are 
fatal. Recall that the two main criticisms marshalled against those accounts were, 
firstly, the uniform inability to show that states have genuine authority over their 
citizens and borders (beyond that which something like the normal justification thesis 
can account for) and are not just victimizing some set of individuals by holding them 
captive and denying them authentic possibilities of escape and alternative supply, and, 
secondly, that all their attempts to restrict applications to certain subsets of people by 
appealing to arguments from birth, proximity and efficiency failed because they 
awarded unjustifiable amounts of significance to random facts of birth, ignored 
historical wrongs or entertained tenuous relationships with reality, be it present or 
past. Particularity demands solid proof if theoretical possibility is to be narrowed 
down to concrete, individualised application, and it would seem that an account that 
argues for obedience on the basis of political entitlements that are universally held- in 
the sense that everyone has then-may appear to struggle with the fact of jurisdictions.  
And that is not the only issue. I’ve also argued the law, in the indistinguishable sense, 
to consist significantly of positivised moral norms in consequence to positivisation. 
As I do not hold the process to be determinant to political obligation per se, this does 
not threaten my account. But insofar as I do consider positivisation to be akin to a 
thesis of authority, and, more importantly, in itself a statement about [the content] of 
moral law, some further discussion regarding the issue of precise districting/inclusion 
is needed. Specifically, we need to see claims of positivisation not to affect the ability 





The issue of particularity is then two-fold. Stricto senso as criterion for 
political obligation, C6 particularity is not, in spite of appearances, much of an issue, 
three things guaranteeing it here.  The first guarantee is the fact that trapping under 
new moral relationship is done with great precision. Law groups together specific 
individuals covering specific territories and ties them into networks of relationships 
with itself and with each other; law, the moral entity and agent, thus keeps itself and 
its particular partners within its own borders. Secondly, particularity is also assured (I 
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would say sufficiently) by law’s own perimeter of activities and demands: although 
law, as a moral entity, may in this capacity interact with all other moral entities, and 
although the morality in its parts may exceed jurisdictions, political obligation is a 
claim and entitlement only against those it chooses to engage in the NMRs, and 
selects for bestowing with political rights and responsibilities. And in that – as well as 
in regulating them – law is very exact. Law’s spheres of action and interest therefore 
protect particularity too. Finally, particularity is secured by law’s effort of 
systematization. I argued that the law organizes moral agents, individually and as 
members of institutions, in ways that guarantee and protect entitlements; clearly in 
doing so it engages specific individuals, who thus come to entertain a morally correct 
special relationship with each other, as members of law’s organizational structure, as 
reciprocal enablers of their entitlements, and as duty bearers.  
None of these raise concerns about the possibility of moral wounds resulting 
from exclusions because a) everyone is engaged by their own law b) this argument 
does not hold law’s actions to constitute or lead to some benefit or greater good from 
which outsiders could then be argue to be removed and c) particularity is not resolved 
with an argument from birth, proximity or efficiency, all of which are irrelevant to the 
special relationship. C6particularity as a criterion of political obligation meets. 
Ceteris paribus, the content of law, and whether or not it appeals to all those held to 
be obligated, becomes a non-issue: independently of content, opinions and moral 
beliefs, selected citizens must comply because law selected them for relationships, 
entitlements and systematization.  
The only remaining issue then is one of correct districting-inclusion arising 
out of the possibility that insiders looking out/outsiders looking in and recognizing 
law that also - or better - reflects their own moral beliefs may be morally harmed 
when told to “stay in their lane” and obey only applicable law. Packed in these lines 
are three separate problems: a) an already resolved one with insiders, who have to 
obey their law, exclusively, because of the reasons mentioned above when defending 
C6particularity, b) a general issue arising out of orthodox opinions that moral 
principles are universal in scope and therefore render positivised moral law 
irreconcilable with morally correct restrictions in applications and c) a theoretical 
concern that content in moral law that appeals to outsiders may impose compliance on 
them as well. The second one is an obstacle only for positivisation functioning as a 
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thesis of authority, the third seemingly for political obligation also but in reality for 
neither. 
 
Positivisation can district whatever compliance it manages to impose as a 
thesis of authority on an argument from “local moralities”, an idea that is compatible 
with both universalist and relativist perspectives on morality. There is no space here 
for more than a perfunctory treatment of either. However, the goal here is not to 
espouse their merits or isolate their faults, but to show that both allow for sufficient 
specificity for precise, correct districting/inclusion to be possible. 
Moral relativism is an opinion that “one’s moral culture is the touchstone of 
moral truth and falsity when it comes to questions of right and wrong”, that “moral 
truth or justification is relative to a culture of society”.318 It rejects the beliefs that 
there is such a thing as a “single, true morality” shared by all, or that there are moral 
norms universally held to be valid and regulating; instead, it defends districted moral 
codes belonging to each and every culture.319 Moral relativism is also heavily reliant 
on the issue of conflict – it presupposes there are deep and permanent clashes between 
the different moral norms that permeate societies –320 and focuses on the hitches of 
moral judgment, which relativists seek to resolve by demonstrating that moral 
evaluations are neither absolutely truthful nor absolutely false, neither correct nor 
wrong, but contingent on “the traditions, convictions or practices of a group of 
persons”.321 All in all, moral relativism presents as a claim to “irrevocable variations” 
in moral standards and statements, a rejection of moral verdicts with pretences of 
universal validity and an invitation to acknowledge that our way of speaking and 
thinking about morality is not necessarily shared by those brought up outside of our 
own cultural sphere.322 Conflict, context and contingency are thus les paroles du jour 
when it comes to moral relativisms.323 
                                                        
318  M. Timmons, Moral Theory, Rowman and Littlefield, Plymouth, 2010, p. 42; C. Gowans, “Moral 
Relativism”, Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 2015,p. 1 (printed version).  
319 Timmons, Moral Theory, p. 43. 
320  Ibid., p. 47. 
321 Gowans, “Moral Relativism”, p.3. 
322  K. Quintelier, D. De Smet, D. Fessler, “The Moral Universalism-Relativism debate”, Klesis- Revue 
Philosophique, No. 27, 2013, pp. 211-262, p. 216. 
323 Moral relativism is particularly popular among communitarians and defenders of group rights. 
Communitarians, for example, have expressed their convictions that “standards of justice” are context-
related and heavily determined by societal norms and ways. People such as Taylor (1985), Walzer 
(1983, 1987, 1994), Benhabib (1992), etc. have all agreed that moral judgments extrapolated from the 
frameworks in which they were made may be unintelligible and meaningless, given that they were 
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Moral relativism, such as it is, appears to be the easy way out of any problems 
of particularity brought about by positivisation. If there are no universal moral norms 
and morality is something neatly circumscribed within the spaces occupied by each 
and every culture then it follows, ceteris paribus, that the particularity requirement is 
not jeopardized because law shares into the same moral nature as the locals and 
positivises whatever moral norms are accepted and employed in situ. It is – at least on 
surface – as neat a justification for particularity as consent or benefaction once were: 
if morality is compartmented then the law that embodies and uses it is as well, and so 
is its application. Restriction thus becomes a non-issue. 
 Naturally, on the practical side, the situation is not as clear-cut: cultures do not 
always perfectly overlap with jurisdictions, two or more cultures can exist in the same 
space and globalization has had a heavy hand in pushing towards homogenization. 
And though the latter could be brushed aside with arguments that globalization has 
left enough/sufficient particularity for this justification to be true, dealing with the 
first issues is not as easy. The fact that national borders do not always reflect cultural 
ones is a fact of the modern world, especially in places where state lines are not 
“natural” consequences of historical progression. And while problems arising from 
the cohabitation of two or more cultures in a single space could probably be resolved 
by arguments that particularity is met as long as law positivises what moral norms 
they have in common (or on the basis of majority moral opinion) and awards special 
consideration and protection to minority cultures and their moral convictions, the 
issue of spill-over is harder to deal with. 
 But not impossible. One could maintain that spill-overs can be accounted for by 
the type of arguments we have made above, i.e. majority opinion plus minority 
protection. Or, one could argue that even though birth and ancestry confirm some 
people as belonging to a culture X, growth, development and the typical brainwashing 
associated to prolonged existence amidst group Y, are bound to create enough 
integration to confirm them as members of its culture, moral attachments and all, and 
therefore bound to the adopting culture’s moral laws. Or one very committed to moral 
                                                                                                                                                              
determinately influenced by the contexts themselves. They have also criticized Rawls and liberalism’s  
“atomistic tendencies”. Instead, communitarians seek to defend valuable forms of community. In 
similar fashion, advocates of group rights, use moral relativism to promote tolerance towards minority 
ethnic, religious or cultural groups who struggle against larger cultures threatening their ways of life, 
traditions, values and so on. In those scenarios moral relativism acts as both a shield against trends of 
cultural homogenization dictated by majorities.  
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relativism could argue that non-integrated spill-overs and minority cultures are not 
affected obedience wise by law’s practice of positivising norms, which is entirely 
inconsequential, given the accompanying argument for political obligation. Keeping 
in mind that these sorts of situations will be the exception rather than the rule in the 
actual world, moral relativism still serves us well: for an overwhelming majority of 
typical cases, this perspective on morality will ensure districting; for the others, 
solutions are possible. Moral relativism thus presents as a wise commitment 
conducive to particularized compliance with de facto authority.  
Moral relativism may not, however, be a commitment that people are willing to 
make. 324  It presents with some unpalatable drawbacks, such as robbing us of 
permission to perform moral evaluations or forcing us, in the name of respect for 
diversity, to ignore atrocities and other major transgressions against other human 
beings.325 As Levy pointed out, if we accept moral relativism’s premises then there is 
no authorization and no method to discover if some sets of moral standards are 
objectively better than others and we are left without “principled means” to evaluate 
and condemn outrageous events in history.326. Additionally, it is not at all obvious that 
moral relativism can protect the worse-off, the very groups it purported to champion, 
a point upon which feminist political theorists have insisted. 327 An obvious problem 
with moral relativism is that it forces us to protect not only inoffensive minority 
groups but also those that “traditionally” hurt vulnerable sub-sets of people. Moral 
universalism, pushy and homogenizing as it is, shields the “victims” of history in a 
way that moral relativism cannot replicate.328 Finally, moral relativism appears to be 
less than favourable to moral discussion and moral progress, given its lack of 
explanatory power, of justificatory power, and its refusal to make a thrust for moral 
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improvement.329  
Moral universalism therefore, with all its many faults – including its practice of 
uniformization, its judgmental and evaluative stance, its commitment to treating 
humans as isolated individuals removed from context and relationships, its shaky 
tolerance of group behaviours it judges faulty, its tendency to split the world into the 
“right us” and “wrong them” is arguably the superior position, even if only for the 
fact that it offers more protection for the worse-off, that it permits and facilitates 
moral judgments that in turn allow us to spot and condemn great evil anywhere, that it 
encourages moral progress and dialogue.  
As mentioned before, however, at first glance, moral universalism does not 
seem to help with issues of correct and precise districting/inclusion; in a world of 
universal moral principles, how do you narrow down obedience?  The answer is that 
this is done by recognizing the fact that moral universalism is not poisonous to 
particularity and particularities, or the other way around, by acknowledging that a 
belief that (some) moral standards are recognized globally and considered to apply 
everywhere does not necessarily mean there cannot be something uniquely moral to 
each society. Much as was the case with “separation/separability”, “universalism” 
gives the impression that it rejects even the suggestion there may be something 
particularized about societies morally speaking. This is not so. Important moral 
universalists have accepted that the theory suffers particularities.330. Of them, Martha 
Nussbaum is most useful to us. She has taken to defend the idea that there can be 
moral differences, moral evaluations and tolerance even within a morally universalist 
context. In her view, particularities, “context sensitivities”, do not necessarily commit 
us to moral relativism. Like moral relativists, she accepts that our beliefs, traditions, 
structures, experiences shape our particularized decisions, our world views, our 
universes in all of their aspects but, in a universalist vein, she holds that “world 
interpretations” are comparable331 and believes in “cross cultural communication” on 
                                                        
329  Levy and Timmons both argue this about moral relativism. 
330  Levy and Rachels, for example, both agree that that moral values and beliefs are routinely shared 
and that the incidence of moral disagreement is exaggerated. See Levy, Moral Relativism: A Short 
Introduction, p. 50 and Rachels, “The Challenge of Cultural Relativism” , p. 59. And, on the other side 
of the coin, communitarians/relativists have admitted to the existence of a “minimal and universal 
moral code”. See M. Walzer, Interpretation and Social Criticism, Harvard University Press, Harvard, 
1987, p. 24. 
331 M. Nussbaum, “Non Relative Virtues: An Aristotelian Approach”, M. Nussbaum, A. Sen, The 
Quality of Life, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1993, p. 261 (pdf.). In simpler terms, Nussbaum 
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matters of moral importance that allows us to recognize some of the experiences of 
others as similar to our own, to understand them, “to be moved by them”332, to debate 
them and finally accept them as “ubiquitous facts of contemporary life” indicative of 
the fact that whatever discrepancies, differences, conflicts are present, a background 
of commonality exists. Thus, Nussbaum, discovers a set of moral norms that are 
universal in application and hold alongside different corresponding beliefs/behaviours 
that are particular to the society that generates them.  
Her opinion is the golden mean. On the one hand, it recognizes the immediate 
obviousness that moral discourse is not identical, that non-identical behaviours can 
and are attached to the same conception of the “right” or of the valuable. It also 
acknowledges, however, that there are moral principles, standards and rules that all 
humans everywhere consider right and binding, that comparisons – even those 
generating negative results – are not always impossible or an instance of liberal 
Jacobinism. The merit of her opinion, therefore, is that she manages to reconcile these 
apparent inconsistencies into something easy to digest: context sensitive universalism, 
a novel fashioning of the same old school into something that allows for the existence 
of universal moral rules but at the same time is more openly acknowledging of the 
fact that beliefs, behaviours, conceptions of right and wrong are culturally shaped in 
very important ways. This is then the position we adopt as our own.  Either 
conception of morality therefore allows positivisation to observe particularity and 
practice correct districting/inclusion.  
The third problem is a concern that neither relativist nor universalist views on 
morality preclude the possibility that contextualized moral opinions and requirements 
may impose not only on those addressed by positivisation but on all outsiders that 
share the beliefs, discover the truth or otherwise accept the content of prescriptions as 
their own moral attitudes. Insofar as positivisation counts here not only as a thesis of 
authority but also as a statement about the content of law in the indistinguishable 
sense, this could be thought to affect my argument for political obligation as well. 
It is a false obstacle for political obligation. The account does not hold 
compliance in any way contingent on the content of moral law, or on adherence to the 
moral code in law; it remains faithful to the directive not to allow the letter of law to 
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be determinant to the requirement to obey. This makes non-problematic the fact that 
normative system law will contain propositions based on principles that are all-
encompassing in hold, and other regarding in ways that exceed legal borders. Take 
justice, for example, an integral part of whichever set of moral beliefs and legal code 
one chooses to inspect. All humans are held to have some duty of justice – or 
something that mimics our generic concept of it –qua humans, independently of 
jurisdictional affiliation. When considerations of justice arise therefore most people 
will experience a “tug” and will, in fact, owe something (it does not pay to speculate 
what) in its direction to fellow citizens, to outsiders or to both. What they will not 
owe to either, because of these considerations of justice, is compliance as political 
obligation however. To be clear, they will have to abide by laws aiming at, instilling 
or actuating justice but the mandatory nature of those legal proposition will be rooted 
in the fact that they are rules imposed by law in possession of a right against, not in 
their being conducive to the realization of justice, or their producing morally pleasing 
effects. This is key: justice might make demands of people that embrace the principle 
and people may need to abide by them qua humans charged with some duty of justice. 
But those demands remain firmly in the land of “oughts”. As always, moral principles 
cannot and do not create political obligations - not even when they have been selected 
for positivisation into legal rules. Justice, therefore, remains part of the goals the law 
tries to achieve through its package of rules; it never moves forward to becoming the 
source of a right to submission (a fact best seen in the previous chapter). The same 
goes for all other principles. In these conditions, even if the community of believers 
exceeded state borders, if indexed moral principles aimed to impose duty on all those 
that embrace them, or even if the community wanted to push its moral code further 
than state lines, political obligation, would still be particularized.  The content of 
moral law is therefore not an obstacle. 
When it comes to positivisation as a thesis of authority however things are not 
as clear-cut. Positivisation does marshal compliance simple as resulting from the 
content of moral law, though not in the sense of “I have to comply because I adhere to 
the moral principles I discover in law” but in the sense “the practice of incorporations 
has led to me and law to sharing a moral code”. Still, given my previous contentions 
that there are sufficient moral peculiarities about each culture to guarantee 
particularity, I believe the thesis can restrict application; insiders will be linked 
through commonality, outsider excluded rightfully on the idea that their own law will 
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also include those moral principles they recognized elsewhere, and more of what and 
how they believe than any other foreign legal system. The health of the thesis of 
authority does not matter though. What is important is that the practice of 
positivisation not negatively impact obedience on political obligation and I believe 
this discussion shows that it does not.  
 
 
As a final theoretical point, claims from moral codes shared between 
law/institutions and citizen bodies would not solve the particularity problem for 
natural duty constructions, primarily because, for them, what law is and how it 
interacts with citizens, is irrelevant. They do not approach law or citizens as special in 
a relevant sense, they do not see the law-citizen relationships as such, and therefore 
do not seek to vindicate this “specialness” it. So, for them, a justification that 
incorporates my claim would read along the lines “people have a natural duty of 
justice predicated on them complying with the law of their institutions that positivise 
their own moral set of beliefs”. It may not be obviously offensive but, broken down, it 
is unintelligible – either you see law/institutions as special in a relevant sense (here a 
consequence of citizens and law sharing moral beliefs), in which case appeals to 
overarching, universal, natural justice become awkward, or you do not, and they are 
mere tools employed towards the satisfaction of a purpose, in which case 
positivisation speaks of a practice that could be claimed efficient- insofar as laws 
positivising justice are obviously conducive to its realization-  but particularity 
remains unresolved, since arguments from the scope of effectiveness are 
inconsequential to it.  Moreover, one cannot hold people to be under an universal, 
natural duty, and then claim restrictions in applications are justified by law’s 
positivising that duty and leave it at that because all law, everywhere does that 
meaning you still have no morally correct answers for exclusion and precise 
districting. Claims of particularity would be a little more credible if it were argued 
that the concept of justice positivised into law looks a little different in each culture 
(and application consequently claimed to be limited by that) but that opens one to 
counterarguments that a) those that have to make due with a lesser conception of 
justice are incorrectly excluded, b) the idea of a “natural duty” loses some of its 
significance, as that duty looks a bit different everywhere and, above all, c) you make 
the issue of content even worse, as it becomes harder to claim that the realization of 
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all understandings of justice, everywhere, are exclusively contingent on one unique 
manifestation- compliance.  
Limits of Positivisation: Disobedience, Prima Facie 
Character 
 
Insofar I marshal a conception of law, in the indistinguishable sense, as 
consisting most significantly of positivised moral norms, my construction could be 
seen as challenging CO7not-too-much-duty:  if the moral principles that apply to us (as 
individuals), are held to apply to us, and apply to our moral group are positivised into 
law, there is a danger that law may come to overstep- by which I mean that law may 
come to make demands that go beyond what is necessary for it to be able to perform 
its functions and secure our duties and entitlements.  This opinion on law could thus 
expose citizens,  [most of all those belonging to protected classes] to a series of risks. 
Three quickly reveal themselves: a) the legal results of positivisation may come to 
trespass against freedom, autonomy and the general pursuit of happiness; b) the 
argument does not account for moral variety and moral dissent; c) the argument 
assumes law will keep up with changes in moral perspective and vice-versa when that 
may not always be the case. In order to meet these concerns head on, some limits will 
need to be placed on positivisation so as to ensure that law does not offend and 
wound, especially those who depart, to any significant degree, from popular, 
majoritarian morality.  
Clearly boundaries of positivisation are already in place. Constitutions 
enumerating the rights, liberties, freedoms and possessions of citizens, and setting the 
principles according to which all political acts, including legislating, must be 
performed act as a first limit, ensuring that whatever ensues from positivisation not 
only safeguards but also does not in any way harm the rights and duties of citizens. 
The charter of human rights, as well as international conventions, other forms of 
supranational law, international courts, etc. are additional safeguards, further 
reinforcing the fact that positivisation must be mindful and protective of the awards 
persons receive in virtue of their own humanity. In addition, other, lower ranking, 
packages of law, carry some of the same burden. But they [altogether] may not be 
enough, or quick acting enough, or accessible enough, or authoritative enough to 
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prevent all deviations. The obvious concern here is that positivisers may be tempted 
to [or actually] make into law moral norms of dubious or debatable worth or level of 
endorsement (for example those concerning the roles, behaviours or duties of women, 
those rejecting homosexuality as “wrong”, those restricting the notion of family to the 
traditional one man-one woman-x number of children formula and so on). In this 
perspective, this understanding of law and the accompanying account of political 
obligation could appear problematic at best and toxic at worst to the demands, 
concerns and well-being of “traditionally” endangered groups, if not downright 
justificatory of illiberal practices. This is not so, however. To begin with, we need to 
remember that there is a hierarchy of moral principles, with the highest order ones 
making it into law as the basic principles of equality, autonomy, freedom(s), pursuit 
of happiness, and so on. These considerably outrank and out-worth any dubious moral 
standard, meaning that any conflicts will be resolved in their favour. Those higher 
order principles (moral but also legal) should ensure that positivising questionable 
standards is impossible, as it would either produce lower-ranking rules that would 
conflict with the superseding principles in organic law, bringing about legal woes, or 
degenerate in the utter dissonance that would be involved in embracing the right 
standards while at the same time restricting or outright denying rights to certain 
categories of citizens. Additionally, those higher-order legal, moral and constitutional 
principles have corrective prerogatives as well, meaning that in places where 
situations as those described above arise they compel legislators to eliminate those 
parts of law that wound them. In other words, the hierarchy of principles in the moral 
domain reflects in positivised law, with superior ones retaining their regulative 
functions.  
Of course, as always, the gap between “should” and “does” can be significant, 
but that is the fault of practice, not the fault of theory: the theoretical space and the 
instruments for control and corrections exist. In addition, as moral relativism 
instructs, we should also be mindful of the fact that while our own standards and 
beliefs may push us into kneejerk assignations of fault and blame and evaluations of 
correctitude, given the notable degree of context dependency of morality, and the fact 
that commonly shared virtues may inspire and sanction radically different behaviours, 
legal norms that fail our moral inspections need not necessarily fail the inspection of 
those that produced them, or are subjected to them.  
As far as the second issue is concerned, it is far more problematic to theory than 
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to reality. In practice, the number of people who will depart so significantly from the 
moral code reflected in their legal system that obedience would destroy reflective 
equilibrium is probably infinitesimal; the “brainwashing” effect of living in that 
society amongst community members accepting of that code, being raised by parents 
that abide by it and being constantly told – by the state, school, institutions, church, 
etc. that the code is “right” and correct” – is bound to keep it low, possibly as low as 
the number of people who would deny consent, or refuse to cooperate with a view 
towards benefaction, or disengage from situations of urgency. That being said, the 
few that could theoretically considerably disagree are not excused from obedience by 
the fact that the moral norms in legal rules do not hold for them, personally. 
Disagreement on moral issues does not have an obvious negative impact on 
applicability, especially when the interests and well-being of others are at stake. Here, 
the claim that the morality in law is the morality in heart is one step on the ladder 
towards obedience as the content of political obligation, but while we could agree that 
those that depart significantly may not “climb” on this particular rung, obedience is 
not at all jeopardized: moral principle retains regulative capacity in spite of opposition 
and, above all, law still retains political obligation. Hence reasonable disobedience is 
the only disobedience these individuals have access to.  
Finally, regarding the third expressed worry, it is true that there are cases in 
which parts of the law do not reflect the moral principles embraced by society. The 
two most likely reasons for this are either law’s failure to keep up with moral progress 
or moral change, or law-makers rushing into legislating on the basis of moral 
principles or convictions they have somehow misidentified as embraced by the 
majority of citizens. In liberal regimes, public discussion and public opinion are given 
substantial consideration so legislators are more attuned to citizen will and thus 
swifter to fix incongruities or mistakes; and with democracies ostensibly preoccupied 
with both individual and collective well-being and awarding equal consideration, all-
out legislative mistakes are likely to have, on-average, more minor adverse effects. It 
should also be recalled, however, that, of all moral entities, law is the most stable, 
rooted and unvarying; attributes that have the advantage of making it an open and 
known quantity but also the disadvantage of making it conservative – it cannot exhibit 
great mutability when its aim is to avoid triggering moral objections from the 
majority, if claims to permanency are to be believable and the epistemological 
function is to be satisfied. Thus, provided that fundamental human or constitutional 
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rights and freedoms are not violated with pervasive, long-lasting, seriously damaging 
effects, in which cases disobedience would be justified, some allowance for 
discrepancy has to exist. But we must not lose sight of the fact that law has “parents”, 
who shoulder the blame for any wounds law may cause citizens. Consequently, in 
situations such as those described above, disobedience is not the immediately, 
justified answer. Intermediate steps need to be taken, with the first and most important 
being citizen voters castigating and pressuring legislators into positivising according 
to their wishes and making sure than their desired legislative changes are inserted into 
public debate. Of course, non-liberal societies will not have – or have less of – these 
tools at their disposal. To the dissatisfied of those regimes we can extend the rights of 
reasonable disobedience and a helping hand provided that we feel compelled by 
Rawls’s second requirement of the natural duty of justice.  
All in all, we have sufficient evidence in favour of thinking that neither my 
conception of law nor my account of political obligation cause more concern for the 
well-being and positive freedom of individuals than others. Between the self-
regulating character of law, the hierarchy of principles and the corresponding 
hierarchy in law, the control elements and safety valves guaranteed by constitutions 
and legislative processes, and the democratic practices in place, there are no serious 
reasons to believe that they wound individual freedoms and autonomy more than 
other conceptions or justifications permit law to do.  
 
This issue of too much duty obviously ties into the corollary concern that the 
account may come to deny access to reasonable disobedience, and, therefore, ceteris 
paribus ascribe to political obligation more than prima facie character. Compliance is, 
after all, seen here first as something owed to law- in a limited sense- as a 
manifestation of consideration for its opinions, interests and well-being, then, in 
another limited sense, because of positivisation’s functioning as a thesis of authority 
and, eventually, as a morally justified entitlement corresponding to a right against. 
Taken together with the fact that we’ve also stated that the other’s enjoyment of their 
own entitlements and duties is possible if we comply, disobedience may seem to be 
excluded from the realm of possibilities.   
This is not so. The account allows as much access to reasonable disobedience as 
consent or principle of fairness paradigms: citizens have to obey up to the point when 
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superior moral considerations interfere and sanction alternative courses of action, or 
when law fails to perform its functions and begins to wound.  Disobedience is thus 
permissible in exceptional circumstances (classic scenarios of stealing cars to save 
wounded people, etc.), when law no longer secures rights and responsibilities, when it 
acts contrary to the entitlements it provided, or when it wounds qua human rights.   
Available disobedience and the limits placed on positivisation ensure then that 
political obligation remains the prima facie duty of people not burdened with 
excessive or excessively demanding law. And neither positivisation and law’s 
trapping into NMRs, nor the way political obligation is justified make compliance 
more than first sight mandatory. Moral principles retain their regulative powers, and 
hierarchical rapports remain in the same at all times, meaning that a) lesser principles 
and laws based on them will not be allowed to conflict or threaten higher order ones, 
b) if they do happen to conflict higher principles and the corresponding peremptory 
rules will “win” and c) the relationship between the duty to obey and the duties 
attached to supererogatory requirements also stays identical – one of subordination. 
All in all, things are in homeostasis, this account allowing political obligation to 
continue inhabiting its habitual space: it can claim itself strong and permanent, even 
if, de facto, there will be occasions when duty will be invalidated by circumstances. 
  In this direction, the only difference ensuing from my claim that the law is 
moral and a moral agent is that disobedience becomes more of a “harm” than under 
earlier paradigms of political obligation. Recall that disobedience not sanctioned by 
exceptional circumstances was ordinarily though to be morally objectionable, 
impermissible, and harmful, in the double sense of “unfair” and “jeopardizing”.333 
Although I think Simmons to have made a valid point that the consequences of low-
key, individual acts of disobedience are unlikely to be as detrimental as political 
theory contends, I still adhere to the classic outlook on disobedience as causing injury. 
My account makes the validity of that statement more obvious than previously. All 
disobedience produces harm, even in the most seemingly innocuous circumstances in 
which it appears, because in all scenarios in which our behaviours intersect with the 
domain of law and we ignore its demands, a potential victim is identified. That victim 
can be another member of the citizen body who, at the very least, is cheated in some 
sense, the larger group of citizens, or, importantly, the law itself, both as the holder of 
                                                        
333 Of others and their benefaction, or their well-being, or their interests and opinions, etc. 
 222 
the right to demand obedience and as a moral agent that entertains a relationship with 
us. In all instances when disobedience occurs, therefore the disobeyer behaves 
inappropriately towards another moral agent, minimally the law wounded in its right 
against. This has no consequences, practical or theoretical, for the amount of 
permitted disobedience, but in does show that disobedience, unless excused, is never a 
victimless, sans damage crime - someone always gets short-changed. 
 
 
So far we have seen this account meet several of the requirements of a good 
account of political obligation: it proposes a single ground of obligation for a 
requirement to obey; it secures particularity, that great obstacle that neutralised almost 
all non-voluntary justifications, by arguing from a form of moral universalism that 
embraces localism and recognizes that shared universal values are consistent with 
typical behaviours, and the fact that law makes moral claims and traps into new 
relationships very specific people; it secures generality by establishing obedience as 
the general case for citizens; and it creates a space for reasonable disobedience that 
conserves political obligation’s prima facie status as it recognizes normal hierarchical 
relationships between moral principles and between obligations and duties. Only two 
more issues need addressing. 
 
The Authoritativeness and Epistemic Problems 
 
This leaves us with two further issues to discuss regarding the level of success 
of this account as a justification of political obligation: whether it contributes 
something to the discussion on the territorial rights of states and whether or not its 
exclusive reliance on arguments from the morality of law and in law detracts in any 
way from the ability to identify and apply the very law that need be obeyed.  
These are two problems inherited separately from Simmons and Raz. 
Concerning the first question, this account manages to state something successfully 
about the territorial rights of states and “boundaries of authority” almost as much any 
other successful voluntary or non-voluntary account of the moral requirement to obey 
could: something definitive about the latter, less about the former. Barring exercises 
in ideal theory, the best a justification of political obligation can hope to accomplish is 
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to show that, generally speaking, the born citizens of a certain state are bound to obey 
its laws. It cannot legitimize any history of state formation, or rectify historical 
wrongs, or forever preclude any instance of territorial breaches; and it cannot morally 
sanitize history or even current political practice beyond proffering an explanation as 
to why, after the recognized random fact of “birth”, people have a duty to obey 
authorities. This account satisfies particularity and because of that it ties citizens to 
their applicable (in a morally justified sense) institutions without causing moral 
wounds.  
The second issue – the epistemic problem – is more complicated and forces us 
to go back to the debate between ILP and ELP about the inclusion of moral principles 
into the criteria of legal validity. As we recall, the former are convinced it is healthy, 
theoretically accurate and inoffensive to the opinion that law and morality are 
separable to allow this insertion, while the others, spearheaded by Raz, are of the firm 
persuasion that any such decision would decimate a legal system’s claims to issuing 
authoritative demands (C5), as the NJT would be invalidated and the identification of 
law would come to depend on the same reasons “authoritative directives” had to pre-
empt.334  
The way ELP voices its concerns reveals that its qualms in respect to the 
incorporation thesis consists of two issues which are separable to all but those who 
ascribe to the NJT: a problem of legitimate authority and a problem of identification. 
The first must not be confused with an interrogation of the supposed duty to obey in 
our sense – it is only an expressed doubt that the opinion that laws are sometimes 
laws on the basis of moral worth exclusively is not poisonous to laws’ ability to meet 
the authoritativeness condition (people doing what the law commands because it is 
the law that commands it). The second, as the name suggests, is a concern that the 
inclusion of moral standards into the criteria of legal validity will prevent citizens and 
adjudicators from discerning applicable law. These two issues preoccupy us insofar as 
there are dangers than an account that relies on the moral nature of law may be a) 
interpreted as making obedience somehow predicated on processes of moral 
evaluation, or b) may hinder abilities to identify applicable rules.  
Having said this, the discussion on these two objections can be conducted on 
two separate levels: the level of political theory and the level of legal theory, which 
                                                        
334  Brian Burge Hendrix, Epistemic Uncertainty and Legal Theory, Ashgate, Aldershot, 2008, p. 117. 
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requires further involvement in the debate between ILP and ELP.  
In first terms, concerning the second issue of identification, it is naïve to assume 
that any theory of law, as any theory of political obligation, will have any sort of 
impact on the practical behaviours towards the law of average legal subjects. At this 
very moment, whatever might be the reasons why citizens obey the law, they certainly 
have nothing to do with any positioning on the positivist scale or any conviction that 
one justification of obligation or another is correct. No concept of law and no 
explanations of authority will entertain a genuine relationship of causality with public 
behaviours towards the law; and we have no evidence that knowledge about law can 
be traced back to theory. As such, no opinion on the criteria of legal validity, on the 
moral nature of law, on the source of obligation will have an actual impact on 
identification and obedience. In these conditions the question is purely theoretical: 
should there be such an enlightened citizen – or confused alien – that he may want to 
be instructed by academia on how to go about his efforts of identifying law, is there 
any possibility that this account of the requirement to obey may cause him to 
improperly identify law? The answer is no. Ultimately, it all comes to sources: for the 
masses, law is whatever bears the rubber stamp of those entitled to make law. Outside 
of erudite preoccupations in the corners of theory, on any account of political 
obligation existing, and on any account possible, the answer to the epistemic problem 
for the overwhelming majority of obeying citizens is that law is whatever rule 
authorities deliver through the proper, known channels. How people come to know 
the law in real life situations is another discussion (one filled with speculations) but 
still operating with the certainty that the source of knowledge is not theory.335 Jules 
Coleman was perfectly aware of this when he wrote that “by contrast [to officials] 
ordinary folk need not necessarily take the internal point of view towards the valid 
law under the rule of recognition”, a complicated way of saying that the rule of 
recognition serves an epistemic function only for those tasked with law-making, 
                                                        
335 People like Hayek noticed this. He wrote that, as long as citizens behave according to the demands 
of rules, it is not necessary for them to be “consciously aware” of them (p.99-100). He was content 
with much more than imperfect knowledge of the law on the side of citizens, his only epistemic 
requirement being that “general practices” be capable of creating and sustaining expectations in 
litigation (mostly), i.e. that they establish precedents (p.86). Hayek, however, did not believe that when 
these expectations were spurred some great imbalance had occurred as well. He recognized both the 
possibility of the end of knowledge on law, and the corresponding need for consultation, and the 
possibility of the end of law tout court, and the ensuing need to create new legislation, including by 
appeals to morals, customs, etc. See F. Hayek, Law, Legislation and Liberty, Routledge, London, 1998.  
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litigation, adjudication, etc.336 Consequently, if principles are part of the criteria of 
moral validity, and obligation is rooted in the moral nature of law, whatever problems 
they may cause for identification will only affect those who genuinely make use of 
the rule of recognition, i.e. not the general mass of uncritical law abiders that is the 
subject of political obligation.  
Regarding the first issue of authoritativeness, in the terms of moral philosophy, 
we have clarified the statement “the law is moral” to be an assertion about the nature 
and essence of law, and its status as a moral agent, and we have attempted to derive 
obedience on the basis of this claim. However,  “the law is moral” was not used as a 
euphemism for “the content of law is acceptable and utility producing”, and 
obedience was not something argued for by invoking the superior practical an moral 
consequences that ensue; obedience here is not the better option but as a special 
relationship. Thus, on this account, the reasons for obedience are not replaced with 
dependent ones, and duty bearers are neither encouraged nor permitted to compare 
and contrast possibilities. C5 meets. 
From the perspective of legal theory, however, the issues are more complicated 
and require countering any actual or possible future suggestions that the argument 
from the moral nature of law, and the implicit allowance of moral principles into the 
criteria of legal validity, encourage evaluations that are incompatible with the 
automatic and un-deliberative process that is obedience, and with authority as a 
whole. We have already expressed an opinion about ELP as being ultimately self-
serving, a branch of positivism seemingly less concerned with delivering an appealing 
and realistic portrait of law than with theorizing its nature in a way that does not 
jeopardize their thesis of authority. Still, the problem needs to be addressed on ELP’s 
own terms as well. 
The first step in this direction is to see why exactly ELP is so adamantly against 
the incorporation thesis.337 Exclusive positivism is a radical position in its reading of 
Hart, in the firmness of its conviction that all law is source based, and in its 
interpretation of soft positivism’s inclusivist thesis that they regard as a far clearer and 
precise statement about the rule of recognition than either of its inclusivist proponents 
intended. To them, this permission given to moral principles occasionally to act as 
criteria of legal validity and dictate law is tantamount to an opinion that the rule of 
                                                        
336 Coleman, The Practice of Principle, p. 135. 
337 The goal is to see if they have any legitimate misgiving besides their desire to protect the NJT.  
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recognition is either a straightforward claim that “all law is at its moral best/ is 
morally best”, or something vocal about its own superb moral competence.338 It is not. 
Neither Hart’s original text, nor his postscript, nor any other major piece of writing on 
legal positivism since, inclusive or otherwise, has stated the rule of recognition. We 
know the rule of recognition to establish the criteria of legal validity, to provide valid 
tests for law and to direct in its identification, but it is not a singular text of definitive 
form. It is a convention, a constitutive one as Andrei Marmor calls it, that produces 
uniformity in thought, practice and behaviour without being a singular item of firm, 
exact nature; the rule of recognition is a sum of many things, not one precise 
statement.339 In other words, the rule of recognition is a list of generally but not 
definitively known things, whose content cannot be encapsulated in the kind of simple 
statement exclusive legal positivists believe their inclusive counterparts to make. Why 
this is in any way significant has to do with the fact that, depending on perspective, 
they are either overemphasizing ILP’s beliefs about the permission to incorporate 
moral principles into the rule of recognition and the consequences attached to it, or 
underemphasizing the complexity of the rule of recognition. It is far easier to argue 
against ILP as a position that precludes identification and non-vitiated claims to 
authority when you take them to mean that they consider the position on moral norms 
as criteria of legal validity to be the rule of recognition. If they actually held such an 
opinion ELP’s case would be stronger: should conformity to moral norms be the only 
– or supreme – condition of legal validity, identification and authority would be 
harder to satisfy, although not perhaps in the way or to the intensity exclusivists 
believe. If ILP genuinely held the rule of recognition to be a plain declaration that all 
law is morally optimal (phrase borrowed from Himma) then identification would be 
problematic, but not for regular citizens in an ordinary context, but in hard litigation 
and arbitration, especially for those on the deciding end.340 In this direction, ELP’s 
best argument against ILP’s thesis would be either that someday, somewhere some 
judge, lawmaker, legal authority, etc. will either not know how to navigate some 
impossibly difficult legal issue, and the rule of recognition will be of no help other 
                                                        
338 K. Einar Himma, “Bringing Hart and Raz to the Table: Coleman’s Compatibility Thesis”, Oxford 
Journal of Legal Studies, Vol. 21, No.4, 2001, pp. 609-627, 621-622. 
339 Andrei Marmor, “Exclusive Legal Positivism”, J. Coleman, K. Einar Himma, and S. Shapiro (ed.), 
The Oxford Handbook of Jurisprudence and Philosophy of Law, 2004. Also see A. Marmor, A. Sarch, 
“The Nature of Law”, Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.  
340 For which the rule of recognition and criteria of legal validity mean nothing and could mean nothing 
because whatever knowledge they have of the law comes from direct contact with legal rules.  
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than instructing to opt for moral bestness, or that the same individuals will decide one 
way or another in a case with the only argument supporting their decision being “I 
have considered the issue and found my solution to be morally best”.341  
The presumed problem on this ELP interpretation of ILP is twofold: there is the 
real possibility of the rule of recognition proving to be useless, and there is an issue of 
negated authority brought about by the need to engage in moral evaluations in order 
to apply or make law. The former speaks about a very valid concern that a rule of 
recognition that banks on moral bestness is akin to an instruction manual that reads 
“use wisely”; most will, but not because the guide instructed them to do so in an 
explicit, clear and authoritative way, but because of other reasons compounded with 
expertise, consultation, sheer luck or accident. Similarly, a rule of recognition that 
reads “law is what is morally best” will make the identification of law and its 
application everything ELP sought to avoid: difficult, requiring of evaluations, 
confused and confusing. The latter (negated authority), on the other hand, would be a 
direct consequence of all these. Whether there would be a need to consider morally in 
order to discover the rule of recognition and what it demands/justifies, or to consider 
morally in order to discover reasons to comply, or all three, this allowing of moral 
norms to function as criteria of legal validity would strip authoritative commands of 
both their authoritative and commanding nature, as they would lose their automatic, 
unthinking, quality, while simultaneously robbing the rule of recognition of its 
conventional nature (as conventionality and evaluations are incompatible). Put more 
simply, authority cannot be the legitimate claim of a legal system where the rule of 
recognition invites efforts to discover morally optimal solutions rather than providing 
specific instructions.  
Exclusive legal positivism’s aversion to the incorporation thesis is 
understandable when the problem is discussed in these terms. The crux of the issue 
obviously has to do with the rule of recognition. Yet that is a corner from which 
inclusive legal positivists can escape easily by rejecting Raz’s thesis and emphasizing 
that their permission to include is no more than a theoretical possibility. ELP’s 
sacrosanct theory of authority is a weaker justification for some beliefs states and 
legal systems have about themselves, and one that does not have the normative power 
                                                        
341  Himma insists on this being a problem. See Himma, “Bringing Hart and Raz to the Table: 
Coleman’s Compatibility Thesis”, pp. 619-621. 
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accounts of political obligation do;342 it is not about substantive facts or genuinely 
even substantive claims, but rather about the theoretical possibility of such claims 
backed by the NJT. Inclusive legal positivism is a problem for authority only for those 
that embrace Raz’s own account, which is not obvious, obviously superior or any way 
genetically, congenitally or indelibly tied to positivism. ELP debates ILP as if the 
latter accepted its premise of the NJT, which is neither true nor necessary, since 
accounts of authority can meet the authoritativeness condition without banking on it. 
Marry ILP with any other justification of obligation and the problem instantly 
narrows down to a question of whether or not the incorporation thesis hinders law’s 
ability to serve the epistemic function.  
But here as well a significant part of the problem stems from ELP’s myopic 
assumption that their inclusive counterparts place the incorporation thesis at the heart 
of the rule of recognition, or approach it as if the inclusion of moral norms into the 
criteria of legality is the essence of the rule. That is not so. Apart from those that 
regard inclusion as a necessity, the incorporation thesis is not held to be a “big 
statement” about the rule of recognition or some crucial feature. The thesis is an 
admission into which they were forced – justifiably so – by Dworkin’s comments in 
Law’s Empire, but it is an addendum, rather than a modification. As such, for ILP, it 
remains true that the rule of recognition is an unstated sum of many things that 
includes, among others, this one yielding that moral worth could be – not that is, not 
that it must be – a source of law, sometimes. It is an argument about a theoretical 
sufficiency restricted to some cases, not one that holds the incorporation thesis to be 
the sufficient content of the rule of recognition or a necessity. The rule of recognition 
for ILP is therefore not a simple claim that “all law is morally optimal/ law is 
whatever is morally best”. If for ELP: 
 
rule of recognition= ……+……..+……….+…….+………+…….. +…….. . 
Then for ILP: 
rule of recognition= ……+……..+……….+…….+………+…….. +…….. + 
sometimes, moral principles.  
 
Given this, even the issue of precluded identification, which, again, will not 
                                                        
342  Or, arguably, even of functionalist/structuralist explanations of authority without political 
obligations.  
 229 
affect average law abiders and run of the mill litigation and arbitration, is less of an 
issue for inclusive positivists. Stating that, occasionally, a law is a law because of its 
moral worth does not amount to saying that nothing but its superb moral credentials 
confirm its status of legal rule. In other words, independently of the reasons why a 
norm has become a legal law, there will always be more than one way to ascertain 
legal status. Other factors, minimally those having to do with pedigree, will interfere 
and confirm it. Coleman agrees. Although he does not mention what else could 
facilitate identification he points out in The Practice of Principle that the criteria of 
legal validity need not coincide with “the modes of identification”, that the content of 
the criteria have no obvious implications on identification, by which he means that no 
axiomatic statements can be made about the relationship between the two in the 
absence of empirical observations of legal practice.343 Thus, the only situations in 
which identification is likely to be a real issue are exceptional ones, when the 
adjudicator has exhausted all law and has to make new one.344 In those circumstances 
she might need to engage in moral consideration and appeal to moral norms in order 
to produce applicable, resolving legislation.  
ELP will of course object to this opinion and the idea of new law from moral 
principles, but only because it once again threatens their theory of authority. The 
protestation will more likely be along the lines of “a rule of recognition that does not 
instruct specifically what to do in those difficult cases is not an authoritative rule of 
recognition”. Yet arguably it is and it does – it instructs the legal experts facing the 
conundrum to apply their best, most educated, legal opinion in an effort to come up 
with morally unobjectionable (or minimally so) solutions, i.e. to improvise to the best 
of their ability. Exclusive positivists need, therefore, to be more openly 
acknowledging of the rule’s limitations, as naturally no convention can or should ever 
be expected or believed to truly exhaust and cover all possible scenarios. Uncertainty 
is not going to be eliminated. Connectedly, if it is recognized that law ends, and 
judicial discretion is accepted, the theoretical possibility of a space past existing law 
that is the legal equivalent of “here be monsters” territory is accepted as well. We 
have no reason to suspect that a rule of recognition that tolerates moral criteria of 
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344  This is not – or should not be – a proposition problematic for positivists, including exclusive ones, 
who accept judicial discretion and the contention that law ends (it would not be objectionable even to 
non-positivists like Dworkin who, even though rejecting judicial discretion and of the opinion that law 
never ends, accepted the fact that written legislation is sometimes insufficient and moral principles will 
needed to be accessed and argued from in order to discover new pieces of legislation). 
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validity will fare worse in those murky waters than ELP’s source-obsessed rule; and 
we have little reason to think that an inclusive rule of recognition will navigate that 
situation in a way that will deprive the legal system of any of its authority, in any 
conception, or of efficiency; and we have equally few reasons to think that ELP’s rule 
will fare better, moral principles being harder to exhaust than accepted sources. So, 
once again, we get at least partial confirmation that what is really objectionable about 
the incorporation thesis is its perceived negative effect on the justification of authority 
that Raz and supporters marshal.  
As a point of general practice, Raz appears convinced that the efficiency of a 
system of rules (if not its entire existence) is contingent on officials being able to 
explain their decisions with appeals to law, legal standards and social facts 
exclusively. Kramer, however, proposes a convincing alternative view on existence 
and efficiency as predicated on generality, regularity, systematization and an ability to 
persuade that obedience should be a non-evaluative process. 345  As for “officials”, if 
asked to explain their actions, members of the executive and legislative branch could 
provide an explanation that need not go beyond a defence in moral terms with which 
the enquiring subject is familiar. The same argument can be extended to members of 
the judiciary: while they are always required to motivate their decisions, in all but the 
most exceptionally difficult cases they will be able to do so without appeals to the 
moral principles and standards that so bothered Raz. In the comparatively small 
number of occasion that they will face uncertainty, an argument invoking the norms 
of critical morality will be adequate because judge, defendant and other parties 
involved will all speak its language. Exclusive positivism, therefore, appears as a 
theory of law conditioning legality and the authority of law on perfect certainty, 
perfect intelligibility, and perfect fact-based explanations when that it is not the level 
at which we do, can or must operate; sufficiency is the bar for both, and ILP clears it.  
As a final conclusion on this particular debate, ELP hammers in the opinions 
that inclusivity will indubitably lead to less authority, more uncertainty and more 
difficult adjudication. In practice, however, what we have is arguably less of their 
theoretical authority. I say, perhaps, because ELP’s argument that incorporationism 
leads to blanket confusions between dependent reasons and the reasons in law is not 
something they have vindicated. Coleman counterclaimed that it is theoretically 
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possible for a legal system to exist in which this does not happen, and it is not one so 
far removed from ours that it lies at the outer limits of extreme possibilities.346 What 
matters most, however, is that, if confusion is to arise, it will most likely be limited to 
exceptionally difficult legal conundrums, the kind in which the decider, having 
exhausted all knowledge and sources of law will have to exercise judicial discretion. 
It is a dubious practice to deny that a judge in that scenario appeals to moral 
principles. And while for her, reasons might coincide, as soon as the decision is made 
those affected or subjected will not be in the same situation: the decider might only be 
able to motivate her solution by invoking moral reasons and principles, but the 
reasons why the solution/law will have to be respected and obeyed are not the reasons 
why she reached it in first place, those former reasons having to do with the actual 
person of the judge, a legal authority and source of law, herself. We have no reasons 
not to think that the rule of recognition allows “the judge says so” to act as reason 
independent of all other considerations, meaning that a decision need not necessarily 
always be understandable (to its objects) or defendable by exclusive appeals to other 
legal principles in order to be authoritative. Legal systems award judges the power to 
create law. In such conditions, legal subjects’ reasons [to obey] will not coincide with 
legal authority’s reasons [to impose] and Coleman is vindicated. Between the fact that 
reasons will not necessarily coincide, and the probability that confusion will be 
restricted to extraordinary legal issues, it is conceivable that a universe in which 
incorporationism and the NJT are at least somewhat compatible is this one.  
 Conversely, we are dealing with equal amounts of uncertainty. ELP believes the 
incorporation thesis to promote uncertainty by creating multi-level confusion amongst 
players in legal systems who will not know what are the morally best legal options, or 
will not understand their legal verdicts because they are the results of moral 
considerations (as opposed to applications of the best fitted legal principle), or will 
find the rule of recognition “unconventional” and “unclear”. We have seen above that 
we do not believe this necessarily to be the case at all. On the other hand, we reject 
the whole premise of the counterargument; uncertainty is not the direct consequence 
of a rule or recognition that includes criteria of legal validity, it is an organic by-
product in any legal universe in which there is too much law, too little law, too 
unclear law or no law. Uncertainty is not from or about secondary rules, it is from or 
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about problematic – either in content or application – primary rules that secondary 
ones are expected to rectify. As such, when ELP discusses uncertainty what they 
really try to convey is that they believe that in an inclusive legal system there will be 
less “solution” to legal problems.  
 This brings us to the third point: there is no way to quantify solution in either 
type of legal system and compare them, especially not abstractedly. Chances are that 
for a significant interval – covering all legal instances where applying law is not an 
exercise of considerable difficulty – solution levels will be equal. Most likely, they 
will remain levelled all the way through the exhaustion of all possible sources of 
knowledge about the law, up to and including the most competent legal authority in 
the state. Uncertainty/ no solution will thus likely begin only at the end of law, at the 
outer limits of the usefulness of the rule of recognition. The case ELP would probably 
make here is that its more fixed, more focused on sources, rule will cover more of the 
space between T1criticallylowlevelusefulness and T0uncertainty (the idea being that 
its rule will provide more information, more guidance, more direction and thus 
survive doubts for a longer period of time). We have no reasons to believe them in 
this, however. ILP does not argue the rule in a way that reveals that they hold it to be 
somehow less fixed, less clear, less source-focused than the exclusive rule; all they do 
is an addition. ILP’s rule is therefore more, not less, and while what it has in addition 
could potentially be problematic past the point of certainty, it could also be a saving 
grace where their opponent’s rule has nothing left to offer. So, ironically, ELP’s case 
for their rule being more useful than the inclusive rule is actually more intuitively 
appealing upon considering day-to-day legislation and adjudication, when a [arguably 
but most likely falsely] more detailed rule providing more direction could fare better, 
than when considered in the perimeter of genuine uncertainty and no solution. Once 
the line is crossed into that territory, it actually stands to reason that a rule that 
includes an additional permission could still have some answers or solutions when the 
other has fallen silent. Thus, on taking account that 1) uncertainty is a systemic 
problem, not a symptom of a problematic rule, and that 2) the inclusive rule of 
recognition gives absolutely no evidence of being less exhaustive, less instructive or 
significantly less source-centric than the exclusive one, the only difference between 
the two being the inclusion of moral principles into the criteria of legal validity, 
something that could produce effects only in the exceptional circumstances at the end 
of law, and that 3) there is no method to empirically test which rule ends first or 
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confuses first or falls silent first, then ELP’s claim that ILP will bring about fewer 
solutions is an empty accusation. The entire situation is comparable to a gin-rummy 
game when one player has 15 cards and the other 14: in the absence of perfect 
knowledge of all cards and all available moves we can neither settle which of them is 
better off nor claim, with any measure of certainty, that the player in possession of 15 
cards is in the inferior position (the card could equally be a mismatched game buster 
or the joker).  
  
 Exclusive legal positivism thus demonstrates a readiness to be very 
theoretically unforgiving towards their inclusive counterparts, more often than not 
reading their claims in an extreme fashion. Motivated by what is clear bias resulting 
from their desire to protect their thesis of authority from anything they perceive as 
damaging, ELP places inordinately heavy burdens of proof on inclusivism and makes 
heavy accusations of negating authoritativeness, facilitating uncertainty and epistemic 
failure, precluding conventions and so on without decisive evidence.  ILP, however, 




In light of the discussion above there should be no doubt that claiming that “the 
law is moral” is decisively poisonous to [pretences of] authority is an unfounded 
accusation; law’s authoritativeness is preserved, since rule-making, recognition, 
application and, above all, obedience, are not predicated on processes of moral 
evaluation. In this account of political obligation, law-subjects obey the law because it 
is the law, not because of its legal or moral excellency, not because of the positive 
consequences of law-abidance, but because of its pedigree.  The account therefore 
meets the authoritativeness condition, and allows law to serve its epistemic functions. 
And we have already seen it to meet C6particularity, C3reasonable access to 
disobedience, and the C4prima facie requirement. None of the others are, in any 
conceivable way, an issue (including C7conformity, as none of my statements 
contradict practical realities or widely depart from ordinary philosophical opinions) 
and, above all, the justification proposes a clear source of normativity -that requires 
no supplementations of the kind that bring about doubts about the actual ground of 
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The aim of this project was to demonstrate the necessary failure of existing 
accounts of political obligation to vindicate the supposed moral requirement to obey 
the laws of the state, and to suggest, in response, a new justification drawing on a 
source of duty previously ignored. More specifically, two salient questions were 
asked in the introduction: (1) if justifications fail to achieve their purposes, do they do 
so exclusively because of individually exhibited faults, or are there systemic errors, 
internal to the justificatory strategies themselves, that unavoidably preclude all 
paradigms in that specific vein from success, and, (2) are we-theoreticians of political 
obligation- consequently at a point at which entirely novel avenues towards 
justification have to be considered. To obtain my answer, on the basis of methodology 
setting firm criteria and standards for this kind of endeavour, I evaluated with a view 
towards establishing if proposed grounds have sufficient normative power to sustain a 
moral requirement of the magnitude of political obligation.   
My evaluation followed the logical and chronological succession from 
voluntarism to non-voluntarism, from the straightforward vindications of the 
requirement in classic political obligation accounts to the newer arguments for it as 
the predicate of a natural duty. Transactional accounts were the first to be assessed. 
Setting aside express consent as the infamous perfect source of political obligation 
with no correspondence in the real world, I focused on various interpretations of tacit 
consent, and modern takes on the concept. I found than, in its most honestly Lockean 
reading, tacit consent entertained as weak a connection to the realities of everyday 
political life as its celebrated brother. Conversely, arguments about tacit consent as 
residence and voting did not struggle with the charge, but avoiding previous issues 
came at the price of accusations of not being authentically consensual, or amounting 
to consent to obligation at all: though more than one criticism could be formulated 
against the argument from residence, what really sank it was consent-or-leave’s 
inability to pass the bar of sufficient freedom for it to count as a genuinely free, 
morally permissible choice situation; as for the argument from voting, failure was the 
direct consequence of mistaking it for a source of duty, when voting is just one 
element of the package of privileges and responsibilities the state awards those under 
its jurisdiction on an assumption it is justifiably entitled to do so in relation with that 
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specific group. Finally, modern consent accounts, though theoretically interesting in 
their attempts to circumvent issues of materialization and concreteness by rendering 
assent hypothetical, proved to be faux consensual, and therefore trapped in a space 
between theses of authority without political obligation and unsuccessful natural duty 
explanations. The general conclusion was that classic consent is an impeccable but 
unrealistic source of political obligation that modern consent, deprived of its 
elementary features of knowledge and intentionality, could not replace: when 
removed from the domain of actuality, consent lost too much of its essence to be able 
to sustain a requirement to obey. A consensual grammatical move had not translated 
into sufficient consent. 
    Rawls’ principle of fairness ran into some of the same problems when trying 
to repair Hart’s original mistake of not setting down firm criteria for membership and 
restrictions in benefaction: though his proposed solution of “acceptance” was as 
competent, on paper, as consent, it was also as absent. As for Klosko, his effort to 
skirt these issues remains the best explanation of political obligation to date, but its 
inability to categorically establish obedience as the only form of fair reciprocation is a 
systemic fault impossible to repair unless returning to the logic of contract, and thus 
to the previous problem of undiscoverable will. Together with that accompanying 
issue of alternative supply, they allowed a finding that principle of fairness 
constructions did not and could not function as proper justifications.  
Non-voluntary associative accounts of political obligation were the subject of 
the third chapter. Associativism revealed itself to also be a paradigm plagued by 
systemic faults. Between its readiness to discover sufficient role-sourced justification 
in relational positions, its conviction that attachments generate obligations, its arguing 
that identity formation is predicated on citizenship to such degree that non-
performance would cause psychological trauma, and its readiness to view practices as 
fully normative independent, it exposed itself to devastating charges of confusion, 
parasitism, insufficiency and degeneration. Associativism assumed political 
obligation to be part and parcel of the role of citizen without considering whether or 
not this is evidence that acts of required submission are justified, or if compliance 
genuinely flows from the role itself, rather than from one of the higher order moral 
principle applicable to the diluted relationship between members of the body politics. 
These were and are its systemic faults, and they prevent associativism from justifying 
obedience as the compulsory correlative of a right against citizens and compatriots.  
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Chapter IV dealt with natural duty accounts. Though coping with non-
voluntarism better than associativism, their general opinion that political obligation is 
the one avenue towards the satisfaction of some duty brought about two 
insurmountable obstacles: a challenge from content and a challenge from precise 
inclusion, denying particularly. No account in this category managed to avoid or 
resolve them, since proponents could not come up with sufficiently correct moral 
reasons to permit excluding other predicates for the duty, and to restrict institutional 
application. Consequently, they could not produce exclusionary reasons as to “why 
obedience” and “why us”, thus maximally imposing a duty that was not clearly one to 
surrender, on a group of people not obviously demarcated by borders. Natural duties 
accounts therefore exhibit structural flaws that endorse my original hypothesis.  
At last, in chapter V I presented my own non-voluntary account of political 
obligation as a now necessary step forward that draws not on a feature of the state or 
of the citizen body, but on law itself, its nature and its acts. I argued political 
obligation to be a special relationship between us and the law, moral agent to moral 
agent, and a consequence of law bestowing us with moral rights and responsibilities, 
as citizen members of new moral relationship. I then defended this justification of the 
moral requirement to obey as allowing the concept to retain all its salient features, as 
meeting all the criteria set in the methodology, and as able to survive not only all the 
criticisms that crippled previous efforts, but also exclusive positivist opinions that 
assumptions that the law is moral in nature are incompatible with authoritativeness 
and well-performed epistemic functions and adjudication. 
In the wake of my examination, I find that both questions asked in the 
introduction are answered in the affirmative, and that my hypothesis holds: we are at 
the end of efforts to defend political obligation as we know them, a status quo brought 
about by evidence that all models of justifications are plagued by systemic issues, 
ensuing directly from one or more of their core claims or inner logics, for which there 
are and can be no rectifications; and, ceteris paribus, we require new paradigms that 
now, having excluded voluntarism and witnessed arguments from  special features of 
states, citizens or groups to be insufficient, ought to focus on the third element of the 
relationship of political obligation, the law, and argue in non-voluntarily fashion from 
one of its aspects. In summary I find we have conclusive reasons to declare existing 
justifications of political obligations disappointing and to start anew from the ground I 
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suggest, the proven only remaining option for those that want to persist in efforts to 
vindicate de jure authority in possession of a power right.   
Concerns about political obligation were and continue to be important. The 
fact that, independently of the absence of justification, citizens routinely comply with 
the legal demands of their institutions does not deprive the issue of moral and 
theoretical significance.  While obedience may be now considered, by and large, 
somewhat morally sanctioned by more modest theses of authority, and the concept of 
legitimacy is being stretched so as to at least partially cover de facto authorities, it 
remains true that the surrender states claim and believe in, and on the basis of which 
they operate is fictional, as are a vast majority of the opinions institutions and citizens 
have on the relationship that exists between them. States and their political agents 
consistently defend their actions by invoking supposed moral permissions they hold in 
virtue of being historically, legally, internationally recognized as legitimately 
authorities groups of people they settle with rights and obligations and who 
consequently comply. But, at a most basic level, this remains one of the world’s most 
enduring, most pervasive, most consequential instance of collective delusion. In 
comparison to the demands and deliveries of political obligation, the piecemeal acts 
of obedience Kantian authority accounts or Raz’s normal justification thesis can and 
do explain are small instantiations of truth in a broader picture of speculation. True 
authority and obligation, understood simply as our having to do what the law 
demands because it is the right of institutions to demand it, are absent from the moral 
universe, even though highly taxing and limiting in reality. This anomaly, on whose 
basis much of what we do and think politically rests, requires reparation though 
vindication, especially in the absence of exit options, permissions to manifest in ways 
other than compliance, and recognized alternative supply. 
My recommendation for future efforts in the field is to persist in the direction 
of political obligation but to do so judiciously, here defined primarily as approaching 
the issue in fashion conscious of the criteria and recommendations set in the 
methodology, and of the bar that must be cleared in order for a justification to count 
as an appropriate argument for political authority correlative to political obligation.  
And identifying other sources of normativity is equally imperative, as the grounds of 
obligation already recognized in the literature have been fully explored and have 
emphatically been revealed not to have sufficient force to sustain a duty to obey. 
Insisting on old paradigms is not going to yield better results, experience having made 
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it clear that what is taken out cannot properly be replaced, and what is added 
uniformly becomes problematic in more than one way.  Law and its aspects is 
therefore the route to go, at least until, at the end of due diligence, it can be 
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